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SUMMARY 
 
Major components of Australia’s public infrastructure assets are controlled and managed by 
local government, currently estimated to be worth more than $306 billion.  The presence of 
multiple external stakeholders with diverse needs and expectations concerning these 
infrastructure decisions is a key feature of infrastructure asset management by LGAs. Such 
stakeholders range from groups at the public level to groups at the higher-tier government 
level. In this study, four groups are identified at the former level, namely: ratepayers; users of 
infrastructure assets;, community special interest groups; and local media; three groups are 
identified at the latter level, namely: State government departments responsible for local 
government; State auditor-general’s office; and the federal authority ‘Infrastructure 
Australia’. LGAs normally have an elected leader, the Mayor, and an appointed leader, the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who will be ultimately accountable to these multiple 
stakeholders for the policies, plans, decisions and performance of their LGA’s infrastructure 
assets. Despite the important phenomenon of the influence of stakeholders on top 
management of LGAs when prioritising, implementing and being accountable for 
infrastructure projects, the prior research into this phenomenon is limited.  
 
The above background leads to the primary research question of the thesis:   In the context of 
local government, to what extent do Mayors and CEOs perceptions of the attributes and 
salience of various stakeholders influence the accountability for, and renewal backlog 
performance of, infrastructure assets? To answer this primary research question, five research 
sub-questions are formulated which are then developed into six testable hypotheses. Thus, the 
current study has sought to advance the modelling and testing of the application of 
stakeholder theory in the public sector through Mayors and CEOs of Australian LGAs. 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) version of stakeholder theory, referred to as stakeholder identification 
and salience theory is adopted. Its modelling has first addressed hypotheses and provided 
 19 
 
evidence of the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder attributes of power, 
legitimacy and urgency regarding their claims and needs concerning infrastructure assets and 
the relationship between these attributes and perceived salience of different stakeholder 
groups. Salience is deemed to reflect the priority given to different stakeholder groups in 
infrastructure decision-making. This study then proceeds to model and provide evidence on 
the relationships between salience of different stakeholder groups and the type of 
accountability emphasis given for infrastructure.  Accountability emphasis is dimensionalised 
into public, managerial and political categories of accountability. Finally, evidence is 
provided on the relationship between the salience of different stakeholder groups and the 
actual and perceived infrastructure performance in terms of its renewal backlog. In testing 
these relationships, the inherent managerial values held by the Mayor and CEO are also 
modelled, together with control variables on LGAs’ demographics.   
 
A mail survey has been carried out in 2011 among 420 LGAs across all jurisdictions in 
Australia and was the Mayor and the CEO. The overall response rate was 26.3%. Secondary 
data on the infrastructure renewal/ replacement backlog ratio was collected using on-line 
annual reports of LGAs for the 2011/12 financial year, only from the LGAs that responded to 
the survey questionnaire.   
 
The thesis provides several key findings. First, results reveal that there are more similarities 
than differences with regard to perceived attributes of different stakeholder groups.  Both rate 
‘public stakeholders’ more highly than ‘higher-tier government stakeholders’ in terms of their 
mean perceptions of stakeholder salience and cumulative attributes. Second, Mayors and 
CEOs view stakeholders in infrastructure decision-making as largely ‘expectant dependant’ 
(i.e., lacking power but having urgent legitimate claims) under Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
stakeholder typology. However, the results of the analysis change in the combined sample 
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where, perceived power of both the public and higher-tier government levels of stakeholders 
now significantly influences salience. Third, the results give support to the hypothesis that 
managerial values held by Mayors positively affect the extent of salience accorded to public 
stakeholders.  
 
Fourth results show the overall accountability for infrastructure is influenced by the extent of 
salience accorded to the demands of public stakeholders, but not by the extent of salience 
accorded to higher-tier government stakeholders. When looking at the three dimensions of 
accountability, it is found that both public and managerial types of accountability are 
significantly greater when public stakeholder salience is higher. In contrast, political 
accountability is significantly greater when the salience accorded to higher-tier government 
stakeholders is higher. Moreover, the results show an inverse significant relationship between 
‘position’ and accountability dimensions, indicating that the Mayor rates the LGA’s emphasis 
on accountability significantly higher than the CEO.  
 
Finally, the results reveal that neither the extent of salience given to stakeholders by Mayors 
and CEOs, nor the managerial values they hold, have a significant influence on the level of 
infrastructure renewal backlog. This non-significant result holds when infrastructure backlog 
is measured subjectively (using a rating scale from the questionnaire) and objectively (using 
published secondary data). Stakeholder theory has been unable to explain the aggregate 
infrastructure performance of LGAs as measured by their ‘renewal ratio’. 
 
The results of the study have important implications for governance and accountability in 
local government, and for the extension of stakeholder theory. An implication in each of these 
areas is highlighted. First, the result that there is considerable similarity between the 
perceptions of Mayors and CEOs regarding different stakeholders’ attributes and salience has 
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positive implications for the governance of LGAs in terms of achieving effective 
infrastructure joint decision-making, particularly in the prioritisation of infrastructure projects. 
Second, result that salience of higher-tier government stakeholders by Mayors and CEOs does 
not impact on public and managerial accountabilities, suggests that LGAs need to be 
incentivised to provide enhanced accountability for infrastructure assets to high-tier 
government departments and agencies. This could require higher-tier government 
stakeholders to more fully exercise their ‘power’ attribute by mandating more prescriptive 
infrastructure performance disclosures. Third, this study advances the construction and 
validation of measurement scales for various concepts embodied in Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
stakeholder identification and salience model. Prior stakeholder theory studies have mainly 
been normative and qualitative. Through the development and administration of a survey 
instrument, it adapts these measurement scales to the new context of managing infrastructure 
assets in local governments. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
“Australia’s future prosperity depends upon the quality of our infrastructure. Efficient infrastructure is essential 
to driving sustainable economic development and growth, lifting levels of productivity and boosting 
employment” (Sir Rod Eddington, 2008, p.3).  
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
The large body of knowledge about new public management (NPM) reforms has debated and 
investigated aspects of theory and practice aimed at improving public sector service delivery 
through increased operational efficiency and effectiveness and enhanced accountability. One 
distinct and sizable area of public sector service delivery in Australia is the development, 
maintenance and preservation of infrastructure assets provided by local government 
authorities (LGAs). Major components of Australia’s infrastructure assets are controlled and 
managed by local government. This is estimated to be worth more than $306 billion (ABS, 
2011 cat no. 5512). However, there exists an issue of infrastructure renewal backlog in the 
Australian local government context (Dollery et al. 2007a; Dollery et al. 2007b) due to 
escalating financial distress (Dollery & Mounter 2010) among LGAs. In particular, LGAs that 
experience operating cash flow deficits tend to defer expenditure on renewals or upgrades of 
existing infrastructure (PWC 2006). Such deferral of capital works expenditure produces the 
renewal backlog. Recent financial sustainability studies based on different jurisdictions have 
confirmed that significant numbers of LGAs are confronted with financial sustainability 
problems (PWC 2006). For instance, The South Australian Financial Sustainability Review 
Board (FSRB) asserts:  
 
“over the past ten years negative net outlays have accumulated into an infrastructure 
renewal/replacement backlog that is estimated to be in excess of $300 million” (2005, p. 9).  
 
Similarly, the Independent Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of New South Wales 
Local Government (2006, p.13) highlights: 
 
“ overall under-spending on infrastructure renewal has been of the order of $400-600 million 
per annum……. would cost over $6.3 billion to restore these assets to a satisfactory 
condition…… a further $14.6 billion is needed to replace existing assets over the next 15 
years”.  
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According to these findings, it is apparent that to develop, maintain, renew and replace 
infrastructure assets, LGAs need to undertake projects which require extensive budgets. These 
budgets are mainly funded directly or indirectly by various stakeholders such as different tiers 
of government, local community rate-payers and ‘user-pays infrastructure’ users. Such 
stakeholders will have an interest in, and expect accountability for, infrastructure asset-
decisions made by LGAs.  
 
The magnitude of the infrastructure renewal backlog problem was acknowledged by the 
Federal Government of Australia. On 18th September 2008, Prime Minister Rudd and Minister 
Albanese announced the establishment of the Australian Council of Local Government 
(ACLG) to forge a new cooperative engagement between the Federal and local government 
giving a voice to local government on matters of national significance. Also, the government 
established the Regional and Local Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) which 
commenced during the 2009/10 financial year. In its first round, $800 million was allocated to 
LGAs to build and improve community infrastructure and boost local economies while $220 
million and $100 million were distributed in the second and third rounds respectively. 
Further, the Local Government Reform Fund (LGRF) was introduced with the objective of 
improving and making nationally consistent, the asset and financial management capabilities 
of LGAs. Under Phase 1 of the Local Government Reform Fund, the Australian Government 
has agreed to fund training and management development projects to the value of $16.521 
million. Funding of further projects was approved in 2011 under Phase 2 of the LGRF.  
 
Returning to the matter of stakeholders, studies have identified multiple stakeholders in the 
local government context (e.g., Pilcher 2009). These stakeholders express needs, have 
expectations and make claims about infrastructure projects, plans and policies. LGAs’ 
infrastructure projects, plans and policies can expect to attract high concern and interest from 
public users including local residents and businesses. At another level they can expect to be 
scrutinized by higher-tier government funding and oversight ministries and agencies. That is, 
there are multiple stakeholders of an LGA’s infrastructure assets at both the high-tier 
government level and the public or local community level. These stakeholder groups will 
have explicit and implicit needs, interests, claims and demands relating to the infrastructure 
assets of their LGA. In Australian LGAs, the elected leader, the Mayor, and the appointed 
leader, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), will be ultimately accountable to these multiple 
stakeholders for the plans, decisions and performance (including the extent of backlog) of 
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their LGA’s infrastructure assets. Broadly in the current study, the stakeholders in the local 
government context are categorised into public stakeholders and higher-tier government 
stakeholders.  
 
Thus, the focus of this study will be on how accountability for, and performance of, 
infrastructure assets of LGAs is affected by the top management’s perceptions of the key 
attributes of various stakeholders and the salience accorded to them.  
 
As an overview of the stages of empirical investigation taken in this study, evidence will first 
be provided on the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs of LGAs with regard to stakeholder 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, as well as the salience of different identified 
stakeholder groups regarding their claims and needs concerning infrastructure assets. Here, 
emphasis is on a comparison of the way Mayors and CEOs categorize stakeholder groups for 
purposes of decision-making regarding infrastructure assets. Then, the study empirically 
investigates whether the way stakeholder groups are prioritised by both Mayors and CEOs, 
through perceptions of salience, will be drivers of the accountability emphasis given by the 
LGA to infrastructure asset plans, processes and performances. Finally, the study empirically 
explores whether the severity of infrastructure renewal backlog is related to the perceptions of 
salience of stakeholders at either the high-tier government level or the public/local community 
level. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
There are four objectives of the study. The first objective is to extend the scant literature on 
the application in the public sector of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) model of stakeholder 
identification and salience by investigating differences and similarities between the 
perceptions of Mayors and CEOs of LGAs. These perceptions of Mayors and CEOs are 
compared with regard to stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency of different 
identified stakeholder groups and how these stakeholders are prioritised (salience) regarding 
their claims and needs concerning infrastructure issues. Since prior literature has argued the 
case for both a divergence and a convergence in the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs 
concerning stakeholder attributes, a comparison of perceptions of these two powerful LGA 
players becomes an empirical question.  
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The second objective is to hypothesise and test the effects of these perceived stakeholder 
attributes, as well as the managerial values and other demographic factors of the Mayors and 
CEOs, on the level of salience given to each type of stakeholder group by the Mayors and 
CEOs. The relative level of salience accorded to each different stakeholder group will have 
expected consequences for prioritisation of their claims and needs in the LGA’s infrastructure 
decision-making process. Further, the extent of convergence or divergence between the 
Mayor and CEO in their level of salience given to each type of stakeholder group will have 
implications for the efficient functioning of a LGA’s infrastructure planning and management 
processes.  
 
The third objective is to model and test the hypothesised effect of perceived stakeholder 
salience (i.e., the priorities given by the Mayor and CEO to needs and demands of public and 
higher-tier government stakeholders) on the types of accountability emphasis given by the 
LGA with respect to its infrastructure assets. Three types of accountability emphasis are 
categorised in terms of public accountability emphasis, managerial accountability emphasis 
and political accountability emphasis.  
 
The fourth objective is to hypothesise and test the effect of stakeholder salience (i.e., the 
priorities given by the Mayor and CEO to needs and demands of the public stakeholders and 
higher-tier government stakeholders) on the extent of infrastructure renewal backlog of the 
LGA. The extent of backlog will be measured both subjectively and objectively in this study. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
To achieve the above research objectives a primary research question and five research sub-
questions are formulated. The primary research question is as follows: 
 
In the context of local government, to what extent do Mayors and CEOs perceptions of the 
attributes and salience of various stakeholders influence the accountability for, and renewal 
backlog performance of, infrastructure assets? 
 
To answer this primary research question, the following five research sub-questions are 
addressed in the current study: 
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1. What are the differences and similarities between Mayors and CEOs in their 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes and salience when considering the infrastructure 
asset claims, demands or needs of various stakeholders groups? 
2. To what extent do the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder attributes 
(i.e. perceived power, legitimacy and urgency) influence their salience of stakeholders 
regarding the prioritisation of demands and needs of competing stakeholder groups in 
infrastructure decision-making? 
3. To what extent do the managerial values held by Mayors and CEOs affect their 
perceptions of stakeholder salience, and the emphasis given to dimensions of LGA 
accountability? 
4. To what extent do the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder salience 
influence the overall accountability and the dimensions of accountability (public, 
managerial and political) emphasised by the LGA in relation to infrastructure assets? 
5. To what extent do the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder salience 
influence the perceived and actual infrastructure renewal backlog experienced by 
LGAs? 
 
Accordingly, theoretical perspectives, empirical objectives and research sub-questions for this 
study are summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of the Study’s Invoked Theories, Concepts, Empirical Objectives 
and Research Questions 
Theoretical / 
Conceptual 
perspective 
Empirical Objectives Research Questions 
Stakeholder  
Attributes  
 
Stakeholder 
Salience  
To investigate the  differences and 
similarities between the 
perceptions of Mayors and CEOs 
of LGAs with regard to 
stakeholder attributes of power, 
legitimacy and urgency of 
different identified stakeholder 
groups and their salience  ( how 
the stakeholder needs are  
prioritised) regarding their claims 
and needs concerning 
infrastructure issues. 
Are there differences and similarities 
between Mayors and CEOs in their 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes 
and salience when considering the 
infrastructure asset claims, demands 
or needs of various stakeholders 
groups? 
 
Stakeholder  
Attributes  
 
Salience  
 
Managerial 
Values  
To identify the effects of the 
perceived stakeholder attributes, 
as well as the managerial values 
and other demographic factors of 
the Mayors and CEOs, on the level 
of salience given to each type of 
stakeholder group by the Mayors 
and CEOs.  
To what extent do the perceptions of 
Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder 
attributes influence the salience of 
stakeholders regarding the 
prioritisation of demands and needs of 
competing stakeholder groups in 
infrastructure decision-making? 
 
To what extent do managerial values 
held by Mayors and CEOs affect the 
perceptions of stakeholder salience 
and accountability? 
 
Accountability 
-Public 
-Managerial 
-Political 
To determine the effect of 
perceived stakeholder salience on 
the accountability emphasis given 
by the LGA in respect to its 
infrastructure assets.  
To what extent do the perceptions of 
Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder 
salience influence the overall 
accountability and dimensions of 
accountability (public, managerial and 
political) emphasised by the LGA in 
relation to infrastructure assets? 
 
Infrastructure 
Renewal 
Backlog 
To determine the effect of  
stakeholder salience on the 
perceived and actual infrastructure 
renewal backlog experienced by 
LGA 
To what extent do the perceptions of 
Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder 
salience influence the perceived and 
actual infrastructure renewal backlog 
experienced by LGAs? 
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1.4 Motivation and Significance of the Study 
 
The study is motivated to provide a contribution to the prior bodies of literature on 
stakeholder theory and accountability typologies, with particular focus on their application in 
the public sector. It is also motivated to provide new evidence that has implications for the 
management of various stakeholders’ interests when rendering accountability and controlling 
backlog performance for infrastructure assets in local government.  
 
In terms of this study’s contribution to prior literature on the application of stakeholder 
theory, it is first to be noted that stakeholder theory, as conceptualised by Freeman (1984) and 
developed into a testable version by Mitchell et al. (1997), has been conceived and mainly 
applied in the context of the private sector. While the stakeholder identification and 
prioritisation (salience) developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) has been applied to a certain 
extent in public sector organisations, it has not been applied in the local government context. 
Key concepts within the stakeholder identification part of the theory (i.e., the perceived 
power, legitimacy and urgency of the demands an external group can make on an 
organisation) are typically conceived in terms of the collective perception of the relevant 
management decision-making group in an organisation. By comparing the perceptions of the 
two most powerful management players in LGAs, the Mayor and CEO, this study extends the 
testing of stakeholder theory. Through the development and administration of a survey 
instrument, it advances the construction and validation of measurement scales for various 
concepts embodied in Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder identification and salience model. It 
adapts these measurement scales to the new context of managing infrastructure assets in local 
governments.  
 
Second, in terms of prior studies in public sector accountability research, there have been a 
limited number of empirical studies that have focused on infrastructure asset disclosure issues, 
including the disclosure of accounting, engineering and performance information about 
infrastructure in the public sector. However, the notion of accountability emphasis as rated by 
key management players and the stakeholder perspective on how this accountability emphasis 
is determined with respect to infrastructure assets is a new contribution to this literature.  
 
Third, the body of literature on accountability in the public sector has been largely normative 
(e.g., Stewart 1984; Fowles 1993). This study seeks to operationalise some of this normative 
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literature about accountability, building on Othman and Taylor’s (2006) review and their 
suggested typology of accountability dimensions. It seeks to construct and validate new 
measurement scales for accountability for infrastructure assets in local government in the 
three dimensions of public, managerial and political accountability. In doing so, it extends 
prior qualitative case-study-oriented empirical studies on accountability in the public sector 
(e.g., Romzek & Dubnick 1987; Sinclair 1995; Luke 2010) to a quantitative study that can 
have generalizability to the wider population of LGAs in Australia.  
 
Fourth, the application of the theory of stakeholder identification and salience in the body of 
empirical research on accountability is scant in prior literature. The only empirical studies to 
date that can be found concerning the relationship between stakeholder salience and 
accountability are Collier (2008) and Assad and Goddard (2010). These two studies did not 
consider the dimensions of accountability but rather accountability as a holistic approach.  
Moreover, the research designs and methods employed by those two studies are different to 
the current study. The current study is a quantitative study which uses a questionnaire 
containing mainly closed-ended scales to collect data through sampling from a wide 
population of LGAs, supplemented with secondary data from this population. In contrast, 
qualitative case-based approaches are adopted by Collier (2008) and Assad and Goddard 
(2010). Collier (2008) uses participant observation method while Assad and Goddard (2010) 
use a grounded theory approach.  
 
Fifth, the current study seeks to pay attention to infrastructure renewal backlog, which is a 
severe problem experienced by local government but largely ignored in the academic 
literature (Dollery et al. 2007a). There are several recent Australian public inquiries into the 
problem in various jurisdictions undertaken either by government or professional bodies 
(FSRB 2005; PWC 2006). The academic literature that has explored infrastructure backlog 
from an empirical perspective has merely looked at the issue from a financial sustainability 
view point. However, the current study attempts to investigate whether there is an impact on 
infrastructure renewal backlog by the way the stakeholders are being prioritised by Mayors 
and CEOs in local government context. This investigation can provide a new insight as to a 
possible factor, other than a purely financial factor, that may drive the renewal backlog 
problem. This is the factor of stakeholder pressure. 
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In terms of the implications for policy and practice that motivate this study, the findings can 
provide insights of relevance to policy-makers, managers and stakeholders associated with 
resource allocation and usage decisions for infrastructure assets in local government. First, 
this study notes that there is a dispute in the literature over whether the Mayor and the CEO 
have similar or different perceptions of the attributes of particular stakeholder groups and the 
level of salience to be accorded to them. Findings on the perceived importance given to the 
competing demands of alternative stakeholder groups by these key decision-makers at the 
governance level of LGAs have practical implications for the management of infrastructure 
assets, including the use of capital works budgets and the handling of large infrastructure 
backlogs. If the Mayor and CEO are significantly divergent in their identification of the 
urgency, legitimacy or power of the claims made by different stakeholder groups, then they 
are likely to be in conflict over the prioritisation of different stakeholder groups’ claims when 
the LGA makes infrastructure resource allocation decisions. This would have ramifications 
for effective management and good governance in LGAs. Hence, the findings can provide 
new insights of importance to those responsible for governance structures, the monitoring of 
capital budget setting and use, and the accountability for infrastructure in LGAs, especially in 
relation to the Mayor’s and CEO’s role in the good governance of infrastructure assets and 
transparency to various interested stakeholder groups.  
 
Second, this study is motivated by the issue that LGA infrastructure decisions are likely to be 
complex and dynamic in nature. So insights about the inputs to, and outcomes from these 
decisions would be of interest to relevant the players. The perceptions of Mayors and CEOs 
about the attributes and salience of different stakeholder groups could change with different 
infrastructure projects under consideration.  Also wider political pressures on Mayors and 
CEOs can be dynamic, so the strength of the managerial values deeply-held by Mayors and 
CEOs can provide balance in a politically unstable environment. Hence, the variability of 
influence of perceived stakeholder attributes and salience, and wider political pressures, can 
cause the LGA’s infrastructure accountability and performance to become unstable. Evidence 
of such instability would be important information for local government oversight bodies 
(e.g., the State government’s department responsible for local government and the Auditor-
General’s office) as well as for the LGAs elected councillors. Findings as to whether there are 
dominant stakeholder groups and whether Mayors versus CEOs perceptions about certain 
stakeholders are more potent, can help to a better understand of the extent of balance and, 
hence stability, in the infrastructure decision-making processes of LGAs. 
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1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This section introduces the eight chapters included in this thesis. Chapter 1 provides the 
background of the study, explains the objectives of the study, formulates the primary and 
secondary questions and describes the motivations and significance of the study. Chapter 2 
reviews the local government context in terms of its functions and roles within the Australian 
government system and diversity of the local government authorities.  It then briefly looks at 
how the new public management has influenced the practices and policies of local 
government. Sources of revenues and the expenditure pattern are also highlighted. 
Infrastructure assets controlled by local government are explained next, while providing 
different definition of infrastructure assets. Then, the current issue with respect to 
infrastructure is identified – infrastructure renewal backlog – emphasising the extent to which 
the local government authorities have affected by it. Current remedies for the backlog issue 
undertaken by different tiers of government are also explained. A brief outline of the prior 
research work undertaken in the local government context and literature related to 
infrastructure backlog is provided to identify the research gaps. Infrastructure renewal 
backlog is one of the research variables in the current study.   
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature related to the research variables within the realm of the 
research objective and research questions. Since the research variable, infrastructure backlog 
is reviewed in Chapter 2, the current chapter reviews stakeholder analysis and accountability 
emphasis. The theory of stakeholder identification and salience (Mitchell et al. 1997) is 
reviewed in detail as an extended version of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder attributes and 
stakeholder salience suggested by Mitchell et al (1997) are research variables in the current 
study. Theoretical rationality and empirical reviews in diverse settings such as accounting, 
strategic management, ethics, marketing and public sector are reviewed. Then the changing 
notion of accountability is discussed. In particular, dimensions of accountability in the public 
sector are reviewed since they are research variables in the current study – public, managerial 
and political accountabilities. This is followed by a review of the empirical studies on 
dimensions of accountability in the public sector including local government. The literature 
review concludes by identifying gaps in the literature which will be bridged by the current 
study. 
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In Chapter 4, the theoretical framework and the development of hypotheses are provided in an 
attempt to bridge the gaps in the literature identified in the previous two chapters. The 
research questions formulated in Chapter 1 are answered by the conceptual framework.  The 
chapter then develops six hypotheses to be tested based on the theories, constructs and 
relevant empirical and conceptual studies. The chapter also provides brief explanations of 
multiple stakeholders in the local government context considered in the study under two 
broad categories: public stakeholders and higher-tier government stakeholders. 
 
Chapter 5 details the research methods employed including the rationale for choice of the 
methods. These methods are used to gather evidence to test the developed hypotheses which 
address the research questions identified in Chapter 1. The chapter then sets out the research 
design in terms of the definition, measurement and modelling of variables. The procedure for 
sample selection, sample size, survey instrumentation including structure and content of the 
survey, validation of the instrument, and administration of the survey and non-response rate 
are discussed in detail. Further, the chapter provides the definitions of all the latent variables 
used in the study along with the details of how they are being measured. Then, it provides all 
the models used to test the hypotheses using multiple regressions in SPSS statistical program.    
 
Chapter 6 consists two main sections. The first section presents the assessment of the scales to 
establish their validity and reliability in preparation for the statistical analyses. It involves 
internal validity giving emphasis on content, construct and factorial validity.  Factorial 
validity is carried out on each of the constructs that measure the multi item-scale survey. 
Internal consistency reliability approach is used to assess the reliability of the multi-item 
measurement instrument. The second section presents the descriptive statistics of all the 
constructs of which the multi-items that met the validity and reliability criteria. In addition to 
the descriptive statistics of observable and latent variables, this section also presents the 
descriptive statistics on the profile of the respondents, and characteristics of the LGAs’ of the 
respondents 
 
Chapter 7 presents the inferential statistics of tests of the six hypotheses developed in Chapter 
4. Prior to testing the hypotheses, bivariate correlations analyses are carried out as preliminary 
tests of hypotheses. Then the equations modelled in Chapter 5 are empirically analysed 
through multiple regression using SPSS statistical program.  The multiple regression results 
are presented under three theoretical perspectives. First the relationships among stakeholder 
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attributes, managerial values and stakeholder salience are analysed. The second analysis 
provides empirical findings on the relationships among stakeholder salience, managerial 
values and accountability emphasis. Finally the findings of the relationships between 
stakeholder salience and infrastructure backlog are presented. Each of these sets of analysis is 
followed by a discussion based upon theoretical inquiries and prior empirical findings. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the summary and conclusions of the study. The main conclusions 
are discussed within the domain of the primary and sub-research questions formulated in 
Chapter 1. Implications of the study for theory and practice, together with limitations are also 
discussed. Finally, the directions for future research are considered.  
 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The introduction to this thesis has been provided by this chapter. The background setting of 
the study was presented first followed by the research objectives. Based on the objectives the 
primary research question is formulated. In the attempt to answer the primary research 
question, five research sub-questions have been articulated. Motivations and significance of 
the study are explained in theoretical, practical and policy formulation terms.  The next 
chapter reviews the context of the Australian local government sector and the phenomenon of 
infrastructure renewal backlog. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTEXT IN AUSTRALIA AND  
INFRASTRUCTURE RENEWAL BACKLOG 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the contextual background of the study, evaluating the current local 
government environment. The chapter begins by outlining the functions and roles of local 
government and discussing the diversity of local government authorities (LGAs). It then looks 
at how the new public management movement has impacted on the local government level. 
Roles of local government Mayors and CEOs are briefly outlined next. The definitions of 
infrastructure assets and the assets controlled at local government level are also presented. 
Then, the chapter highlights the issue of infrastructure renewal backlog: how the local 
government authorities are affected by the issue and remedies provided so far. The chapter 
concludes with a brief review of empirical research undertaken with regard to infrastructure 
assets.  
 
2.2 Local Government Level and Its Functions and Roles 
 
The public sector in Australia can be classified into three broad groups, namely: government 
trading enterprises; government departments and agencies; and whole of government. The 
whole of government consists of three tiers. Local government in Australia is the third tier of 
government, standing below the Federal and State governments. It plays an integral role in the 
Australian economy and possesses the closest relationship within local communities (English 
& Guthrie 2003; DRALGAS 2012). Australia is a federation of six states and two territories 
namely New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), 
Western Australia (WA), Tasmania (TAS), Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Northern 
Territory (NT). The Australian constitution does not cover the local level of government; 
rather this level is separately dealt with under each State’s constitution with an exception in 
the ACT, where the ACT government provides the services of local government.  Each State 
has its own parliament, executive government and judiciary and has the constitutional power 
to set laws on matters relating to the State, including local government matters within its 
State. For financial reporting purposes local government is defined as ‘an entity comprising 
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all entities controlled by a governing body elected or appointed pursuant to a Local 
Government Act or similar legislation’ (AARF 1990, p.11).The Australian Government is 
responsible to the local government level through the Department of Regional Australia, 
Local Government, Arts and Sport which is under a federal government minister.  
 
The first LGA in Australia was established in Adelaide in 1840 followed by incorporation of 
the city of Sydney and Town of Melbourne in 1842. The local government level was mainly 
created to enable colonial governments to deliver local services and allow local residents to 
contribute to their cost (DRALGAS 2012).  Since local government has no independent 
constitutional status, but is accorded State constitutional recognition, they derive their 
functions and powers from State and Territory legislations. However there are some bodies 
established under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Commonwealth) , 
many of which are indigenous community councils (Productivity Commission 2008). The 
naming conventions for local governments vary across Australia and can be called councils, 
cities, shires, towns, boroughs, district councils or municipalities. In this study the term 
‘council’ is used to mean the body of elected councillors, ‘local government’ is used to mean 
the level or tier of government   while ‘local government authority' (LGA) is used to mean a 
local government entity.  
 
Currently there are 565 LGAs which play multiple and diverse functions and services which 
are beyond their traditional roles of providing local roads and other services to property. The 
initial focus of LGAs was on property-based services, particularly building and maintaining 
local roads, which provided the primary means of transportation  (DRALGAS 2012). 
However, currently the main roles of LGAs include governance, service delivery, advocacy, 
provision of infrastructure and asset management, planning, community development and 
regulation. According to local needs and the requirements of legislation the LGAs decide the 
functions to be provided in their respective jurisdiction. Over time the scope of local 
government functions and service provision has changed significantly. According to Dollery 
et al. (2007a) Australian LGAs were largely responsible for delivering physical services to 
property (roads and rubbish) at the time of federation. After World War II the services 
extended to incorporate town planning, building and health standards and later welfare and 
recreation. However major functions of LGAs involve providing goods and services. 
Productivity Commission (2008), states these goods and services will possibly be: 
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• Public goods - consumption of public goods by one person will not diminish the 
consumption by another such as catchments management, parklands and gardens. 
•  Externalities - if left to unregulated private markets, such services would be under or 
over provided such as public health programs (like immunisation services at 
community health centres)  libraries and waste collection services.  
•  Natural monopolies - infrastructure with substantial economies of scale such as local 
roads, bridges, footpaths, freshwater and sewerage networks, stormwater drainage and 
waste collection services.  
 
Further the Productivity Commission (2008) states that the range of services provided by 
local government varies widely across Australia, reflecting differences in legislation, 
population and geography, as well as history, community preferences, and the willingness of 
communities to pay for the services.  Table 2.1 indicates the essential functions or services 
provided by local government which impact on the daily lives of almost all 
Australians. .Some of these services are undertaken jointly by local government and other 
levels of government, particularly health and social services. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Services and Functions provided by Local Government 
Service/ Function  
category  
Service examples 
Engineering and  
infrastructure  
 
Public works design, construction and maintenance of roads, 
bridges, footpaths, drainage, cleaning, waste collection and 
management. 
Property-related  Domestic waste management including solid waste and recycling 
services, water and sewerage. 
Administration,  
regulation and  
planning  
street parking. 
Land use and town planning (including heritage), development 
approvals, building inspection, licensing, certification and 
enforcement, administrative functions related to aerodromes, 
quarries, cemeteries and parking stations . 
Environmental and  
health  
. 
Catchments management, parks and gardens, tree removal, pest and 
weed control, water sampling, food sampling, immunisation, public 
toilets, noise control, meat inspection and animal control 
Community and  
social   
Aged care, child care services, health clinics, youth centres, 
community housing refuges and facilities, counselling and welfare 
Recreation, cultural  
and education  
. 
Swimming pools, recreation centres, community halls, sports 
facilities, lifeguards, camping grounds, community festivals, 
libraries, art galleries, theatres and museums. 
Other  Bus services, abattoirs, livestock sale-yards, markets and group 
purchasing schemes. 
Source: Productivity Commission (2008, p. 15)  
 
 37 
 
2.3 Diversity in Local Government 
  
LGAs in Australia vary widely in size and population. They have been classified according to 
the Australian Classification of Local Government (ACLG) since 1994 according to their 
socioeconomic characteristics and their capacity to deliver a range of services to the 
community. 
 
Table 2.2: Australian Classification of Local Government Authorities 
Category/Code  Description NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT Total 
Urban Capital 
City  
Urban (U) Capital City (CC) population scale not applicable 
UCC  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Urban Developed Urban (U), metropolitan developed (D), part of an urban centre>1 million population 
density > 600 persons per sq./km 
UDS Small (S) 
(<30000) 2 0 0 11 2 0 0 15 
UDM Medium (M) 
(30001-70000) 14 1 0 5 6 0 0 26 
UDL Large (L) (70001- 
120000) 8 8 0 5 4 0 0 25 
UDV Very Large (V) 
(>120000) 13 12 0 2 2 0 0 29 
 
 
Total 37 21 0 23 14 0 0 95 
Urban Regional Urban (U) Regional towns/city (R) , part of an urban centre with population <1 million 
and predominantly urban in nature  
URS Small (S) 
(<30000) 11 8 8 7 10 4 2 50 
URM Medium (M) 
(30001-70000) 20 10 9 4 1 1 0 45 
URL Large (L) (70001- 
120000) 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 11 
URV Very Large (V) 
(>120000) 4 1 5 0 0 0 0 10 
 
 
Total 39 22 26 11 11 5 2 116 
Urban Fringe Urban (U), Fringe (F), a developing LGA on the margin of a developed or regional urban 
centre 
UFS Small (S) 
(<30000) 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 8 
UFM Medium (M) 
(30001-70000) 2 2 0 4 1 3 0 12 
UFL Large (L) (70001- 
120000) 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 
UFV Very Large (V) 
(>120000) 1 6 4 1 1 0 0 13 
 
 
Total  4 11 5 6 5 4 2 37 
Rural Significant 
Growth 
Rural (R), Significant Growth (SG), average annual population growth >3% , population > 
5000andnot remote population scale not applicable 
RSG  0 0 0 4 1 0 0 5 
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Category/Code  Description              NSW   VIC     QLD    WA    SA       TAS      NT     Total 
Rural 
Agricultural 
Rural (R) , Agricultural (A), population density < 30 persons per sq./km  
RAS Small (S) (<2000) 5 0 0 51 9 2 2 69 
RAM Medium (M) 
(2001-5000) 20 1 1 16 13 3 0 54 
RAL Large (L) (5001- 
10000) 25 8 0 6 9 9 0 57 
RAV Very Large (V) 
(10001-20000) 20 15 7 1 7 5 1 56 
 
 
Total 70 24 8 74 38 19 3 236 
Rural Remote Rural  (R), Remote (T) , < 90% of population urban 
RTX Extra Small (X)  
(<400) 3 0 5 6 3 0 0 17 
RTS Small (S) (<2000) 0 0 9 3 0 0 0 12 
RTM Medium (M) 
(2001-5000) 0 0 12 6 0 0 1 19 
RTL Large (L) (5001- 
10000) 1 0 7 5 1 0 7 21 
 
 
Total 4 0 33 20 4 0 8 69 
Total Number of Councils 155 79 73 139 74 29 16 565 
Percentage, Urban Capital City  .5 1 1 .7 1 3.3 6.25 1 
Percentage, Urban Developed 20 28 3 14 19.5 0 0 17 
Percentage of Urban Regional 24 30 15 6.3 11.5 28 6.25 20 
Percentage of Urban  Fringe 6 13 7 7 4 3.3 6.25  
Percentage Rural Significant Growth 0 1 0 5 4 3.3 6.25  
Percentage Rural Agricultural 47 27 19 51 52 62 6.25  
Percentage Rural Remote 2 0 33 16 1 0 18.75  
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source Adopted: DRALGAS (2012) 
 
LGAs included in the classification system are those that receive general purpose financial 
assistance grants as defined under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 
(Commonwealth). Generally the federal minister declares the LGAs to be considered under 
the Act on the advice of the state minister. However, county councils, voluntary regional 
organisations of councils and the Australian Capital Territory are excluded. The classification 
system generally involves three steps. Each step allocates a prefix (a letter of the alphabet) to 
develop a three-letter identifier for each classification. Currently there are 22 categories. As 
an example, a medium-sized council in a rural agricultural area would be classified as RAM – 
Rural, Agricultural, and Medium. If it was remote, however, it would be classified as RTM – 
Rural, Remote and Medium (DITRDLG 2010, p. 202).  Table 2.2 exhibits the seven 
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categories of Australian Classification of Local Government. Most of the Australian LGAs 
(42%) are classified as rural agricultural followed by urban regional (18%).  
 
Population size varies significantly across LGAs within and among jurisdictions. In 
Queensland the Brisbane City Council, an urban capital city (UCC), for example, has a 
population of 1,067,279 with a land area of 1,326 square kilometres resulting a population 
density of 804.7 persons per square kilometre while a rural remote large (RTL) council like 
Cook shire council has a population of only 3,976 dispersed over 106,168.5 square kilometres 
representing a population density of 0.037 persons per square kilometre in year 2010 (ABS 
2011). Further, LGAs are divergent in scale of functions, physical and social cultural 
environment, state legislative, financial frameworks and road length and other infrastructure. 
Some of the physical and financial characteristics are illustrated in Table 2.3.   
 
 
Table 2.3: Selected Characteristics of Local Government Authorities by Jurisdictions 
 NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT 
Population  (a) 7232589 5545932 4513850 2293510 1644582 507643 229711 
Population 
Density (a) 
9 24.4 2.6 .09 1.7 7.5 0.2 
Area km2  (a) 801315 227415 1734174 2531563 985338 67914 1352176 
Area of largest 
LGA km2 (b) 
53509 
Central 
Darling 
22087 
Mildura 
117084 
Cook 
371696 
East Pilbara  
8863 
Coorong 
9574 
West 
Coast 
323755 
Barkly 
Area of 
smallest LGA  
km2 (b) 
6 
Hunter’s 
Hill 
20 
Yarra 
6 
Napranum 
2 
Peppermint 
Grove 
2 
Yalata 
78 
Hobart 
2 
Wagait 
Aggregate 
Revenue $m 
(a) 
8107 5592 8048 2688 1581 725 356 
Revenue  
per capita $ (a) 
1163.6 1055.57 1880.64 1233.36 987.01 1455.24 1618.92 
Aggregate 
Expenditure 
$m (a) 
7423 5151 6619 2274 1423 670 423 
Expenditure 
per capita $ (a) 
1065.42 972.33 1546.71 1051.22 888.38 1344.84 1923.60 
Road Length -
km (a) 
144748 128207 155978 125276 77639 14222 14165 
(a) Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Regional Profile (2011)  
(b) Australian Local Government Association  (201 b) 
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In terms of economic significance in 2011 the local government sector employed 195,500 
people nationally in the workforce. The taxation revenue of local government was $13.20 
billion in the year 2011-12, which represented 1 per cent of gross domestic product while it 
was 3.38% of all taxes raised across all three levels of governments (Table 2.4). Taxation 
revenue of LGAs increased 6% from $12,449 million in 2010-11 to $13,209 million in 2011-
12. Taxes on property are the sole source of taxation revenue for LGAs. State government has 
earned nearly twice as much in taxes on property compared with LGAs.  
 
Table 2.4: Taxation Revenue as a Percentage for All Levels of Government 2011-12 
Revenue Source Federal State Local Total 
% % % % 
Taxes on Income 59.03 0.00 0.00 59.03 
Employers’ payroll taxes 0.13 5.07 0.00 5.20 
Taxes on property 0.01 5.21 3.38 8.60 
Taxes on provision of goods and services 21.37 2.77 0.00 24.14 
Taxes on use of goods and performance 
activities 
.79 2.24 0.00 3.03 
Total 81.33 15.29 3.38 100 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) , Taxation Revenue, Australia 2011-12, cat. No. 5506  
 
2.4 The New Public Management and Local Government  
 
Governments in OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries 
moved towards reforms known as the New Public Management (NPM) during the 1980s and 
1990s characterised by a focus on private sector management principles and practices.   
Governments at all levels pursued strategies that would increase the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness so as to increase  the quality of public service in a way that enable the public 
sector to respond flexibly and more strategically to external changes, and to support and foster 
national economic performance (OECD 1995).  In, Australia government at all levels 
including the local government underwent significant administrative and financial reforms. 
According to Hoque and Moll (2001) the administrative reform placed emphasise on; 
structural reforms, legal reforms, labour reforms, the review of information systems and 
accountability reforms; the financial reform stressed on general purpose financial reporting, 
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accrual accounting, full cost pricing, purchaser/provider agreements and assets management. 
These are briefly discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
 
2.4.1 Administrative Reforms 
 
All state governments after intensive reviews and amendments completed their new Local 
Government Acts and these were introduced during late 1980s and 1990s. The purposes of the 
Acts were mainly to reform government activities and to ensure that local governments 
remain accountable to the community (Hoque & Moll 2001) though they differed enormously 
in their content (Worthington & Dollery 2002). During the 1990s many states experienced 
structural adjustments which embraced the restructuring and amalgamation of local 
government areas resulting in reduction in the number of LGAs in each jurisdiction. The 
contributing factor for the boundary changes was mainly due to economies of scale in the 
provision of local government services, advances in technology, infrastructure and 
transportation, administrative simplicity, access to more diverse funding bases and lower cost 
of representation (Worthington & Dollery 2002). Table 2.5 shows the trends in the number of 
Australian LGAs from 1910 to 2011.  
 
Table 2.5: Trends in the Number of Australian Local Government Authorities 
State 1910 1991 1993 1997 2001 2011 
NSW 324 176 178 177 172 155 
VIC 206 210 205 78 79 79 
QLD 164 134 132 125 125 73 
WA 147 138 139 142 142 139 
SA 175 122 119 71 68 74 
TAS 51 46 29 29 29 29 
NT n/a n/a 7 7 7 16 
Total 1067 826 809 629 622 565 
Source: Worthington and Dollery (2002); DRALGAS (2012) 
 
 
In addition to the structural reforms, public sector employment in all three spheres of 
government underwent significant changes under the NPM reforms in the area of the human 
resource management practices, principles and concepts (Gramberg & Teicher 2000; Pullin & 
Haider 2003). Many restrictive employment strategies that prevailed in the local government 
labour market have been removed with deregulation opening a cross-sector working 
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environment attracting a number of senior managers from the private sector (Worthington & 
Dollery 2002).The most significant human resource change was the introduction of a CEO 
and senior management appointments. These changes replaced the then existed dual 
management hierarchy which was equally shared by the town clerk and the city engineer who 
were responsible for their own functional areas and reported independently to the council of 
LGA (Pullin & Haider 2003).  
 
2.4.2    Financial Reforms 
 
The introduction of general purpose financial reporting and accrual accounting concepts into 
the public sector is linked to the NPM’s financial reforms (Ryan et al.  2007). The effort 
involved in the introduction of the specific Australian Accounting Standard - AAS27 
Financial Reporting by Local Government (AARF 1990) for external reporting requirements, 
for LGAs to move from cash flow based on the traditional fund accounting system to an 
accrual accounting system which is a more business oriented system (Worthington & Dollery 
2002). Further, with the introduction of the Local Government Finance Standard 1994, the 
LGAs were required to apply full cost pricing and a return on capital. The standard also 
reinforced AAS27 by advising LGAs to comply with the Australian Accounting Standards, 
the Statement of Accounting Concepts and the Statements of Accounting Practice (Hoque & 
Moll 2001). The Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (PSASB) introduced the standard 
for two reasons. Firstly the standard requires the LGAs to prepare general purpose financial 
reports so that the information provided for decision making can be improved. Secondly with 
the disclosure of performance, financial position, financing, investing and compliance, the 
LGAs are made more accountable to the community (Hoque & Moll 2001). The requirements 
of the standard are identical to those of the private sector which requires LGAs to value all 
assets, recognise expenditure and liabilities provide for depreciation charges and accrue funds 
for the maintenance of assets. Accordingly LGAs were required to identify, classify, assess 
and value all community infrastructure assets and resources (Hoque & Moll 2001). 
  
However, from 1st January 2009, AAS 27- Financial Reporting by Local Government-
became superseded by the Australian Accounting Standard Board. AASB 1049 - Whole of 
Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting was introduced. The 
standard was a result of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) harmonisation project, in concert with the amended 
and revised standards being developed from the Short-term Review of the requirements in 
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AAS 27 (Financial Reporting by Local Governments), AAS 29 (Financial Reporting by 
Government Departments),  and AAS 31 (Financial Reporting by Governments). Table 2.6 
exhibits various acts, legislation and financial reporting requirements across the local 
government level in Australian jurisdictions.  
 
 
Table 2.6: Reporting Requirements on General Purpose Financial Reports in Local 
Government  
Jurisdiction State Legislation Accounting Standards and other reporting 
requirements 
NSW Local Government Act 1993 
No. 30 
The local government Code of Accounting 
Practice and Financial Reporting 
The Australian Accounting standards and 
professional pronouncements 
VIC Local Government Act 1989 Local Government (Finance and Reporting) 
Regulations 2004 
Australian Accounting Standards and 
pronouncements 
QLD Local Government Act 2009 
City of Brisbane Act 2010 
 
City of Brisbane (Finance , plans and 
Reporting) Regulation 2010 
Local Government (Finance, plans and 
Reporting) Regulation 2010 
Australian Accounting Standards and 
Interpretations 
WA Local Government Act 1995 Local Government (Financial Management) 
Regulations 1996 
Australian Accounting Standards and 
Interpretations 
SA Local Government Act 1999 Local Government (Financial Management) 
Regulations 2011 
Australian Accounting Standards and 
Interpretations 
TAS Local Government Act 1993 Australian Accounting Standards and 
Interpretations 
NT Local Government Act  Local Government Accounting Regulations 
 Australian Accounting Standards and 
Professional  Pronouncements 
 
 
 
2.5 Leaders in the Local Government 
 
Local government has advanced from a simple administrative organisation into a complex 
service institution (Tucker 1997), that is a multi- professional service organisation represented 
by task specialisation (Cetinic-Dorol 2000). Accordingly, local governments are made up of 
councillors led by the Mayor and the administration led by the Chief Executive Officer 
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(CEO). A Mayor is elected either by other councillors or by a vote of all electors in the LGA 
to lead the Council. The role of Mayor as chair of Council and community leader is crucial to 
effective relationships with the administration. Council’s authority is exercised on behalf of 
Council as a whole rather than through individual Councillors.  
 
‘The mayor’s role as chair of council, which is also contained in legislation is very 
important in creating the atmosphere for excellence in governance to occur. However 
the mayor’s role as leader of councillors is not generally incorporated into legislation. 
The mayor does not have statutory authority over other councillors in such areas as 
behaviour or adherence to council policy. Individual local governments need to address 
these issues through governance protocols and agreements’ (CPA 2005, p.9).   
 
 
Thus, Mayors perform various roles and duties on behalf of the Council including good 
governance, chairing of Council, developing and maintaining external relations, managing the 
media, and supporting the community (VLGA 2004). 
  
The functional responsibilities in LGA’s are carried out through locally agreed organisational 
arrangements consistent with the provisions of the relevant Local Government Acts.  The 
CEOs are responsible for managing the organisation to achieve the goals and strategies 
endorsed by council in which they play a crucial role in maintaining good governance. The 
CEO is responsible for:  
 
‘Providing frank and fearless advice to council; putting in place appropriate systems to 
achieve accountability and integrity;  managing the organisation in a way which can 
achieve council’s vision and plan;  managing relationships between the various 
elements in the local government;  ensuring that the organisation is staffed by suitably 
qualified and motivated staff and that policies are in place which promote this; and  
ensuring that the staff is aware that they are working for a democratically elected 
council and that council decisions form the basis for the administration’s activities’ 
(CPA 2005,p.9) 
 
An effective relationship between the mayor and the CEO is crucial in order to achieve the set 
goals of the LGA. They need to work closely together with openness and good 
communication and understand that they have different roles and authorities.  The mayor is 
the leader of the local government (this position has limited specific authority) while CEOs 
have particular authorities under the various local government acts (CPA 2005).  
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2.6 Local Government Revenue and Expenditure 
 
The revenue of local government is mainly raised from own-source revenue and grants from 
other tiers of government.  Own source revenues, which accounts for approximately 91 
percent of total revenue is raised from taxes  on property (35%), sales of goods and services, 
annual charges, user charges (29%), interest and dividend income (2%) and fines, developer 
charges, contributions, other capital revenue (25%) in 2009- 10 (Figure 2.1). The revenue 
raising capacity of the local government level varies significantly among LGAs due to 
population size and economic activities of the LGAs. In addition to own source revenue, 
various grants namely specific purpose payments and direct program funding, provide 
significant financial assistance to local government. The Australian government provides 
grants in order to support service delivery and to improve the financial capacity, performance 
and efficiency of LGAs. These grants are mainly administered under the Local Government 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995.  
 
These Financial Assistance Grants are of two components, namely; a general purpose 
component and an identified local road component. The general purpose grant is based on the 
changes of population and consumer price index (so that the value of the grant is maintained 
in real per capita terms). It is from Federal government to the States and Territories according 
to their population and an identified local road component that allocates between the States 
and Territories according to fixed historical shares.  
 
State and Territory governments receive the grants quarterly and the grants are administered 
by the Local government grants commissions established in all jurisdictions. The LGAs are 
allowed to spend the received grants according to their priorities.  During 2011-12 the LGAs 
received $1495.2 million under the general purpose component while the local roads 
component was $663.4 million. Around 10% of the LGAs are heavily dependent on grants, 
which represent 58% of the LGAs’ revenue with a lower revenue raising capacity. Revenue 
raising capacity is dependent upon many diverse factors. It is the LGA’s fiscal capacity 
measured by the aggregate after tax income (ability of the community to purchase local 
government and private goods and services) of the council (Productivity Commission 2008). 
Key local government cost drivers across Australia are depreciation (21%), employee 
expenses (38%) and other operating expenses (41%) (Figure 2.1) which include all costs of 
providing goods and services and maintaining infrastructure dispersed over transport and 
communications, housing and community amenities, general public services and recreation 
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and culture, emphasising the importance of infrastructure provided by the local government. 
Arguably major proportion of expenditures of local governments is directed towards 
investing, renewing and maintaining infrastructure of varying kinds (Jones & Walker 2007).     
 
Figure 2.1: Sources of Local Government Revenue and Gross Operating Expenses in 
2009-10 Period 
  
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012), Government Finance Statistics, cat. No. 5512.0 
 
 
 
2.7 Infrastructure Assets Controlled by Local Government 
 
Infrastructure can comprise up to 90% of the Australian LGA’s total assets (Pilcher & Dean 
2009). The definition of infrastructure is somewhat ambiguous. The OECD groups 
infrastructure into two broad categories. The first category is ‘economic’ infrastructure, which 
comprises networked services such as hydraulic facilities, highways and other transport 
facilities, and energy distribution networks. The second category, ‘social’ infrastructure, 
comprises facilities that provide community services such as education, health and leisure, 
and law and order (Industry Commission 1993). According to Webb (2008) the difference 
between the two categories is that the social infrastructure does not produce services for sale 
but is primarily not-for-profit.  
 
According to Walker et al. (2000), infrastructure is generally defined either by describing its 
common features or by listing examples. For example, it has been suggested that 
infrastructure represents ‘facilities that provide essential services and enhance the productive 
capacity of the economy’, and includes items such as: pipes, roads, bridges, drains, railroads, 
Sources of Local Government Revenue 
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power generation plants and transmission lines, police stations, courthouses, schools, 
hospitals, other government buildings, parks and gardens, playing fields, footpaths, kerbing 
and guttering, pavements, sea-walls, levee banks, other major public works, water and 
sewerage systems including underground’ (NSW Department of Local Government, 1996a, p. 
601). In this context, infrastructure is perceived to be virtually everything put to the service of 
the public in general. For financial reporting purposes, infrastructure assets have been defined 
as ‘...all non-current assets comprising the public facilities that provide essential services and 
enhance the productive capacity of the economy, which include roads, bridges, railroads, 
water supply and sewerage system power generation and distribution networks’ (Tasmania 
Treasury and Finance 1995, par A2). In this sense, Henderson and Pierson (2004) present four 
essential features of infrastructure assets, namely that they are: public facilities; concerned 
with essential services; immovable; and necessary to sustain living standards. However, 
Rowles (1992) argues that specification of these characteristics by which these assets can be 
distinguished appears to be ambiguous and in certain times contradictory.  
 
Table 2.7: Responsibility for Infrastructure in Australia across the Three Tiers of 
Government 
Level of 
Government 
Economic Infrastructure Social Infrastructure 
Commonwealth Aviation services (air navigation) 
Aviation (major airports–although 
under long term private lease) 
Railways (shared) 
Roads (national, local) (shared) 
Telecommunications 
Tertiary education  
Public housing (shared)  
Health facilities (shared) 
State Aviation (regional airports)  
Railways (shared) 
Roads (urban, rural, local) (shared) 
Electricity supply 
Public transport 
Dams, water and sewerage systems 
Stormwater management 
Ports and sea navigation 
 
Educational institutions  
(primary, secondary and technical) 
(shared), Community health services 
(base hospitals, small district 
hospitals, and nursing homes) 
(shared), Public housing (shared)  
Sport, recreation and cultural  
facilities, Libraries, Public order and 
safety (courts, police stations, traffic 
signals etc.) 
Local Aviation (local airports) 
Roads (local) (shared) 
Electricity supply 
Public transport (bus) 
Sewerage treatment, water and 
drainage supply 
Stormwater management 
Libraries  
Community centres and nursing 
homes  
Recreation facilities, parks and open 
spaces 
Source: Webb (2008, p. 3) 
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Responsibility for infrastructure in Australia is spread across all three tiers of government, 
which are shown in Table 2.7. However the overall responsibilities of the party responsible 
for policy making, approval process, asset management and ownership are still ambiguous 
(Webb 2008). 
 
Major components of Australia’s infrastructure assets are controlled and managed by local 
governments which are approximately more than $306 billion (ABS, 2011 cat no. 5512,). Out 
of this total assets, over $4 billion is plant and equipment while the remaining $302 billion is 
comprised of $25.9 billion in building (net of depreciation), $187.3 billion in local roads and 
other fixed assets (net of depreciation) and $88.3 billion in land. Table 2.8 exhibits the 
dispersion of infrastructure of local government in different jurisdictions in 2009-10. Local 
Government manages 80% of Australia’s roads which is around 683,893 kilometres in length 
(ALGA 2012)  
 
Table 2.8: Value of Local Government Land and Fixed Infrastructure by State  
($ million)  
  NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT Total 
Buildings 8788 6506 4787 2677 2023 736 379 25896 
Local Roads and 
other fixed assets 
68245 27416 65477 11409 9867 4165 726 187305 
Land 42288 25285 11307 2628 5651 828 404 88331 
Total  119261 59207 81571 16714 17541 5729 1509 301532 
Source; ALGA (2012) 
 
According to Burns et al. (1999) much of Australia’s infrastructure was constructed in the 
peak period after the Second World War and is now ageing, reaching the end of its useful life 
and becoming due for maintenance or renewal expenditure. If not, the ongoing maintenance 
of quality of the services provided by infrastructure will be eroded (Lee & Fisher 2004).  
 
According to Dollery et al. (2007a), at least five distinct types of infrastructure expenditure 
can be identified, although in practice it is often difficult to differentiate between classes of 
expenditure in local government accounting systems. Firstly, a new infrastructure asset is to 
be created to meet additional service level requirement in a LGA. Secondly, the existing 
assets require routine operational maintenance to provide expected service. Thirdly, where 
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current maintenance has been inadequate or insufficient, ‘backlog maintenance’ expenditure 
is required to reverse any unnecessary deterioration that has occurred as a consequence 
(Dollery et al. 2007a, p. 6). Fourthly, renewal or replacement expenditure is incurred to 
reinstate an asset to its original capacity or replace an asset at the exhaustion of its economic 
life (Dollery et al. 2007a; DITRDLG 2010).  Finally, asset enhancement or upgrade 
expenditure occurs when an existing asset is enhanced to provide services beyond its original 
intended service capacity. This indicates that the provision of public infrastructure is 
expensive with initial cost of capital followed by a series of maintenance costs of the asset 
(Cannadi & Dollery 2005). Supporting this clarification, The Institute of Public Works 
Australia (IPWEA 2006) states that the total cost that certain assets can incur over their 
lifetime can be up to five times of the initial capital outlay. Funding for renewal of ageing 
infrastructure assets is a major cost pressure, which has led many LGAs to struggle to meet 
the expectations of their communities. Financial sustainability of a LGA is strongly linked to 
its ability to renew its infrastructure (MVV 2011).   
 
2.8 Infrastructure (Renewal) Backlog in Local Government 
 
 ‘Local government is asset rich and income poor’ (DRALGAS 2010, p. 49). Financial 
sustainability of a LGA is defined as the ‘extent to which a LGA’s financial capacity is 
sufficient - for the foreseeable future - to allow the council to meet its expected financial 
requirements over time without having to introduce substantial or disruptive revenue (and 
expenditure) adjustments. Financial capacity is the sum total of the financial resources (both 
operating and capital) that a LGA can mobilise through its revenue raising and financing 
policies’ (Access Economics 2006, p. xi). Australian Local Government National Report 
2007-08, has highlighted a number of issues affecting the financial sustainability of local 
government including an expansion in the range of services provided by local government, 
demographic changes, population movements and a growing infrastructure renewal backlog. 
Dollery et al. (2007b, p. 116) asserts: 
 
‘By far the greatest source of financial difficulties seems to reside in ensuring adequate 
local infrastructure provision. In this vein, the main burden of financial distress has 
undoubtedly been borne by deferred local infrastructure maintenance and renewal. This 
has led in turn to a massive local infrastructure backlog. Everything from local roads and 
water and sewerage networks to the local community hall appears in need of immediate 
and expensive attention in numerous jurisdictions. These conclusions echo the findings of 
the state-based and national inquiries and suggest that urgent steps are required to remedy 
the problem.’ 
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Moreover, due to population shifting some LGAs are left with fewer ratepayers and skilled 
workers while some LGAs on the coast and the city fringes experience population growth and 
urgent requirements regarding upgrade of infrastructure, which is not matched by timely 
revenue growth. The Figure 2.2 shows that the Commonwealth government collects 81% 
($267 billion) of total tax revenue, whilst maintaining 10% ($86 billion) of land and fixed 
assets. By contrast, local government controls 34% ($306 billion) of land and fixed assets 
although the tax revenue is limited up to 3.5% ($11.5 billion). The net result of financial 
distress has typically led to insufficient funding in local infrastructure investment, 
maintenance and renewal as well as the development of local infrastructure backlogs of 
varying degrees of severity (Dollery & Mounter 2010).  
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Proportion of Revenue and Land and Fixed Infrastructure 
Assets in All Levels of Government in 2009-10 
  
  Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012), Government Finance Statistics, cat. No. 5512.0 
 
 
The Australian Local Government Association commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) to undertake the first national study of the financial sustainability of local government 
in 2006. The report, National Financial Sustainability Study of Local Government, asserts that 
financial distress is common in all Australian local government jurisdictions and the greatest 
difficulties are encountered when providing local infrastructure to the community. The PWC 
report (2006) estimated that national infrastructure backlog in renewal work is about $14.5 
billion, with an annual underspend on asset renewals of $1.1 billion. This is creating a funding 
gap to clear the backlog and correct the underspend of about $2.16 billion a year. Australians 
have become used to a high standard of infrastructure and expect the same standards to be 
continued. According to Burns et al. (1999) over the past 80–100 years the development of 
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infrastructure has been rapid although unplanned to a certain degree. The major growth period 
took place during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s while growth steadied in the 1980s and has 
slowed down in the 1990s. This has now become a matter ‘for concern as new capital works 
still predominate in the public mind and the renewal of existing infrastructure is taken for 
granted’ (Burns et al. 1999, p. 690). The routine maintenance of infrastructure is crucial to the 
quality of service delivery (Lee & Fisher 2004). The backlog of local government renewals 
appears to have developed mostly in areas of community infrastructure, such as community 
centres, swimming pools, libraries, galleries, museums, sports fields etc. However, the 
backlog renewals in local network infrastructure expenditure, such as local roads, sewerage 
and water services, are not so common since a  significant amount of  the expenditure is 
funded either from user charges or grants from higher tiers of government (Dollery & 
Mounter 2010).  
 
According to the DLGNSW (2013), the traditional focus on infrastructure assets was the 
provision of new assets such as roads, water and sewerage networks, airports etc. However, 
they admit: 
  
‘……it is becoming more and more apparent, that it is no longer sustainable to focus on 
meeting infrastructure needs through investment in the creation of new assets alone, 
without recognising the long-term lifecycle costs associated with the ongoing operation, 
maintenance and renewal of existing assets. Many councils are struggling to keep up with 
renewal of their assets to a level that is satisfactory to their community.’  
 
Accordingly, the current study considers the infrastructure backlog created due to deferring 
and underspending on renewal and upgrading of existing infrastructure but not the backlog 
created due to lack of capital expenditure on new infrastructure.   
 
‘Renewal of infrastructure means restores, rehabilitates, replaces existing asset to its 
original capacity. Upgrade of infrastructure means enhancing the existing asset to provide 
higher levels of service. New infrastructure means creation of a new asset to meet 
additional service level requirements’ (Indigo Shire Council 2012, pp. 119-120). 
 
 
2.9 The Extent to Which the Local Government Authorities are affected     
           by Infrastructure Backlog  
 
Each LGA has a different combination of infrastructure and infrastructure financing pressures 
and there exists an association between the geographical area of a LGA and infrastructure 
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responsibilities of that LGA (Roorda 2006). For example, a very large rural LGA with a low 
population density may have to maintain a large road network without adequate revenue and 
technical expertise. However, Dollery et al. (2007b) argue that the LGA size and location 
(urban/ rural) has relatively minor impact on the infrastructure responsibilities and renewal/ 
replacement backlog of that LGA. They emphasise three tentative lessons that can be learnt 
from the current status of infrastructure in Australia.  Firstly, despite the fact that 
infrastructure backlog affects all LGAs, the extent of the impact varies among Australian 
local government jurisdictions since the needs of the infrastructure and the capacity to meet 
these needs may differ significantly from each LGA. Secondly, the reporting and disclosure 
practices  of infrastructure assets and asset management of many LGAs is at a low level with 
insufficient technical skills resulting in difficulties to measure the infrastructure backlog 
accurately. Finally, small rural LGAs are viewed as the most significantly affected by 
infrastructure backlog and require substantial financial and technical assistance to resolve the 
dilemma.  In addition to the above three tentative lessons Dollery et al. (2007b) further 
emphasise the fact that LGAs in Australian jurisdictions do not apply nationally uniform 
regulations and guidance, which results in less compatible and ambiguous performance of 
infrastructure.    
 
Different solutions to the dilemma of Australian local government infrastructure have been 
proposed by various authorities. PWC in their report called National Financial Sustainability 
Study of Local Government (2006) claim that 169 LGAs are financially unviable, which is 
about one quarter of Australian LGAs. The report recommended the improvement of financial 
sustainability based on a twin track approach. The first approach is to consider internal 
reforms of certain LGAs to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. These internal reforms 
are to be achieved through greater economies of scale, expanding the capacity of local 
governments to raise their own-source revenue, establishing robust long term service plans, 
improving asset management and financial skills to manage asset renewals and replacements 
and developing nationally consistent local government financial and asset management. The 
second approach recommended in the report is to consider the changes in intergovernmental 
funding for improved financial sustainability. The suggested reforms in funding are threefold: 
establish a new Local Community Infrastructure Renewals Fund (LCIRF) which would 
require approximately $200-250 million per annum funding particularly community 
infrastructure assets; provide funds for the Roads to Recovery (R2R) program permanent; and 
finally to provide funding support by state governments in order to encourage the efficiency 
and asset management reforms of LGAs.  Subsequent to the publication and 
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recommendations of the PWC (2006) study, some state governments have taken initial steps 
to reform long-term financial sustainability and asset management.  
 
2.10 Current Programs Undertaken by the Government and Other     
            Authorities to Mitigate the Infrastructure Issue 
 
The Rudd Government’s December 2008 and February 2009 announcements aimed at 
strongly supporting jobs and insulating the Australian economy from the worst of the global 
financial crisis, were collectively known as The Nation Building-Economic Stimulus Plan 
(NB-ESP).  This was an effort in investing in long-term infrastructure needs of the country, 
anticipating a higher productivity while creating job opportunities and maintaining an 
economic stability.  As a result, the Rudd government announced in its May 2008 Budget, the 
establishment of a Regional and Local Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) to 
commence over the fiscal year 2009-10. In its first round $800 million was allocated to LGAs 
to build and improve community infrastructure and boost local economies while $220 million 
and $100 million were distributed in the second and third rounds respectively.  
 
On 9th April 2008 Infrastructure Australia, a statutory body, was established under the 
Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 with the intention of providing economic, social and 
environmental advantages to the nation by way of improving the national productivity 
through quality and efficient infrastructure (IA 2012). Accordingly the major function of the 
body is to advise the minister, commonwealth, state, territory and local governments, 
investors in infrastructure and owners of infrastructure in relation to Australia’s current and 
future needs and priorities with regards to nationally significant infrastructure. Nationally 
significant infrastructure includes transport, energy, communication and water infrastructure. 
The body is also concerned the ways of financing investment in infrastructure.   
 
In addition on 18 September 2008, the Prime Minister, and Minister Albanese announced the 
establishment of the Australian Council of Local Government (ACLG) to forge a new 
cooperative engagement between the Australian and local governments giving a voice to local 
government on matters of national significance.  Further, the Local Government Reform Fund 
(LGRF) was introduced with the objective of improving a nationally consistent framework for 
asset and financial management capabilities of LGAs. This framework would encourage 
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greater collaboration between LGAs and provide nationally consistent data to enable the 
performance of LGAs to be measured Under Phase 1 of the Local Government Reform Fund, 
the Australian Government has agreed to fund projects to the value of $16.521 million. 
Funding of further projects was to be approved in 2011 under Phase 2 of the LGRF 
(DRALGAS 2011a). 
 
The Roads to Recovery (R2R) Program which was initiated in 2000 by the federal 
government was extended in 2007 until June 2014 (DIT 2012a). Funding for the program will 
also be increased to $350 million from 2009-10. The program was initiated by the Federal 
government and operates uniformly across all jurisdictions in Australia with the intention of 
filling the gap in the road funding requirement to maintain a satisfactory level of service. R2R 
is jointly administered by LGAs and the Federal Department of Infrastructure and Transport. 
The funds are directly submitted by the Federal Government to the LGAs (specific purpose 
payments) which decide the spending. 
 
In 2009, the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government (ACLG) was established 
by the Australian Government with an initial investment of $8 million in order to enhance 
professionalism and to develop best practices in local government (DRALGAS 2011b). There 
are five consortium partners -University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), University of 
Canberra, the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Local Government 
Managers Australia and the Institute of Public Works Engineering Australia Limited. There 
are also three program partners- the Australian National University, Charles Darwin 
University and Edith Cowan University. Activities of the ACLG are grouped into six 
programs and one of them is an organisation capacity building program which aims to 
develop asset management planning and infrastructure financial planning among LGAs across 
all jurisdictions in Australia.  
 
Under the inter-jurisdictional distribution of the Financial Assistance Grant of the local road 
component, the South Australian LGAs are at a disadvantage. In order to combat this issue in 
May 2011 the Australian Government announced that South Australia's local governing 
bodies would receive an estimated $51 million in supplementary local road funding over the 
period 2011-12 to 2013-14 (FSRB 2005). 
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Further, the government funds a project which identifies dangerous road locations through 
consultation with the larger community, with the intention of preventing crashes. This Black 
Spot Program has provided $59.5 million per annum towards construction of traffic lights and 
roundabouts at dangerous locations (DIT 2012b). 
The National Asset Management Committee (NAMS.AU) of the Institute of Public Works 
Engineering Australia (IPWEA) has taken a national leadership role in sustainable 
management of infrastructure assets insisting on a nationally consistent framework. This is to 
be achieved through a special training program based on the International Infrastructure 
Management Manual (IIMM). The aim of the program is to assist service providing 
organisations, particularly for LGAs to write their own asset management plans (IPWEA 
2012).  Currently there are two training programs conducted namely NAMS.PLUS which 
targets large LGAs with a population of more than 5000 while NAMS.lite is suitable for small 
rural or remote LGAs with a population of less than 5000. By year 2012 more than 300 LGAs 
had participated in these training programs.   
 
In addition to the above explained program, IPWEA in association with the National Local 
Government Financial Management Forum carryout a project to provide the Australian 
Infrastructure Financial Management Guidelines to every organisation and individual who has 
a responsibility for managing infrastructure assets. The guidelines provide directions in the 
following areas: accounting for infrastructure, depreciation, valuation, useful life, fair value, 
managing financial sustainability, integrating asset management planning and long term 
financial planning, and meeting frameworks for financial reporting. These Guidelines have 
been well received with over 600 copies sold by 2011.  
 
The Department of Regional Australia, Local Government, Arts and Sport with the aim of 
recognising, rewarding and promoting the innovative work of LGAs, runs The National 
Awards for Local Government (DRALGAS 2009). In year 2012 there were 16 award 
categories sponsored by different departments of Australian Government. Two of those 16 
awards are with respect to infrastructure assets. One award is the Asset and Financial 
Management Award which recognises asset and financial management projects or initiatives 
that build the sustainability and capacity of LGAs to meet community needs. This award is 
open to all LGAs with an emphasis on the maintenance, upgrading and replacement of 
community infrastructure assets, enhancement of the quality of infrastructure assets, 
prioritising the infrastructure requirements with the consultation of the community and 
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adoption of best financial management practices. The other award is the Innovative 
Infrastructure Development Award which recognises the LGAs that have implemented 
innovative infrastructure projects meeting the requirements of the local community. This 
award is open to all LGAs and the innovative projects can be with respect to physical, social 
or economic infrastructure. 
 
2.11 Academic Studies on Infrastructure Assets in the Local Government       
         Context   
 
Academic studies with regard to infrastructure assets in the local government context are 
predominantly descriptive. The studies can be mainly categorised into: infrastructure 
reporting practices; best methods of accounting; infrastructure performance and measurement 
issues; infrastructure asset management. Their summaries are presented in Table 2.9. 
However, these studies are mainly either descriptive or prescriptive in nature.  
 
2.11.1 Academic Research on Infrastructure Renewal Backlog  
 
There are many public inquiries which address the issue of infrastructure renewal backlog 
(FSRB 2005; Access Economics 2006; LGAQ 2006; PWC 2006; WALGA2006). Also there 
are prior academic studies that have particularly discussed the issue of infrastructure backlog 
(Dollery & Mounter 2010) and remedies suggested for the infrastructure backlog problem 
(Dollery et al. 2007a,b; Byrnes et al. 2008). They are briefly reviewed below.  
 
Dollery and Mounter (2010) carried out a comparative analysis of local infrastructure 
investment, maintenance and renewal between Australia and New Zealand. It is argued that 
while both the intergovernmental grants system and the quantum of these grants differ 
significantly between the two nations, local government infrastructure in both countries 
requires urgent attention from policy makers and similar policy solutions. Walker and Jones 
(2006) considered cost of restoring infrastructure assets to a satisfactory condition as a proxy 
in a statistical model to explain sources of financial distress at local government level. The 
infrastructure variables considered in the study are: the carrying values for buildings, roads, 
other transport, water, sewerage and drainage infrastructure; estimated costs to bring 
buildings, roads, other transport, water, sewerage and drainage infrastructure to a satisfactory 
condition; and budgeted maintenance expenditure for buildings, roads, water, sewerage and 
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drainage infrastructure. They collected data for their exploratory study from 172 LGAs in 
New South Wales (NSW) over a two year period 2001-02. Despite their main finding, that the 
degree of financial distress in LGAs is positively associated with the revenue generating 
capacity of LGAs they also found that road maintenance costs associate highly with local 
government distress.  
 
Dollery et al. (2007a, b) and Byrnes et al. (2008) address ways to remedy the infrastructure 
management and renewal crisis experienced at the local government level.  In their 
exploratory attempt (2007a) they suggest a tentative solution in the form of a Commonwealth 
Infrastructure Asset Fund that could operate complementary to the current Roads to Recovery 
Program.  This proposed fund would consider local infrastructure backlog needs and provide 
adequate finance for LGAs to overcome backlogs. In order to become eligible for funding, 
LGAs need to demonstrate infrastructure backlog and implement a decided asset management 
system. In another attempt Byrnes et al. (2008) proposed a form of income stream based on a 
fixed-income asset-backed security issued by the local government sector.  
 
There are currently no studies that have provided empirical evidence on the effects of 
stakeholder pressure on infrastructure backlog decision-making at the local government level 
in Australia.   
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    Table 2.9: Summary of Empirical Studies (Academic) of Infrastructure Assets (including the Local Government Context) 
Theme Author(s)  Context/ Method  Focus of the Study Key Findings  
Infrastructure 
Reporting 
Practices 
Pallot (1997) The study reviews 
practices in local 
government in New 
Zealand regarding 
accounting for 
infrastructure assets.  
The paper attempts to explain 
how current ideas of a working 
party of the Society of Local 
Government Managers might 
represent a way of reconciling 
different views about accounting 
for infrastructure assets in a 
manner that is consistent with 
the statement of concepts. 
Technical questions such as the 
physical nature of networks 
determine the accounting methods 
that are most appropriate, with 
possibility to apply a statement of 
concepts. The accounting requires a 
more comprehensive system of 
concepts which can accommodate 
more comprehensive notions of 
ownership and control.  
 
 
 
Walker et al. 
(1999) 
 
A review was undertaken 
of 1995-1996 annual 
reports of   177 NSW 
councils 
Which  maintain some 
road or drainage 
infrastructure 
 
While local councils are required to 
apply the profession's asset 
valuation and accrual standards in 
preparing general purpose financial 
reports, the State of New South 
Wales has gone further by requiring 
local councils to also present 
information about the physical 
condition of infrastructure, together 
with estimates of the cost of 
bringing that infrastructure to a 
satisfactory condition, and the 
annual costs of maintaining 
infrastructure at that standard 
thereafter. This study examines 
how this information was reported 
for 1995-96. 
 
Results show that, local government 
manages a high proportion of the 
nation's infrastructure. The data also 
highlight the gap between recently 
budgeted expenditure on infrastructure 
and estimates of the cost of repairing or 
upgrading those assets. While some 
reservations may be held about reported 
accounting data (particularly valuations 
of infrastructure on the basis of some 
proportion of current replacement 
prices), the supplementary disclosures 
made by local councils about the 
physical condition of infrastructure, and 
the basis of those assessments, are likely 
to provide useful information to 
stakeholders.  
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Theme Author(s)  Context/ Method  Focus of the Study Key Findings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McCrae and 
Aiken (2000) 
A debate- the 
appropriateness of the 
application of accrual 
accounting and accounting 
standards on Infrastructure 
Assets in Australian 
Context 
To investigate in relation to 
Accounting under private sector 
concepts for public, infrastructure 
assets. In particular, they examine 
whether inter-generational fairness 
and neutrality in measurement can 
be preserved using private sector 
accounting concepts of property 
ownership, capital maintenance, 
and depreciation accounting and the 
associated `stock' perspective of 
asset accounting. 
Two propositions underlie the 
discussion of infrastructure asset 
accounting in relation to generational 
issues.  
First, generational accounting 
measurements should contain the 
attributes of fairness and neutrality in a 
generational sense. They should not bias 
the inter-generational allocation of cost 
or funding burdens.  
Second, the forced application of 
inappropriate commercial accounting 
concepts of asset valuation, depreciation 
and capital maintenance may introduce 
significant generational measurement 
bias. 
 
Walker et al. 
(2000) 
Numerous options that 
have been proposed for 
accounting or reporting on 
the value and condition of 
infrastructure and the 
treatment of past or 
proposed expenditures to 
restore, maintain or 
upgrade infrastructure have 
been evaluated in 
Australian context. 
 
The article examines existing and 
proposed methods of accounting or 
reporting on the condition and the 
associated value of (physical) 
infrastructure with particular 
reference to the use of ‘provisions’ 
to record sums likely to be spent on 
routine, cyclical, major or deferred 
maintenance. 
It then explores how public sector 
stakeholders might be better 
informed about critical financial 
and other characteristics of public 
sector assets. 
 
This analysis suggests that the optimal 
form of reporting on infrastructure 
involve careful combination of 
supplementary financial and non-
financial disclosures. The latter in turn 
needs to incorporate a combination of 
condition ratings for assets of differing 
economic lives, statements of 
assumptions about future asset 
utilization, and proposed or projected 
cash flows on future maintenance and 
upgrading work taking account of 
society’s expectations about system 
functionality. 
Walker et al. 
(2004) 
A survey (telephone) was 
undertaken of the attitudes 
of mayors,  
councillors, and the 
The aim of the study was to 
explore:  
(a)whether infrastructure reports 
had been disseminated within 
The preparation and dissemination of 
infrastructure condition reports was 
found to be time consuming and were 
viewed by some as burdensome 
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Heads of engineering and 
finance divisions (or their 
equivalent) to investigate 
the attitudes of prepares 
and potential users of 
infrastructure reporting in 
Australian context.  
 
 
  
councils  and the extent to which 
information contained in those 
reports had been actively discussed 
within the organisation; 
(b)the influence of the reports on 
resource allocation decisions; 
(c)the extent of collaboration 
between preparers of infrastructure 
reports; 
(d) the perceived desirability and 
relevance of information disclosed 
in infrastructure reports; and 
(e) whether, overall, the reports 
assist decision making. 
 
obligations. The attitudes of users 
towards infrastructure reporting may be 
contingent on whether they are currently 
experiencing very serious problems with 
the management of infrastructure.  
 Lee and Fisher 
(2004) 
Infrastructure assets 
disclosure in Australian 
public sector annual 
reports. The 1999 annual 
reports of 73 public sector 
entities within the 
electricity, water and 
transport industries in 
Australia were examined.  
This paper examines whether 
specific infrastructure asset 
information identified in relevant 
literature is disclosed in practice- 
reporting of physical economic 
infrastructure.  
The research revealed a low level of, 
and considerable diversity in, 
disclosures, particularly relating to the 
physical condition of infrastructure 
assets, their maintenance and 
performance measurement. Such 
disclosure was found to be driven by 
government reporting guidelines rather 
than the use of corporate form. 
 
Walker and 
Jones (2012) 
Evidence obtained from 
telephone and mail surveys 
about the attitudes of 
engineers, accounting and 
finance professionals and 
other senior managers 
of Australian public sector 
agencies towards current 
infrastructure reporting 
practices. 
 
 
The present study sought to assess 
whether alternative reporting 
options (using financial and non-
financial information) were likely 
to adequately inform stakeholders 
about how government entities 
have discharged their 
responsibilities in managing public 
sector infrastructure. 
The findings were that respondents, 
irrespective of their organizational 
affiliation or professional background, 
overwhelmingly preferred information 
about the physical condition of assets, 
combined with estimates of the current 
cost of bringing those assets to a 
satisfactory condition Historical cost 
accounting received little support from 
respondents. 
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Theme Author(s) Context/ Method  Focus of the Study Key Findings  
Infrastructure 
Performance 
and 
Measurement 
Issues   
Pilcher (2002)  A combined qualitative 
/quantitative research 
methodology was applied 
which enabled the primary 
method (survey 
administration) to be 
supported by interviews 
using a multiple-case study 
approach 
This paper examines the recording, 
maintenance and depreciation of 
roads in a sample of NSW local 
councils. 
Results reveal that concerns have been 
expressed about the appropriateness of 
the use of accrual accounting, and in 
particular depreciating certain assets, not 
only in local government but in the 
public sector as a whole. Findings 
reported in this paper suggest these 
concerns are well founded as it appears 
that a council’s financial performance 
influences their willingness to comply 
with current depreciation reporting 
requirements 
Pilcher (2009) Initially annual reports 
were analysed over a 
period of three years, 
examining the valuation 
and depreciation policies 
of all (170) councils in 
NSW in Australia.  Then, 
interviews were conducted 
with a sample of councils 
(15) representing all 
geographical areas of the 
state 
This paper revisits the debate 
regarding myriad measurement 
bases and begins a new discussion 
within a public sector environment. 
It does this by considering the 
under-researched technical aspect 
of measurement within Neely et 
al.’s measures design template 
framework. 
Examination of local government 
infrastructure assets revealed that 
myriad measurement methods – 
historical cost, replacement cost, current 
cost, market value and fair value – were 
being used by local authorities, not 
always appropriately.  Under the 
auspices of the modified Neely et al.’s 
measures design template, additivity 
problems associated with valuing 
infrastructure, property, plant and 
equipment (IPPE) were found to result 
in the production of unreliable 
performance indicators – in this case, the 
capital expenditure ratio (CER).  
Infrastructure 
Asset 
Management  
Burns et al.  
(1999) 
A survey was undertaken 
among the CEOs of 
Victorian LGAs 
The aim is to predict the cost and 
timing of their future infrastructure  
in time to develop corrective 
planning strategies 
The generally poor quality of asset 
management information reflects the 
past philosophy of ‘build and forget’ for 
infrastructure. The poor quality of 
information and lack of detailed analysis 
indicates that little analysis has occurred 
to measure the long term consequences. 
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2.12 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter discussed the distinctive characteristics of Australian local government paying 
attention to its roles, functions and diversity. It briefly reviewed how LGAs have been 
required to adopt private sector practices due to introduction of new public management at all 
levels of government. It is revealed that the major source of revenue of LGAs is from taxation 
revenue on property while the major proportion of expenditure is on infrastructure assets. 
Infrastructure assets comprises up to 90% of the Australian LGA’s total assets while 80% of 
Australia’s road network is managed at the local government level. Also discussed in the 
chapter is the asset renewal problem due to the ageing of infrastructure. However, insufficient 
funding on infrastructure renewal due to financial distress experienced by some types of 
LGAs has created an infrastructure renewal backlog situation. The programs undertaken by 
the government and other authorities to mitigate this infrastructure backlog are outlined, 
followed by a review of academic literature on infrastructure assets including infrastructure 
backlog. Infrastructure renewal backlog is a research variable in the current study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the context of the current study. It discussed the functions of 
local governments, duties and roles performed by the Mayors and CEOs, and major reforms 
from the New Public Management era. In particular, it discussed the various definitions of 
infrastructure assets and detailed the current infrastructure backlog experienced by LGAs. 
Infrastructure backlog is a research variable in the current study. 
 
This chapter presents an in-depth review of literature emphasising the nature and theoretical 
underpinning of the major theories and concepts focal to the current study. The chapter 
reviews two bodies of focal literature, the first related to stakeholder theory and the second 
related to accountability. The chapter begins with the literature on stakeholder theory and the 
debate about its definitions and related concepts; it then moves on to the advancement of this 
theory. Thus, the theory of stakeholder identification and salience is reviewed in detail.  The 
review includes the rationale behind the salience model, the stakeholder attributes, managers’ 
role in the theory and the stakeholder typology. Stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy 
and urgency – and stakeholder salience are concepts that will be operationalised as variables 
in the current study. The chapter then proceeds to a review of empirical studies that invoke 
shareholder theory in diverse settings including the public sector.  The purpose of this review 
is to demonstrate the influence and the application of the theory even to the local government 
context. Further development of the salience model is also presented at the end of this section.  
 
Then the chapter turns to the changing notion of accountability, emphasising the complexity 
of the concept. In particular, dimensions of accountability in the public sector are reviewed. 
Chosen dimensions to be modelled and measured as variables in the current study will be 
public, managerial and political accountability. This review of the complexity of the notion of 
accountability is followed by a review of empirical studies on dimensions of accountability in 
the public sector including local government. Generally, the accountability review section 
highlights the complexity and the existence of multiple accountabilities to multiple 
stakeholders in the public sector.  
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The chapter is designed in a manner to provide broad conceptual analyses of the major 
concepts relevant to this study, followed by reviews of prior empirical studies. The literature 
under review was drawn from various disciplines including accounting, management, 
marketing, mass communication and public administration. The review concludes by 
identifying gaps in the literature which will be bridged by the current study. 
 
3.2  Review of Literature on the Notion of Stakeholder and the    
           Development of Stakeholder Theory 
 
This section consists of four parts. The first part reviews the evolution of the notion of 
stakeholder and the analysis of who a stakeholder is. The second part presents different 
categorisations of stakeholders and underpinning rationales behind the classifications. 
Analysis of stakeholders in the public sector is given in the third part. Finally the theoretical 
underpinning and applied nature of the development of stakeholder theory is presented.  
 
 
3.2.1 Evolution of Stakeholder Notion and Identification 
 
The notion of stakeholder originated from business science literature and can be traced back 
to works of Adams Smith (1759), Berle and Means (1932) and Barnard (1938) (cited in 
Freeman 1984, p. 32). However Freeman deserves the tribute for contributing to the 
stakeholder concept with his seminal work in 1984, which provided a new way of thinking 
about strategic management during turbulent times. According to Freeman (1984) the word 
‘stakeholder’ had first appeared in 1963 in an international memorandum at the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI International) in order to generalise the idea of stockholder or 
shareholder which was the ultimate group to which the management was deemed to be 
economically responsible.  Accordingly, the stakeholder concept was originally defined as, 
‘those groups without whose support the organisation would cease to exist’ (Freeman 1984, p. 
31), which consist of shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society. 
Preston and Sapienza (1990) state that although the term stakeholder was not really in use 
during the Great Depression the General Electronic Company identified four major groups as 
stakeholders namely, shareholders, employees, customers and the general public.  The 
president of Johnson & Johnson in 1947 listed its ‘strictly business’ stakeholders as 
customers, employees, managers, and shareholders. In 1950 the Chairman of Sears 
Corporation, General Robert Wood listed four parties according to their importance to any 
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business as customers, employees, community and stockholders; he asserted that the 
stockholders would be eventually satisfied when the needs and requirements of the first three 
groups are satisfied (Preston & Sapienza 1990).  
 
However, organisations are complex today and they experience turbulences specially when 
dealing with interactive environments. Two main sources cause these turbulences namely; 
internal change and external change (Freeman 1984). Internal change involves managers 
paying attention to frequently changing demands of groups in the internal environment of the 
organisation such as customers, employees (their trade unions), shareholders and suppliers 
with a view of reconsidering current objectives and policies (Freeman 1984). External change 
emerges due to the involvement of new groups such as governments, lenders, competitors, 
media, environmentalists and special interest groups and their issues and events which the 
existing framework is unable to understand promptly (Freeman 1984). The external changes 
include ‘increasing takeovers, activism, foreign competition, new industrial relations, a 
worldwide resource market, government reform, rising consumer movement, increasing 
environmental concerns and advancement in communication technology’ (Freeman 1984, p. 
5). These changes are ambiguous and not readily incorporated into relationships with internal 
groups.  
 
The discrepancy between the two sources of change is relative to a particular framework or 
theory and when the current theory does not provide valid answers to the external changes the 
existing theory needs to be abandoned and a new theory or concepts need to be developed. 
The new theory or concepts should be competent to turn the external change into internal 
change, thus reducing the ambiguity. This conceptual revolution should be compelled to 
amend the boundaries of the manager’s job so that s/he can understand all the changes that 
have occurred internally and externally. As a consequence, the new concept allows the firm to 
consider ‘all of those groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected by, the 
accomplishment of organisational purpose’ (Freeman 2004, p. 25). Since each of these groups 
plays a vital role in the success of the modern organisation while having a stake in that 
organisation, the term, ‘stakeholder’ and ‘the stakeholder model or framework’ or 
‘stakeholder management’ emerged (Freeman 2004). 
 
Frooman (2010) states that a substantial portion of behaviour of managers in organisations 
today is in response to the stakeholders they interact with. Thus, managers have to constantly 
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scan their environment to identify the stakeholders who may try to interfere with the 
objectives and activities of the organisation or the managers’ need to find an answer to the 
question about who are the stakeholders of the organisation.  
 
Accordingly, Freeman (1984), states the word stakeholder denotes groups that are having a 
stake and who are legitimate. He believes that managers need to understand the stakeholder 
legitimacy even when the demands of the stakeholders are inappropriate; managers need to 
allocate time and resources irrespective of the appropriateness of the stakeholders’ demands. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that stakeholder analysts argue that all persons or groups 
with legitimate interests participating in an organisation do so to obtain benefits and that there 
is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another.  
 
Freeman (1984) considers stakeholders as traditional groups of customers, suppliers, 
employees and shareholders. He considers non-traditional groups as local community, 
environmentalist and consumer defence organisations, government authorities, special interest 
groups, competitors and even media.  Consequently Freeman’s widely accepted, now classic, 
definition which led to stakeholder theory states a stakeholder is: 
 
Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives (1984, p. 46).  
 
This is one of the broadest definitions in the literature, allowing any or all internal and 
external individuals, groups or organisations to be considered. Accordingly actual or potential 
stakeholders can be persons, groups, neighbourhoods, organisations, institutions, societies and 
even the natural environment (Mitchell et al. 1997). The definition is from the perspective of 
senior managers and Freeman (2004) asserts that ‘if a group of individuals could affect the 
firm (or be affected by it, and reciprocate) then managers should worry about that group in the 
sense that it needed an explicit strategy for dealing with the stakeholder’ (Freeman 2004, p. 
229).   
 
Numerous books and hundreds of articles with primary emphasis on the stakeholder concept 
have appeared since Freeman’s (1984) publication titled ‘Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach’ (Donaldson & Preston 1995). Regardless of its popularity the term 
remains ambiguous in the literature while academics suggest various definitions of 
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‘stakeholder’ in the absence of a single generally accepted definition. Despite the variations 
among the definitions, the researchers take into consideration the needs, interests and 
influences of different groups who are either impacted by or impact the policies and 
operations of the organisation (Fredrick et al. 1992). Thus far, a majority of studies has 
adopted the definition put forward by Freeman in 1984 which takes into account ‘those 
groups and individuals that can affect or are affected by the accomplishment of organisational 
purpose’ (p. 25).  
 
Table 3.1 provides a range of chronologically developed definitions of who a stakeholder is 
since the definition put forward by Freeman in 1984. Freeman’s (1984) definition gives rise to 
the need for processes and techniques to enhance the strategic management capability of the 
organisation in order to manage the relationships with its stakeholders at least over three 
levels as follows.   
 
1. Understanding from a rational perspective, who are the stakeholders in the 
organisation and what are the perceived stakes; 
2.  Understanding the organisational processes used to either implicitly or explicitly 
manage the organisation’s relationships with its stakeholders; 
3. Understanding the set of transactions or bargains among the organisation and its 
stakeholders  (Freeman 1984, p. 53) 
 
However, Freeman’s (1984) definition has been criticised for being too all-inclusive 
(Donaldson & Preston 1995; Mitchell et al. 1997; Phillips et al. 2003).  Mitchell et al. (1997) 
emphasise that according to Freeman’s (1984) definition the basis of the stake can be 
unidirectional or bidirectional – ‘can affect or is affected by’ – and since definitions involve 
relationships, transactions, or contracts there is no implication or necessity for reciprocal 
impact. According to this broad view, ‘excluded from having a stake are only those who 
cannot affect the firm and are not affected by it’ (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 856) resulting in a 
long list of stakeholder to be managed by the organisation.  
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Table 3.1: Who is a Stakeholder? A Chronology 
Source Stakeholder definitions 
Stanford memo 1963 ‘those groups without whose support the organization would 
cease to exist’ (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983, and Freeman, 
1984) 
Rhenman 1964 ‘are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals 
and on whom the firm is depending for its existence’ (cited in 
Nasi, 1995) 
Ahlstedt and 
Jahnukainen 1971 
‘driven by their own interests and goals are participants in a firm, 
and thus  depending on it and whom for its sake the firm is 
depending’ (cited in Nasi, 1995) 
Freeman and Reed 1983, 
p. 91 
Wide: ‘can affect the achievement of an organization's objectives 
or who is  affected by the achievement of an organization's 
objectives’   
Narrow: ‘on which the organization is dependent for its continued 
survival’ 
Freeman 1984, p. 46 ‘can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives’ 
Freeman and Gilbert  
1987, p. 397 
‘can affect or is affected by a business’ 
Cornell and Shapiro  
1987,  p. 5 
‘claimants’ who have ‘contracts’ 
Evan and Freeman 1988, 
p. 75-76 
‘have a stake in or claim on the firm’ 
Evan and Freeman 1988, 
p. 79 
‘benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or 
respected by, corporate actions’ 
Bowie 1988, p. 112 ‘without whose support the organization would cease to exist’ 
Alkhafaji, 1989, p. 36 ‘groups to whom the corporation is responsible’ 
Carroll, 1989, p.  57 ‘asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes’-‘ranging 
from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal 
title to the company's assets or property’ 
Freeman and Evan  1990 contract holders 
Thompson et al. 
1991, p. 209 
 in ‘relationship with an organization’ 
Savage et al. 199, p.61   ‘have an interest in the actions of an organization and ... the 
ability to influence it’ 
Hill and Jones 1992, p. 
133 
‘constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm ... 
established through the existence of an exchange relationship’ 
who supply ‘the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in 
exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by 
inducements)’ 
Brenner 1993, p. 205 ‘having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an 
organization [such as] exchange transactions, action impacts, and 
moral responsibilities’ 
Carroll 1993, p. 60 ‘asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business’-
may be affected or affect ... 
Freeman 1994, p. 415 Participants in ‘the human process of joint value creation’ 
Wicks et al. 1994, p. 483 ‘interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation’ 
Langtry 1994, p. 433  the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they 
hold a moral or legal claim on the firm 
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Source  Stakeholder definitions 
Starik 1994, p.  90 ‘can and are making their actual stakes known’-‘are or might be 
influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some 
organization’ 
Clarkson 1994, p. 5 ‘bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form 
of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm’ or 
‘are placed at risk as a result of a firm's activities’ 
Clarkson 1995, p.106 ‘have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation 
and its activities’ 
Nasi 1995: 19 ‘interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible’ 
Brenner 1995, p. 76 ‘are or which could impact or be impacted by the 
firm/organization’ 
Donaldson and Preston 
1995, p.  85 
‘persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive  aspects of corporate activity’ 
Mitchell et al. (1997, p.  858). 
 
3.2.2 Categorisation of Stakeholders 
 
Overtime, in order to reduce the managerial complexity of the organisations, the long list of 
stakeholder groups identified by Freeman (1984) needed to be grouped (Mainardes et al. 
2011). Grouping the range of stakeholders involves employing some acceptable and 
justifiable sorting criteria to the field of possibilities (Mitchell et al. 1997). Frooman (2010) 
says the most common approach is to divide stakeholders of the organisation into basically 
two groups: those whose interactions help an organisation accomplish its goals; and those 
whose interactions do not. Although there exist many different classifications of stakeholders 
which are presented in Table 3.2, Frooman (2010) asserts that there exists a single assumption 
under all these classifications. That is, ‘the correct way to identify stakeholders involves 
determining who is a stakeholder of the firm. In other words, one starts with a firm, finds who 
has, for instance, a financial stake in the firm (Clarkson 1994), who is a core stakeholder (Su 
et al. 2007), who is external to the firm’s formal boundaries (Carroll, 1989), or who is further 
out on the periphery (Hart & Sharma, 2004), and so forth’ (p.162).  
 
Alternative proposed stakeholder categorisations are summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
Table 3.2 Stakeholder Categorisation Schemes  
Researchers Categorisation Schema 
Freeman and  Reed 1983, p. 173  narrow- vital to the success of a firm 
wide- any group or individual affecting or affected by a 
firm  
Freeman 1984, p. 53 Legitimate- hold similar values and agendas for action as a 
firm 
Illegitimate- hold vastly different values/ agendas for 
action as a firm 
Freeman 1984, pp. 142-143 Cooperative potential – able to help a firm achieve its 
objectives 
Competitive threat – able to interfere with a firm’s 
objectives  
Carroll 1989, p. 21 Internal - those inside the organisation’s formal boundaries 
External - those outside the organisation’s formal 
boundaries  
Wood 1994, p. 171 Single issue - focused on one aspect of firm’s operations 
Multiple issue - focused on several aspects of firm’s 
operations 
Wood 1994, p. 171 Social - concerned with how the firm’s activities affect 
issues usually not expressed in terms of dollars or tangibles 
Economic - involved in the supply /distribution of firm’s 
material and financial resources  
Clarkson 1994, p. 5 Voluntary - bear risk due to the investment of value in a 
firm 
Involuntary - at risk by a firm’s activities 
Clarkson 1995, pp. 106-107 Primary - engage in essential transactions with a firm 
Secondary - engage in non-essential transactions with a 
firm 
Frooman 1999, p. 200 Direct - possess a resource critical to a firm 
Indirect - lack a resource critical to a firm 
Friedman and Miles 2002, p. 8 Compatible/incompatible - whether ideas and material 
interests are shared 
Necessary/contingent -whether parties are dependent/ 
integrally connected 
Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003, 
p. 208 
Interest based - have shared material interests 
Identity based - value common identity gained by 
membership 
Phillips 2003, pp. 30-31 Moral - contribute to the firm’s success 
Derivative – have power and can affect the firm 
Hart and Sharma 2004, p. 10 Core- have power, legitimacy or urgency 
Fringe- remote, weak, poor, isolated, illegitimate, 
nonhuman 
Pajunen 2006, p. 1265 Minor - have no influence on organisation’s survival 
Potential - have potential to influence on organisation’s 
survival 
Governing - have direct influence on organisation’s 
survival 
Su et al. 2007, p. 308 Core - managers responsible for firm’s strategic decision 
Major - supply critical resources or can harm firm directly 
Peripheral - influence the major stakeholders and thus the 
core indirectly 
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Researchers Categorisation Schema 
Lawrence and Weber 2008, p. 
629 
Market-based/primary – employees, consumers and 
stockholders 
Non-market-based/secondary – media, government, 
agencies and community activist groups 
Fassin 2010, p. 40 Real stakeholders - dedicated stakeholders with a real 
positive and loyal interest 
Stake Watchers - pressure groups who do not really have a 
stake themselves but protect the interest of the real 
stakeholders - trade unions, customer/investor associations, 
special interest groups 
Stake-keepers - independent regulators, who have no stake 
in the firm but who impose external control and regulations 
on the firm. 
Adapted: Frooman (2010) 
 
All of the above typologies attempt to answer the question ‘who are stakeholders?’ and 
attempt to identify them. Mitchell et al. (1997) claim that there is lack of conformity to 
Freeman’s (1994) ‘The Principle of What Really Counts’, which attempts to explain who or 
(what) are the stakeholders of the organisation?  
 
3.2.3 Analysis of Stakeholders in the Public Sector 
 
Bryson (2004) says the word stakeholder has obtained a significant position in public and 
non-profit organisations in the last 20 years and especially in the last decade.  If a public 
organisation wants to succeed, a critical factor would be identifying and building strategic 
capacities in order to produce the greatest value for the key stakeholders (Bryson et al. 2007). 
Bryson et al. (2007) further assert that since public organisations are externally justified, their 
political, economic and social existence depends on satisfying key stakeholders. That is, the 
legal existence and survival of these organisations depends on serving public purposes.  
Following are some of the typical definitions of stakeholder from public and non-profit sector 
literature (Bryson 2004). Out of them, the first definition considered the stakeholders as 
people or groups who have the power to directly affect the organisation’s future and if they do 
not possess power, they are not considered as stakeholders (Bryson 2004). According to 
Bryson (2004) ‘the three definitions would seem to be more compatible with typical 
approaches to democracy and social justice, in which the interests of the nominally powerless 
must be given weight’ (p. 22). 
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‘All parties who will be affected by or will affect (the organization’s) strategy’ 
 
‘Any person group or organization that can place a claim on the organisation’s 
attention, resources, or output, or is affected by that output’  
 
 ‘People or small groups with the power to respond to, negotiate with, and change  
 the strategic future of the organization’  
 
‘Those individuals or groups who depend on the organization to fulfil their own 
  goals and on whom, in turn, the organization depends’  
 
Thus, defining stakeholders can be consequential, as it affects who and what counts (Mitchell 
et al. 1997).  
 
Turning to the case of public sector and non-for-profit organisations, this consequential aspect 
of defining stakeholders takes on more importance. For public sector organisations, it is more 
prudent to begin any stakeholder identification and analysis procedures in a more 
comprehensive manner (Lewis & Gilman 2012).  Bryson (2004) asserts that it would be 
difficult to envisage managing relationships effectively without making use of careful 
stakeholder analyses and hence paying attention to stakeholders is vital. He further reasons 
the importance of paying attention to stakeholders as follows (pp. 25-26) 
 
Firstly, ‘the success for public organisations and certainly survival depend on 
satisfying key stakeholders according to their definition of what is valuable’ (Bryson 
1995, p.27). As Rainey argues, public agencies are born of and live by satisfying 
interests that are sufficiently influential to maintain the organisations political 
legitimacy and the resources that come with it’ (1997, p. 38). If key stakeholders are 
not satisfied, at least minimally, according to their criteria for satisfaction, the normal 
expectation should be that something will change – for example, budgets will be cut, 
elected or appointed officials will lose their job, new initiatives will be undermined, 
and so on’. 
 
Secondly ‘attention to stakeholders is also needed to assess and enhance political 
feasibility (van Horn et al. cited in Bryson 2004), especially when it comes to 
articulating and achieving the common goods’ (Bryson et al. 2002; Campbell & 
Marshall cited in Bryson 2004). 
 
Finally, ‘attention to stakeholders is important to satisfy those involved in, or affected 
by, requirements for procedural justice, procedural rationality and legitimacy that have 
been met’ (Suchman 1995; Alexander 2000). 
 
Accordingly, stakeholder analyses have become important in the public and non-profit sector 
since attention to stakeholders is important (Bryson 2004). Bryson (2004) says, ‘stakeholder 
analyses should help public managers to figure out who the key stakeholders are and what 
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would satisfy them and ideally, the analyses will help reveal how ways of satisfying those key 
stakeholders will also create public value and advance the common good’ (p. 26). 
 
O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) state that the stakeholder concept has been focused on 
practices especially in publicly quoted companies and is usually considered as a remedy to 
shareholder theory. They say only very few studies have in fact looked at the relationship 
between stakeholders and the pivotal organisation in a more generic sense. Literally, there 
have been only a few studies done on stakeholders and not-for–profit organisations and non-
business bodies.  
 
In an attempt to explore the meaning of the stakeholder concept in politics, de Bussy and 
Kelly (2010) used the theories developed in the disciplines of management, political science 
and public relations. This qualitative study involved in-depth interviews with 23 politicians 
and political advisers in Western Australia and was conducted in the style of a grounded 
theory investigation.  The use of the term ‘stakeholder’ by politicians and the meanings 
attached to it was their first research question under investigation. They explicitly found that 
the notion of stakeholding is extensively used in the political domain and that it refers, in 
principle, to those with a legitimate interest or claim in a particular situation or policy 
decision. In particular, the participants were asked if they consider parliamentary constituents 
as stakeholders.  Some respondents even differentiated between the concept of the general 
community and the constituency. According to Dunham et al. (2006) there exists an 
ambiguity of the definitions of community, especially when identifying different types of 
communities with an importance to stakeholder management such as virtual advocacy groups. 
Few respondents were of the belief that stakeholders refers to ‘people involved in specific 
policy issues, who are more directly affected or have a greater degree of interest in the 
outcome of a particular policy decision’ (p. 297). In particular, one respondent highlighted 
that ‘even in the case of a project being undertaken in a particular suburb, only some – not all 
– constituents would become stakeholders’ (p. 297).  This is the notion of ‘active public’ 
according to Grunig (1997). Some participants claim that the word ‘stakeholder’ was either 
misused or over-used in the political arena. That is when certain groups are labelled as 
‘stakeholders’, politicians tend to become more obliged to them, albeit they may have little 
legitimacy or less of a claim than other groups. Another respondent asserted that ‘the word 
stakeholder was helpful at times, but its use implied a marketplace scenario where every 
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proponent was on a level playing ground’, which is not necessarily the case (de Bussy & 
Kelly 2010, p. 297).  
 
Thus, to most participants in de Bussy and Kelly’s study (2010), a stakeholder is not just 
anyone but someone with a legitimate interest and those who are affected by government. 
However, the participants were aware that this type of stakeholder does not exist constantly, 
creating the opportunity for abuse.  
 
3.2.4 The Development of Stakeholder Theory 
 
The development of stakeholder theory has been centred on two related themes: (1) defining 
the stakeholder concept and (2) classifying stakeholders into various categories with the 
intention of understanding the individual stakeholder relationships (Rowley 1997). According 
to Mainardes et al. (2011), stakeholder theory has originally evolved in the academic fields of 
sociology, economics, politics, and ethics. Especially in the literature spawned by corporate 
planning, systems theory, corporate social responsibility literature, and organisation theory 
(Freeman 1984). In the corporate planning literature the stakeholders are identified at a 
generic level as customers, suppliers, owners, public, society and their behaviour is taken as 
given. The management will formulate the strategies against this static environment assuming 
that there will be no radical movements in a stakeholder’s actions. Hence adversarial groups 
or special interest groups are not considered as stakeholders in this approach.  
 
The systems theory literature emphasises on an open system view of organisations with the 
support and interaction of the stakeholders in the system when planning together the future of 
the organisation. However the organisation literature has a contradicting view to corporate 
planning literature in which it emphasises the notion of those groups which make a difference, 
particularly the demands of interest groups upon which the organisation depend for resources 
and support. These theorists also argue that though other theorists emphasize the requirement 
of looking at the external environment only a few have developed concepts allowing the 
external environment to enter into the organisation. Corporate social responsibility literature 
differentiates the stakeholder concept by applying it to non-traditional stakeholder groups in 
social and political arena who are assumed to have adversarial relationships with the firm. 
Further this literature emphasises less on satisfying owners of the firm and emphasises more 
on the public, community and employees.  
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Freeman et al. (2010) claims that the stakeholder concept mentioned in above literature 
emphasises relationships in the internal and external environment of the organisation. 
Accordingly, these relationships assist the organisation to understand and integrate the issues 
of organisational strategy and take necessary actions. Thus, Freeman et al. (2010, pp. 63-64) 
say: 
 
‘We see stakeholder theory as a framework, a set of ideas from which a number of 
theories can be derived. And we often use ‘stakeholder theory’ to refer to the rather 
substantial body of scholarship which depends on the centrality of the stakeholder idea or 
framework. For some purposes it is surely advantageous to use the term in very specific 
ways but for other it is not. Think of stakeholder theory as a genre of management theory 
to recognise the value of the variety of uses one can make of this set of ideas.  There is 
enough commonality across these uses to see them as part of the same genre, but enough 
diversity to allow them to function in an array of settings and serve different purposes’. 
 
 
Stakeholder theory has been proposed as alternative to stockholder-based theories of 
organisation (Freeman 1994) and as a proposal for the strategic management of organisations 
during the late twentieth century (Mainardes et al. 2011). Phillips et al. (2003) say 
‘stakeholder theory is a theory of organisational management and ethics’ (p. 480), which 
concerns explicitly the morals and values as a focal character of managing organisations.  The 
bottom line of organisations and the means of achieving these bottom lines are critically 
examined in stakeholder theory.  They further assert that the theory is concerned with who has 
input in decision-making as well as with who benefits from the outcomes of such decisions. 
Procedure is as important to stakeholder theory as the final distribution (Phillips et al. 2003).  
 
Collier (2008) says stakeholder theory is concerned with how the power of stakeholders with 
their competing interests is managed by an organisation in terms of its broader accountability.  
According to Clarkson (1995), Donaldson and Preston (1995), and Rowley (1997) the concept 
of stakeholder management was developed  so that organisations could recognise, analyse and 
examine the characteristics of individuals or groups influencing or being influenced by 
organisational behaviour.  
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim stakeholder theory significantly differs from other 
theories of the organisation since the theory is expected both to explain and guide the 
structure and operation of the organisation. These organisations should be managed in the 
interest of all diverse constituents with varying interest and demands (Laplume et al. 2008). 
‘Why would anyone accept the stakeholder theory over alternative conceptions of 
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corporations?’ (Donaldson & Preston 1995, p. 69). They say stakeholder theory is managerial 
since it advocates simultaneous attention to the legitimate interests of all appropriate 
stakeholders during the time of ascertaining organisational structures and policies and during 
decision making. Thus, stakeholder theory acclaims attitudes, structures, and practices that, 
taken together, originate stakeholder management. Donaldson and Preston (1995) provide 
three aspects of stakeholder theory: descriptive, instrumental and normative.  
 
 
With the descriptive aspect, ‘the theory is used to describe, and sometimes to explain, specific 
organisational characteristics and behaviours’ (Donaldson & Preston 1995, p. 70), such as the 
nature of the organisation, or the managers’ management philosophies and thinking. 
Accordingly, the descriptive aspect constitutes the implicit basis for organisational practices 
(Donaldson & Preston 1995) related to stakeholders including the nature of organisations 
(Brenner & Cochran 1991), how managers perceive their organisations (Brenner & Molander 
1977), how organisations are managed (Clarkson 1991), the diffusion of social information 
(Ullman 1985), the concept of target-stakeholders (Mitchell et al. 1997), and the meanings 
attributed to each stakeholder, varying in accordance with the phase reached in the respective 
company life cycle (Jawahar & McLaughlin 2001). According to Donaldson and Preston 
(1995), stakeholder theory replicates and describes past present and future states of affairs of 
corporations and their stakeholders under the descriptive aspect.  
 
The instrumental approach is used to identify ‘the relationships or lack of relationships 
between the management of stakeholders and the achievement of traditional organisational 
objectives’ (Donaldson & Preston 1995, p. 71) such as profitability, growth or other financial 
performances and social performances (Barton et al. 1989; Preston et al.1991). This approach 
gives attention to what will happen if managers or firms behave in certain ways or it explores 
the causes and effects of management behaviours (Jones 1995; Mainardes et al. 2011). For 
example, it conceives that trusting and cooperative relationships help solve problems related 
to opportunism. The instrumental perspective of stakeholder theory is developed from an 
economic viewpoint especially using assumptions from agency theory, transaction cost theory 
and insights from behavioural science and ethics (Jones 1995).   
 
The third approach of stakeholder theory according to Donaldson and Preston (1995) is the 
normative approach which ‘is used to interpret the functions or relationships of organisations 
based on moral or philosophical directives for the operation and management of 
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organisations’ (p. 71). Further this aspect of stakeholder theory tries to generalise how 
organisational behaviours may be shaped; that is on how and why the organisation needs to 
satisfy its stakeholders while prescribing values (Mainardes et al. 2011). A normative theory 
would describe why firms should give consideration to their stakeholders (Freeman 2004). 
 
According to Laplume et al. (2008), stakeholder theory is ‘timely yet adolescent, controversial 
yet important’ (p. 1153). In clarifying this statement they assert: it is timely since the 
divergent practices of the organisations such as ethical misconduct and harmful impact of 
corporate negligence; it is adolescent because on many fundamental propositions, empirical 
validity is yet to be established; it is controversial since stakeholder theory questions the 
traditional objective or managerial concern of an organisation which is profit maximisation; 
yet it is also important as it attempts to answer the question of how organisations affect 
society.  
 
Stakeholder theory has been explored from various perspectives, including agency theory 
(Hill & Jones 1992), corporate social responsibility (Donaldson & Preston 1995), network 
theory of stakeholder influences (Rowley 1997), fairness in stakeholder identification 
(Phillips 1997) and stakeholder influence strategies based on resource dependency theory 
(Frooman 1999).  However, Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the enduring problem 
of identifying stakeholders and evaluating their legitimate stake is not resolved by the theory. 
Further stakeholder theory does not believe managers are the only controlling parties in 
organisational governance but also considers the shareholders, government and other parties. 
Nevertheless the theory does not entail a view that all stakeholders should be equally involved 
in all processes and decisions of the organisation.  
 
However in practice, all stakeholder relationships are not equally perceived as important by 
managers. ‘Some efforts have therefore gone into conceptualising the relationship between 
the attributes of various stakeholder groups and the attention they receive from managers’ 
(Harvey & Schaefer 2001, p. 244). Accordingly, Huse and Eide (1996), suggest that 
stakeholder influence and power can be based on a formal or institutionalised basis, an 
economic basis or a societal legitimacy basis.  Rowley (1997) proposed that stakeholder 
influence is determined by the attributes of individual stakeholder groups and the way they 
form networks and interact with different stakeholder groups. Mitchell et al. (1997) identified 
three attributes that influence the stakeholder salience for managers: power that a particular 
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stakeholder group is perceived to hold; legitimacy of the claim of the stakeholder group and 
the perceived urgency of the stakeholder group's claims and demands. They propose that 
managers would pay more attention to those stakeholders who possess more attributes than 
those who possess fewer attributes. The following sub-section explains the theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) and the empirical 
studies which they employed the theory.  
 
3.3 Extended Version of Stakeholder Theory: A Theory of Stakeholder    
        Identification and Salience 
 
3.3.1      Introduction  
 
Although stakeholder theory has been explored from various perspectives, there appears no 
agreement on what Freeman (1994) calls ‘The Principle of Who or What really Counts’. That 
is, ‘who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom (or what) do managers pay 
attention?’ (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 853).  
 
Stakeholder theory as reviewed above, proposes diverse and confounding elucidation of who 
a stakeholder is and how to identify a stakeholder. There are broad definitions that strive to 
admit as a stakeholder almost anyone who, on empirical evidence, can affect or be affected by 
the functions of an organisation. However this is astonishingly complicated for managers to 
apply. Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that a normative theory of stakeholder 
identification is needed which is able to separate stakeholders from non-stakeholders reliably 
and logically. To this end, they propose a theory of stakeholder salience, which explains to 
whom managers need to really pay attention. 
 
Moreover there are numerous narrow definitions that endeavour to stipulate the practical 
reality that managers may not be able to attend to all actual or potential claims.  These narrow 
studies of specific stakeholder claims in practice propose an array of priorities for managerial 
attention. The limiting of scope to specific claims is mainly supported by appeal to limited 
resources, limited time and attention, and limited perseverance of managers with dealing 
external limitations. Mitchell et al. (1997) state narrow views of stakeholders define the 
groups in accordance with their direct relevance to the organisation’s core economic 
objectives. For example, stakeholders are essential for the organisation’s survival (Freeman & 
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Reed 1983), stakeholders placed something at risk in relationship with the organisation 
(Clarkson 1995), stakeholders as contractors or participants in exchange relationships 
(Freeman & Evan 1990; Hill & Jones 1992).  Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997) propose that what is 
needed also is a descriptive theory of stakeholder salience that can explain to whom and to 
what managers actually pay attention under which conditions. Further they assert:  
 
‘Stakeholder salience – the degree to which managers give priority to competing 
stakeholder claims – goes beyond the question of stakeholder identification, because the 
dynamics inherent in each relationship involve complex considerations that are not 
readily explained by the existing stakeholder framework’ (p. 854). 
 
 Consequently, endeavouring to improve the mutual understanding of what Freeman (1994) 
called ‘the principle of who or what really counts,’ Mitchell et al (1997) offered a theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience that proposes that managers' perceptions of three key 
stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy, and urgency – affect stakeholder salience – i.e., the 
degree to which managers give priority to a variety of competing stakeholder claims (Agle et 
al. 1999).  
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) initiate the theory with a broad definition so that no stakeholders, 
potential or actual, are excluded from analysis. Then the classes of stakeholders are identified 
by their possession of attributes - the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, the legitimacy 
of the stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on 
the firm. This creates a comprehensive typology of stakeholders based on the normative 
assumption that these variables define the field of stakeholders and in turn to whom managers 
should pay attention. Based upon this typology, Mitchell et al. (1997) further propose a theory 
of stakeholder salience which is a dynamic model that permits the explicit recognition of 
situational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritise 
stakeholder relationships. Moreover, the theory demonstrates how the identification typology 
predicts managerial behaviour with respect to each class of stakeholder, as well as predictions 
about how stakeholders change from one class to another and how mangers would interpret 
them.  
 
The following sub-sections further explain the theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience. Further, Ghobadian et al. (2009) state the theory developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) 
has in a relatively short period become an influential model in the area of stakeholder 
management Similarly, Crawford et al. (2011) say the theory developed by Mitchell et al 
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(1997) has been extensively recognised as a basis for research in organisation-stakeholder 
engagements, laying the groundwork for a vast amount of research and practice in the field. 
 
3.3.2 Stakeholder Identification and Salience 
 
Although Freeman's (1984) definition of stakeholder is widely cited in the literature, it is not 
accepted universally among researchers. According to Mitchell et al. (1997) narrowing the 
range of stakeholders necessitates acceptable and justifiable categorisation criteria to the field 
of possibilities. Savage et al. (1991) emphasise that there needs to be two attributes to identify 
a stakeholder: a claim (claimants) and the ability to influence (influencers) a firm. However, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) argue influencers even if they do not have valid claims or any claims at 
all they have power over the organisation. In contrast, claimants may or may not have any 
power to influence the organisation despite their legitimate or illegitimate claims. To this end, 
power and legitimacy are considered different, at times with overlapping dimensions, which 
can exist without the other. Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997) assert a theory of stakeholder 
identification needs to accommodate these differences. They say:  
 
‘Scholars, who attempt to narrow the definition of stakeholders, emphasise the claim's 
legitimacy based upon contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral right, at-risk 
status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company actions. In 
contrast, scholars who favour a broad definition emphasise the stakeholders’ power to 
influence the firm's behaviour, whether or not there are legitimate claims…… Thus as a 
bridging concept, we argue that the broad concept of stakeholder management must be 
better defined in order to serve the narrower interests of legitimate stakeholders. 
Otherwise influencing groups with power over the firm can disrupt operations so severely 
that legitimate claims cannot be met and the firm may not survive. Yet, at the same time, 
it is important to recognize the legitimacy of some claims over others. Power and 
legitimacy, then, are necessarily core attributes of a comprehensive stakeholder 
identification model’ (Mitchell 1997, p. 862).  
 
The theoretical struggle between power and legitimacy is mirrored in major organisational 
theories including agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976), resource dependence (Pfeffer 
1981) and transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975). These three organizational theories 
show why power is a crucial variable in a theory of stakeholder-manager relations. However, 
power itself is not sufficient to fully understand the way the managers prioritise stakeholder 
needs in stakeholder-manager relationship. There remain stakeholders who do not possess 
power, but who nevertheless matter to organisations and managers. 
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Organizational theories with an open-system orientation (Scott 1987), such as institutional 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977) and population ecology (Carroll & Hannan 1989) theories address 
the organisational legitimacy which is closely associated with survival. These two theories 
suggest that legitimate stakeholders are the ones who really count in the socially constructed 
world and legitimacy is profoundly a way to get identified by the managers. However, 
emphasising legitimacy and ignoring power may leave legitimate stakeholder who do not 
have any influence creating a gap in stakeholder identification.  
 
Albeit intensity is not a principal facet of any particular organisational theory, the extent of 
urgency of a stakeholder’s needs can have an impact on the perceptions and attention of 
managers. Hence the stakeholder attribute of urgency the degree to which stakeholder claims 
call for immediate attention – becomes a third element in (Mitchell et al.’s 1997) stakeholder 
identification model.  In stakeholder- manager relationships the attention on various 
circumstances such as negotiating with avoidance of losses, or achieving of organisational 
goals may depend on the urgency of that claim (Mitchell et al. 1997). Accordingly, ‘urgency 
adds a catalytic component to the theory of stakeholder identification, for urgency demands 
attention’ (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 864). Power and legitimacy, are clearly core attributes of a 
comprehensive stakeholder identification model and when these two attributes are evaluated 
in light of the undeniable demands of urgency, a logical, comprehensible, and dynamic model 
is the result . Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 864) emphasise that, in order to understand ‘The 
Principle of Who and What Really Counts’, ‘we need to evaluate stakeholder-manager 
relationships systematically, both actual and potential, in terms of the relative absence or 
presence of all or some of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and/or urgency’. The following 
sub-sections define the three attributes of the stakeholder identification model. 
 
3.3.2.1 Power 
 
Power is ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance’ (Weber cited in Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 865). Pfeffer 
defines power as ‘a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get 
another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done’ (1981, p. 3). 
Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997) agree that ‘power may be tricky to define, but it is not that 
difficult to recognise’. They cite Salancik & Pfeffer’s (1974, p. 3) statement about power as 
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‘the ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire’. With the 
intention of explaining how power is exercised, Etzioni (1964) systematically categorises 
power in the organisational setting, based on the type of resource used to exercise power 
(p.59). To the extent a party in a relationship can possess or gain access to coercive, utilitarian 
or normative power means that party can impose its will in the relationship (Mitchell et al. 
1997). This is briefly explained below (Etzioni 1964, p. 59): 
 
Coercive Power- based on the physical resources of force, violence, or restraint; that is the 
control is based on application of physical means. The use of a gun, a whip, or a lock is 
physical since it affects the body; the threat to use physical sanctions is viewed as physical 
because the effect on the subject is similar in kind, though not in intensity, to the actual 
use.  
 
Utilitarian Power- based on material or financial resources; that is use of material means 
(good and services) for control purposes. The granting of symbols (e.g., money) which 
allow one to acquire goods and services is classified as material because the effect on the 
recipient is similar to that of material means.  
Normative power- based on symbolic resources including normative symbols such as 
prestige and esteem, and social symbols such as love and acceptance for control purposes. 
When physical contact is used to symbolize love, or material objects to symbolize prestige, 
such contacts or objects are viewed as symbols because their effect on the recipient is 
similar to that of ‘pure’ symbols. The use of symbols for control purposes is referred to as 
normative, normative-social, or social power. 
 
3.3.2.2 Legitimacy 
 
The scholars who narrowly define stakeholder identification (Carroll 1989; Hill & Jones1992; 
Clarkson 1995) are focused essentially on defining the basis of stakeholder legitimacy (those 
seeking a normative core of stakeholder theory). Whether or not the core of legitimacy is to be 
found in something at risk, or in property rights, in moral claims, or in some other construct, 
emphasis of ‘The Principle of Who or What Really Counts’ is generally legitimacy-based 
(Mitchell et al. 1997).  Mitchell et al. (1997) accept Weber's  proposal that ‘legitimacy and 
power are distinct attributes that can combine to create authority (defined by Weber as the 
legitimate use of power) but that can exist independently as well’ (cited in Mitchell et al. 
1997, p. 866).  Further Mitchell et al. (1997) assert that an entity may have legitimate standing 
in society, or it may have a legitimate claim on the firm, but unless it possess either power to 
enforce its will in the relationship or a perception that its claim is urgent, it will not gain 
priority or attention of the managers of the firm. Accordingly they argue that ‘a 
comprehensive theory of stakeholder salience requires that separate attention be paid to 
legitimacy as an attribute of stakeholder-manager relations’ (p. 866). Thus, Mitchell et al. 
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(1997) accept the definition suggested by Suchaman (1995) in which he defines legitimacy as 
‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions’ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Mitchell et al. (1997) state this definition implies that 
‘legitimacy is a desirable social good, that it is something larger and more shared than a mere 
self-perception, and that it may be defined and negotiated differently at various levels of 
social organisation’ (p. 867). Moreover, Suchman's (1995) definition of legitimacy recognises 
that the social system within which legitimacy is attained is a system with multiple levels of 
analysis, the most common of which are:  the individual, organisational, and societal (Wood, 
1991, p. 696). 
 
Individual – based on people as actors within organisation. This defines managers’ 
responsibility to be moral actors and to perceive and exercise choice in the service of 
social responsibility.  
Organisational – based on a firm’s specific circumstances and relationships to the 
environment. Confines a business’s responsibility to those problems related to the firm’s 
activities and interests, without specifying a too-narrow domain of possible action.  
Societal- based on a firm’s generic obligations as a business organisation. Defines the 
institutional relationship between business and society and specifies what is expected of 
any business. 
 
3.3.2.2 Urgency 
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) assert adding urgency as a stakeholder attribute helps move the model 
from static to dynamic since power and legitimacy alone as independent variables do not 
capture the dynamics of stakeholder-manager interactions. They believe that urgency exists 
only when two conditions are met. First, when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive 
nature, (that is the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship 
is unacceptable to the stakeholder) and secondly when that relationship or claim is important 
or critical to the stakeholder. Thus urgency is defined by Mitchell et al. (1997) as the degree 
to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention. 
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) claim that the thought of paying attention to various stakeholder 
relationships in a timely fashion has been a focus of issues management and crisis 
management scholars for many years, though it was not addressed explicitly in stakeholder 
literature.  Further, they emphasise that time sensitivity alone is not sufficient in identifying a 
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stakeholder's claim or manager relationship as urgent; moreover the stakeholder must view its 
claim on the firm or its relationship with the firm as critical or highly important. Mitchell et 
al. (1997) further clarify that: 
 
‘Our theory does not specify why stakeholders assess their relationships with firms as 
critical. Furthermore, our theory does not attempt to predict the circumstances under 
which ‘time will be of the essence’. Rather, when both factors are present, our theory 
captures the resulting multidimensional attribute as urgency, juxtaposes it with the 
attributes of power and legitimacy, and proposes dynamism in the systematic 
identification of stakeholders’ (p. 868). 
 
The following Figure 3.1 shows the possible conditions for the presence of urgency as 
suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997) as a function of criticality (Mitchell et al. 2011). It shows, 
in general, urgency occurs only in one of four situations, where temporality and criticality are 
both high. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Urgency as a function of Criticality and Time Sensitivity  
 
 
      
Criticality 
 
 Time Sensitivity 
 Yes No 
Yes  1. 
Urgency Present 
 
2. 
Long-Term Importance 
No 3. 
Short-Term Importance 
 
4. 
Urgency Absent 
Source: Mitchell et al. (2011, p. 246) 
 
Table 3.3 presents the constructs, definitions and origins of the concepts in the theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience. Mitchell et al. (1997) say few additional features of 
power, legitimacy and urgency need to be considered in order to support a dynamic theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience. The three features are as follows: 
1. Stakeholder attributes are variable not steady stake (variable status) 
2. Stakeholder attributes are socially constructed, not objective reality 
(perceptual quality) 
3. Consciousness and wilful exercise may or may not be present 
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Table 3.3: Key Constructs in the Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience 
Construct Definition Sources 
 
Stakeholder Any group or individual who can  
affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the & organization's objectives 
Freeman 1984; Jones 1995; 
Kreiner and Bhambri 1988 
Power 
      
 
 
 
 
Bases  
A relationship among social actors in 
which one social actor, A, can get 
another social actor, B, to do something 
that B would not have otherwise done 
Dahl 1957; Pfeffer 1981; 
Weber 1947 
Coercive-force/threat  
Utilitarian-material/incentives  
Normative-symbolic influences 
Etzioni 1964 
Legitimacy 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Bases 
A generalized perception or assumption 
that, the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, definitions 
Suchman 1995; Weber 
1947 
Individual 
Organisational 
Societal 
Wood 1991 
Urgency 
     
 
 
 
Bases 
The degree to which stakeholder claims 
call for immediate attention 
Origin- builds on the 
definition from the 
Merriam- Webster 
Dictionary 
Time Sensitivity- the degree to which 
managerial delay in attending to the  
claim or relationship is unacceptable to 
the stakeholder 
Criticality- the importance of the claim 
or the relationship to the stakeholder 
Eyestone 1978; Wartick 
and Mahon 1994 
 
Origin- asset specificity 
from Hill and Jones 1992; 
Williamson 1985 
Salience The degree to which managers give 
priority to competing stakeholder 
claims 
Origin - build on the 
definition from the 
Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary 
Source: Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 869) 
 
3.3.3 Role of Manager in the Theory 
 
Clarkson (1995, p. 112) states, ‘as managers make decisions and act in terms of stakeholder 
management in resolving inevitable conflicts of interest between stakeholder groups, they can 
no longer rely on ‘ the invisible hand’ to solve problems and, instead, must deal directly 
themselves with ethics and moral principles.’ Mitchell et al. (1997) often referred to the 
‘stakeholder-manager relationship’ (pp. 868–9), not the stakeholder-organisation or 
stakeholder-industry relationship (Parent & Deephouse 2007).  In their theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience they suggest that it is the managers of organisations who determine 
which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive the attention of management despite 
the reliable identification of stakeholders based on the typology. That is, although a 
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stakeholder is identified based on the three attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) the 
managers may or may not perceive the stakeholder field accurately. The concept is based on 
the agency-stakeholder model developed by Hill and Jones (1992) that employed the view of 
agency theory. It considers ‘firm as a nexus of contracts between stakeholders and managers 
at a central node, where managers have the responsibility to reconcile divergent interests by 
making strategic decisions and allocating strategic resources in a manner that is most 
consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups’ (Hill & Jones 1992, p. 134). They 
further state: 
 
‘Whatever the magnitude of their stake, each stakeholder is a part of the nexus of implicit 
and explicit contracts that constitutes the firm. However, as a group, managers are unique 
in this respect because of their position at the centre of the nexus of contracts. Managers 
are the only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship with all other 
stakeholders. Managers are also the only group of stakeholders with direct control over 
the decision-making apparatus of the firm’ (Hill & Jones 1992, p. 134). 
 
Accordingly, Mitchell et al. (1997) say ‘the stakeholders winning management's attention will 
be only those managers perceive to be highly salient’ (p. 871). In their propositions they 
suggest managers’ perceptions of stakeholder salience are highly influenced by their 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes. Managerial characteristics are treated as a variable and 
considered to be a significant moderator of the stakeholder-manager relationship (Mitchell et 
al. 1997). Thus, since stakeholder salience occurs in the minds of managers, they play a key 
role in the theory (Mitchell et al.  2011). Nevertheless, they draw upon research in cognitive 
psychology to demonstrate how managerial attributes such as values, beliefs, attitudes, etc. 
impact perceptions of managers and the prioritisation process with regard to stakeholders 
(Agle et al. 1999; Hambrick & Mason 1984). 
 
3.3.4 Stakeholder Typology 
 
The theory of stakeholder identification and salience analyses different stakeholder types 
based on various combination of the attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency), paying 
attention to managerial implications of each type when they exist. If there are individuals or 
entities with none of the three attributes in relation to the organisation they are not considered 
as stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the managers of the 
organisation (Mitchell et al. 1997). Seven types of stakeholders are explored conceptually and 
logically. There are three types of stakeholders possessing only one attribute, another three 
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possessing two attributes and one type holding all three attributes. Each type is given a 
descriptive name and is briefly discussed below.   
 
3.3.4.1  Latent Stakeholders  
 
They are the stakeholders who possess only one stakeholder attribute. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
say managers may do nothing about the stakeholders who possess one attribute and may not 
even concern identifying their existence. Moreover, latent stakeholders are not expected to 
provide any attention or acknowledgment to the organisation and are three types: dormant; 
discretionary; and demanding. 
Dormant Stakeholders: These stakeholders possess the attribute of power to impose their will 
on an organisation. However, without having a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim the 
power may remain unused. Although they may have a low interaction with the organisation 
dormant stakeholders may seek to acquire another attribute. The dynamic nature of the 
stakeholder manager relationship suggests, if the dormant stakeholders are able to acquire 
legitimacy or urgency they may become more salient.  
  
Discretionary Stakeholders: These stakeholders who possess only legitimacy neither have 
power to influence neither organisation nor urgent claims. Therefore, managers do not have 
any pressure to involve in an active relationship with discretionary stakeholders.  
 
Demanding Stakeholders: When stakeholders only possess the attribute of urgency they are 
labelled as demanding stakeholders. Mitchell et al. (1997) say ‘the stakeholders with no 
power or legitimacy are the ‘mosquitoes buzzing in the ears’ of managers: irksome but not 
dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management attention, if any at 
all’ (p.875). If these stakeholders do not acquire one of the other attributes – power or 
legitimacy – the ‘noise’ of urgency is not sufficient to uplift the claim to a more salient 
position. 
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3.3.4.2 Expectant Stakeholders  
 
According to the theory of stakeholder identification and salience proposed by Mitchell et al. 
(1997) the low-salience latent stakeholders become moderate-salience when they possess the 
combination of two of the three attribute. Then they are viewed as stakeholders ‘expecting 
something’, since there will be an increase responsiveness for their claims with higher level of 
engagement between the managers and them. These stakeholders are three types which are 
briefly discussed below.  
 
Dominant Stakeholders: Since these stakeholders possess power and legitimacy they appear 
to be the dominant alliance in the organisation (Mitchell et al. 1997). While dominant 
stakeholders will have some proper mechanism that recognises the significance of their 
relationship with the organisation their expectations will matter to managers. Mitchell et al. 
(1997) assert that the dominant stakeholders are by no means the full set of stakeholders to 
whom managers should or do relate; nevertheless they gain much of managers’ attention. 
 
Dependent Stakeholders: Dependent stakeholders depend upon the guardianship of other 
stakeholders or the guidance of the values of internal management, since they lack power to 
carry out their legitimate and urgent claims. If their urgent claims are adopted by the 
dominant stakeholders the dependent stakeholders may become the most salient, 
demonstrating the dynamism in the theory of stakeholder identification and salience.  
 
Dangerous Stakeholders: A stakeholder who is dangerous to the organisation lacks 
legitimacy, but is equipped with power and urgency and can be coercive and violent.  Their 
actions such as employee sabotage and terrorism can be dangerous not only to the 
stakeholder-manager relationships but also to other individuals and entities involved due to 
their illegitimate status.  Since the use of coercive power often accompanies illegitimate status 
they can be labelled as ‘coercion’ (Mitchell et al. 1997). 
 
3.3.4.3 Definitive Stakeholders 
 
When a stakeholder's claim is urgent, and if it is accompanied by power and legitimacy then 
managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that 
stakeholder's claim. Thus, the highest salient stakeholders will be the definitive stakeholders. 
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According to the theory of stakeholder identification and salience any expectant stakeholder 
can become a definitive stakeholder by obtaining the missing stakeholder attribute. Table 3.4 
represents the different stakeholder classes identified by Mitchell et al. (1997) according to 
different combinations of the three stakeholder attributes. 
 
Table 3.4: Stakeholder Classification According to Stakeholder Attributes 
Stakeholder Typology 
Stakeholder Attributes 
Comment Power Legitimacy Urgency 
Latent Stakeholders     
     Dormant  Stakeholder √ -  
Power is not useful since 
legitimacy is lacking 
    Discretionary Stakeholders - √  
Relates to social 
responsibility 
    Demanding Stakeholders - - √ Irksome, but not dangerous 
Expectant Stakeholders     
     Dominant Stakeholders √ √  
They form dominant coalition 
in firm 
     Dangerous Stakeholders √ - √ 
Coercive and sometimes 
violent 
     Dependent Stakeholders - √ √ 
Depend upon other 
stakeholders or organisation’s 
management for power 
Definitive Stakeholders √ √ √ 
Defines organisation’s 
direction. Any expectant 
stakeholder can become 
definitive by acquiring the 
missing attribute  
Non Stakeholders / Potential    
    Stakeholders - - - 
Generally ignored. No 
salience with managers. 
Adopted from Mitchell et al. (1997); Masoud & Wilson (2011) 
 
3.3.5 Dynamism in Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience 
 
As mentioned, Mitchell et al. (1997) postulate that the stakeholders possess some combination 
of three critical attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Then they predict that the salience 
of a particular stakeholder to the organisation’s management is low if only one attribute is 
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present, moderate if two attributes are present and high if all three attributes are present. 
However, managers need to remember that the possession of the attributes and accordingly 
the salience of the stakeholders may vary from issue to issue and from time to time.  Thus, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) claim their model enables a more systematic sorting by managers of 
stakeholder-manager relationships as these relationships accomplish and abandon salience in 
the dynamics of ongoing operations of the organisation. Moreover, the model supports and 
initiates a normative core in the managerial context since the legitimacy attribute alerts the 
moral implications of the actions with respect to multiple stakeholder interests.  Mitchell et al. 
(1997) state ‘the stakeholder identification typology we have developed here is amenable to 
empirical operationalization and to the generation of testable hypotheses concerning, for 
example, predictions about the circumstances under which a stakeholder in one category 
might attempt to acquire a missing attribute and thus enhance its salience to a firm's 
managers’ (p. 881).  
 
3.4  Empirical Studies Employing the Theory of Stakeholder Identification   
       and Salience  
  
Having discussed the theory of stakeholder identification and salience, this section explores 
the empirical research that has adopted this theory. Although there have been only a few 
empirical studies using the Mitchell et al. (1997) stakeholder salience framework reported in 
the accounting literature there are many assessments published in other disciplines including 
management, marketing and mass communication. Despite the wide application of the theory 
in the public sector there are no empirical studies found in the local government context.  
 
Prior studies have basically used five research methods, when applying the theory which are 
summarised in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Methods Used in the Application of the Theory Developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) 
Method  Author and Date Advantages of the 
method 
Disadvantages of the method 
Archival 
Material  
This includes 
coalesced laws 
and past research 
findings, media 
articles, websites, 
and books 
Moon and Hyun 
2009; Weber and 
Marley 2012; 
Eesley and Lenox 
2006 
Unobtrusive access to 
data and the potential 
toexamine stakeholder 
relationships over time 
Does not query managers 
directly 
Surveys  
 
Answers on 
Likert scales to 
closed questions 
Agle et al. 1999;  
Gago and Antolin 
2004; O’Higgins 
and Morgan 2006;    
Cummings and 
Guthrie 2007;  
Masoud and Wilson 
2011;  Boesso and 
Kumar Kumar 
2009a,b; Mishra 
and Suar 2010     
 
Surveys featuring 
closed ended questions 
are often amenable to 
hypothesis testing 
The short time frame involved in 
survey research  
 
Providing a pre-determined 
list of stakeholders in the survey 
may add bias by including 
unnecessary stakeholders or 
excluding important stakeholders 
 
The use of Likert scales can lead 
to stakeholders having similar 
levels of salience 
 
Results may be affected from the 
mono-method, mono-source data 
collection. 
 
Case Studies  
Includes open 
ended interviews 
Harvey and 
Schaefer 2001; 
Parent and 
Deephouse 2007; 
Magnes 2008; 
Myllykangas  
et al. 2010; Gifford 
2010;  
 
A richer understanding 
of stakeholder 
relationships, 
especially in a 
descriptive sense 
Theory building or testing has 
been limited in case study 
method 
Grounded 
Theory 
de Bussy and Kelly 
2010; Assad and 
Goddard 2010 
 
The most widely used 
framework for 
analysing qualitative 
data that captures 
complex social 
phenomena 
Awareness of relevant theories 
and concepts can be suspended 
until a quite a late stage of the 
analysis.  
Time-consuming  
Ethnography- 
Participant 
observation  
Collier 2008 Captures a record of 
event as they occur 
together with the 
organisational 
portrayal of those 
events as found in 
documentary research 
Very complex and time-
consuming due to the tedious 
coding process and memo 
writing as part of the analysis 
Source: Adapted and updated from Parent and Deephouse (2007); Bryman and Bell (2007) 
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Some of these empirical research findings are discussed briefly in the following four sections.  
First selected empirical research with a focus on the findings of the relationships between 
stakeholder identification and attributes are examined. Secondly, the findings of the 
relationships between stakeholder attributes and salience are explored. Thirdly the 
relationship between stakeholder salience and various organisational objectives are 
scrutinised.  Finally, the application of the theory in the public and non-for-profit sector is 
investigated.  
 
3.4.1 Stakeholder Identification Studies 
 
This subsection reviews selected empirical research with a focus on the identification of 
stakeholders based upon their possession of stakeholder attributes.  The Table 3.7 presents a 
summary of selected empirical studies which analyse the different stakeholder typology based 
on various combinations of the attributes they possess - power, legitimacy and urgency. 
 
The theoretical model proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) has been widely applied in 
environmental management literature. Harvey and Schaefer (2001) report the approach of six 
U.K. water and electricity companies towards managing the relationships with their green 
stakeholders. Stakeholders such as government due to its position as the environmental and 
industry regulator were considered to have significant stakeholder power, legitimacy and 
urgency. Customers and the public were considered as highly legitimate and indirectly 
powerful while employees were considered to be very legitimate but their power and the 
urgency was not certain.  
 
Gago and Antolin (2004) surveyed environmental managers from 277 Spanish manufacturing 
firms in order to evaluate their perceptions of stakeholder attributes and salience with regard 
to environmental issues. Managers were asked to score attributes from one to five for ten of 
the stakeholder groups. The government stands out amongst them indicating when the 
environment is considered as a public good the intervention of administration is inevitable. 
Owners are perceived by the mangers as the next stakeholder group who is present with 
power.  Local community who is directly affected by environmental activities of the 
organisations occupies second place of possession of legitimacy and urgency.  Since the 
purchasing decisions of customers can have a direct impact on organisation’s performance 
they possess power and salience. Suppliers were rated as the least important stakeholder in 
 93 
 
corporate environmental decisions with lower power and legitimacy. Despite the possession 
of power and urgency media is rated as a low salient stakeholder group.  
 
Parent and Deephouse (2007) examined stakeholder identification and prioritisation by 
managers using the stakeholder attributes.  They use a multi-method, comparative case study 
of two large-scale sporting event organising committees. They carried out 22 interviews with 
managers at three hierarchical levels to examine the stakeholder identification and 
prioritisation by managers using the three stakeholder attributes. They found that out of eight 
different stakeholders considered in the study, most stakeholders were labelled as definitive 
(power, legitimacy, and urgency), dominant (power, legitimacy) or dormant (power) types.  
 
Identification of stakeholders using the model proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) is applied in 
the cross-country context and reviewed in the next two studies.  First, Cummings and Guthrie 
(2007) in their study using pairwise comparisons between stakeholders across three western 
Pacific economies, Australia, China and Indonesia. They found mix results. They hypothesised 
that Australian respondents will be less likely to have greater discrepancies in the perceived 
legitimacy, power and urgency of stakeholders, than their Chinese and Indonesian counterparts. 
But similar results are indicated for both Australia and Indonesia. Customers and investors are 
viewed as definitive stakeholders (power, legitimacy and urgency) and are perceived as primary 
organisational stakeholders. Government is perceived as dormant (power) while employees are 
considered as dependent (legitimacy and urgency) by Australia and discretionary (legitimacy) by 
Indonesia. Environmental groups and suppliers are not considered as important stakeholders by 
both countries. However, in China, both government and investors are considered as definitive 
(power, legitimacy and urgency) while customers are viewed as demanding (urgency). The 
environmental groups are viewed as dependent (legitimacy and urgency) whereas both employees 
and suppliers are considered of no importance. In general, the results indicate that there are 
differences among the three countries regarding stakeholder salience. Factors such as the diverse 
social and economic conditions, including legal systems may have caused the varied results 
(Cummings & Guthrie 2007).  
 
Second, Boesso and Kumar (2009a) carried out a study to investigate how USA and Italian 
managers prioritise competing stakeholder relationships based on stakeholder attributes and to 
what extent firms engage in disclosures with the stakeholder groups they deem to be 
important. An anonymous questionnaire was administered among 130 USA managers and 
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114 Italian managers. Data were collected with regard to five different stakeholder groups that 
are common to most of the industries. Clarkson’s (1995) two broad categories of stakeholders 
were followed. Accordingly, financial community, labour unions and customer groups were 
used as representatives of the voluntary stakeholder group, while environmental advocacy 
groups and professional industry groups were included as representatives of the involuntary 
stakeholder group. Results reveal significant differences in the managerial perceptions of 
power, legitimacy and urgency among the five stakeholder groups in both the USA and the 
Italian sample. In particular, the Italian managers perceived labour unions as the most 
powerful and urgent and professional and industry groups to be the most legitimate.  The 
USA managers perceived financial community to be the most powerful and, professional and 
industry group to be the most urgent and legitimate. They further found that managers of both 
countries discriminate in the salience they associate with various stakeholder groups. For 
example, in the USA, managers reported financial community as the most salient stakeholder 
group and the labour union as the least salient stakeholder group.  The Italian managers, also 
perceived the financial community as the most salient stakeholder, but their saliency was not 
as strong as the USA. Customer advocacy group was perceived as the least salient stakeholder 
group by the Italian managers. The results indicate that all stakeholders of the firm are not 
accorded equal importance by the managers. 
 
 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) model has also been applied in the area of the diffusion of network 
innovation. In an attempt to analyse the roles of institutional stakeholders and to assess their 
salience in the diffusion of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) in Australia, 
Troshani and Doolin (2007) collected empirical evidence via interviews. Eight stakeholders 
identified are: large accounting and auditing firms, accounting bodies, software developers 
and vendors, international and local consortia, government regulatory agencies, educational 
institutions, investors and analysts and individual organisations. As a key characteristic of the 
stakeholder network they focus on stakeholder salience. The results of this exploratory study 
indicate that all identified stakeholders have a legitimate basis for adopting or promoting 
XBRL but most lack the power to effect change. Hence, they are labelled as discretionary 
(legitimacy). However, three exceptions - large accounting and auditing firms, the accounting 
bodies and government regulatory agencies are viewed as dominant (power, legitimacy) 
stakeholders. None of the stakeholders have any urgency claims for XBRL resulting in a lack 
of definitive (power, legitimacy and urgency) XBRL stakeholders. They identified four 
reasons for the lack of salience among the stakeholders: alternative solutions and non-
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standard forms of XBRL implementation; lack of dominant design of a relevant accounting 
standard under the IASB’s priorities; perceived instability of the XBRL specification; and 
local business culture in Australia (wait-and-see). 
 
The following two studies are undertaken on Fortune companies applying the stakeholder 
identification model. First, Moon and Hyun (2009) employ the salience model to compare 
stakeholders and their attributes highlighted in business news and press releases. Six 
stakeholder groups which are commonly identified in stakeholder studies were chosen: 
shareholders, customers, employees, community, government and suppliers. The study uses 
content analysis of press releases from 50 Fortune 500 companies and news stories about 
them that appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post. They found that the 
shareholder was the most frequently mentioned stakeholder group. This group enjoyed more 
salience in both press releases and newspapers. Less attention was paid to employees, 
community and suppliers. Both press releases and news stories focused more on legitimacy 
than power or urgency for all stakeholders except government.  
 
A second study, by Weber and Marley (2012), explored the attributes of stakeholders using 
corporate webpages. They investigated business organisation-stakeholder relationships 
described in the Fortune Global 100 corporate social responsibility or sustainability reports in 
order to understand stakeholder salience. That is, they obtained secondary data from these 
reports available on the websites of the Global 100 companies. They argue that stakeholder 
attributes and salience can be influenced by different organisational demographic factors such 
as the organisation’s nationality and the organisation’s industry membership. Interestingly, 
they viewed the ‘natural environment’ as a ‘definitive’ organisational stakeholder, possessing 
all three attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency), labelled as the most salient stakeholder.  
This finding indicated particularly in Europe and Asia that there is a growing rhetorical 
conversation among business executives and increasing governmental sustainability efforts.  
 
The empirical studies discussed above are summarised in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Stakeholder Identification Based on Stakeholder Attributes 
Author / 
Year 
Context of the 
study 
Stakeholders considered in the 
study 
Findings  
Harvey and 
Schaefer 
(2001) 
Six U.K. water 
and electricity 
companies 
Government, environmental and 
industry regulators, customers, 
employees, shareholders. 
Government and the 
regulators are perceived 
as most influential. 
Gago and 
Antolin 
(2004) 
277 large 
manufacturing 
firms in Spain  
Government, owners, customers, 
local community, employees, global 
community and future generations, 
business associations, 
environmentalist groups, mass 
media, suppliers. 
The government stands 
out among the 
stakeholders. 
Parent and 
Deephouse 
(2007) 
Two Canadian 
large scale 
sporting 
organisation 
committees 
Canadian governments, organisation 
committees, parent sport 
organisation, media, international 
delegations, national sports 
organisation, international sports 
federations, community, international 
governments. 
Most stakeholders were 
definitive, dominant, or 
dormant types. 
 
Cummings 
and Guthrie 
(2007) 
Managers from 
Australia, China 
and Indonesia 
Customers, employees, 
environmental group, government, 
shareholders, supplier. 
The results indicate that 
there are differences 
among the three countries 
regarding stakeholder 
attributes. 
Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2009a) 
130 USA 
managers  and 
114 Italian 
managers   
Financial community, labour unions, 
customer groups, environmental 
advocacy groups, and professional 
industry groups. 
Stakeholders of the firm 
are not accorded equal 
importance by the 
managers of the two 
countries. 
Troshini and 
Doolin 
(2007) 
27 organisational 
members of  
XBRL of 
Australia 
Large accounting and auditing firms, 
accounting bodies, software 
developers and vendors, international 
and local consortia, government 
regulatory agencies, educational 
institutions, investors and analysts, 
individual organisations.  
While all stakeholders 
were found to have a 
legitimate basis for 
adopting XBRL, most 
lack power or centrality 
and none possesses 
urgency claims for XBRL 
Moon and 
Hyun (2009) 
50 Fortune 500 
companies 
Shareholders, customers, employees, 
community, government, and 
suppliers. 
Shareholder was the most 
frequently mentioned 
stakeholder group in both 
press releases and 
newspapers. 
Legitimacy is more 
focused than power or 
urgency for all 
stakeholders except 
government.  
Weber and 
Marley 
(2012) 
The Fortune 100 
Global 
Companies 
(an international 
sample) 
Stockholders/investors, employees, 
customers, suppliers, 
wholesalers/retailers, community, 
government, NGOs, media and 
natural environment. 
The natural environment 
is a ‘definitive’ 
organisational 
stakeholder, possessing 
all three stakeholder 
attributes. 
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3.4.2 Studies of the Relationship between Stakeholder Attributes and   
           Stakeholder Salience  
 
This subsection considers the prior empirical research which focuses on the findings of the 
relationship between stakeholder attributes and stakeholder salience which provides mix 
results. The summary of these findings are presented in Table 3.7. 
 
The first empirical study to test Mitchell et al.’s theoretical model (1997) was undertaken by 
Agle et al. (1999). They  examined stakeholder salience by surveying CEOs at 80 firms and 
found ‘that in the minds of CEOs, the stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency 
are individually (with only two exceptions) and cumulatively (with no exceptions) related to 
stakeholder salience’ (p. 520). The stakeholders identified in the study are shareholders, 
employees, customers, government and communities. Their findings suggest that stakeholder 
attributes do affect the degree to which top managers give priority to competing stakeholders. 
The perceptions of CEOs with regard to power, legitimacy and urgency are individually and 
cumulatively related to CEO values and stakeholder salience across all stakeholder groups.  
 
In the discipline of environmental management, Harvey and Schaefer (2001) found that 
stakeholders with significant power, legitimacy and urgency were given high priority in the minds of 
managers while stakeholders with only one or two attributes have only limited direct influence 
on actions of the managers. Similarly, Gago and Antolin (2004) discovered that 
environmental urgency significantly influences the environmental salience positively for all 
ten stakeholders under investigation while environmental power has a positive significant 
effect on salience except for owners and suppliers. Environmental urgency of all stakeholders 
has a greater impact on environmental salience. As perceived by managers, urgency and 
legitimacy are the most influential attributes on organisational environmental actions 
compared to stakeholder power. 
 
Parent and Deephouse (2007) found a positive relationship between the number of 
stakeholder attributes and perceived stakeholder salience which supports the theory of 
stakeholder identification and salience of Mitchell et al. (1997). They found that the attribute 
of power has the most important effect on salience, followed by urgency and legitimacy. They 
further state that utilitarian power was more powerful than normative or coercive power.  
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Table 3.7:  Summary of Empirical Studies that Relate Stakeholder Attributes to Salience  
Author(s) and 
year 
Context of study Focus of the Study Key Findings  
Agle et al. 
(1999) 
80 US companies  Relationships among the 
stakeholder attributes and 
salience 
the attributes do affect the 
degree to which top 
management give priority to 
competing stakeholder needs 
 
Parent and 
Deephouse 
(2007) 
Two Canadian 
large scale sporting 
organisation 
committees 
Examine the stakeholder 
identification and 
prioritisation by managers 
using the power, 
legitimacy and urgency 
Positive relationship between 
stakeholders attributes and 
perceived stakeholder salience. 
Power has the most important 
effect on salience, followed by 
urgency and legitimacy 
Harvey and 
Schaefer 
(2001) 
Six U.K. water and 
electricity 
companies 
Managing the relationships 
with green stakeholders  
Stakeholders with significant 
power, legitimacy and urgency 
were given high priority in the 
minds of managers 
Gago and 
Antolin (2004) 
277 large 
manufacturing 
firms in Spain  
To identify how managers 
assess different 
stakeholders and their 
attributes in relation to 
environmental issues. 
How these attributes 
influence stakeholders’ 
environmental salience 
environmental urgency 
significantly influences the 
environmental salience of all 
stakeholder groups 
Eesley and 
Lenox (2006) 
 
600 secondary  
stakeholder  actions  
in the US   
It explores  the  conditions  
under  which secondary  
stakeholder groups are  
likely to  elicit positive  
firm  responses 
 
The findings support Mitchell 
et al.'s (1997) stakeholder  
identification  and  salience 
framework  that power,  
legitimacy, and urgency are 
important drivers  of  salience  
Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2009b) 
130 USA managers  
and 114 Italian 
managers   
Examine the extent to 
which the power, 
legitimacy, and urgency 
that managers 
associate with various 
stakeholder groups, 
determines how managers 
prioritize competing 
stakeholder claims 
The power and legitimacy that 
managers associate with a 
stakeholder group 
cumulatively are the most 
important determinant of how 
managers go about 
prioritising competing claims.  
 
Gifford (2010) Six UK and US 
investee companies 
To analyse the attributes of 
power, legitimacy and 
urgency, to determine the 
factors that are likely to 
enhance shareholder 
salience 
All the three attributes need 
not be present to achieve high 
levels of salience. The study 
suggests that within the 
engagement of practitioner 
community, there is a strong 
preference for legitimacy-
based engagement in the first 
instance, with an appropriate 
degree of intensity, and power 
being applied only after 
legitimacy based options have 
been exhausted. 
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Eesley and Lenox (2006) develop and test a theory of the extent to which secondary 
stakeholder groups may obtain positive responses from firms to their requests based upon  
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder identification and salience framework. While this 
framework is based on the notion that fixed attributes of stakeholder groups determine their 
saliency to managers, Eesley and Lenox (2006) sought to ‘extend this framework and propose 
that saliency is dependent on the specific interaction between the stakeholder group and the 
targeted organisations. In particular, they contend that stakeholder groups interact with 
targeted firms by making requests to change their activities consistent with some issue of 
concern’ (p. 767).  The saliency of this request, according to Eesley and Lenox (2006) 
depends not only on stakeholder attributes but also on the nature of the request and the 
attributes of the targeted organisation. If the same stakeholder group had made a different 
request to the same organisation, the organisation may view the request as more or less 
salient. Similarly, the same stakeholder group making the same request of a different 
organisation may be perceived as more or less salient.  With such a conceptualization, they 
measure saliency by action rather than preference. In other words, saliency is determined by 
the degree to which an organisation positively responds to a specific stakeholder request. By 
'positively', they mean that the organisation acts in ways consistent with the stakeholder's 
request (p.767). To test this framework, Eesley and Lenox (2006) built a unique dataset of 
over 600 secondary stakeholder actions within the United States, all concerning 
environmental issues over the period 1971-2003. In particular, their data covered actions such 
as protests, boycotts, and letter writing campaigns. Their findings generally supported 
Mitchell et al.'s (1997) stakeholder identification and salience framework that power, 
legitimacy, and urgency are important drivers of salience. 
 
Boesso and Kumar (2009b) attempt to empirically examine the perceptions of the USA and 
Italian managers on stakeholder attributes associated with the claims of different stakeholder 
groups and the salience associated with those groups. The stakeholder groups were financial 
community, labour unions, customer groups, social and environmental groups and 
professional and industry groups. The results indicate power influenced the salience accorded 
to a stakeholder group in all of the five cases. While urgency was associated with the salience 
of labour, financial and customer groups, legitimacy influenced the salience of labour, 
financial, and social and environmental groups. The situation is explained by the varying 
nature of the relationships between the organisation and the stakeholders.   
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Gifford (2010) employs the model of stakeholder salience to the shareholder context with the 
aim of analysing the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, and determining the factors 
that are likely to enhance shareholder salience. A qualitative case study approach was 
undertaken in six UK and US investee companies. The results reveal that shareholders are 
most salient when there have high levels of power, legitimacy and urgency and the target 
company managers have values that allow for the accommodating of the shareholders’ 
concerns. The most important determinants of salience were a strong business case and the 
values of the managers of investee companies. However, the study concludes that the 
presence of all three attributes is not necessary to achieve high levels of salience. The study 
further suggests that ‘within the engagement practitioner community, there is a strong 
preference for legitimacy-based engagement in the first instance, with an appropriate degree 
of intensity, and power being applied only after legitimacy based options have been 
exhausted’ (p. 97).  
 
3.4.3 Stakeholder Salience and Organisational Goals 
 
Magenss (2008) suggests that Mitchell et al. (1997) have provided a descriptive version of 
stakeholder theory, one that offers a framework for deciding when managers ascribe 
stakeholder status to any of the members of the external stakeholder audience. He adds that 
the framework provides a method of operationalising stakeholder theory. However, Magness 
(2008) claims that although the theory was initially developed in a descriptive way by 
Mitchell et al. (1997), they later subsequently suggest a much broader use for their findings. 
They illustrate by the following quote: 
 
Knowing what types of stakeholders actually exist, which our identification typology 
facilitates, and why managers respond to them the way they do, which our notion of 
salience clarifies, sets the stage for future work in stakeholder theory that specifies how, 
and under what circumstances, managers can and should respond to various types of 
stakeholder (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 855). 
 
 
 
Thus, Magness (2008) asserts ‘clearly, the authors imply that their work contributes to the 
development of an instrumental version of stakeholder theory, a decision-framework that 
guides managers’ actions during the pursuit of organisational goals’ (p. 189).  
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Clarkson (1995) says organisational objectives or goals count because they can be measured 
and evaluated, whether an organisation and its management are motivated by enlightened self-
interest, common sense, or high standards of ethical behaviour. Accordingly, when employing 
the theory suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997) some empirical studies attempt to investigate 
relationships between stakeholder salience and different organisational goals. A few of these 
studies are analysed as follows and the summary of the studies are presented in Table 3.8. 
 
Agle et al. (1999) examined stakeholder salience among 80 large U.S. firms, and found a 
significant relationship between salience and corporate social performance but no link 
between salience and financial performance. However they also note that empirical studies of 
this approach to stakeholder theory are still developing. Therefore other factors they did not 
examine may indeed have a significant impact on salience and financial performance. 
 
Similarly, in attempt to analyse stakeholder salience in two environmental accidents in 
Canadian mining industry, Magness (2008) found that stakeholder status is transient and 
determined through the eyes of the decision-maker, in this case, the management and the 
shareholder.  The management response was examined through change in disclosure while the 
shareholder response was examined through change in share return and risk. The results 
revealed that the management as decision makers who possessed all three stakeholder 
attributes reacted to the first accident and there was a noticeable change in disclosure. 
Likewise, the shareholders as decision makers who possessed all three attributes reacted to the 
second accident and there was a significant change in share price.  
 
One of the objectives of Boesso and Kumar’s (2009a) cross-country study was to examine to 
what extent firms engage in disclosures with the stakeholder groups they deem to be 
important. They found both in the USA and Italy the combination of power and legitimacy is 
the strongest determinant of the level of engagement between firm and the stakeholder, while 
the combination of legitimacy and urgency is the weakest.  Also the results indicate that the 
greater the power and legitimacy associated with the claims of a stakeholder group, the 
greater is the level of reported interaction between the firm and the stakeholder group, as 
evidenced in the voluntary disclosures made by the firms in their annual report.  
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Table 3.8: Summary of Empirical Studies on Stakeholder Attributes, Salience and 
Organisational Objectives 
Author(s) 
and year 
Context of 
study 
Focus of the Study Organisational 
Goal 
Key Findings  
Agle et al. 
(1999) 
80 large US 
companies 
Relationships among 
salience, CEO values 
and corporate 
performance 
 
Corporate 
performance- 
profitability, 
employee relations, 
products, 
environment and 
community 
 
Salience does  influence 
corporate social 
performance,  but no 
support is found for a link 
between salience and 
financial performance 
Magness   
2008 
Canadian 
mining 
industry 
The relationship 
between stakeholder 
salience and response 
of decision makers  
Change in share 
price and disclosure 
When decision makers 
possess all three 
attributes, share prices 
and disclosure change 
significantly  
 
Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2009a) 
 
Italian and 
USA 
Companies 
The relationship 
between stakeholder 
attributes and 
voluntary disclosure 
Stakeholder 
Engagement- 
Voluntary Disclosure 
The more priority given 
to a stakeholder group, 
the greater the efforts 
aimed at engaging the 
stakeholder groups (as 
evidenced by the 
voluntary disclosures 
made in the annual 
report) 
 
Boesso and 
Kumar 
(2009b) 
 
Italian and 
USA 
Companies 
The relationship 
between salience and 
number of Key 
Performance 
Indictors disclosed 
Number of Key 
Performance 
Indictors disclosed 
Salience of labour, 
financial and customer 
stakeholder groups have a 
positive relationship with 
the number of key 
performance indicators 
disclosed but not with 
social and environmental 
and professional and 
industry groups 
 
Mishra and 
Suar 
(2010)  
150 Indian 
manufactur
ing 
companies 
It examines the 
influence 
of strategy and 
salience on corporate 
social responsibility 
(CSR) and tests their 
relative strength in 
influencing CSR  
Corporate social 
responsibility 
Corporate social 
responsibility is enhanced 
and influenced by the 
salience of six primary 
stakeholders 
Myllykang
as et al. 
2010 
A service 
company in 
Finland 
The relationship 
between Stakeholder 
salience and value 
creation  
Value creation  The salience model is not 
sufficient to understand 
value creation. 
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Boesso and Kumar (2009b) in another study using the same above data wanted to investigate 
the relationship between the salience associated with a stakeholder group and the engagement 
effort directed at that group as evidenced in the number of disclosed key performance 
indicators.  Results revealed that salience associated with a group is a predictor of stakeholder 
engagement efforts for labour, financial and customer groups. However, the results fail to 
predict the relationship in the case of social and environmental and professional and industry 
groups. That is, even though the social and environmental and professional and industry 
groups are perceived to be salient, the key performance indicators disclosed by companies 
provide no significant evidence of efforts made to meet the demands and interests of these 
stakeholder groups. 
 
Similarly Mishra and Suar (2010) examined whether strategy towards primary stakeholders 
and their salience influence corporate social responsibility towards the corresponding 
stakeholders in state owned and private Indian manufacturing companies. Measures 
developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999) were employed to assess 
stakeholder salience. They administered a survey among 150 senior level managers including 
CEOs.  Six primary stakeholders were identified in the study in accordance with Clarkson’s 
(1995) premise that primary stakeholders, who are essential for the survival of the firm, will 
be salient to managers. They listed primary stakeholders as employees, customers, investors, 
community, natural environment, and suppliers. Mishra and Suar (2010) believe that salience 
of the primary stakeholder groups persuades firms to adopt corporate social responsibility 
policies due to significant global issues and trends such as environment, labour, customer 
safety, community relations, corporate governance, and supply chain in the new global 
economic order. Accordingly, they found that the corresponding corporate social 
responsibility is enhanced and influenced by the salience of six primary stakeholders. The 
results are consistent with Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) findings that highly legitimate 
stakeholders with control over resources are more likely to get positive response from the 
firms. Mishra and Suar (2010) assert that an organisation’s relationship with primary 
stakeholders is mutual. This is due to the fact that primary stakeholders have an economic 
stake in the company and bear some degree of risk (Clarkson 1995) and hence management is 
unlikely to undertake actions that adversely affect the interest of the organisation and other 
stakeholders. 
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Myllykangas et al. (2010) undertook a study with the aim of analysing the dynamics of 
stakeholder relationships as part of change in value creation in a particular company.  The 
case company had experienced a strategic change from being a division of a large industrial 
corporation to an independent service company.  The stakeholder salience model is used to 
understand stakeholder relationships and their relevance in the value creation process of 
business. Personal interviews were carried out among company’s management and personnel, 
and external stakeholders (customers, the industrial area, and local authorities) in order to 
collect data. The time period under research (6/2004–4/2007) was organised in five periods 
and stakeholders were identified and prioritised in these periods using the framework of 
Mitchell et al. (1997). Owners, employees, customers, management, industry area, suppliers 
and competitors were identified as stakeholders. They founded that stakeholder salience 
varies from period to period and the stakeholders can be classified into definitive, expectant, 
latent, and non-stakeholders. For example, in the first period, the definitive stakeholders were 
owners and customers, the expectant stakeholders were personnel and management, the latent 
stakeholders were the industry area and suppliers, and the non-stakeholders were potential 
customers. However, the results reveal that stakeholder salience analysis does not capture the 
value creation process.  
 
3.4.4 Stakeholder Identification and Salience in the Public Sector 
 
Mainardes et al. (2011) claim that more studies are needed on how to relate good stakeholder 
management to organisational goals and Beach (2009) says possibly the most effective 
theoretical application might actually be in public or non-profit organisation rather than the 
private sector (Beach 2009). Phillips et al. (2003) assert that the application of stakeholder 
theory only to corporations is an ‘unnecessary limitation on the scope of stakeholder theory’ 
(2003, p. 495). They highlight how little attention has been paid by stakeholder theorists to 
other organisational forms, including governmental organisations. Laplume et al. (2008) made 
a similar observation and emphasised the need for appropriate research in order to rectify this 
deficiency. de Bussy and Kelly (2010) claim that writers in the field of policy development 
have also struggled with the same problems of stakeholder breadth. Colebatch (cited in de 
Bussy & Kelly 2010) argued that one of the greatest challenges faced by different tiers of 
government is the identification of who should be involved in the process of policy 
formulation and implementation.   
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Below are some of the empirical researches undertaken in the public and not-for-profit sectors 
using the theory of stakeholder identification and salience. Their summaries are presented in 
Table 3.9. 
 
The first two studies are from the political domain in two different countries that applied the 
model proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997).  First, O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) carried out a 
survey to investigate the relationships between political parties and their stakeholders 
(electoral groups, environmental groups, media, party members/representatives/staff, special 
interest/lobby groups) in Ireland.  Their survey sought to reflect an internal party view of the 
key members of which stakeholder groups are most salient. Survey participants were the 
officials and activists in five major Irish political parties. O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) 
discovered that media was the most powerful stakeholder in the political arena. The power of 
media is believed to be continuous and is exercised not only during election time unlike that 
of the electorate. The respondents perceive that media as a moderately salient stakeholder, 
indicating the independence and impartiality of the media despite its importance.  
Nevertheless, the media were perceived as the least legitimate stakeholder group in the 
political domain. The electorate is perceived as the most legitimate and urgent stakeholder 
group in the political arena and they are also perceived as the most salient stakeholders. The 
level of urgency of the electorate group is expected to be lower during a government or 
council’s midterm.  Party member/representatives achieved a moderate level of salience, 
although they possessed all three stakeholder attributes of Mitchell’s (1997) framework. 
However, the environmental groups despite their possession of only legitimacy are perceived 
as highly salient stakeholders. The special interest/lobby groups do not possess any of the 
three attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) and are considered not salient. The findings 
indicate that legitimacy is the most important attribute for political parties in Ireland. That is, 
the possession of legitimacy of a stakeholder is considered more important than power and 
urgency when rating a stakeholder as salient.  
 
However, O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) say ‘overall, the results suggest that political parties 
may find other attributes over and above the three proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) to 
determine salience. This may indicate that political parties find other attributes, not accounted 
for by Mitchell et al.’s (1997) method, more important to assigning salience’ (p. 72). They 
further explain that the possession of one or two attributes may be more relevant to salience 
than the mere possession of all three attributes. Also, the three attributes of the framework do 
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not seem to completely describe salience to all organisations in a generic sense. ‘However, it 
appears that more ideologically oriented organisations may assign higher salience to 
stakeholders who fit their ideology, as opposed to those who possess power, legitimacy and 
urgency. The ideological dimension appears to be something beyond legitimacy’ (p. 73). 
 
Similarly, in an attempt to explore the meaning of the stakeholder concept in politics, de 
Bussy and Kelly (2010) used the theory of stakeholder identification and salience as a 
framework. They attempted to discover whether a gap existed between those politicians they 
say they should pay attention to in-principle (stakeholder identification) and those they 
actually pay attention to in practice (stakeholder salience). They believe the existence of any 
such gap would not auger well for the resolution of the democratic deficit. This qualitative 
study involved in-depth interviews with 23 politicians and political advisers in Western 
Australia and was conducted in the style of a grounded theory investigation.  Unlike 
O’Higgins and Morgan’s (2006) study they did not nominate any particular stakeholders to as 
participants.  
 
de Bussy and Kelly (2010) found in the political arena a stakeholder is referred to as a person 
or group with a legitimate interest or claim in a particular situation or policy decision. Hence, 
in a political context, in terms of stakeholder identification, they view legitimacy as the most 
important of the three variables of the theory of stakeholder identification and salience. When 
turning to the notion of salience, de Bussy and Kelly (2010) explored ‘that there are many 
groups with legitimate interests who are effectively excluded from the consultative process 
because they are largely unorganised and hence lack the power to command the attention of 
the political elite’ (p. 300). In particular, these unorganised groups include young people, 
Australian Muslims, Aboriginal people, single parents, stay-at-home mothers, people with 
disabilities, gay and lesbian people, and people living in remote, rural or regional areas as 
mentioned by various participants. However, the participants also mention that the issues of 
these unorganised groups will become salient during the election time. They say ‘the 
heightened perceived urgency of these claims for politicians seeking re-election naturally 
increases their salience as the polling date approaches, irrespective of their legitimacy’ (de 
Bussy & Kelly 2010, p. 299). However, in practice, those who are with power and urgency to 
influence their claims obtain the most attention from the politicians and their advisers. de 
Bussy and Kelly (2010) say, ‘Unsurprisingly, urgency is a particular factor in the lead-up to 
elections when those with power redouble their efforts to sway the policy debate’ (p. 301).   
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Table 3.9: Summary of Empirical Studies in Public and Not-for-Profit Sectors employing the 
Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience 
Author(s) 
and year 
Context of 
study 
Focus of the Study Key Findings  
O’Higgins 
and 
Morgan 
(2006) 
 
Officials and 
activists in five 
major Irish 
political Parties 
Whether stakeholder salience 
based on attributes  portray 
who and what really matters to 
political parties and the 
differences between parties in 
relation to their assignment of 
stakeholder salience are 
reflected in their electoral 
success 
Stakeholders considered more 
important to the organisation 
receive higher levels of 
engagement from the parties than 
those stakeholders thought to be 
less critical. The results suggest 
that high levels of stakeholder 
engagement can yield beneficial 
electoral results for political parties 
Collier 
(2008) 
a non-profit 
distributing 
quasi-public 
organisation 
Focus on board and its 
accountability to its three main 
stakeholders 
The board did not equally identify 
the stakeholders in terms of their 
power, legitimacy and urgency nor 
equally prioritised the stakeholder 
demands in terms of salience 
de Bussy 
and Kelly 
(2010) 
 
23 Politicians 
and political 
advisers in 
Western 
Australia.  
To explore the meaning of the 
stakeholder concept in politics, 
using theories drawn from the 
fields of management, political 
science and public relations. In 
particular, the theory of 
stakeholder identification and 
salience is to be used as a 
framework. 
There is a gulf between how 
politicians think stakeholder status 
should be accorded in principle and 
what happens in reality. 
In practice, power seems to play a 
far greater role than legitimacy in 
determining stakeholder salience 
among political decision-makers 
Assard and 
Goddard 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
Two Tanzanian 
Non-
governmental 
organisations 
(NGOs). 
To investigate the influence of 
stakeholders on accountability 
relationships and the 
development of accounting 
practices and processes within 
two Tanzanian NGOs 
 
Overseas donors were the 
stakeholders with the highest 
salience.  
Differences in the accounting 
functions in the NGOs were 
explained by the influence of 
dominant stakeholders indicating 
that it was largely a tool for 
satisfying claims of the highly 
salient stakeholders 
Masoud  
and 
Wilson(20
11) 
 
213 managers 
from 20 
privatised firms 
and 35 state 
owned firms in 
Tanzania 
To analyse the effects of 
stakeholder attributes on the 
stakeholder salience of 
shareholders groups  in state-
owned and privatized firms in 
Tanzania 
Employees, customers, and 
community attained inferior status 
compared to the results obtained in 
developed countries for which the 
theory had been developed.  
Results indicated that the effects on 
salience are similar for 
shareholders but different for the 
remaining stakeholder groups  
 
Wynn-
Williams 
(2012) 
New Zealand’s 
system, the 
Pharmaceutical 
Management 
Agency 
(PHARMAC) 
To explore how a public sector 
entity within New Zealand’s 
public health system, 
continues to operate unfettered 
with ongoing public challenges 
Ministry of Health as funder is a 
dominant stakeholder, indicating 
that there is no urgency being 
applied to PHARMAC for change. 
The recipient group, the general 
public is viewed as a dependent 
stakeholder with no power. 
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Accordingly they assert that there exists a gap between stakeholder identification and salience  
in the political domain. That is ‘there is a difference between who politicians say they should 
pay attention to in principle and who is actually taken into account in practice’ (p. 301). The 
gap created has the potential to worsen the democratic deficit. Accordingly, in theoretical 
terms they suggest that, legitimacy is the major determinant of stakeholder identification but 
power and urgency are the keys to understanding stakeholder salience, in a political context. 
de Bussy and Kelly (2010) further argue that in the content of stakeholder theory, this gulf 
between the stakeholder perception and the actual practice could be termed the 
normative/descriptive divide as explained by Donaldson and Preston (1995). These findings 
are similar to the findings of O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) claim that ideology plays an 
important role in stakeholder salience in politics.  
 
With the aim of exploring accountability of organisations to multiple stakeholders, Collier 
(2008) undertook a four-year longitudinal field study via participant observation of a non-
profit distributing quasi-public organisation providing ‘affordable housing’ to low income 
tenants. The researcher was an independent board member. The study was focusing on board 
and its accountability to its three main stakeholders who had differing interests, namely: the 
Housing Corporation as regulator; lenders; and tenants. Collier (2008) says since 
accountability requires governance, the stakeholder accountability perspective is the only 
available option for non-profit distributing quasi-public organisations with social welfare 
objects. The housing association was going through a structural transformation with the aim 
of improving its capability to fulfil its multiple but not mutually exclusive accountabilities. 
The board had multiple accountabilities to multiple stakeholders, prioritising explicitly or 
implicitly the different demands and claims. However, Collier (2008) observed that during the 
transformation, the board of the housing association neither equally identified the 
stakeholders in terms of their power, legitimacy and urgency nor equally prioritised the 
stakeholder demands in terms of salience.   
 
Assad and Goddard (2010) investigated the influence of stakeholders on accountability 
relationships and the development of accounting practices and processes within two 
Tanzanian non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They use grounded theory approach and 
employ the theory of stakeholder identification and salience in order to evaluate the positions 
of stakeholder groups. In-depth interviews, observation and documentary analysis are the 
methods used to collect data for the study. During the analysis of stakeholders they identified 
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six major stakeholders: the government, donors, the board of trustees, the regulatory 
accounting board, members and beneficiary communities. According to the analysis the 
government falls under the category of definitive stakeholder who possesses all three 
stakeholder attributes, since it possesses the power to allow registration and de-registration of 
an NGO, it has legitimacy claims on NGO operations which are mostly urgent. Donors and 
board of trustees according to the Mitchell et al. (1997) framework are also considered as 
definitive stakeholders.  Most of these donors are based in the USA and Europe and have 
common concerns and requirements for accountability and accounting with respect to their 
donations.  The requirements of donors’ accounting information demands and their effect on 
other internal organisational resource priorities are viewed as burdensome. Hence the 
reporting requirements including financial reporting were carried with much discontentment 
even in the organisations that were reputed to be credible. It was also noted that the board of 
trustees, in spite of being a definitive stakeholder, failed to exercise its oversight functions 
due to depth of personal relationships with management. The regulatory accounting board is 
viewed as a dominant stakeholder who does not have any urgency to accomplish its needs and 
claims. The members of the Tanzanian NGOs and beneficiary communities are considered as 
dependent stakeholders who lack power to pursue their claims even when they are urgent. 
They need the support of a definitive stakeholder, such as donors, the regulatory accounting 
board or government in order to accomplish their claims. 
  
 In order to analyse the effects of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency on 
the stakeholder salience of shareholders, employees, customers, and community in state-
owned and privatised firms in Tanzania, Masoud and Wilson (2011) administered a survey. 
Further they compared the results with studies carried out in developed countries such as the 
USA (Agle et al. 1999) and Spain (Gago & Antolin 2004). They found both in state-owned 
and privatised sectors the shareholders were definitive (power, legitimacy and urgency). For 
state-owned organisations, employees and the community were perceived as dangerous 
(power and urgency). Customers were viewed as demanding (urgency) by state-owned 
organisations. Moreover, the customers, employees and the community were seen as 
dependent (legitimacy and urgency) by the management of the privatised organisations. When 
comparing the results with the USA and Spain, they found that the shareholders were 
classified as dependent (legitimacy and urgency) in the developed countries while in Tanzania 
the classification was definitive (power, legitimacy and urgency).  However, in Tanzanian 
context, employees, customers, and community attained inferior status compared to the results 
obtained in developed countries in which the theory had been developed. Masoud and Wilson 
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(2011) argued these differences can be not only due to economic and financial differences of 
the developed and developing nations but due to cultural differences as well.  
 
Wynn-Williams (2012) explored how a public sector entity within New Zealand’s public 
health system, the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC), continues to operate 
with minimal government interference in the face of ongoing public challenges. PHARMAC 
is a crown entity and a statutory corporation with different stakeholders such as, funders 
(Ministry of Health - government), providers and recipients (public).  The data was collected 
from publicly available documents and semi-structured interviews. The analysis revealed that 
the Ministry of Health as funder is a dominant stakeholder, indicating that there is no urgency 
being applied to PHARMAC for change. The recipient group, the general public is viewed as 
a dependent stakeholder with no power. Wynn-Williams (2012) stated that ‘PHARMAC’s 
accountability is limited to these two major stakeholder groups, and they are quite unequal in 
terms of ability to induce action’ (p. 353).  
 
 
3.4.5 Further Development of Mitchell et al.’s Model 
 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of stakeholder identification and salience has been one of the 
most significant contributions in the development of stakeholder literature (Neville et al. 
2011). However, certain studies based on their empirical evidence, believe and suggest that 
there are many alluring ways to advance the theory of stakeholder identification and salience. 
In fact Mitchell et al. (1997) acknowledged that ‘…..we have necessarily made sweeping 
assumptions …. (that) must be revisited and assessed …….point toward additional enquiry 
that can enrich the theory and add to its usefulness’ (p. 881). Nevertheless, further 
development of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) study has been relatively limited and rarely 
recognised and integrated (Neville et al. 2011). Consequently, the model of stakeholder 
salience is generally applied referring to the original conceptualisation (Neville et al. 2011).  
 
Table 3.11 presents some further developments of  the model contributed by other researchers 
organised under three themes, namely: ‘the nature of attributes as they relate to stakeholder 
salience; the epistemological assumptions underpinning the framework; and the contextual 
variables that may affect the model’s generalizability’ (Neville et al. 2011, p. 359).  
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Table 3.10: Themes and Contributions of Researchers post-Mitchell et al. (1997) 
Theme Contribution Authors Specific Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St
ak
eh
o
ld
er
 
 
A
ttr
ib
u
te
s 
New attribute Driscoll and Starik (2004) Stakeholder salience is also affected by 
‘proximity’ of stakeholders. 
Deeper 
understanding 
of attributes 
Driscoll and Starik (2004) 
 
Eesley and Lenox (2006) 
 
Neville et al. (2011) 
 
Urgency is also driven by the probability a 
claim will occur. 
Exercise of power is also driven by resource 
access. 
The moral legitimacy of the stakeholder‘s 
claim applies to stakeholder salience. 
Relative 
contributions 
of attributes and 
component parts 
Parent and Deephouse 
(2007) 
 
Neville et al. (2011) 
Power is the most influential attribute, 
followed by urgency. 
Salience increases with the accumulation of 
three types of power, of which utilitarian 
power had the most effect upon salience. 
Urgency is not relevant for identifying 
stakeholder salience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ep
ist
em
o
lo
gi
ca
l  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
s 
 
Theoretical 
underpinning of 
power 
Driscoll and Starik 
(2004); Neville and 
Menguc (2006); and 
Pajunen (2006) 
Stakeholder power may also be explained by 
social network theory. 
 
Unit of analysis 
Neville and Menguc 
(2006) 
May need to assess salience of coalitions of 
stakeholders. 
Phillips (2003) Legitimacy can be ‘derived’ from potential to 
affect others.  
Managers should prioritise normative over 
derivative stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 
o
f  
co
n
te
x
t 
 
 
 
 
 
Role of managers’ 
perceptions 
Agle et al. (1999) No effect of managers’ values 
Parent and Deephouse 
(2007) 
Managers’ role and hierarchical level affects 
stakeholder identification and the attribute-
salience relationship. 
Harvey and Schaefer 
(2001) 
Managers’ intuition affects assessments of 
salience. 
Henriques and Sadorsky 
(1999); and Buysse and 
Verbeke (2003) 
Environmental proactiveness affects 
stakeholder identification. 
Jones et al. (2007) Stakeholder culture affects assessments of 
attributes and salience. 
External factors Jawahar and McLaughlin 
(2001) 
Stage of the organizational life cycle will 
affect assessments of salience. 
Pfarrer et al. (2008)  Type of transgression at heart of claim will 
affect salience. 
Stage of resolution of the crisis will affect 
salience. 
Adapted: Neville et al. (2011) 
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3.5   Review of Literature on Accountability in the Public Sector 
 
This section is presented in four parts. First, the definitions and complexity of the notion of 
accountability is provided. The changing nature of accountability for the public sector and 
dimensions of accountability in the public sector are presented in the second and third 
sections respectively. Finally a brief analysis of the dimensions of accountability in the public 
sector is presented.   
 
3.5.1 Definitions and Complexity of Accountability 
 
Accountability is a socially constructed concept (Sinclair 1995) which impacts on all aspects 
of government operations (Barton 2006). Traditionally, accountability means the giving or 
rendering of an account in particular a statement explaining one’s conduct or actions (Parker 
& Gould 1999). This has also arisen from the concept of stewardship. A steward is willing to 
accept responsibility and be answerable for all actions to the principal in discharging duties 
when he or she is entrusted with resources (Stewart 1984). The concept of accountability can 
be also be viewed in terms of accounting for, reporting on, explaining and justifying 
activities, and accepting responsibility for the outcomes (Barton 2006; Patton 1992). 
According to the Management Advisory Board of the Australian Commonwealth Government 
the concept of accountability requires activities including setting goals, providing and 
reporting on results and the evident repercussion for getting things right or wrong which goes 
beyond simply providing information or answering questions (Core cited in Parker & Gould, 
1999).  
 
In the current study, accountability is referred as ‘certain obligations that arise within a 
relationship of responsibility, where one person or body is responsible to another for the 
performance of particular services’ (Mulgan 2000a, p. 87). Thus, initially one has to account 
for the decisions or actions undertaken while performing duties and subsequently, to accept 
sanctions or redirections as a consequence of those performances (Mulgan 2000a). 
Accountability, consequently, involves two or more parties (Stewart 1984). One party is the 
accountor or agent or one who accounts and is held to account and the other party is the 
accountee or principal or one who holds to account (Stewart 1984). For example, elected 
councillors are agents for the citizens that elected them and LGA managers are agents for the 
councillors (Kluvers & Tippet 2010).  
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3.5.2 Changing Nature of Public Sector Accountability  
 
Fuller and Roffey (1993) argue that the fundamentals of accountability in the public sector are 
derived from the Westminster system of government. Features of this system are: public 
servants are accountable to ministers; ministers are accountable to the parliament; and 
parliament is accountable to the public. However, Parker and Gould (1999) claim that 
relations between minister and public servants and between public servants and parliament are 
more complicated than proposed by the Westminster system of government. This is because 
‘public servants are considered to be accountable not only to their immediate supervisors and 
ultimately to the minister but also to a range of external institutions such as parliament and its 
committees, the Auditor General and the courts, members of the public themselves and even 
to their own professional consciences’ (Parker & Gould 1999 p. 119). This situation is 
contradictory to the hierarchical relationships presumed from the Westminster system 
(Mulgan 1997) since public servants appear to maintain relationships with multiple 
stakeholders (Burritt & Welch 1997). Consequently the public sector managers often feel they 
are simultaneously accountable to multiple stakeholders (Core cited in Parker & Gould, 
1999). These accountability relationships may embrace professional/client relationships and 
social communal relationships in addition to the traditional hierarchical relationships 
(Goddard & Powell 1994).  Nevertheless, Parker and Gould (1999) emphasise that these 
multiple stakeholder relationships maintained by public sector managers are defined by a 
combination of legislation, guidelines and convention. Similarly accountability is accustomed 
by constitutional, legal, professional statutory and practical requirements creating public 
sector accountability that is more complex than private sector.  
 
Moreover, since the term New Public Management (NPM) was introduced in Europe in the 
1980s, a different conception of accountability has applied in the public sector. This 
conception of accountability has, purportedly, reduced the gap between the public and private 
sectors (Hood 1995). NPM has brought a profound change to the fundamental orientation of 
public sector accountability. It has moved from a concept of accountability to the public at 
large for the multiple dimensions of public sector activity, to accountability for financial 
outcomes to be largely exercised within the hierarchy of public sector activity (Parker & 
Gould 1990; Pallot 1997). Researchers have argued that new public management has meant a 
move from external accountabilities to internal accountabilities. In particular it has meant a 
focus on accountability to the customer as opposed to accountabilities to the Parliament and 
the public (Parker & Gould 1999). As Sinclair’s (1995) study of CEO in Australian public 
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sector organisations found, accountability in the public sector is multiple and fragmented with 
full accountability in one dimension, while requiring compromised accountability in another. 
 
3.5.3 Dimensions of Accountability in the Public Sector 
 
While general definitions of accountability have been established, the concept is deemed to be 
multi-dimensional because it changes with context (Sinclair 1995). As a consequence of the 
Westminster system of government, the new public sector management (NPM) approach and 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders, multiple dimensions of accountability in the public 
sector are inevitable. A number of researchers have presented different dimensions of 
accountability. Table 3.11 presents a summary of studies on dimensions of accountability 
displaying the evolution of the notion and dimensions of accountability in the public sector. 
 
Three primary dimensions of accountability are concerned when sub-dimensions are 
explained as ‘traits’ that construct the elements of a primary dimension (Othman & Taylor 
2006). The three primary dimensions are: public, managerial and political which fit the 
collective results of four empirical studies. They are, Sinclair (1995) – political public and 
managerial, Taylor and Rosair (2000) – managerial and fiduciary, Kloot and Martin (2001) – 
political and public and Luke (2010) – political, public and managerial. These consolidated 
dimensions and elements are discussed briefly below and presented in Table 3.12.   
 
First is the dimension of public accountability. LGAs provide a wide range of community 
services to the public, requiring public accountability. The public accountability process is 
mostly established by legislation and democratically elected parliamentary institutions 
(Cameron 2004). To this end, governments need to be ‘answerable to the public for governing 
in the best interests of all citizens according to legally prescribed processes and accepted 
conventions’ (English 2003 p.53). In LGAs, councillors are responsible to the public; the 
public can judge the performance of the council and exercise its influence via voting rights. 
Thus, public accountability holds those in power accountable to the community and general 
public at large for their acts and omissions, decision and policies and expenditure which 
requires openness of account giving (Cameron 2004). This will involve responding to and 
directly informing the community in relation to its concerns, complaints and enquiries. This 
can occur through various channels from newspaper reports to hearings which lead to more 
direct, transparent answerability to the community (Sinclair 1995; Kloot and Martin 2001). 
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Table 3.11: Summary of Prior Studies on Dimensions of Accountability in the Public Sector 
Author/ 
Year  
Dimension of 
Accountability 
Comment  
Normanton  
(1966); 
(1971) 
Political Accountability  The author noted that in the public sector, public 
officials are required to provide information 
particularly on financial management to superior as 
well as to persons at the highest level in government. 
Robinson  
(1971) 
Program accountability  
Process accountability 
Fiscal accountability 
Argued that faculty members of a university are not 
answerable to anyone as a result of academic 
freedom.  In order to account for their research funds, 
they are expected to be concerned with quality of their 
work and ensure their set program goals are achieved 
and requirements on reporting on research funds and 
processes are met.  
Johnson  
(1974) 
Legal  Accountability 
Political Accountability 
Professional Accountability 
Administrative 
Accountability 
Argued that accountability requires the performance 
and conduct of persons exercising public authority to 
be evaluated in legal, political, professional and 
administrative dimensions for their actions and 
inactions.  The persons exercising public authority 
consist of those holding elected political office or a 
permanent position in the political and administrative 
structure. 
Stewart  
(1984) 
Ladder of Accountability for: 
Probity  
Legality  
Process  
Efficiency 
Good administration 
Performance 
Program 
Managerial Accountability 
Commercial Accountability 
Policy Accountability 
A conceptualization of accountability in public sector 
organizations in which several bases are perceived for 
accountability, depending on the activities for which 
the accounts have to be given and the purpose of the 
account. The alternative bases of account-ability are 
set out as a ladder of accountability according to the 
purpose for which a bond is constituted. The ladder 
leads from accountability by standards to 
accountability by judgment.  
Going up the ladder of accountability, the type of 
information provided should also change.  Financial 
data alone are not sufficient.  Other information such 
as output data (for performance accountability) and 
objectives (for program accountability) should also be 
included.   
Romzek and 
Dubnick  
(1987) 
Bureaucratic Accountability 
Legal Accountability 
Professional Accountability 
Political Accountability 
Case study on the space shuttle Challenger tragedy, 
highlighting the detrimental effect of multiple 
accountability systems and how inappropriate political 
and bureaucratic accountability at NASA leads to the 
Challenger disaster when decision makers relied upon 
supervisors to make the decisions rather than deferring 
to professional experts. 
Roberts  
(1991)  
  
  
Individualizing forms of 
accountability  
Socializing forms of 
accountability 
In this conceptual article on accountability, the author 
conceived how two different forms of accountability 
produce different senses of self and the 
interdependencies of self with others. Accountability 
in practice is deemed to be a form of social relation 
with moral and strategic dimensions.  
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Author/ 
Year  
Dimension of 
Accountability 
Comment  
Fowles  
(1993) 
The notion of accountability 
in social policy 
Discussion of the contemporary notion of 
accountability, which focuses on providing better 
quality services to consumers and users of services 
rather than merely internal checks on performance.  
Cochrane  
(1993) 
Contractual Accountability  
Rights-based Accountability 
Contended that managerialism, contracting out, quasi-
market and value for money introduced to the public 
sector incorporate the notion of accountability. 
Argued that contractual accountability could conceal a 
high degree of inequality in contracting while rights-
based accountability does not have much impact on 
the rights of the consumers. 
Sinclair  
(1995) 
Political Accountability 
Public Accountability 
Managerial Accountability 
Professional Accountability 
Personal Accountability 
Case study on 15 Chief Executive Officers of a public 
sector agency in Australia.  Findings suggest that 
accountability in the public sector agency is 
subjectively constructed and changes with context. 
The concept is multiple and fragmented 
(accountability in one form sacrifices other forms of 
accountability). It is tied to language and ideology; 
values and ethics and emotions and motivations.  
Virtanen  
(1997) 
Internal Accountability  
External Accountability 
Survey amongst 17 public agencies in Finland which 
found both public managers and workers were 
strongly accountable to their immediate superior and 
particular customers who use their services. Internal 
accountability such as feeling highly accountable to 
immediate superior and fellow workers was slightly 
stronger than external accountability such as 
accountability to taxpayers and political 
representatives. 
Taylor and 
Rosair  
(2000) 
Managerial Accountability  
Fiduciary Accountability  
Survey of Principal Accounting Officers of State 
government departments throughout Australia.  An 
accountability-related disclosure index was used to 
study the extent of fiduciary and managerial 
accountability-based disclosure provided by 
government departments, as influenced by different 
active stakeholders.  
Kloot and 
Martin  
(2001) 
Political Accountability to: 
State government and 
Councillors  
Public Accountability to: 
Ratepayers and the Wider 
community 
A survey of Australian local governments in all States, 
which examined the perceptions of accountability to 
multiple stakeholders. It found that managers in local 
government have to contend with multiple 
accountabilities to multiple stakeholders. Generally, 
higher emphasis is placed on public accountability 
than political accountability.  
Luke (2010)  
 
Political Accountability 
  
Public Accountability 
  
Managerial Accountability 
  
Professional 
Accountability 
In-depth interviews with senior executives of New 
Zealand State owned enterprises and analysis of 
textual data are carried out. The findings reveal that 
GBEs face multiple dimensions of accountability. The 
traditional dimensions of accountability of public, 
managerial and political accountabilities are 
mentioned in the discussions with the executives. 
Source: Othman and Taylor (2006); Luke (2010) 
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Second is the dimension of managerial accountability. A private-sector version of 
accountability has been imported into the public sector (Hood 1995) resulting in a more 
managerial-style accountability. Managerial accountability according to Sinclair (1995) is the 
answerability of the managers when producing outputs or use of resources in achieving the 
final objectives of a particular organisation. Thus, managerial accountability involves 
achieving economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the functions and operations of the 
organisation. This is a monitoring process of inputs, outputs and achievement of intended 
outcomes. Although a typical LGA does not have profit maximisation as a primary objective, 
there is a need to measure performance against objectives to enhance accountability (Pinnuck 
& Potter 2009). To this end, performance indicators and performance reporting have become 
means of discharging managerial accountability in public sector organisations (Kloot 1999; 
Kluvers 2001; 2003) particularly in financial, budgetary and service delivery terms.  
Managerial accountability to different tiers of government and to local community is 
measured by financial and non-financial performance measures (Kloot 1999).   
 
Third is the dimension of political accountability. The Westminster system of government 
provides a direct line or a chain of political accountabilities. In this hierarchical chain, the 
government representatives (managers) are directly accountable to an executive or a minister 
for implementing the set of policies and the minister is accountable to the Parliament for the 
outcomes and ultimately the Parliament is accountable to the electorates (Thynne & Goldring 
1987; Stewart 1984; Funnell & Cooper 1998). This hierarchical accountability leads the LGA 
managers to be answerable to different tiers of government oversight bodies, including the 
state government department responsible for the LGA and auditor-general. Othman and 
Taylor (2006) state political accountability is used to relate a manager’s accountability even to 
local councillors, as well as to state and federal ministers, who in turn are accountable to their 
constituents.  Sinclair (1995) found that political accountability was the main focus of the 
CEOs of public sector entities due to their concern for defending their organisation’s 
processes from ministerial interferences and restricting their organisation from getting caught 
in political assessments. 
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Table 3.12: Consolidated Accountability Dimensions and Elements 
Primary 
accountability 
dimensions 
Accountability traits or 
elements 
Description  
Public 
Accountability 
Good administration 
(Stewart 1984) 
Emphasis on giving excellent service, 
prompt assistance and information 
about services to the public. 
Administrative justice 
(Johnson 1974) 
Concerned with giving explanations for 
non-performance and ensuring 
maladministration does not lead to 
injustice for the public. 
Managerial 
Accountability 
 
 
 
Performance (Stewart 
1984) 
Whether the results achieved meet the 
required targets and standards (effective 
and efficient) 
Program (Robinson 1971; 
Stewart 1984) 
Responsibility to meet program 
management expectations. 
Political 
Accountability 
Policy (Fowles 1993) Setting and meeting policy according to 
directives of elected officials. 
Political (Normanton 
1971; Sinclair 1995)  
Accountable to political representative 
and leaders who are in turn accountable 
to the community. 
Source: Othman and Taylor (2006)  
 
3.5.4 Empirical Studies on Dimensions of Accountability in the Public Sector 
 
Empirical studies in public sector accountability are mostly conducted through case studies 
and surveys in the domains of local government, government departments and statutory 
authorities. Sinclair (1995) investigated the accountability of CEOs of government 
departments and statutory authorities in Victoria and identified five dimensions of 
accountability, namely the political, public, managerial, professional and personal 
accountability. The study employed qualitative methods that involved semi-structured 
interviews and content and discourse analysis of the transcripts. Two discourses of 
accountability were identified: structural and personal. The CEOs were said to be faced with a 
complex chameleon-like accountability and answerable to many competing constituencies, 
from government ministers to professional society. 
 
In an attempt to investigate the distinctions of accountability faced by local government 
managers across Australian states and between urban and non-urban areas, Kloot and Martin 
(2001) conducted a quantitative accountability study. A survey was administered and the 
managers were asked to rate their degree of accountability to various stakeholders. The results 
indicate that there are only minor differences in the perception of accountability within 
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different States and between urban and non-urban areas and the mangers indicated they have 
high responsibility to discharge their accountability to ratepayers, councillors, wider 
community and state government. Providing further evidence of Sinclair’s (1995) public and 
political accountabilities, Kloot and Martin (2001) found that the managers perceived these 
accountabilities to be of high and very high importance. Othman and Taylor (2006) carried 
out a survey among heads and senior managers of Malaysian local authority departments in 
order to provide evidence of the existence of an accountability typology in the public sector. 
Their findings support the prior empirical findings of Sinclair (1995) and Kloot and Martin 
(2001) with the evidence of three exclusive dimensions of accountabilities. Othman and 
Taylor’s (2006) study provides three distinct accountability dimensions: managerial/public; 
fiduciary/compliance and political.  
 
In order to observe the impact of the NPM on accountability in the modern context, Kluvers 
and Tippet (2011) conducted an empirical study within Victorian local government. A survey 
was administered among councillors and managers of Victorian local government authorities.  
Four factors were generated through factor analysis which revealed the effect of the NPM on 
the understanding of accountability of the councillors and managers. Their findings indicate 
that accountability has moved away from the traditional stewardship notion of accountability 
and toward managerial accountability.  With the key elements of the NPM – performance, 
outputs and financial reporting – respondents perceive accountability to be associated with 
private sector business-like behaviour. Thus, they conclude the NPM has changed the 
parameters of public decision-making.  
 
3.6  Literature Gap and Contribution of the Study 
 
Several gaps are identified in the review of literature. First, the literature is sparse on the 
application of the theory of stakeholder identification and salience in accountability research. 
In particular, hypothesising and testing relationships between stakeholder attributes and 
salience and dimensions of accountability is limited in prior literature. Only two empirical 
studies can be identified as investigating the relationship between stakeholder salience and 
accountability. They are Collier (2008) and Assad and Goddard (2010). However, these two 
studies have not considered the dimensions of accountability, but accountability as a holistic 
approach.  Moreover, the research designs and methods employed by these two studies are 
different to the current study. The current study is a quantitative study which uses survey data 
predominantly and secondary data to a certain extent whereas the other two studies are 
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qualitative. Collier (2008) uses a participant observation method while Assad and Goddard 
(2010) use a grounded theory approach.  
 
Second, the current study seeks to extend the stakeholder identification and salience literature 
to the local government context. Although there are empirical studies undertaken in the public 
sector employing the theory of stakeholder identification and salience (O’Higgins & Morgan 
(2006); Collier (2008); de Bussy and Kelly (2010); Assard & Goddard (2010); Masoud & 
Wilson(2011); Wynn-Williams (2012)), no such studies were found in the context of local 
government. Further, the current study attempts to investigate the relationship between 
stakeholder salience and infrastructure backlog (refer to Chapter Two) experienced by local 
government authorities. This relationship has not been hypothesised in the prior literature.  
 
Third, prior studies on public sector accountability have focused on infrastructure asset 
disclosure issues including the disclosure of accounting, engineering and performance 
information (refer to Chapter Two). The notion of accountability emphasis as rated by key 
management players (Mayors and CEOs), and the stakeholder perspective of how this 
accountability emphasis is determined with respect to infrastructure assets, is a new 
contribution to this literature.  
 
Fourth, the body of literature on accountability in the public sector has been largely normative 
(Kloot & Martin 2001). This study seeks to operationalise some of the concepts in this 
normative literature about accountability and its determinants.  
 
Lastly, the prior empirical study by Kluvers and Tippet (2011) that explored the dimensions 
of accountability in the context of Australian local government was limited only to the 
Victorian State. Kloot and Martin (2001) administered their survey to the CEOs of all 
Australian LGAs but that was in 1998. Since then there has been no other study which has 
explored dimensions of accountability of LGAs. Moreover, the current study investigates 
dimensions of accountability from the perspective of the CEOs and Mayors, respectively.   
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3.7 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter has reviewed the bodies of literature related to the theoretical underpinning of the 
concepts and variables to be modelled in the current study. In particular, it has reviewed 
conceptual and empirical studies drawn from the theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience and from dimensions of accountability.  
The first section of the review focused on the concept of a stakeholder, the categorisation of 
stakeholders, and the analysis of stakeholders in the public sector. This review has been tied 
to the development of stakeholder theory. Then the chapter proceeded to review the extended 
version of stakeholder theory: the theory of stakeholder identification and salience. It 
discussed the stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, the concept of 
stakeholder salience and the typology of types of stakeholders. It then reviewed focal 
empirical studies in diverse contexts. The review of the literature has identified the gap that, 
despite the application of stakeholder theory in the public sector, it has not been applied in the 
local government context to date.  
The second section reviewed the changing notion of accountability while discussing the 
complexity of the concept. Alternative views on the dimensions of accountability in the public 
sector have been reviewed followed by a review of empirical studies. A search was especially 
made for studies on accountability in the local government context. While two prior studies 
have investigated accountability in local government, no prior empirical studies have been 
found that investigate relationship between stakeholder salience and dimensions of 
accountability in local government context.  
The next chapter develops the theoretical framework and the hypotheses for this study. This 
framework and set of hypotheses will contain the concepts of stakeholder attributes, 
stakeholder salience, dimensions of accountability and infrastructure backlog reviewed in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To provide a basis from which to address the research questions set out in Chapter One, this 
chapter first designs and present a conceptual framework. Underlying this framework is the 
local government field setting which is described. Then hypotheses arising from this 
framework are generated. In summary, the chapter comprise of four sections. A diagram of 
the conceptual framework for the study is discussed and presented in the first section. The 
second section provides brief explanations of multiple stakeholders in the local government 
context under two broad categories: public stakeholders and higher-tier government 
stakeholders. In the third section, six hypotheses are developed based on logic and evidence 
from prior literature..  The hypotheses are presented under three theoretical perspectives.  In 
the final section, a diagram of the empirical schema for the study along with a table showing 
the connections between the study’s invoked theories, concepts, research questions and 
hypotheses are presented.  
 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptualisation of this study is based on two perspectives: (1) stakeholder identification 
and salience and (2) accountability in its multiple dimensions. In addition to these two 
perspectives, which were discussed in Chapter 3, the study focuses on the concepts of 
managerial values and infrastructure backlog. The conceptual framework in Figure 4.1 is 
constructed from on these particular perspectives and concepts.  
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Figure: 4.1  Conceptual Model 
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The framework in Figure 4.1 can be divided into three parts. First it considers how the three 
attributes namely power, legitimacy and urgency possessed by different stakeholder groups 
(public stakeholders and higher-tier government stakeholders) influence the way the Mayors 
and CEOs prioritise the demands and claims of these stakeholder groups (stakeholder 
salience) with regard to infrastructure assets. Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder typology 
which demonstrates the various combinations of the three attributes is employed here. 
Second, the framework relates the manner in which Mayors and CEOs prioritise different 
stakeholder claims and demands to the emphasis given by the local government to the 
discharge of different accountability dimensions (namely, public, managerial and political 
accountabilities). Third, the framework in Figure 4.1 envisages that the manner in which 
Mayors and CEOs prioritise different stakeholder claims and demands will have an impact on 
the ‘infrastructure backlog’ performance of their local government. Since an organisation’s 
strategic choices and performance levels are also likely to be affected  by the values and 
beliefs held by key management personnel, the variable ‘managerial values’ is depicted in the 
framework as having a direct effect on the Mayor’s and CEO’s perceived salience of 
alternative stakeholder groups. 
 
4.3 Stakeholders in the Local Government Context 
 
In the case of LGAs, there are multiple stakeholder 
 
 
rs who can affect or can be affected by decisions taken by Mayors and CEOs with respect to 
infrastructure assets. Thus, there needs to be an identification of the different stakeholder 
groups towards whom an LGA would feel accountable. To date, there exists no known 
empirical study in the local government context that has specifically investigated the 
relationships between stakeholder attributes, salience, accountability and infrastructure 
backlog.  
 
There are a number of prior studies that have sought to identify the stakeholders of public 
sector organisations including local governments (e.g., Mack & Ryan 2007). Most of these 
studies have used normative arguments when classifying stakeholder groups.  Amongst them, 
the most influential work is that by Anthony (1978), in which he normatively identified five 
categories of stakeholders of public sector entities. These are governing bodies, investors and 
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creditors, resource providers, oversight bodies, and constituents. In comparison, Bryson 
(1995) suggests the following set of stakeholders:  citizens, taxpayers, service users, other 
levels of government, employees, trade unions, interest groups, political parties and the 
financial and business communities. A number of empirical studies have identified with some 
consistency, users of local government annual reports which include ratepayers/taxpayers, 
other resource providers, elected officials, other recipients of services, oversight bodies, 
internal management and other like entities (Cheng 1994; Taylor & Rosair 2000; Mack & 
Ryan 2007; Stanley et al. 2008). Taylor and Rosair (2000) identified broadly two user groups 
when developing an accountability-related disclosure index in the local government context. 
They are ‘participating parties’ which include Treasury, the relevant Minister, the CEO and 
lobby  groups and ‘public’ which include taxpayers and recipients of departmental goods and 
services.  Some other studies in the public sector (Boyne et al. 2002; Mack & Ryan 2006) 
categorise these stakeholders into two more broad groups: ‘internal’ and ‘external’. The main 
internal stakeholders in local government according to Boyne et al. (2002) are managers, staff 
and councillors. The public, local business and the voluntary sector are categorized as external 
groups which include ratepayers/taxpayers, other resource providers, other recipients of 
services, oversight bodies and other like entities.  
 
In this study, the lenses of stakeholders are taken from the perspective of Mayors and CEOs 
concerning infrastructure assets. Prior classifications of participating parties and the public, or 
internal and external, were felt to not have the right resonance for Mayors and CEOs. Instead, 
this study has selected a classification of stakeholder of local government infrastructure assets 
at two levels – those at the level of the local public or community and those at the oversight or 
regulatory level of higher-tier government and its agencies. Brief discussion of these two 
levels- public stakeholder group and higher-tier government stakeholder group is given in the 
next two sub-sections. 
 
4.3.1 Public Stakeholder Group 
 
The term ‘public’ can be subdivided into users of services, taxpayers and citizens (Boyne et 
al. 2002), all of whom may have differing requirements. At local government level ‘public 
stakeholders’ will be the actual end-users or service recipients (or their representatives) of 
goods and services while some will also be fund providers. They are all part of the local 
community.  
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Section 1A of the Victorian Local Government Act (1993) states ‘local community includes: 
people who live in the municipal district; people and bodies who are ratepayers; and people 
and bodies who conduct activities in the municipal district’. Accordingly, in the current study, 
four main stakeholder groups with an interest in infrastructure assets are selected as falling 
under the ‘public’ category. They are: ratepayers, users of infrastructure assets, community 
special interest groups and local media. A brief explanation of each of these ‘public’ 
stakeholders is given below.  
 
4.3.1.1 Ratepayers 
 
Ratepayers are viewed as involuntary resource providers and are or expect to be recipients of 
public goods and services (Taylor & Rosair 2000; Gomes & Gomes 2009). They are 
responsible of electing councillors who, in turn, oversee processes and decisions of the 
councils (Pilcher & Dean 2009). According to ABS (2012, cat. No. 5512.0), 35% of the local 
government revenue is earned by taxes/rates paid by the owners of properties and businesses. 
Consequently, the LGAs need to be accountable to the ratepayers, which is one accountee 
group in Sinclair’s (1995) concept of ‘public accountability’. This is already evidenced 
empirically, by prior research (Kloot & Martin 2000; Taylor and Rosair 2000; Pilcher and 
Dean 2009). However, PWC Report (2006) states that anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
ratepayers are not aware of the large volume of local and regional infrastructure and essential 
services provided by LGAs. 
 
4.3.1.2 Users of Infrastructure Assets  
 
These are predominantly the recipients of public goods and services, in this case the users of 
infrastructure asset. Taylor and Rosair (2000) in their attempt to identify accountees in 
achievement of outputs, assert that this user group compose most of the citizenry or general 
public. They further state the users are less likely to have a right to obtain accountability 
information from a government department, unless they succeed in a specific claim for access 
to information under freedom of information legislation. Most users will also be local and 
national tax/ratepayers, businesses and voluntary organisations (Boyne et al. 2002) who have 
an array of relationships with LGAs.  Users of services will probably have a particular interest 
in issues of quality and effectiveness of services being provided (Pollitt 1989). Determining 
this appropriate level of service depends on understanding the expectations of the users. In 
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order to obtain the expectations of the users all LGAs are required to carry out a 
comprehensive customer satisfaction survey during the financial year.   
  
 
4.3.1.3 Community Special Interest Groups 
 
Many prior studies related to stakeholder identification and salience have considered special 
interest groups or  lobby groups in different industries as one of the stakeholders (Gago & 
Antolin 2004; Cordano et al. 2004; Henriques & Sharma 2005; O’Higgins & Morgan 
2006;Cummings & Guthrie 2007; Boesso & Kumar 2009 a,b). The development of 
infrastructure assets requires long lead times, reflecting the significant planning required to 
ensure the community is appropriately consulted, and needs are prioritised in accordance with 
funding constraints (Engineers Australia 2005).   To this end, the community special interest 
groups can be highly influential in decisions made by LGAs with regard to infrastructure 
assets. In addition, the community special interest groups can become active and persuasive 
during a deprived situation including natural catastrophe such as floods or bushfire. 
 
The influence of the community interest groups was clearly publicized when the Baillieu 
government's Planning Minister Matthew Guy announced his intention to rezone a 24-hectare 
site at Ventnor near Cowes, citing housing affordability as the justification: (Millar & Lucas  
2012).  
 
 
Mr Guy's intervention sparked a furious community response and backlash from 
within the Liberal Party. Hollywood starlet Miley Cyrus bought into the row, her 
tweets about the threats to Phillip Island making the Ventnor issue international. 
Mr Guy was forced into an embarrassing backflip within days of his initial decision 
(Millar & Lucas 2012, p. 3).  
Planning Minister Matthew Guy, has been forced into a humiliating backflip over a 
controversial land rezoning at Phillip Island after some of his own Liberal 
colleagues lined up against the proposal with local Bass Coast property owners, 
holiday homers and councillors (Millar & Lucas 2011, p. 2). 
 
 
 
4.3.1.4 Local Media 
 
Local Media is also often considered as a stakeholder in prior literature in relation to 
stakeholder identification and salience in the private sector as well as in the public sector 
(Kuratko et al. 2004; Gago & Antolin 2004; Henriques & Sharma 2005; O’Higgins & Morgan 
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2006; Parent & Deephouse 2007). According to Cheng (cited in Pilcher 2005, p.176) 
‘…media has an increasingly adversarial stance against government, questioning the role of 
government and the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs’.  According to 
Gomes and Gomes (2010) the local media is able to scrutinise the decision making since it has 
control over the critical resource of public information. Pilcher (2005a) claims that media is a 
stakeholder who applies conflicting pressure in LGAs and provides the following illustration: 
 
During 1999/2000 a LGA (C31) considered the 80-year life of their roads as 
unrealistic. An engineer of the LGA indicated that a 25-year life was more 
appropriate, particularly given that a high degree of maintenance was not being 
expended on their rural roads. The LGA was named in an article appearing in a 
major Australian newspaper due to its very large operating loss of $3.94M. Facing 
political pressure, the LGA revised its allocated useful lives of the road assets back 
to the original life nominated – despite engineering evidence to the contrary (Pilcher 
2005a, p. 176) 
 
 
4.3.2  Higher-tier Government Stakeholder Group 
 
‘Higher-tier government stakeholders’ will be the state or federal government ministries and 
agencies who can affect local governments through their policy-making, oversight, 
monitoring and funding powers. These groups are considered as parties that directly 
participate in the operations of a government department and are in a position to demand 
certain accountability information (Taylor & Rosair 2000).  In the current study, the parties 
considered as the main direct participants in LGAs are the state government department 
responsible for local government authority, state auditor general, and Infrastructure Australia. 
A brief explanation of each of these stakeholder groups is given below.  
 
4.3.2.1 State Government Department Responsible for Local Government Authority  
 
The State and Northern Territory government departments of local government are the 
legislative bodies responsible for monitoring all LGAs for their financial capability and 
sustainability (Pilcher & Dean 2009). Their main purpose is to strengthen the local 
government sector, resulting in successful LGAs that in turn will engage and support their 
communities by delivering improved capabilities (DLGNSW 2012). To achieve these 
objectives the relevant State/Territory departments develop and maintain policies and 
legislative frameworks in matters ranging from local government finance, infrastructure, 
governance, performance and community engagement (DPCD 2013; DPAC 2013). The 
 129 
 
policies and frameworks are designed to ensure transparency and openness on financial 
arrangements and accountability of elected councillors and senior management in the LGAs 
(PWC 2006). The relevant Local Government Acts in all States and Territories require the 
LGAs to present annual reports along with financial statements and performance indicators to 
their relevant State and Territory government department of local government. Accordingly, 
the department can determine whether or not a LGA will have continued existence, leading to 
a greater accountability to the State or Territory Government (Kloot 2000). 
 
According to Bryson (1995) a stakeholder who can influence the organisation’s resources is 
considered to be a significant stakeholder. The relevant Government Department certainly fits 
this criterion. Local government revenue sources can be defined as own-source revenue and 
grants and subsidies from other levels of government (as discussed in Chapter Two). State 
and Northern Territory government departments of local government have the power to 
impose legislative and regulatory constraints on raising of own-source revenue by LGAs.  The 
other method of revenue raising source is grants and subsidies distributed by the Australian 
and State Governments. The State or Territory government departments allocate the financial 
assistance grants to local governments in their respective jurisdictions according to the 
recommendations of the State grants commissions in each State and the Northern Territory. In 
determining grant allocations, the State grants commissions are required to make their 
recommendations in line with National Principles under the Local Government (Financial 
Assistance) Act 1995 (Productivity Commission 2008). Furthermore, LGAs are required to 
obtain approval from State and Territory departments of local government prior to committing 
to major financial initiatives such as a new debt or public-private partnership (PWC 2006).   
 
4.3.2.2 State Auditor General’s Office  
 
Under the Westminster system of government, State audit is a vital element to ensure 
executive government accountability to parliament and the public (English 2003).  By 
conducting financial and performance audits the state auditor-general’s office provides not 
only  annotations on what has happened, but also the administrative malfunctions that have 
resulted in drawbacks in economic, efficient, effective and transparent policy implementation 
and reporting (English 2003). All LGAs across Australia are subject to frameworks of 
financial governance, audit and other controls (PWC 2006). These frameworks are generally 
specified in state and territory based local government Acts.  
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Table 4.1 details the role of the Auditor-General with respect to LGAs of jurisdictions in 
Australia.  
 
Table 4.1: Role of the Auditor-General Regarding LGAs in Australia 
Juris- 
diction 
State Legislation Details of the Auditor General  
NSW Local Government Act 1993 
No. 30 
A council’s auditor may be:  
(a) an individual who is a registered company auditor, or  
(b) a partnership whose members or employees include a 
registered company auditor, or  
(c) a corporation whose employees include a registered 
company auditor 
The Auditor -General is authorised to audit a council’s 
financial reports if the council fails to appoint an auditor 
or during any vacancy in the office of auditor.  
VIC Local Government Act 1989 Auditor- means the Auditor-General 
The LGA is required to submit the standard statements 
in the annual report and the financial statements 
(prepared in the manner and form 
prescribed by the regulations) to the 
auditor for auditing as soon as possible after 
the end of the financial year 
The auditor must prepare a report on the standard 
statement, financial statement and the performance 
statement of the LGA and submit a copy of the report to 
the Minister. 
QLD Local Government Act 2009 
 
The Auditor-General prepares a report based on the 
financial statements prepared by the LGA 
City of Brisbane Act 2010 
 
The Auditor-General prepares a report based on the 
financial statements prepared by the Brisbane City 
Council 
WA Local Government Act 1995 The local government’s auditor is to be a person who is: 
(a) a registered company auditor; or 
(b) an approved auditor. 
SA Local Government Act 1999 The auditor will be appointed by the council on the 
recommendation of the council's audit committee. 
The auditor must be: 
 (a)   a registered company auditor; or 
 (b)   a firm comprising at least one registered    
         company auditor. 
The Minister may, on the basis of a report on 
misconduct or an unauthorised action under section 129 
(6)-require the Auditor-General to carry out an 
investigation. 
TAS Local Government Act 1993 The accounts and financial statements of the council 
may be audited by private auditors with the approval of, 
and subject to any terms and conditions determined by, 
the Auditor-General. 
NT Local Government Act The auditor must be:  
(a) the Auditor-General; or  
(b) a registered company auditor or an authorised audit 
company; or  
(c) a firm whose members include a registered company 
auditor. 
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4.3.2.3 Infrastructure Australia 
Under the New Public Management era since the 1980s and in many contexts within the 
public sector, the practices of accountability, performance monitoring and measurement 
systems have been carried out with the intention of appraising efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy as value for money considerations (Johnston & Kouzmin 2010). After its electoral 
success in late 2007, the Federal government proclaimed that it was establishing Infrastructure 
Australia, an independent statutory advisory body, with the intention of providing economic, 
social and environmental advantages to the nation by way of improving the national 
productivity through quality and efficient infrastructure. Infrastructure Australia came into 
effect on 9th April 2008 and was established under the Infrastructure Australia Act 2008. It 
has 11 members, appointed by the Federal Minister for Infrastructure and Transport. 
Infrastructure Australia has the primary function of providing advice to the Minister, 
Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments, investors in infrastructure and 
owners of infrastructure. Their advice covers matters relating to infrastructure, including the 
following scope of matters (IA 2012): 
1. Australia's current and future needs and priorities relating to nationally significant 
infrastructure (transport, energy, communications and water infrastructure); 
2. Policy, pricing and regulatory issues that may impact on the utilisation of 
infrastructure; 
3. Impediments to the efficient utilisation of national infrastructure networks; 
4. Options and reforms, including regulatory reforms, to make the utilisation of 
national infrastructure networks more efficient; 
5. The needs of users of infrastructure; 
6. Mechanisms for financing investment in infrastructure.  (IA 2012) 
In addition to the above stated main functions, the body is also responsible for conducting  
audits to determine the adequacy, capacity and condition of nationally significant 
infrastructure, taking into account forecast growth and  developing the lists (to be known as 
Infrastructure Priority Lists) that prioritise Australia's infrastructure needs (IA 2012). 
 
4.4 Development of Hypotheses  
 
The conceptual framework for this study, depicted in Figure 4.1 (earlier in this chapter), 
shows a set of relationships between concepts of stakeholder identification, stakeholder 
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salience, managerial values, infrastructure accountability and infrastructure performance. The 
framework in Figure 4.1 can be viewed as comprising of three segments with the concept of 
stakeholder salience as the centre point of this framework. The three segments, each 
containing the concept of stakeholder salience, are as follows: 
 
1. The first segment depicts the relationship within Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
theory between stakeholder identification and stakeholder salience. 
Stakeholder identification – through the attributes of power, legitimacy and 
urgency – is related to the concept of stakeholder salience. Because salience 
in this study is measured as a perception of the Mayor and CEO, the 
additional concept of ‘managerial values’ is included as it could have a 
potential confounding effect on this perception of stakeholder salience.   
2. The second segment depicts the relationship between stakeholder salience 
accorded to different stakeholder groups – especially between stakeholders 
at the levels of ‘public’ versus ‘higher-tier government’ – and the 
infrastructure accountability emphasis given to these different stakeholder 
groups. Infrastructure accountability emphasis is dimensionalised into the 
concepts of public, managerial and political accountability. 
3. The third segment depicts the relationship between stakeholder salience 
accorded to ‘public’ and ‘higher-tier government’, as perceived by the 
Mayor and CEO, respectively, and the infrastructure performance of the 
LGA as measured by the extent of infrastructure backlog. 
 
These three segments of the conceptual framework in Figure 4.1 are now used to guide the 
formulation of three sets of hypotheses to be empirically tested in this study. These 
hypotheses are developed and specified under the three sub-sections below. 
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4.4.1 Stakeholder Attributes, Managerial Values and Stakeholder Salience 
 
4.4.1.1 Mayors and CEOs Perceptions of Stakeholder Attributes and Their Salience in  
            Infrastructure Asset Decision-making 
 
In developing the theory of stakeholder identification and salience, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
proposed that managers are central to the theory since managers are a unique group in an 
organisation due to their position which allows them to enter into contractual relationships 
with their organisation’s stakeholders. Further they assert that:  
 
Although stakeholder groups can be identified based on the degree of possession of 
power, legitimacy and urgency in their needs and claims over an area of responsibility 
of an organisation, it is that organisation’s managers who determine which stakeholders 
are salient and therefore will receive management attention. (p. 871).  
 
That is, if a manager perceives a stakeholder group to be more highly salient, that stakeholder 
group will be given higher priority by the manager. This can translate into the manager having 
greater concern for the needs and claims of a more highly salient stakeholder group when that 
manager is involved in decisions in an area of activity of the organisation relevant to the 
stakeholder group. In the current study, the relevant area investigated is infrastructure 
development and maintenance decisions by LGAs. 
 
Public sector employment in all three spheres of government has undergone significant 
changes over the last three decades. Under the NPM reforms the private sector management 
practices were imported to the public sector even into the areas of the human resource 
management practices, principles and concepts (Gramberg & Teicher 2000; Pullin & Haider 
2003). Many restrictive employment strategies that prevailed in the local government labour 
market have been removed, with deregulation opening a cross-disciplinary working 
environment attracting a number of senior managers from the private sector (Worthington & 
Dollery 2002). The most significant human resource change was the introduction of CEO and 
senior management appointments. These changes replaced the then existing dual management 
hierarchy which was equally shared by the town clerk and the city engineer who were 
responsible for their own functional areas and reported independently to the LGA (Pullin & 
Haider 2003).  
 
In terms of whether the Mayor and CEO are more likely to be in conflict or in harmony in 
their LGA’s infrastructure decision-making process, the literature provides contradictory 
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arguments and evidence. First, the tendency for Mayors and CEOs to take different positions 
can arise from their different accountability focuses. The Mayor is an elected politician 
whereas the CEO is normally an appointed career bureaucrat. The decisions taken by the 
Mayor and CEO will affect the quantity and quality of the services delivered to, and 
infrastructure made available to, the local community. While a formal Council of the 
Councillors has authority to make decisions at Council meetings, the Council is led by the 
Mayor who is either elected by the Councillors (elected annually) or sometimes by the 
electors in the local municipal area (every four years). Thus, the Mayor can be considered as 
an elected manager whose tenure can be one to four years depending the way he or she is 
elected.  The Mayor has a general leadership role as ‘first citizen’ of the Council (CPA 
Australia 2005). On the other hand, the local government has an administration that is 
formally accountable to the Council through the CEO. The decisions made by the Council 
under the chairmanship of the Mayor can be heavily influenced by the advice of the CEO and 
senior managers in the administration. The administration can also have delegated discretions 
in implementing decisions of the Council. In dealing with their organisation’s decision area of 
infrastructure development and maintenance, the CEO and the Mayor will work together as 
the bridge between the elected Council’s authority and the administration’s expert knowledge.  
For the sake of the efficient functioning of their organisation, the CEO and Mayor will be 
under pressure to reach consensus and present an agreed position to Council on infrastructure 
decisions.  
 
While there is no academic research carried out of the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs with 
regard to stakeholder attribute and salience when making decisions of infrastructure assets, 
Martin and Simons (2002) carried out a survey to investigate how the leadership styles affect 
the working relationship between the Mayors and CEOs in the Australian context. According 
to their study the Mayor and CEO are expected to play a complementary role in local 
economic and community development since the quality of services delivered to the local 
community is influenced by the nature of the working relationship between the Mayor and the 
CEO. The study surveyed 413 pairs of Mayors and CEOs to assess the effectiveness of their 
working relationship with the other party.  They found 76% of Mayor/CEO pairs who report 
an effective working relationship with each other were on the same leadership style 
dimension. The results suggest that Mayors and CEOs are more likely to perceive an effective 
working relationship when they have similar managerial styles, suggesting complementarities 
act to provide greater harmony in problem solving with a greater emphasis on achieving team 
results. 
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Hence, on the one hand, the different backgrounds and forms of appointment of Mayors and 
CEOs suggest they would hold divergent views on the attributes of various stakeholder 
groups. But on the other hand, there is evidence that Mayors and CEOs maintain consensus in 
their decision-making for the sake of efficiency and good governance of their LGA, so would 
converge in their views on the attributes of various stakeholder groups.  This discussion leads 
to the formulation of a null hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There are no significant differences between the ratings given by Mayors 
and CEOs to the perceived power, perceived legitimacy and perceived 
urgency of various stakeholder groups and their salience in relation to 
infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
The argument can be extended to an examination of how Mayors and CEOs prioritise the 
needs and claims of players in the ‘public stakeholder’ category compared to the ‘high-tier 
government stakeholder’ category. The priority or degree of attention, overall, accorded a 
category of stakeholders would be reflected in a higher perceived salience given to that 
stakeholder category. The elected Mayor would be motivated to give more attention to those 
stakeholder groups who directly or indirectly influence the local government elections, 
namely, ratepayers, users of infrastructure in the local government area, special interest 
groups who can be politically active, and the local media. These stakeholder groups, which 
make up the ‘public stakeholder’ category, are likely to be the Mayor’s foremost focus of 
attention, and therefore be perceived as having high salience. The research question of interest 
is whether it is the Mayor’s perception of power, legitimacy or urgency (or a combination of 
these attributes) that determines the Mayor’s perceived salience given to ‘public 
stakeholders’.  
 
In contrast, the CEO’s position would be considered in the wider public sector as a public 
service career appointment. Therefore, the CEO would be motivated to give close attention to 
those stakeholders at higher-tiers of the public sector who he or she will have direct dealings 
with in their oversight, monitoring or approval roles. They will include senior bureaucrats in 
the State government department of local government, the State Auditor-General’s Office and 
the Federal government’s advisory body Infrastructure Australia|. They represent the ‘higher-
tier government stakeholder’ category. They are likely to attract the CEO’s focus of attention, 
and therefore be perceived by the CEO as having high salience. The other research question 
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of interest is whether it is the CEO’s perception of power, legitimacy or urgency (or a 
combination of these attributes) that determines the CEO’s perceived salience given to 
‘higher-tier government stakeholders’. These arguments lead to the following two related 
hypotheses: 
             
Hypothesis 2a: In terms of infrastructure asset decision-making by Mayors, their 
perceptions of the extent of (a) power (b) legitimacy and (c) urgency, 
for ‘public stakeholders’ are positively related to their perception of 
the extent of salience of that stakeholder category. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: In terms of infrastructure asset decision-making by CEOs, their 
perceptions of the extent of (a) power (b) legitimacy and (c) urgency 
of ‘higher-tier government stakeholders’ are positively related to their 
perception of the extent of salience of that stakeholder category. 
 
4.4.1.2 Managerial Values of Mayors and CEOs and Stakeholder Salience in     
           Infrastructure Asset Decision-making 
 
When managers resolve an issue or perceive a stakeholder attribute they inevitably use 
subjective judgement. Their judgements will be shaped by their managerial values, formed 
out of their past experiences, professional networks, functional tracks and formal education. 
Similarly, managerial values possibly vary among Mayors and CEOs. Values are guiding 
principles that determine what is important to people. Values have been defined as ‘enduring 
beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially 
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state’ (Rokeach 1973, p. 5). 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987;1990) developed a conceptual definition of values that 
incorporates the five formal features of values based on prior literature: values are concepts or 
beliefs; they are desirable end states; they transcend specific situations; they guide selection or 
evaluation of behaviour and events; and they are ordered by relative importance. These 
researchers (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky 1987; 1990; Schwartz 1992) concur in their 
assertion that values reflect real differences between cultures, social classes, occupations, 
religions and political orientations.  
In addition, Hambrick and Mason (1984) in their upper echelon theory, posit that top 
managers’ personal characteristics will affect organisational outcomes. They state that when 
managers are confronted with complex situations they bring a cognitive base and values in 
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order to scan the situation and to decide a strategic choice. As March and Simon (cited in 
Hambrick & Mason 1984, p. 195) argued each decision maker brings his or her own set of 
"givens" to an administrative situation. These givens reflect the decision maker's cognitive 
base:  knowledge or assumptions about future events; knowledge of alternatives; and 
knowledge of consequences attached to alternatives. Further, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
state that an organisation’s strategic choices and performance levels are partially predicted by 
managerial background characteristics of top managers. Thus, many researchers have 
investigated the impact of values on decisions taken by various individuals (Sagiv & Scwartz 
1995; Bardi & Schwartz 2003). 
 
Values are treated in the current study as an independent variable that can directly enter into a 
strategic choice, ‘because theoretically a decision-maker can arrive at a set of perceptions that 
suggest a certain choice but discard that choice on the basis of values’ (Hambrick & Mason 
1984, p. 195). Therefore, in this study, the variable ‘managerial values’ is modelled as having 
a direct effect on the Mayor’s and CEO’s perceived salience of alternative stakeholder groups 
(and by inference on the priority given to alternative stakeholders’ needs and claims which 
determine strategic choices concerning infrastructure asset decisions).  The model will also 
include the direct effects of both managerial values and perceived attributes on salience. The 
suggestion by Mitchell et al. (1997) that managerial values should be a moderator of 
perceived attributes in their theory of stakeholder identification and salience is believed to not 
suit the context of this study. Nevertheless, it is noted that Agle et al. (1997) and Gifford 
(2010) tested ‘values’ as a moderator when they empirically analysed Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
salience model.  
 
From the above arguments, the following hypotheses are generated:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Managerial values held by Mayors will be significantly related to their      
                  perceptions of the salience of ‘public stakeholders’ with regard to 
infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Managerial values held by CEOs will be significantly related to their     
              perceptions of the salience of ‘higher-tier government stakeholders’ 
with  regard to infrastructure asset decision-making. 
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4.4.2   Stakeholder Salience, Managerial Values and Accountability Emphasis 
 
4.4.2.1  Stakeholder Salience and Accountability Emphasis in Infrastructure Asset  
             Decision-making 
 
There are multiple stakeholders who can affect or can be affected by infrastructure asset 
decisions taken by Mayors and CEOs in LGAs. The Mayors and CEOs need to prioritise the 
claims and demands of these multiple stakeholders. Consecutively, the manner in which the 
Mayors and CEOs prioritise different stakeholder claims and demands may have an impact on 
multiple accountabilities they discharge to multiple stakeholders.  
 
A search of the literature has failed to find any prior empirical research that addresses the 
relationship between stakeholder salience and accountability at the local government level. 
However, there are prior descriptive and empirical studies that have sought to investigate the 
relationships between multiple stakeholders and accountability emphasis in the public sector 
and local government context. For an example, Taylor and Rosair (2000) state that the extent 
of accountability disclosure of State government departments is mostly influenced by the user 
groups that directly participate in the decision-making process– i.e. Treasury, the relevant 
Minister, the CEO and lobby groups – while the ultimate accountees of the government- 
taxpayers and recipient of public goods and services have only a low influence. This finding 
infers that the public user groups are given low priority when discharging accountability. 
Kloot and Martin (2001) carried out a survey among the managers in LGAs in Australia to 
examine perceptions of accountability to multiple stakeholders. Mangers have placed higher 
emphasis on external, public accountability to ratepayers and the wider community than they 
have on political accountability to state government. This suggests that managers are more 
concerned with satisfying the demand of the community than satisfying the demands of the 
state government, although the state government has the authority to restructure the LGAs. 
The results indicate that managers are able to perform successfully in a framework of multiple 
accountabilities. Further, Kluvers and Tippet (2010) in their exploratory, empirical study 
attempt to understand the perception of accountability within Victorian LGAs. They surveyed 
councillors and managers of 78 Victorian LGAs. Their study reveals that councillors and 
managers perceive three important aspects of accountability: the need for and value of 
information; honest values; and legal enforcement. That is accountability is perceived to 
require honest participation, involving an exchange of information, while it is understood to 
involve legal compliance. Further, they confirm that the difficulty of the hierarchical structure 
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of accountability relationships effectively diminishes accountability to the broader 
community. 
 
There are some studies carried out in the public sector that examine the influence of 
stakeholder salience on accountability relationships. Collier (2008) focuses on the boarder 
accountability of the organisations in terms of the power of multiple stakeholders with their 
differing interests while considering governance. He was a participant-observer in a 
longitudinal field study carried out in a housing association in the UK. Collier (2008) argues 
that accountability requires governance, hence a stakeholder accountability perspective is the 
only available option for a non-profit distributing, quasi-public organisation with social 
welfare objects. The housing association was going through a structural transformation with 
the aim of improving its efficiency and effectiveness. The board had multiple accountabilities 
to multiple stakeholders, prioritising explicitly or implicitly the different demands and claims. 
However, during the transformation the board of the housing association neither equally 
identified the stakeholders in terms of their power, legitimacy and urgency nor equally 
prioritised the stakeholder demands in terms of salience.   
 
In an attempt to investigate the influence of stakeholders on accountability relationships, 
Assad and Goddard (2010) conducted a case study within two Tanzanian non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Six principal stakeholders were identified by the researchers namely; 
the government, donors, the board of trustees, the regulatory accounting board, members and 
beneficiary communities. They found that the overseas donors were significantly salient than 
other stakeholders and could influence accountability relationships and accounting processes 
and practices with in NGOs. Nevertheless, the proclaimed objective of NGOs is to provide 
welfare to beneficiary groups, the study found the NGOs accountability towards beneficiaries 
were at a very low level.  
 
The above discussion suggests that although managers in the public sector do not equally 
prioritise the demands and claims of multiple stakeholders, they do prioritise demands and 
claims of certain stakeholders ahead of others when discharging accountability to these 
multiple stakeholders. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed to examine the impact of 
the perceived salience of the Mayor and CEO with regard to different stakeholder groups on 
the rendering of the LGA’s accountability, in aggregate and in its separate dimensions.  
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Hypothesis 4a: The perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs with regard to ‘public    
                          stakeholders’ and ‘high-tier government stakeholders’ is significantly 
related to the extent of aggregate accountability for infrastructure asset 
decision making. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs with regard to ‘public 
stakeholders’ and ‘high-tier government stakeholders’ is significantly 
related to the emphasis given to different accountability dimensions of 
(a) public accountability (b) managerial accountability and (c) political 
accountability for infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
4.4.2.2 Managerial Values and Accountability Emphasis 
 
Judgements made by the Mayor and CEO, individually or jointly, in matters of rendering the 
accountabilities of their office and their organisation to various stakeholders are expected to 
be shaped by their own managerial values. These managerial values would be formed out of 
their past experiences, professional networks, functional tracks and formal education. Pullin 
and Haidar (2003) explored the values that senior officers in LGAs in Victoria assume in their 
relationship with elected officials or councillors. They found that there is a high propensity for 
senior managers to adopt more traditional neutral values. Kluvers and Tippet (2010) found the 
attitudes of individual councillors or managers in LGAs in Victoria towards the management 
of organisational accountabilities were shaped by their values. They further argued that the 
discharge of accountability is perceived to be dependent upon an individual’s values 
regardless of legal requirements or access to information. That is, the extent to which 
accountability goes beyond certain requirements is perceived to depend upon personal values. 
Values will either assist or impede the process of determining and fulfilling accountability 
relationships. Personal values of openness, co-operation, service, will enhance an 
accountability relationship, whereas values of personal gain, emphasis upon individual 
ambition, and manipulation of information for the enhancement of power, will impede a 
relationship’ (Kluvers and Tippet 2010, p. 51).  It is noted that Agle et al. (1997) and Gifford 
(2010) tested ‘values’ as a moderator when they empirically analysed Mitchell et al.’s (1997) 
salience model. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis is generated: 
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Hypothesis 5a: The managerial values of the Mayors and CEOs are significantly related 
to the extent of aggregate accountability for infrastructure asset 
decision-making. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The managerial values of the Mayors and CEOs are significantly related 
to the emphasis given to different accountability dimensions of (a) 
public accountability (b) managerial accountability and (c) political 
accountability for infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
4.4.3 Stakeholder Salience and Infrastructure Backlog 
 
Performance measurement has become an instrument of control of state government over 
local government (Gramberg & Teicher 2000). As required by the State or Northern Territory 
local government Acts, all LGAs must report on their performance either by way of annual 
reports, performance statements, financial statements and/or strategic planning reporting 
(DRALGAS 2012). These reports need to be submitted either to the State or Northern 
Territory government departments of local government or to the grant commission of the 
relevant jurisdiction. A comparative analysis of the performances amongst the LGAs in the 
same jurisdiction is undertaken in this study. However, not all this information is publically 
available (DRALGAS 2012).  
 
In addition to the individual Local Government Acts, the Local Government (Financial 
Assistance) Act 1995 (Commonwealth) requires an annual report to Parliament on its 
operations, which includes evaluations constructed on comparable national data of the 
performance and efficiency of LGAs  (DRALGAS 2012).  However, it was identified by 
previous Local Government National Reports that the assessment of comparable national data 
is complicated due to the alternative reporting and collecting methods undertaken by each 
jurisdiction. Namely, ‘using different performance indicators, collecting data from different 
sources such as annual reports, state grants commission data returns, satisfaction surveys, or 
specific collection for performance measurement, having different reporting periods, either 
financial or calendar years and tendency of reporting on outputs rather than the efficiency, 
effectiveness, timeliness or quality services’ are the barriers (DRALGAS 2012, p. 44). 
Nevertheless, on 26th March 2007 at the Local Government and Planning Ministers’ Council 
meeting, State and Territory Governments decided to provide improved data on financial and 
 142 
 
asset management practices in a nationally consistent format. Accordingly, three Local 
Government Financial Sustainability Frameworks (Nationally Consistent) were developed: 
Criteria for Assessing Financial Sustainability; Asset Planning and Management; and 
Financial Planning and Reporting. Implementation of these frameworks was initiated during 
the 2008-09 period.  (DRALGAS 2012). However, the frameworks have not been equally 
implemented or reported by all LGAs in all jurisdictions. Thus, comparison of information on 
performance of LGAs at a national level is yet to be accomplished in practice.  
 
Performance data indicates what an organisation is actually doing or has done with reference 
to specific issues (Clarkson 1995). The performance of the LGAs in this study is conceived by 
the construct ‘infrastructure backlog’. As per the discussion in Chapter Two (section 2.6), the 
financial distress experienced by a LGA induces infrastructure backlog. In other words, it is a  
tendency by some LGAs to defer or underspend on the renewal or upgrading of existing 
infrastructure assets and on new infrastructure assets due to financial deficits experienced by 
them (PWC 2006).   
 
One way to determine if a LGA is affected by infrastructure backlog is to evaluate the asset 
renewal/replacement ratio. ‘The net acquisition of non-financial assets for 
renewal/replacement purposes is the analytical balance appropriate with regard to the annual 
financial performance of councils on the renewal or replacement of existing assets’ (PWC 
2006, p. 110). This is measured dividing the renewal and upgrade expenditure on non-
financial assets by a relevant depreciation amount (VAG 2009).  A ratio resulting in higher 
than 1:1 indicates that spending on existing assets is greater than the depreciation rate, that is, 
there exist no infrastructure back log during that particular period.  
 
However, amongst all the jurisdictions, there is no consistent method and format in reporting 
the infrastructure renewal/ replacement ratio in the annual reports of LGAs.  This issue has 
been addressed by Pilcher (2005a) when examining the flawed financial figures in 
performance measures in LGAs in NSW.  Table 4.2 presents various titles and presentations 
used by LGAs, indicating the doubtfulness of the relevance and reliability of the 
renewal/replacement ratio.  The method of calculation of the ratio by each jurisdiction is 
explained in Chapter Five.  
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Table 4.2: Differences in Reporting of Asset Renewal/Replacement Ratio in the Annual 
Report amongst Jurisdictions 
LGA Annual Reports 2011-12 
 
Agle et al. (1999) say that performance does matter to an organisation while Ryan et al. 
(2002) assert that performance information investigates the outcomes of the organisation by 
comparison to its objectives. Further, Clarkson (1995) states that performance counts since it 
can be measured and evaluated, whether an organisation and its management are motivated by 
enlightened self-interest, common sense, or high standards of ethical behaviour. Performance 
measures also have a significant role in managerial control, especially in ensuring that 
organisations are managed in the best interests of all stakeholders (Kloot 1999).  
 
Accordingly, the manner in which Mayors and CEOs prioritise different stakeholder claims 
and demands with respect to infrastructure assets may have an impact on performance of the 
LGA.  There are many prior studies that have considered the performance measurement or 
key financial indicators at Local Government level (Kloot 1999; Gramberg & Teicher 2000; 
Kluvers 2001; Ryan et al. 2002; Kluvers 2003; Pilcher 2005a, b, 2009; Farneti & Guthrie 
2008; and Hoque 2008). Also there are prior studies that have particularly discussed the issue 
of infrastructure backlog (Dollery et al. 2007a; Murray & Dollery 2005; Dollery & Mounter 
2010) and remedies for the infrastructure backlog (Dollery et al. 2007(b); Byrnes et al. 2008). 
However, these studies are descriptive and conceptual in nature. According to the researcher’s 
knowledge, currently there are no studies that have considered infrastructure backlog in an 
analytical study in local government context.   
Jurisdiction Title and the Presentation of the Renewal/Replacement Ratio 
 
NSW Infrastructure Renewals Ratio- presented in the Statement of Performance 
Measurement Indicators in the annual report. 
VIC Infrastructure Renewal Ratio – presented under Victorian Local Government 
Indicators in the annual report. 
QLD Asset Sustainability Ratio – presented under Financial Sustainability Measures 
in the annual report. 
SA Asset sustainability Ratio- presented under Organisation Wide Indicators or 
Financial Indicators in the annual report. 
WA No indicators are provided in the annual report with respect to infrastructure 
renewals, replacement or upgrade. 
TAS No indicators are provided in the annual report with respect to infrastructure 
renewals, replacement or upgrade. 
NT No indicators are provided in the annual report with respect to infrastructure 
renewals, replacement or upgrade 
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The instrumental approach of stakeholder theory advanced by Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
examines the way stakeholder theory is used to attain the performance objectives of an 
organisation as an instrument to be positioned in strategic decision making. According to 
Mainardes et al. (2011) studies that adopt an instrumental approach normally use statistical 
methodologies and explore causes and effects. That is, the focus of the approach is to 
establish a framework for examining the relationships between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate performances (Donaldson & Preston 
1995), including financial and social performances (Barton et al. 1989; Preston et al. 1991). 
This instrumental approach is employed by Mitchell et al. (1997) when they developed the 
theory of stakeholder identification and salience. Thus, Mitchell et al. (1997) assert that the 
strategic behaviour of the managers when achieving the organisational objectives is dependent 
on the diverse stakeholder groups within the organisation and the way the needs and demands 
of these stakeholder groups are prioritised. Since the development of the theory in 1997, there 
were many studies which empirically explored the relationships between the ways the 
managers prioritise (stakeholder salience) different stakeholder needs and demands of an 
organisation and organisational performances. The organisational performances measured 
have been diverse: corporate performance (Agle et al. 1999); corporate social responsibility 
(Mishra & Suar 2010, Weber and Marley 2012); environmental issues (Gago & Antolin 2004, 
Cordano et al. 2004, Murillo-Luna et al. 2008); voluntary disclosures including key 
performance indicators (Boesso & Kumar 2009a, b); and accountability relationships (Assard 
& Goddard 2010). As discussed above, the current study considers the infrastructure backlog 
as an organisational performance in the local government context and accordingly the 
following hypothesis is developed.  
 
Hypothesis 6:  The perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs with regard to  ‘public 
stakeholders’ and ‘higher-tier government stakeholders’ is significantly 
related to the extent of infrastructure backlog experienced by the relevant 
local government authorities.    
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4.5 Empirical Schema 
                                     
To depict the way the six hypotheses developed above connect into the conceptual framework 
in this study, Figure 4.2 presents the empirical schema for the study. It should be noted in the 
empirical schema in Figure 4.2 that the hypotheses tie into the three segments of the 
conceptual framework (Figure 4.1) as follows: 
 
• H1, H2 and H3 relate to the first segment which links stakeholder attributes (and 
managerial values) to stakeholder salience 
• H4 and H5 relate to the second segment which links stakeholder salience (and 
managerial values) to accountability 
• H6 relates to the third segment which links stakeholder salience to organisational 
performance (i.e., infrastructure backlog). 
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Figure 4.2: Empirical Schema 
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4.6 Chapter Summary  
 
The conceptualisation of the study is presented in this Chapter. It has developed a conceptual 
framework based upon the theory of stakeholder identification and salience (Mitchell et al. 
1997) and dimensions of accountability. In addition, the framework embraces the constructs 
of managerial values and infrastructure backlog. The chapter has developed six hypotheses 
that investigate various relationships among stakeholder attributes, stakeholder salience, 
managerial values, and infrastructure backlog and accountability dimensions. These 
hypotheses which are presented in the empirical schema will be empirically tested and the 
results will be presented in Chapter Seven. The basis for measuring variables and testing their 
validity and reliability are detailed next, in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical framework underpinning the thesis and the development of hypotheses for 
empirical analyses were presented in Chapter Four. The current chapter details the research 
methods employed including the rationale for choice of the methods. These methods are used 
to gather evidence to test the developed hypotheses which address the research questions 
identified in Chapter One. The chapter then sets out the research design in terms of the 
definition, measurement and modelling of variables. There are five sections in this Chapter. 
The second section briefly identifies the existing alternative research paradigms and the 
paradigm adopted in the current study. The third section discusses the research methodology 
and the approach employed in the study. Section four of the chapter details the survey method 
including the definitions and measurements of variables in the study with the underlying 
rationales, empirical models to be tested and analysis of data. The last section concludes the 
chapter.  
 
5.2 Identification of Research Paradigm  
 
A research paradigm is ‘a philosophical framework that guides how scientific research should 
be conducted based on peoples’ philosophies and their assumptions about the world and the 
nature of knowledge’ (Collis & Hussey 2009, p. 55).  Instead of the term paradigm, some 
researchers use the word worldview which means ‘a basic set of beliefs that guide action’ 
(Guba, cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 6). According to Collis and Hussey (2009) there are two 
main paradigms – positivism and interpretivism. These are also referred to as research 
philosophies or epistemological approaches in social science research (Saunders et al. 2009; 
Burrel & Morgan 1994). Positivism, which originated in the natural sciences, is ‘underpinned 
by the belief that reality is independent of us and the goal is the discovery of theories, based 
on empirical research of observation and experiment’ (Collis & Hussey 2009, p. 56).  In order 
to explain and/or predict a certain phenomenon under positivism, researchers use theories 
while applying logical reasoning to emphasise the objectivity and rigour rather than 
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subjectivity and intuitive interpretation. This positivism paradigm is referred as post- 
positivist world view by Creswell (2009) and states that the problems studied by post-
positivists reflect the need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes, such as 
found in experiments. The knowledge that develops through a positivist lens is based on 
careful observation and measurement of the objective reality that exists ‘out there’ in the 
world (Creswell 2009, p. 7). Thus, developing numeric measures of observations and studying 
the behaviour of individuals becomes paramount for a post-positivist (Creswell 2009).  
 
Table 5.1: Assumptions of the Main Paradigms- Positivism and Interpretivism 
Philosophical 
assumption 
Question Positivism  Interpretivism 
 
Ontological 
assumption  
What is the nature 
of reality? 
Reality is objective 
and singular, separate 
from the researcher. 
Reality is subjective 
and multiple, as seen 
by the participants. 
Epistemological 
assumption 
What constitutes 
valid knowledge? 
Researcher is 
independent of that 
being researched. 
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched. 
Axiological 
assumption  
What is the role of 
values? 
Researcher is value-
free and unbiased. 
Researcher 
acknowledges that 
researcher is value 
laden and biases are 
present. 
Rhetorical assumption What is the 
language of 
research?  
Researcher writes in 
a formal style and 
uses the passive 
voice, accepted 
quantitative words 
and set definitions. 
Researcher writes in 
an informal style and 
uses the personal 
voice accepted 
qualitative terms and 
limited definitions. 
Methodological 
assumption  
What is the process 
of research? 
Process is deductive.  
Study of cause and 
effect with a static 
design (categories are 
isolated beforehand). 
Research is context 
free. 
Generalisations lead 
to prediction, 
explanation and 
understanding. 
Results are accurate 
and reliable through 
validity and 
reliability. 
Process in inductive. 
Study of mutual 
simultaneous shaping 
of factors with an 
emerging design 
(categories are 
identified during the 
process). 
Research is context 
bound. 
Patterns and /or 
theories are 
developed for 
understanding. 
Findings are accurate 
and reliable through 
verification.  
Source: Collis & Hussey (2009, p. 58). 
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The second main paradigm, interpretivism emerged in response to criticisms of traditional 
positivism or the natural scientist way (Collis & Hussey 2009; Saunders et al. 2009). ‘It is 
underpinned by the belief that social reality is not objective but highly subjective because it is 
shaped by perceptions of individuals’ (Collis & Hussey 2009, p. 57).  Interpretivism is 
referred as ‘social constructivist worldview’ by Creswell (2009) claiming that “social 
constructivists hold assumptions that individuals seek understanding of the world in which 
they live and work” (p. 8). The goal of this type of research is to rely as much as possible on 
the participants’ views of the situation being studied. That is, the researcher’s intent is to 
make sense of, or interpret the meanings others have about the world rather than starting with 
a theory as in positivism (Creswell 2009).  
 
The two research philosophies (epistemological approaches) contain important assumptions 
about the way a researcher views the world or the nature of the reality (referred to as 
ontology).This underlying philosophical position influences his/her research 
strategies/methodologies and methods chosen (Saunders et al. 2009). Table 5.1 reflects the 
assumptions underpinning the main paradigms.  
 
Over the years many new paradigms have emerged although the positivism/postpositivist 
worldview and interpretivism/social constructivist worldview are treated as the main 
paradigms representing the two extremes. The current study embraces the positivist 
philosophy of the development of knowledge, although the researcher believes that there is no 
right or wrong paradigm. However a paradigm chosen by a researcher will be mainly 
determined by the research problem under investigation (Collis & Hussey 2009). Thus, this 
study uses existing theories (Stakeholder Theory and Theory of Stakeholder Identification and 
Salience) to develop research questions and hypotheses. These hypotheses are statistically 
tested and confirmed, (in whole or part) or refuted, enabling further refinement of theory 
which can be tested by further research (Saunders et al. 2009). The data for this study are 
collected from a mail survey of a large sample from a population of Mayors and CEOs of 
LGAs in Australia. The concepts and variables are operationalised by the researcher in order 
to measure. Such measures will include the ‘perceptions’ of the subjects under study since 
positivism is underpinned by the ontological assumption that social reality can be objectively 
measured. The researcher claims to be value free unlike an interpretivist in which the 
researcher is value laden. The next component to be considered in the framework of research 
design suggested by Creswell (2009) is the research strategy or research methodology. 
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5.3 Research Methodology / Strategies of Inquiry 
 
Once the research paradigm is identified, the researcher should be concerned about a research 
strategy (Collis & Hussey 2009). In other words once the researcher has decided on the 
paradigm, a methodology need to be selected that reflects the philosophical assumptions of 
the paradigm chosen. Irrespective of the way it is labelled, research strategies (Saunders et al. 
2009) or strategies of inquiry (Creswell 2009) or research methodologies (Collis & Hussey 
2009) are types of quantitative and/or qualitative designs or models that provide specific 
direction or approach for procedures in a research design.  
 
The methodologies traditionally associated with positivism support the deductive approach 
with a view to providing explanatory theories to understand social reality (Collis & Hussey 
2009) or to test theories (Saunders et al. 2009). It is also reductionistic in that the intent is to 
reduce the ideas into a small, discrete set of ideas to test, such as the variables that comprise 
hypotheses and research questions (Creswell 2009). Since positivism assumes that social 
reality is external, objective (Bryman & Bell 2007) and can be measured, positivism is 
associated with quantitative methods of analysis (Collis & Hussey 2009).  
 
In contrast, methodologies associated with interpretivism involve an inductive process with a 
view to provide interpretive understanding of social reality with in a particular framework 
(Collis & Hussey 2009) or develop theories (Saunders et al. 2009).  Since it is focused on 
exploring the complexity of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of 
individual’s creation (Bryman & Bell 2007), interpretivists adopt a range of qualitative 
methods (Collis & Hussey 2009). Table 5.2 exhibits the association between the paradigm 
chosen and the respective research methodologies/strategies (Collis & Hussey 2009). Here 
again there is no particular superior methodology or strategy that can be adopted in a study  
but need to consider whether the methodology chosen will  enable to answer the research 
question(s) and the objective(s) of the study (Saunders et al. 2009). Further these 
methodologies are not mutually exclusive (Saunders et al. 2009). Since the current study 
embraces positivist philosophy it uses existing theories to develop research questions and 
hypotheses, uses empirical data to test the hypotheses and uses quantitative methods of 
analysis. Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.2 below, the current empirical study employs a 
deductive approach while primary data is mainly collected by using survey methodology.  
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Table 5.2: Methodologies Associated With the Main Paradigms 
Positivism (Deductive Approach ) Interpretivism (Inductive Approach) 
Experimental Studies Hermeneutics 
Surveys (using primary or secondary data) Ethnography 
    -Cross-sectional studies Participative enquiry 
    - Longitudinal studies Action research 
 Case studies 
 Grounded theory 
 Feminist, gender and ethnicity studies 
Source: Collis & Hussey (2009, p. 58). 
 
5.3.1     Survey Research Methodology 
 
Survey is a popular and common methodology in business and management research and is 
the most frequently used to answer ‘who, what, where, how much and how many questions’ 
(Saunders, et al. 2009, p. 144). A survey refers to an investigation where: 
(a) Systematic measurements are made over a series of cases yielding a matrix of data; 
(b) The variables in the matrix are analysed to see if they show any patterns; 
(c) The subject matter is social (Marsh, cited in Roberts 1999, p. 55) 
‘The design of a survey method follows a standard format’ (Creswell 2009, p. 146). 
Accordingly, the main components in the survey are planned as follows:  
  
1. The survey design 
2. The population and sample 
3. Survey instrumentation 
4. Secondary Data 
 5.   Variables in the study 
 6.   Models in the study 
7.   Analysis of data  
 
The following sections will describe the components of the survey method and how they have 
been employed in the current study.  
 
5.4  Survey Design 
 
This component introduces to the basic purpose, nature and rationale of the survey research 
followed by data collection method. 
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5.4.1  Purpose of the Survey Research 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, a survey methodology is associated with positivist 
paradigm and deductive approach. A survey is defined as ‘a systematic method of gathering 
information from (a sample of) entities for the purposes of constructing quantitative 
descriptors of the attributes of the larger population of which the entities are members’ 
(Groves et al. 2004, p. 2). The quantitative descriptors are referred to as statistics by Groves et 
al. (2004). They further assert “statistics are quantitative summaries of observation on a set of 
elements; some are ‘descriptive statistics,’ describing the size and the distributions of various 
attributes in a population while others are ‘analytic statistics’ measuring how two or more 
variables are related” (p. 42). Accordingly, they claim that (the research) ‘goal sets surveys 
apart from other efforts to describe people or events’ (Groves et al. 2004, p. 2). 
 
Similarly, Collis and Hussey (2009) state a survey method ‘is designed to collect primary or 
secondary data from a sample, with a view to analysing statistically and generalising the 
results to a population’ (p. 76). According to the purpose, surveys can be divided into two 
types, namely, descriptive and analytical (Collis & Hussey 2009). Descriptive surveys are 
used when researchers need to represent phenomena at a particular instance or at various 
instances while analytical surveys are carried out to investigate any relationships between 
particular variables (Collis & Hussey 2009). Thus, the current study uses an analytical survey 
or an explanatory survey since the purpose of the study is to investigate the extent of the 
relationships of multiple variables identified based on theoretical framework.    
 
In addition to the above discussion, survey method is preferred, since it is deemed to be the 
most effective method of research for large population and ‘is one of the most common 
approaches used in the social sciences to empirically study the characteristics and 
interrelations of sociological and psychological variables’ (Roberts 1999, p. 53).  
 
5.4.2 Timing of Administration of the Survey 
 
Another important aspect to consider when designing a survey, is the time horizons of the 
survey undertaken (Saunders et al. 2009; Creswell 2009). Accordingly, it can either be a 
cross-sectional study or a longitudinal study. Cross-sectional study, which is also referred as 
‘snapshot’ time horizon (Saunders et al. 2009) is “designed to obtain variables or group of 
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subjects  in different contexts, but over the same period of time” (Collis & Hussey 2009, p. 
77). A longitudinal study or the ‘diary perspective’ (Saunders, et al. 2009) “is used to 
investigate variables or a group of subjects over a long period of time” (Collis & Hussey 
2009, p.78). The most common design used in survey research is the cross-sectional design 
(de Vaus 2002).  
 
The current study uses cross-sectional design, due to multiple reasons. The first reason being 
it is less expensive and can be conducted simultaneously among different groups. The survey 
of the current study was carried out amongst the Mayors and CEOs in 420 LGAs dispersed in 
seven jurisdictions in Australia. The second reason is to accommodate the demanding work 
schedules of the potential respondents - Mayors and CEOs. It appears impractical to carry out 
a longitudinal study which requires continuous or multiple investigations of research variables 
over an extended period of   time. The third reason for employing a cross-sectional study is 
the researcher strives to carry out the survey in a non-election year for LGAs with the 
intention of obtaining responses not being affected by specific election issues or election 
campaigns. However, out of the seven jurisdictions two of the jurisdictions held their local 
government elections during the year 2011 which is beyond the researcher’s control. These 
jurisdictions were Tasmania and Western Australia, in which the elections were held in 
October 2011.  
 
5.4.3 Form of Data Collection 
 
Although, survey designers have created many new methods of collecting data (Groves et al. 
2004), questionnaires remain as the most widely used data collection technique (Roberts 
1999) in social science research. Other methods of data collection in survey research include 
observations, interviews and focus groups. Questionnaires can be normally administered in 
three ways: face-to-face, telephone or mail (Roberts 1999) and these methods have their own 
benefits and limitations. The mail questionnaire survey is very much applicable when data 
collection is required from a geographically dispersed sample (Kloot & Martin 2001). Further, 
anonymity and confidentiality are assured through mail questionaries compared with face-to 
face and telephone methods, particularly, when the study deals with sensitive issues.  
However, the mail questionnaire approach is criticised over the poor response rate (Fowler 
2002), quality of response, and the involvement of high costs especially when it is a large 
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survey. Nevertheless, Roberts (1999) argues that those limitations could be alleviated by 
employing appropriate techniques in questionnaire design and mail-out procedures.  
 
The current research study uses a mail questionnaire survey method and the cost of the survey 
was not a serious barrier since the survey was funded by an AFANNZ research grant 2010/11 
and RMIT College of Business research grant 2011. Further, in the process of survey 
validation (explained in section 5.7.1 below), the researcher was advised by the academic 
experts to carry out a mail survey questionnaire, since they perceived that a better response 
would be obtained from the employees in the public sector compared  to an online survey.  
 
5.5   The Population and Sample Selection 
5.5.1 Population and Unit of Analysis 
 
A sample’s representation of a population will be determined by the sampling frame, the 
sample size and the specific design of selection procedures (Fowler 2002). The sampling 
frame for the survey in this study is the population of all Local Government Authorities 
(LGAs) in all jurisdictions in Australia that existed in year 2011. This is a population of 565 
LGAs. A sampling frame ‘is a record of the population from which a sample can be drawn’ 
(Collis & Hussey 2009, p. 209) or ‘is a representation of the elements of the target population’ 
(Malhotra 2002, p. 348).  
 
A unit of analysis is defined as ‘the unit from which the researcher obtains information’ (de 
Vaus 1995, p. 32), in this study are the Mayors and CEOs or their equivalent from the whole 
population of LGAs. These target respondents are chosen since in Australian LGAs, the 
elected leader, the Mayor, and the appointed leader, the CEO, will be ultimately accountable 
to multiple stakeholders for the plans, decisions and performance of their LGA’s 
infrastructure assets. The database for the list of Mayors and CEOs in LGAs has been 
prepared using the websites of relevant state government department responsible for LGAs. 
Some of these websites link to the homepage of the relevant LGAs in that particular state and 
others provide the corresponding details of the relevant LGAs. Using these links an Excel-
data base was prepared including the names of the Mayor and CEO of the LGA, names of the 
LGA, and the mailing address of the respective LGA. 
 
The following links have been accessed to collect the above information: 
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New South Wales: Division of Local Government- Department of Premier and Cabinet 
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_LocalGovDirectory.asp?index=1&CN=ALL#20
47 
 
Victoria: Department of Planning and Community Development 
http://www.dpcd.vic.gov.au/localgovernment/find-your-local-council#councils 
 
Queensland: Department of Local government, Community Recovery and Resilience 
http://www.dsdip.qld.gov.au/local-government-directory/council-postal-list.html 
 
Western Australia: Government of Western Australia- Department of Local Government 
http://www.dlg.wa.gov.au/content/directory/default.aspx 
 
South Australia: Government of South Australia- Department of Premier and Cabinet 
http://www.lga.sa.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=992 
 
Tasmania: Tasmanian Government- Department of Premier and Cabinet 
http://www.dpac.tas.gov.au/divisions/local_government/local_government_directory 
 
Northern territory: Northern Territory Government- Department of Local Government 
http://www.localgovernment.nt.gov.au/home/council_information 
 
5.5.2  Sampling and Sample Size  
 
In the current study, out of the total population of 565 LGAs, 145 of them were removed due 
to following reasons: 
 
(1) Initially, 66 LGAs in the jurisdictions of Western Australia and Queensland were 
removed since they were in the process of amalgamation and boundary restructuring. 
(2) Another 48 LGAs with the ACLG classification of – rural remote extra small, rural 
remote small and rural remote medium were removed. It is empirically evidenced that 
these LGAs suffer from asset management and reporting deficiencies (Dollery et al 
2007a). Moreover, they lack the requisite of qualified staff and technical skills.  
(3) Finally, 31 LGAs were removed since there was no proper ACLG classification on 
these LGAs.   
 
Consequently 420 LGAs were selected for the study. This is 75% of the total LGAs in 
Australia (420/565*100). Since two units of analysis, the Mayor and CEO are targeted in 
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every selected LG, the sample size is 840 (i.e. 420*2).  Table 5.3 shows the profile of the 
selected LGAs in the current study. 
 
Table 5.3: Profile of Local Government Authorities Sampled 
Australian Classification of 
Local Governments (ACLG) 
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Urban Capital City   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Urban Development  30 22 2 18 14 0 0 86 
Urban Regional 36 24 11 9 8 8 1 97 
Urban Fringe 11 10 5 10 3 1 1 41 
Rural Significant Growth 0 1 0 7 3 1 0 12 
Rural Agricultural 68 21 10 22 29 16 1 167 
Rural Remote Large 1 0 4 5 0 0 0 10 
Total Sample 147 79 33 72 58 27 4 420 
Total number of LGAs in 
Australia 155 79 73 139 74 29 16 565 
Sample as a % of total number of 
LGAs in Australia 26 14 6 13 10 5 1 75 
LGAs  in the pilot survey  0 30 0 0 0 0 0 30 
LGAs in the main survey 146 49 33 72 58 27 5 390 
 
According to de Vaus (1995), generally, two key factors influence the sample size: the extent 
of the accuracy expected from the sample and the degree to which there is variation in the 
population with regard to the key characteristics of the sample. The researcher needs to decide 
the tolerable sampling error at a 95% level of certainty. Table 5.4 gives an approximate guide 
to the different minimum sample sizes required from different sizes of population at a 95% 
confidence level for different margins of error (Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
Saunders et al. (2009) suggest for most business and management research, the estimated 
population’s characteristics at 95 % certainty to be within plus or minus 3% to 5 % of its true 
values. Accordingly, the current study with a total population of 565 and a sample size of 420 
for each of the two units of analysis strongly satisfies the above condition at 2% margin of 
error.  
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Table 5.4: Sample Sizes for Different Sizes of Population at a 95 Confidence Level  
 Margin of error 
Population 5% 3% 2% 1% 
50 44 48 49 50 
100 79 91 96 99 
150 108 132 141 148 
200 132 168 185 196 
250 151 203 226 244 
300 168 234 267 291 
400 196 291 343 384 
500 217 340 414 475 
750 254 440 571 696 
1000 278 516 706 906 
2000 322 696 1091 1655 
5000 357 879 1622 3288 
10000 370 964 1936 4899 
Source: Saunders et al. (2009, p. 219).  
 
 
5.6   Survey Instrumentation 
5.6.1 Development of the Survey Instrument 
 
As mentioned in section 5.4.3 above, the current study uses a mail questionnaire instrument to 
collect data. ‘A questionnaire is a highly structured data collection method where by each 
respondent is asked much the same set of questions’ (de Vaus 1995, p. 80). Prior to designing 
the survey instrument an in-depth literature review was carried out to understand the  
constructs of stakeholder attributes, stakeholder salience, dimensions of accountability in the 
public sector and infrastructure backlog. A construct is a set of concepts or general notions 
and ideas a person has in mind about certain things. Because a construct is a mental image or 
an abstract idea, it is difficult to observe and measure. Consequently, positivists develop a 
category or numerical scales to measure perceptions and opinions held by respondents (Collis 
& Hussey p. 191). There are some existing instruments related to the constructs that the 
current study investigates. These constructs, have been developed as scales in previous studies 
in different contexts including the local government context. The following Table 5.5 shows 
the studies used to adapt the items for different constructs when developing the survey 
instrument. 
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Table 5.5: List of Studies Used to Develop the Survey Instrument 
Stakeholder Attributes and 
Stakeholder Salience 
Dimensions of 
Accountability 
Infrastructure Backlog 
Mitchell et al. (1997) 
 
Kloot and Martin (2001) Murray and Dollery (2005)  
Agle et al. (1999) 
 
Taylor and Rosair (2000) Jones and Walker (2007) 
Boesso and Kumar (2009 a) 
 
Othman and Taylor (2006) Pilcher (2005;2009) 
Boesso and Kumar (2009 b) 
 
 
Dollery et al. (2007a,b;2008) 
 
 
5.6.2 The Scale, Structure and Content of the Survey Instrument 
 
5.6.2.1 The Scale 
 
A six-point Likert scale is used to measure the perceptions of different constructs in the 
current study.  Four-point Likert scale or six-point Likert scale are considered to be the new 
approach of Renis Likert rating scale to measure personal attributes (Chomeya 2010). These 
scales cut the opportunity of choice for answering without considering the items of 
measurement. That is, the respondents cannot choose the moderate value, middle point and 
need to choose between one of the two qualifications of the scale to be the answer. Thus, the 
respondents are compelled to think for a while before rating a scale.  Chomeya (2010) 
compared the quality of psychology test between Likert Scale 5 and 6 points in his empirical 
study and found that six-point tend to give higher discrimination and reliability values than 
the five-point scales. Further, in order to reduce the deviation or reduce the risks which might 
occur due to deviation of personal decision making it is required to choose the scale six-point 
instead of five-point.  Similarly, Wyatt and Meyers (1987), and Dixon et al. (1984) using five-
point and six-point scale respectively , found no systematic differences between the data from 
end-defined and conventional Likert scales.   
 
5.6.2.2 The Structure and Content of the Questionnaire  
 
The development of the survey instrument needs to reflect both theoretical thinking and an 
understanding of data analysis (de Vaus 1995). In this study, there are multi-item scales 
developed for the dependent, independent and control variables. There are five sections and 
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129 questions on a seven page survey questionnaire (refer Appendix One for the full 
questionnaire).  The content of each section is briefly explained below.  
 
Section One- Professional Background and Demographic Data 
 
There are 15 questions in section one which includes 11 questions related to professional 
background of the Mayor and CEO and the remaining four questions with regard to the 
demographic details of the relevant LGA.  In the first part of section one, the respondents are 
initially asked to indicate their position either as Mayor or CEO.  Then the respondents are 
required to state their highest academic qualification and the discipline of the highest 
academic qualification with the intention of categorising them according to their academic 
qualifications. Next they are asked to indicate whether they are members of any professional 
bodies.  The next three questions pertain to the respondents’ work experience in the public 
and private sector and the period they had worked in the current local government position.  
Then respondents are asked to mention whether they attend any conferences, seminars or 
workshops relevant to work or self-development and if so the frequency of attendance. Data 
on gender and age of the respondents is also collected. In the second part of section one of the 
questionnaire, there are four questions requiring the name (optional), population, area and the 
ACLG categorisation of the LGA.  
 
Section Two- Infrastructure Backlog  
 
This section seeks to assess the perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs with regard to the 
financial difficulties faced by the relevant LGA in upgrading and renewing existing 
infrastructure assets and investing in new infrastructure assets. As explained in the 
development of hypothesis in Chapter Four, the greatest source of financial difficulties in 
LGAs seems to reside in ensuring adequate local infrastructure provision (Dollery et al. 
2007a).  In this vein, Dollery et al. (2008) have argued that the main burden of financial 
distress has undoubtedly been borne by deferred local infrastructure maintenance and renewal 
which has led in turn to a massive local infrastructure backlog.     
 
There are three items on infrastructure backlog in the questionnaire. Typically, respondents 
are asked to agree or disagree to each of these statements by circling a response from the six- 
point Likert scale (1- strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-slightly disagree, 4-slightly agree, 5- 
agree, 6- strongly agree). According to the researcher’s knowledge this construct has not been 
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measured in a survey instrument before. However the multi-items are based on ideas from 
prior literature on infrastructure backlog (Dollery et al. 2007a,b; 2008; Murray & Dollery 
2005; Jones & Walker 2007; Pilcher 2005; 2009). 
 
Section Three- Managerial Values 
 
This section is concerned with the managerial values held by Mayors and CEOs that influence 
judgements taken by them.  The most widely recognised and tested  instruments for capturing 
the values of individuals are Rokeach’s  value survey (RVS), Hofstede’s value survey module 
(HVSM), the competing values framework (CVF)  and Schwartz value survey (SVS) (Zhang 
et al. 2008). According to Zhang et al. (2008) RVS is too open to interpretation and not too 
specific to actual behaviours. The HVSM has been highly criticised as being non-exhaustive 
(Schwartz 1999). The Schwartz value survey (SVS) defines a comprehensive typology of 
cross-cultural human values (Zhang et al. 2008). Schwartz (1992) uses a 57 –item survey of 
which 45 value items are considered to derive the following 10 value types. 
 
1. Self-direction- independent thought of action on choosing, creating and exploring. 
2. Stimulation –maintain an optimum level of action with excitement, novelty and 
challenge in life 
3. Hedonism- pleasure and enjoyment in life. 
4. Achievement- personal success through demonstrating competence, intelligence, 
influence and capability according to social standards 
5. Power- attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more general 
social system through authority, wealth, social power and social recognition 
6. Security- individual and group security requirements including national security, 
reciprocation of favours, family security, sense of belonging, social order, healthy, 
clean 
7. Conformity- emphasise self-restraint in every day interaction usually with close others 
being obedient, self-disciplined, polite, honouring of parents, elders and tradition 
8. Tradition- respect, commitment, and acceptance of customs and ideas that one’s 
culture or religion impose on individuals 
9. Benevolence- preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one 
is in frequent personal contract being helpful, loyal, forgiving, honest, responsible, 
true friendship and mature love. 
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10. Universalism- understand, appreciate, tolerate and protect the welfare of all people and 
for nature.  
 
The SVS instrument assesses how important these values are as ‘guiding principles of one’s 
life’ rather than desirable end states or ideal behaviours (Zhang et al. 2008, p. 1013).  More 
than 100 studies undertaken in over 50 countries confirm the value types suggested by 
Schwartz (Lee  et al. 2008). Thus, managerial values held by Mayors and CEOs in the current 
study have been measured against the Schwartz’s (1992) value types, using value statements 
developed by Zhang et al. (2008) on a six-point Likert scale. Ratings have become the 
preferred method on research on values over the rankings lately (Lee et al. 2008).   
 
Section Four – Perceptions about Stakeholders’ Attributes and Salience 
 
There are four parts in this section. Three parts are related to the construct of stakeholder 
attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency while the fourth part is related to the construct of 
stakeholder salience. Constructs for the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs related to 
stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency and  stakeholder salience have been based on 
multi-item scales developed and validated in the prior empirical studies of Mitchell et al. 
(1997), Agle et al. (1999) and Boesso and Kumar (2009a,b). The questionnaire contains three 
items for each of the separate constructs of stakeholder attributes and salience. A six point 
Likert scale is used to rate each item for each of seven stakeholder groups in turn (ratepayers, 
users of infrastructure assets, special interest groups, local media, State department of local 
government, State auditor general and federal government Infrastructure Australia). Since 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes and salience can vary over time and the survey study is 
cross sectional, the Mayors and CEOs are given a specific time period to evaluate the 
stakeholder attributes and salience (Agle et al. 1999). Hence, a statement was provided under 
the instructions as follows: ‘Your response on the scale below should be based on the 
perceptions you have formed throughout your current tenure’. The Mayors and CEOs will 
have different tenures since the former is elected for four years term while the latter can be 
contracted for longer periods.  
 
Section Five – Accountability Emphasis  
 
The notion of accountability for infrastructure asset decision-making in the study is defined as 
the organisational emphasis given to processes, practices and systems for discharging 
 163 
 
accountability outcomes as perceived by Mayors and CEOs. Three dimensions of 
accountability: public, managerial and political are measured using multi-item scales in the 
survey instrument. Each of these dimensions is measured with six items and in total there are 
18 items measuring the aggregate concept of accountability emphasis. Most of these multi–
items are developed based on extractions and modifications of dimensions of accountability 
found in prior empirical studies by Kloot and Martin (2001); Taylor and Rosair (2000); and 
Othman and Taylor (2006). The respondents were asked to agree or disagree to each of these 
18 statements by circling a response from a six point Likert scale. 
 
 
5.7 Instrument Validation and Administration of the Survey 
5.7.1 Expert’s Comments 
 
The draft survey instrument was first distributed among six professors and a senior academic 
of three different universities and two ex-councillors of LGAs. All the academics were from 
the accounting discipline, and have publications in at least one of the research areas of public 
sector, local government or accountability. Each of these experts gave their feedback and 
comments in writing with regard to the constructs, appropriateness of the items and the format 
of the instrument. This feedback were carefully discussed and evaluated by the researcher and 
the supervisors. Consequently, several fairly minor revisions were made to the survey 
instrument. 
 
5.7.2 Pilot Test 
 
A pilot survey was carried out in the months of April and May 2011 using a selection from 
the main sample of 30 LGAs in the jurisdiction of Victoria. The purposes of the pilot test are 
to assess any incomplete responses for relevance and clarity of the wording of items in the 
questionnaire and to track the efficiency of administration of the survey. Separately 
customised questionnaires were personally addressed to both Mayors and CEOs of each LGA 
(i.e., a total of 60 questionnaires were sent at the pilot stage). A covering letter (refer 
Appendix Three) and an invitation to participate in research project (refer Appendices Four 
and Five) which included a project information statement were sent along with the 
questionnaire to each participant in a reply paid envelope.  Follow-up reminder questionnaires 
were sent three weeks later. Twenty one questionnaires were returned, giving a pilot response 
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rate of 35%. Minor changes were made to the survey instrument based on the results of the 
pilot survey. 
 
5.7.3 The Main Administration of the Survey 
 
The main survey was administered to 390 LGAs in the months of August, September and 
October 2011, involving the mailing of 780 questionnaire packages amongst Mayors and 
CEOs .  The mail-out package included a covering letter that briefly explained the purpose of 
the study, and an invitation to participate in the research project which included a project 
information statement, the survey questionnaire and a reply-paid envelope. The covering letter 
also advised that the questionnaire had been approved by RMIT University’s Business 
College Human Ethics Committee. At the end of the questionnaire, the respondents were 
advised to return the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed, reply paid envelop. They 
were also given the option of stating their email addresses if they intend to obtain a summary 
of the findings of the study. Otherwise respondents remained anonymous. Although the 
envelopes and covering letters were personally addressed to the Mayors and CEOs, the 
researchers had no control over who actually responded. 
 
The main survey administration was followed up with the administration of a reminder.  
Reminders were sent to all the Mayors and CEOs who did not respond within the first six 
weeks from the initial mail-out. The reminder pack included all the documents that were 
included in the initial survey pack - a covering letter, a survey questionnaire, an invitation to 
participate in the project and a reply-paid envelope. Consequently, there were 200 useable 
responses received, giving a response rate of 25.6%. With the addition of the pilot survey 
responses of 21 responses, the overall response rate was 26.3%. The response rate is close to 
two other comprehensive mail surveys carried out in Australian LGAs in all jurisdictions. 
These are the surveys by Kloot and Martin (2001) which had a 29.3% response, and the 
survey by Carnegie et al. (2011) which had a 28.8% response. Out of the total responses 
31.7% were completed by Mayors and 68.3% were completed by CEOs. The descriptive 
statistics of the profiles of the respondents and their LGAs are given in Chapter Six. 
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5.7.4 The Issue of Non-Response 
 
Considerable non-response occurs generally in mail surveys (Malhotra 2002) and the 
generalisability of the results will be low when non-response bias exists. The effect of non-
response on survey estimates ‘depends on the percentage not responding and the extent to 
which those not responding are biased’ (Fowler 2002, p. 40). Bias means that if non- 
respondents had responded, their responses would have significantly altered the whole results 
of the survey (Creswell 2009).  According to de Vaus (1995) non-responders are often 
different in crucial respects to the responders in terms of age, education and ethnic 
background.  Babbie (1989) emphasises that those who respond may be more interested in the 
topic, or may be more affected by the issues concerned, or the issue may be sensitive or 
controversial. Hence, there can be higher tendencies to respond amongst particular groups. 
The response rate is only a guide to the sample’s probable representativeness and the issue is 
related to the degree of bias reflected in the respondent sample rather than the actual response 
rate (Babbie 1989).  
 
Table 5.6: Mean Differences between Early and Late Responses  
Latent Variable Mayor n=70 CEO n=151 
Early  
Mean 
Late  
Mean 
t-Statistic 
(Sig) 
Early  
Mean 
Late  
Mean 
t-Statistic 
(Sig) 
Cumulative Stakeholder 
Attributes of: 
 
Ratepayers 3.67 3.44 1.10 (.276) 3.69 3.68 .043 (.966) 
Users of Infrastructure Assets 3.64 3.36 1.13 (.265) 3.69 3.64 .395 (.693) 
Community Special Interest 
Groups 
3.64 3.49 .661 (.513) 3.68 3.68 .017 (.986) 
Local Media 3.33 2.98 1.58 (.121) 3.10 3.11 -.060 (.952) 
State Govt. Dept. of LGA 3.35 3.19 .639 (.527) 3.23 3.34 -.724 (.471) 
State Auditor General 2.84 2.56 .898 (.735) 2.40 2.56 -.813 (.418) 
Other Constructs       
Infrastructure Australia 2.97 2.60 1.10 (.278) 2.73 1.21 -.504 (.615) 
Public Stakeholder Salience 4.26 3.85 1.41 (.167) 4.19 4.10 .599 (.551) 
Higher-tier Government Salience 3.65 3.17 1.16 (.251) 3.35 3.48 -.552 (.582) 
Infrastructure Backlog 3.95 3.92 .076 (.940) 4.15 3.85 1.12 (.263) 
Managerial Values  5.25 5.16 .620 (.539) 5.20 5.31 -1.21 (.227) 
Public Accountability 5.25 5.09 .997 (.326) 4.80 4.72 .703 (.484) 
Managerial Accountability 4.48 4.24 1.00 (.325) 4.00 3.81 1.22 (.224) 
Political Accountability 3.73 3.72 .019 (.985) 3.41 3.39 .100 (.920) 
 
 
 
To this end, the degree of association between early and late responses is assessed, which 
suggests that late responses are often similar to non-responses (Oppenheim 1992). Latent 
variables involving perceptions of Mayors and CEOs with regard to cumulative stakeholder 
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attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) of seven stakeholders, salience of stakeholder 
groups, infrastructure backlog, managerial values and dimensions of accountability are the 
focus for response bias for analysis. The responses received during the month of August and 
until 6th of September 2011 are treated as early responses while the responses received from 
7th of September, 2011 are treated as late responses. The non-response bias is assessed using 
late responses as a proxy for non-responses (Roberts 1999). Independent Samples t tests are 
carried out separately for Mayor respondents and CEO respondents to compare the means of 
the latent variables. No significant differences are found between the early and late responses 
of both Mayor and CEO respondents. Table 5.6 indicates the results. As such, it is concluded 
that there are no significant differences between the respondents and non-respondents of the 
current study.  
 
5.8 Secondary Data 
 
Despite, the mail questionnaire being the predominant data collection method, this study 
collects secondary data to gather information pertaining to infrastructure backlog experienced 
by LGAs. One way to determine if a LGA is affected by infrastructure backlog is to evaluate 
the asset renewal/replacement ratio. ‘The net acquisition of non-financial assets for 
renewal/replacement purposes is the analytical balance appropriate with regard to the annual 
financial performance of councils on the renewal or replacement of existing assets’ (PWC 
2006, p. 110). This is measured dividing the renewal and upgrade expenditure on non-
financial assets by relevant depreciation amount (VAG 2009).  A ratio resulting 1:1 indicates 
that spending on existing assets is greater than the depreciation rate, that is, there exist no 
infrastructure backlog during that particular period.  
 
However, amongst all the jurisdictions, there is no consistent method of calculation and 
format of presentation of infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio nationally at the local 
government level. Moreover, there exists no consistent title for the renewal/replacement ratio 
amongst different jurisdictions. However, Western Australia, Tasmania and Northern 
Territory neither specifically calculate this ratio nor provide data on assets renewals or 
replacement during the year. With the information provided by these three jurisdictions only 
the capital expenditure ratio could be calculated. Capital expenditure ratio compares the rate 
of spending on infrastructure with its depreciation. Since the current study considers only the 
renewal/replacement backlog and not the backlog created due to lack of capital expenditure 
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on new infrastructure assets those three jurisdictions are removed from the secondary data 
collection stage.   
 
Relevant data are collected from 2011/2012 on-line annual reports from the websites of the 
respective LGAs in the jurisdictions of NSW, VIC, QLD and SA. The ratios using secondary 
data are calculated only for the LGAs who responded the survey questionnaire, which 
amounts to 221 LGAs. The following ratios in Table 5.7 are used to calculate the 
infrastructure backlog ratio.  
 
Table: 5.7: Title and Method of Calculation of Renewal/replacement Ratio 
State Title of the renewal/replacement 
ratio 
Method of calculation 
New South 
Wales 
Infrastructure Renewal Ratio   Asset renewals / depreciation, 
amortisation and impairment 
Victoria Infrastructure Renewal Ratio  Current spending on renewal  of 
assets / depreciation, 
amortisation and impairment 
Queensland Asset Sustainability Ratio  Capital expenditure on  renewal 
and replacement of existing 
assets / depreciation  
South Australia Asset Sustainability Ratio  Capital expenditure on  renewal 
and replacement of existing 
assets / depreciation  
 
5.9 Variable Definitions and Measurements In the study 
 
This section defines all the variables used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter Four.  
The measurements of the variables are accomplished based on the data collected through the 
questionnaire. The constructs are the stakeholder attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency), 
stakeholder salience, infrastructure backlog, managerial values and accountability emphasis 
(public, managerial and political). As stated earlier in this chapter, these constructs are 
measured based on multi-item scales.  
 
5.9.1 Latent Variables 
 
The definitions and measurements of 24 latent variables used in the study are given in Table 
5.8. 
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Table 5.8: Definitions and Measurements of the Latent Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement References 
POWPUB 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Power  
The extent to which the 
public stakeholder group 
(ratepayers , users of IFA , 
community special interest 
group and media) has the 
ability to carry out its will 
in relation to the relevant 
LGA (Etzioni 1964). 
 
Perceptions of Mayors with regard to 
power of public stakeholders of 
infrastructure assets decision-making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
POWPUB 
CUM 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Power 
Cumulative 
The extent to which the 
public stakeholder group 
has the ability to carry out 
its will in relation to the 
relevant LGA (Etzioni 
1964). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to power of public 
stakeholders of infrastructure assets 
decision-making. 
The construct is same as POWPUB 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
POW 
HIGH 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Power 
The extent to which higher-
tier government stakeholder 
group (state department, 
auditor general, IF 
Australia) has the ability to 
carry out its will in relation 
to the relevant LGA 
(Etzioni1964). 
Perceptions of CEOs with regard to 
power of higher-tier government 
stakeholders of infrastructure assets 
decision-making.  
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
POW 
HIGHCUM 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Power 
Cumulative 
The extent to which the 
higher-tier government 
stakeholder group 
has the ability to carry out 
its will in relation to the 
relevant LGA (Etzioni 
1964). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to power of higher-tier 
government stakeholders of 
infrastructure assets decision-making.  
The construct is same as HIGHPUB 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
LEGIPUB 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Legitimacy 
 
 
The extent to which  a 
particular claim of the 
public stakeholder group 
(ratepayers , users of IFA , 
community special interest 
group and media) is 
accepted and considered 
proper and appropriate, 
within socially constructed 
system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman 1995). 
 
Perceptions of Mayors with regard to 
legitimacy of public stakeholder needs 
and demands of infrastructure assets. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
 
 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
LEGIPUB 
CUM 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Legitimacy 
Cumulative 
The extent to which a 
particular claim of the 
public stakeholder group is 
accepted and considered 
proper and appropriate, 
within socially constructed 
system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman 1995). 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to legitimacy of public 
stakeholder needs and demands of 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is same as LEGIPUB 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
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Variable Definition Measurement References 
LEGIHIGH 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Legitimacy 
The extent to which  a  
particular claim of the 
higher-tier government 
stakeholder group (state 
department, auditor 
general, IF Australia)  is 
accepted and considered 
proper and appropriate by 
the CEO, within socially 
constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions (Suchman 1995) 
 
Perceptions of CEOs with regard to 
legitimacy of higher-tier government 
stakeholder needs and demands of 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
LEGIHIGH 
CUM 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Legitimacy 
Cumulative 
The extent to which  a  
particular claim of the 
higher-tier government 
stakeholder group   is 
accepted and considered 
proper and appropriate 
within socially constructed 
system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman 1995). 
 
Perceptions of CEOs with regard to 
legitimacy of higher-tier government 
stakeholder needs and demands of 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is same as LEGIHIGH 
above 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
URGPUB 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Urgency 
The extent to which public 
stakeholder’s (ratepayers, 
users of IFA, community 
special interest group and 
media) calls for immediate 
attention by Mayor 
(Mitchell et al 1997). 
Perceptions of Mayors on urgency of 
public stakeholders of infrastructure 
assets decision-making.  
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
URGPUB 
CUM 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Urgency 
Cumulative 
The extent to which public 
stakeholder’s stake calls for 
immediate attention by 
Mayor (Mitchell et al 
1997). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
on urgency of public stakeholders of 
infrastructure assets decision-making.  
The construct is same as URGPUB 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
URGHIGH 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Urgency 
The extent to which 
Higher-tier Government 
stakeholder’s (state 
department, auditor 
general, IF Australia)   calls 
for immediate attention by 
CEO (Mitchell et al 1997). 
 
Perceptions of CEOs with regard to 
urgency of higher-tier government 
stakeholders of infrastructure assets 
decision-making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
URGHIGH
CUM 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Urgency 
Cumulative 
The extent to which 
Higher-tier Government 
stakeholder’s stake calls for 
immediate attention by 
CEO (Mitchell et al 1997). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to urgency of higher-tier 
government stakeholders of 
infrastructure assets decision-making. 
The construct is same as URGHIGH 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
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Variable Definition Measurement References 
SALPUB 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Salience 
 
The degree to which 
Mayors give priority to 
competing public 
stakeholder (ratepayers, 
users of IFA, community 
special interest group and 
media) claims (Mitchell et 
al 1997). 
 
Perceptions of Mayors on how the 
public stakeholder needs are prioritised 
with regard to infrastructure assets 
decision-making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
SALPUB 
CUM 
Public 
Stakeholder 
Salience 
Cumulative 
 
The degree to which both 
Mayors and CEOs give 
priority to competing public 
stakeholder (ratepayers, 
users of IFA, community 
special interest group and 
media) claims(Mitchell et 
al. 1997). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
on how the public stakeholder needs are 
prioritised with regard to infrastructure 
assets decision-making. 
The construct is same as SALPUB 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
SALHIGH 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Salience 
The degree to which CEOs 
give priority to competing 
higher-tier Government 
stakeholder (state 
department, auditor 
general, IF Australia)   
claims (Mitchell et al 
1997). 
Perceptions of CEOs on how the higher-
tier government stakeholder needs are 
prioritised with regard to infrastructure 
assets decision-making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
references provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures (for each 
stakeholder) in the multi-item survey 
instrument. 
 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
SALHIGH 
CUM 
Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Salience 
Cumulative 
The degree to which both 
Mayors and CEOs give 
priority to competing 
higher-tier Government 
stakeholder (state dept., 
auditor general, IF 
Australia) claims (Mitchell 
et al. 1997). 
 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
on how the higher-tier government 
stakeholder needs are prioritised with 
regard to infrastructure assets decision-
making. 
The construct is same as SALHIGH 
above. 
Mitchell et al. 
(1997); 
Agle et al. 
(1999); Boesso 
and Kumar  
(2009 a, b) 
MVMAY 
Managerial 
Values of 
Mayors 
Managerial Values of 
Mayors – values of 
achievement, hedonism, 
power, stimulation, self-
direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, 
conformity and security 
( Schwartz 1992). 
 
Managerial values of Mayors with 
regard to infrastructure assets decision-
making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via eight measures in the multi-
item survey instrument. 
Schwartz 
(1992) 
MVCEO 
Managerial 
Values of 
CEOs 
Managerial Values of 
CEOs - values of 
achievement, hedonism, 
power, stimulation, self-
direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, 
conformity and security  
( Schwartz 1992). 
Managerial values of CEOs with regard 
to infrastructure assets decision-making. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via eight measures in the multi-
item survey instrument. 
Schwartz 
(1992) 
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Variable Definition Measurement References 
MVCUM 
Managerial 
Values 
Cumulative 
Managerial Values of 
Mayors and CEOs values 
of achievement, hedonism, 
power, stimulation, self-
direction, universalism, 
benevolence, tradition, 
conformity and security 
( Schwartz 1992). 
Managerial values of both Mayors and 
CEOs with regard to infrastructure 
assets decision-making. 
The construct is same as MVMAY and 
MVCEO  above. 
Schwartz 
(1992) 
PUBACC 
Public 
Account 
-ability 
Holds those in power 
accountable for the 
community and general 
public at large for their acts 
and omissions, decision and 
policies and expenditure 
which requires openness of 
account giving.  
(English 2003; Cameron 
2004). 
Perceptions of Mayors and CEOs of 
extent of emphasis given to actual 
practices adopt by LGA to demonstrate 
public accountability with regard to 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via six measures in the multi-
item survey instrument. 
Sinclair 
(1995); Parker 
and Gould 
(1999); Taylor 
and Rosair 
(2000); Kloot 
and Martin 
(2001); 
Othman and 
Taylor (2006); 
Luke (2010) 
MGLACC 
Managerial  
Account 
-ability 
Monitors both input and 
outputs or outcomes as a 
measure of management’s 
effectiveness in setting and 
achieving output targets as 
well as managing resources 
effectively. 
Sinclair (1995) 
Perceptions of Mayors and CEOs of 
extent of emphasis given to actual 
practices adopt by LGA to demonstrate 
managerial accountability with regard to 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via six measures in the multi-
item survey instrument. 
Same as 
PUBACC 
POLACC 
Political  
Account 
-ability 
Constitutes government 
representatives (Mayors 
and CEOs) directly 
accountable to an executive 
or parliament represented 
by and for the people  
(Thynne & Goldring 1987; 
Stewart 1984). 
Perceptions of Mayors and CEOs of 
extent of emphasis given to actual 
practices adopt by LGA to demonstrate 
political accountability with regard to 
infrastructure assets. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via six measures in the multi-
item survey instrument. 
Same as 
PUBACC 
AGGACC 
Aggregate 
Account 
-ability 
Aggregate Accountability 
of Mayors and CEOs 
(aggregation of all three 
dimensions of 
accountability- public, 
managerial and political – 
discussed above). 
Perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to overall accountability 
(public, managerial and political 
accountability)of infrastructure assets  
 Same as 
PUBACC 
IFBLOG(1) 
Infra 
-structure 
renewal 
backlog 
A tendency by some LGAs 
to defer or underspend on 
renewal and upgrading of 
existing infrastructure 
assets due to financial 
deficits experienced by 
them (PWC 2006;VAG 
2009) 
Renewal means restores, 
rehabilitates, replaces 
existing asset to its original 
Perceptions of Mayors and CEOs with 
regard infrastructure backlog in the LGA 
experienced due to funding constraints. 
The construct is developed based on the 
reference provided and the data is 
obtained via three measures in the multi-
item survey instrument 
 
Dollery et al. 
(2007); 
(2008); 
Murray and 
Dollery 
(2005); Jones 
and Walker 
(2007); Pilcher 
(2005); (2009)  
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capacity. 
Upgrade means enhancing 
the existing asset to provide 
higher levels of service. 
New means creation of a 
new asset to meet 
additional service level 
requirements(DITRDLG 
2010) 
IFBLOG(2) 
Infra 
-structure 
renewal 
backlog 
A tendency by some LGAs 
to defer or underspend on 
renewal and upgrading of 
existing infrastructure 
assets due to financial 
deficits experienced by 
them (PWC 2006;VAG 
2009) 
Ratio of renewal and upgrade 
expenditure on non-financial assets by 
relevant depreciation amount during the 
financial year 
 
Annual 
Reports 
2011/12 
 
 
5.9.2 Control Variables 
 
In the current study, respondent-specific and organisation-specific characteristics are 
considered as control variables. These chosen control variables are the responding Mayor’s 
and CEO’s characteristics of their academic qualifications, gender and age. The control 
variables of respondents’ organisation-specific characteristic in this study are the jurisdiction 
of the LGA and its socio-economic level according to official classification.  
 
Jurisdiction is treated as an ordinal variable in models 1, 2 and 4. It is defined in terms of the 
size of the population and budget of state government. Potentially this can translate into 
greater monitoring power of state government over its LGAs and more demand from public 
stakeholders concerning infrastructure assets. As a control variable JURIS will control for 
effect of state government size on stakeholder salience concerning LGA infrastructure. 
 
This socio-economic classification is developed by the Australian Council of Local 
Government (ACLG) on the grounds of each LGA’s population, population density and 
proportion of urban population. The LGAs included in the ACLG classification system are 
those that receive general-purpose financial assistance grants as defined under the LGA 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Commonwealth). However, voluntary regional organisations 
of LGAs and the Australian Capital Territory are excluded ((DITRDLG, 2012). This leaves 
for sampling in this study those LGAs categorised under the ACLG’s main categories of 
urban capital city, urban development, urban regional, urban fringe, rural significant growth, 
rural agricultural and rural remote large (refer Chapter Two for more details of ACLG 
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categories). Table 5.9 presents the definitions and measurements of control variables used in 
the current study. 
 
Table 5.9: Definitions and Measurements of the Control Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement Reference 
ACLG Australian 
Classification 
of Local 
Governments 
A score is given to a LGA based on the 
Australian classification of local governments as 
follows: 
 
Classification                                       Score 
Urban Capital City                                   1 
Urban Development                                 2 
Urban Rural                                              3 
Urban Fringe                                            4 
Rural Significant Growth                        5 
Rural Agricultural                                    6 
Rural Remote Large                                 7 
 
 
Department of 
Infrastructure, 
Transport, 
Regional 
Development 
and Local 
Government 
(2008) 
JURIS Jurisdiction of 
the LGA of the 
respondent. 
A score is assigned to the jurisdiction as follows: 
  
Jurisdiction                                                      Score 
New South Wales                                     1 
Victoria                                                      2 
Queensland                                              3 
South Australia                                 4 
Western Australia                             5 
Tasmania                                         6 
Northern Territory                                    7 
 
 
POS Position of the 
respondents 
A score is allocated to the position as follows: 
Position                                                      Score 
Mayor          0 
CEO                                                              1 
 
 
GENDER Gender of the 
respondents 
A score is allocated to the gender as follows: 
Gender                                                       Score 
Male                                                              1 
Female                                                          2 
 
AGE Age of the 
respondents 
A score is assigned to the age as follows: 
Age  
      Score 
Below 35 years 
    1 
35-44 years 
   2 
45-54 years 
   3 
55-64 years 
   4 
65 or older 
   5 
 
 
ACQUALI Academic 
qualifications 
of the 
respondents 
A score is assigned to the highest academic 
qualifications as follows: 
 
Qualification       Score 
Other     1 
Secondary     2 
TAFE Diploma    3 
Bachelors    4 
Postgraduate    5 
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5.10 Development of Models 
 
The theory of stakeholder identification and prioritisation assumes linear relationships among 
stakeholder attributes, stakeholder salience and organisational performances. Prior empirical 
studies (Agle et al. 1999; Kuratko et al. 2004; Gago & Antolin 2004; Cordano et al. 2004; 
Eesley & Lenox 2006; Parent & Deephouse 2007; Magness 2008; Murillo-Luna et al. 2008; 
Boesso & Kumar 2009 a,b; Mishra & Suar 2010; and Masoud  & Wilson 2011) have used 
linear regression models to model the phenomena of stakeholder identification based on 
power, legitimacy and urgency with stakeholder prioritisation, organisational performances 
and disclosures. Accordingly, the current study uses linear multiple regression models to test 
the relationships among dependant and independent variables to be consistent with prior 
empirical studies that use cross-sectional data to test relationships arising from stakeholder 
theory. These relationships are hypothesised in Chapter Four. 
 
 
Model 1- Effect of Stakeholder Attributes, Managerial Values on Stakeholder Salience 
 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) perspective of stakeholder theory is that stakeholder salience - the 
degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims - is affected by 
managers’ perceptions of three key stakeholder attributes - power, legitimacy and urgency. 
Model one is developed to examine this relationship between the perceptions of the Mayors 
and CEOs with regard to power, legitimacy and urgency associated with infrastructure claims 
of stakeholder groups, categorised into public stakeholder and higher-tier government 
stakeholders, and the perceived salience of those categories of stakeholders.  In addition to the 
three stakeholder attributes another independent variable, managerial values of the Mayors 
and CEOs is added to the regression model. Some control variables, namely, the socio-
economic level of the LGA, the jurisdiction of the LGA and demographic characteristics of 
academic qualifications, gender and age of the responding Mayors and CEOs are added. The 
regression models are run separately for the two stakeholder categories. Hence, the dependent 
variable is the salience of the public stakeholder category (consisting of four different 
stakeholder groups) for one set of regression analysis, and the higher-tier government 
category (consisted with three different stakeholder groups) for the other. Within these two 
sets, the relationships are tested separately for Mayor respondents (n=70) and CEO 
respondents (n=151). The following equations are modelled and empirically analysed through 
multiple regression model.  Model 1(a) tests Hypotheses 2(a) and 3(a) developed in Chapter 4 
while Model 1(b) tests Hypotheses 2(b) and 3(b). 
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SALPUB =  β0+ β1POWPUB + β2LEGIPUB + β3URGPUB+   β4 MVMAY + β5 ACLG  +  β6 
JURIS
 + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                              (1a) 
 
 
SALHIGH =  β0 + β1POWHIGH + β2LEGIHIGH + β3URGHIGH + β4 MVCEO + β5 ACLG 
+ β6 JURIS +  β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                    (1b) 
 
 
Model 2 - Effect of stakeholders attributes managerial values on public stakeholder 
salience -with the introduction of two dummy variables for perceptions of Mayors and 
CEOs  
 
The above two models do not directly test for significant differences between the perceptions 
of the Mayors and CEOs. To this end, the sample is not split, but instead, a dummy variable is 
introduced into the model to distinguish Mayors’ from CEOs’ responses (Mayor=1 and 
CEO=2). This dummy variable is used as an interaction term with the respective stakeholder 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Such modelling allows the responses to be 
pooled thereby increasing the degrees of freedom, which can improve the relative precision of 
the estimated regression coefficients (Jahmani 2003).  Other variables included in the model 
are managerial values and the same control variables as in Model 1 above.  The model is 
developed for the two stakeholder categories, where the dependent variable becomes the 
cumulative salience of the public stakeholder category and the higher-tier government 
stakeholder category respectively. The following Model 2(a) tests Hypotheses 2(a) and 3(a) 
while Model 2(b) test Hypotheses 2(b) and 3(b). 
 
SALPUBCUM=β0+ β1POWPUBCUM+ β2LEGIPUBCUM+ β3URGPUBCUM + β4 
(POWPUBCUM*MAYORADJ) + β5 (LEGIPUBCUM* MAYORADJ) + β6 (URGPUBCUM* 
MAYORADJ) + β7 MVCUM + β8 ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε                                                                                                                          (2a) 
 
 
SALHIGHCUM= β0 + β1POWHIGHCUM+ β2LEGIHIGHCUM + β3URGHIGHCUM + 
β4(POWHIGHCUM*CEOADJ)+ β5(LEGIHIGHCUM* CEOADJ)+   β6(URGHIGHCUM* 
CEOADJ)+ β7 MVCUM + β8 ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε                                                                                                                          (2b) 
 
 
Model 3- Effect of stakeholder salience and managerial values on aggregate 
accountability- Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceptions 
 
Model three is developed to examine the relationship between the perceptions of the Mayors 
and CEOs with regard to salience associated with infrastructure claims of stakeholder groups, 
 176 
 
categorised into public stakeholder and higher-tier government stakeholders, and the 
perceived accountability emphasis. In addition to the salience of the two stakeholder groups, 
two more independent variables, managerial values and dichotomized position for the Mayors 
and CEOs are added to the regression model. Hambrick & Mason claim that ‘theoretically a 
decision-maker can arrive at a set of perceptions that suggest a certain choice but discard that 
choice on the basis of values’ (1984, p. 195) while  Cameron (2004) states that accountability 
of every public officer must be clear and well understood since the position they occupy will 
determine the applicable legislative and policy regime. 
 
Control variables, namely the socio-economic level of the LGA, the jurisdiction of the LGA 
and demographic characteristics of academic qualifications, gender and age of the responding 
Mayors and CEOs are added.  The developed model is shown below and it tests Hypotheses 
4(a) and 5(a) developed in Chapter Four. 
 
 
AGGACC =   β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 
ACLG + Β6 JURIS + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                          (3)                                       
 
 
Model 4- Effect of stakeholder salience and managerial values on dimensions of 
accountability emphasis - Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceptions 
 
Since the concept of accountability is multidimensional and the current study is concerned 
with public, managerial and political accountability, it is worth examining the influence of the 
explanatory and control variables separately on the three dimensions of accountability 
emphasis. The following three equations are modelled to empirically explore the influences of 
stakeholder salience and managerial values on dimensions of accountability emphasis, 
namely- public, managerial and political accountability. In addition, another independent 
variable, ‘position’ is added to the regression models here. Cameron (2004) states that 
accountability of every public officer must be clear and well understood since the position 
they occupy will determine the applicable legislative and policy regime. And in turn the 
regime influences the duties, responsibilities and powers of individual public officer.  
Accordingly the following three models test Hypotheses 4(b) and 5(b) developed in Chapter 
Four. 
 
PUBACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG + 
Β6 JURIS + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                      (4a)   
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MGLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG 
+Β6 JURIS +β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                     (4b) 
 
 
POLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG 
+Β6 JURIS +β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                     (4c) 
 
 
Model 5- Effect of Stakeholder Salience on Infrastructure backlog 
Model five is developed to examine the relationship between salience of public and higher-
tier government stakeholders with the infrastructure renewal backlog. The model is tested 
separately using the data with respect to infrastructure renewal backlog obtained from the 
mail questionnaire as well as secondary data. Accordingly, the dependent variables are the 
extent of infrastructure renewal backlog perceived by the Mayors and the CEOs and the 
infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio. Control variables, namely, the socio-economic level 
of the LGA and the jurisdiction of the LGA and demographic characteristics of academic 
qualifications, gender and age of the responding Mayors and CEOs are added to the 
regression model. Hypothesis 6 is tested by this model.    
 
IFBLOG=β0+β1SALPUBCUM+β2SALHIGHCUM+β3POS+β4ACLG+ β5JURIS+ε          (5)                                                  
 
 
The following Table 5.10 summarises the five sets of models which are employed to 
empirically analyse the hypotheses developed in this study. 
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Table 5.10: Summary of Hypotheses Developed and Model Specifications  
Model Hypo
thesis 
Constructs Model 
1(a) H2(a) 
H3(a) 
Effect of stakeholder 
attributes, managerial values 
on  public stakeholder salience 
- Mayors’ perceptions 
SALPUB =  β0+ β1POWPUB + β2LEGIPUB + 
β3URGPUB+   β4 MVMAY + β5 ACLG  +  β6 JURIS + 
β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                           
 
1(b) H2(b) 
H3(b) 
Effect of stakeholder 
attributes, managerial values 
on  higher-tier government 
stakeholder salience – CEOs’ 
perceptions 
SALHIGH =  β0 + β1POWHIGH + β2LEGIHIGH + 
β3URGHIGH + β4 MVCEO + β5 ACLG + β6 JURIS +  
β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε              
2(a) H2(a) 
H3(a) 
Effect of stakeholders 
attributes, managerial values 
on public stakeholder salience 
(with the introduction of two 
dummy variables)- Mayors 
and CEOs perceptions 
SALPUBCUM=β0+ β1POWPUBCUM+ 
β2LEGIPUBCUM+  β3URGPUBCUM + β4 
(POWPUBCUM*MAYORADJ) +  
β5(LEGIPUBCUM* MAYORADJ)+  
β6(URGPUBCUM* MAYORADJ)+ β7 MVCUM + β8 
ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε      
                                                                                                                             
2(b) H2(b) 
H3(b) 
Effect of stakeholders 
attributes, managerial values 
on higher-tier government 
stakeholder salience (with the 
introduction of two dummy 
variables)- Mayors and CEOs 
perceptions 
SALHIGHCUM= β0 + β1POWHIGHCUM+ 
β2LEGIHIGHCUM + β3URGHIGHCUM + 
β4(POWHIGHCUM*CEOADJ)+ 
β5(LEGIHIGHCUM* CEOADJ)+   
β6(URGHIGHCUM* CEOADJ)+ β7 MVCUM + β8 
ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε                                                                                                                   
 
3 H4(a) 
H5(a) 
Effect of stakeholder salience 
and managerial values on 
Aggregate Accountability- 
Mayors’ and CEOs’ 
perceptions 
AGGACC =   β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ 
β2SALHIGHCUM +  β3MVCUM + β4 POS 
+ β5 ACLG + Β6 JURIS + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 
ACQUALI+ ε       
 
4(a) H4(b) 
H5(b) 
Effect of stakeholder salience 
and managerial values on 
public accountability- Mayors’ 
and CEOs’ perceptions 
PUBACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM 
+ β3MVCUM + β4 POS 
+ β5 ACLG + Β6 JURIS +  β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 
ACQUALI+ ε         
 
4(b) Effect of stakeholder salience 
and managerial values on 
managerial accountability- 
Mayors’ and CEOs’ 
perceptions 
MGLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM 
+  β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG +Β6 JURIS +β7 
GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε         
 
4(c)  Effect of stakeholder salience 
and managerial values on 
political accountability- 
Mayors’ and CEOs’ 
perceptions 
POLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM 
+   β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG +Β6 JURIS +β7 
GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε         
 
5 H6 Effect of stakeholder salience 
on perceived infrastructure 
backlog of Mayors and CEOs. 
IFBLOG  =  β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM 
+  β3 POS + β4 ACLG + β5JURIS +ε     
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5.11 Analysis of Data  
 
The final component of the survey methodology is the processing and analysis of data. The 
data processing has been initiated with coding and data entry with regard to 221 useable 
responses. Data analysis is undertaken using SPSS software in two stages. First, the multi-
item scales are assessed for their factorial dimensionality using principal component analysis 
and reliability and validity tests. These are presented in Chapter Six along with descriptive 
statistics of the variables including discussion of the frequencies, means and standard 
deviations. In the second stage the validated data is analysed statistically and is presented in 
Chapter Seven. First, correlation analysis of the independent variables and the association 
among independent and dependent variables are carried out. This correlation analysis can 
provide an initial indication of multicolinearity, which can be a concern in the current study 
since data with regard to all the variables are collected from the survey questionnaire. Then, 
comparisons of mean analyses among stakeholder attributes, salience and accountability 
emphasis are conducted using ANOVA and Independent Samples t-tests. Finally multiple 
regression analyses are carried out to test the models developed in Chapter Five, in order to 
examine the casual relationships between independent variables and dependent variables.  
 
 
5.12 Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter has provided the research design underpinning the current study, the methods 
used to collect data and how the data analysis will be undertaken to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter Four. Thus, the current study embraces positivist philosophy. It 
employs existing theories to develop research questions and hypotheses and uses quantitative 
methods to analyse the empirical data to test the developed hypotheses. Accordingly, this 
study employs a deductive approach while primary data is mainly collected by using survey 
methodology via a mail questionnaire that mainly uses close-ended scales. The procedure for 
sample selection, sample size, survey instrumentation including structure and content of the 
survey, validation of the instrument, and administration of the survey and non-response rate 
were discussed in detail in section four. Further, the section provides the definitions of all the 
latent variables used in the study along with the details of how they are being measured. Then, 
it provides all the models used to test the hypotheses using multiple regressions.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY TESTS AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
_______________________________________________________________ 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided the research design underpinning the current study, the 
methods used to collect data and how the data analysis will be undertaken to test the 
hypotheses developed. This chapter consists of two main sections. The first section presents 
the assessment of the multi-scale variables to establish their validity and reliability in 
preparation for the statistical analyses. It involves internal validity tests giving emphasis on 
content, construct and factorial validity.  Factorial validity is carried out on each of the 
constructs that measure the multi-item scales from the survey instrument. Additionally, an 
internal consistency reliability approach is used to assess the reliability of the multi-item 
variable measures. These tests will be performed using the SPSS statistical program. The 
second section presents the descriptive statistics for all the constructs for which the items met 
the validity and reliability criteria. In addition to the descriptive statistics of observable and 
latent variables, this section also presents the descriptive statistics on the profile of the 
respondents and the characteristics of the LGAs’ of the respondents.  
 
6.2  Assessing Validity of the Multi-item Variables    
 
Validity is concerned with whether findings are really about what they appear to be or 
whether an accurate view of what is being studied is represented by the data collected 
(Saunders et al. 2009; Collis & Hussey 2009). Henerson et al. (1987), say ‘validity boils down 
to whether the instrument is giving the researcher the true story, or at least something 
approximating the truth’ (p. 133). Establishing the validity of the scores in a survey is useful 
to identify whether an instrument might be appropriate to use in survey research (Creswell 
2009). This is vital, since the accuracy of measurement and the ability to be able to replicate 
the experiment reliably is the focus of positivism.  
 
Cooper and Schindler (2011) say external validity and internal validity can be treated as two 
major forms. External validity or generalisability of the research is whether the findings of the 
study can be equally applicable to other research settings such as other organisations 
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(Saunders et al. 2009) beyond the specific research context (Bryman & Bell 2007). Roberts 
(1999) claims that external validity may be higher in survey instruments, since surveys 
attempt to find naturally occurring variations between variables instead of manipulating 
variables as in experimental research.  External validity was discussed with reference to 
sampling in Chapter Five. Thus, the following section will consider only internal validity 
measurements. Moreover, the discussion is limited to the ability of the research instrument to 
measure what it is claimed to measure. 
 
6.2.1 Internal Validity of Multi-item Scales 
 
The ability of the questionnaire to measure what is intended to measure is referred to as 
internal validity in relation to a survey questionnaire (Saunders et al. 2009). Roberts (1999) 
asserts that internal validity is not high in survey research, particularly when the statements 
about relations between the variables cannot be as strong in surveys as they are in 
experimental research. This is due to the fact that surveys attempt to find naturally occurring 
variations between variables. 
 
Bryman and Bell (2007) also point out that in cross-sectional survey questionnaires, the 
internal validity is typically weak since research designs produce associations rather than 
findings from which casual inferences can be explicitly made.  When discussing the internal 
validity of survey data, researchers (Field 2009; Cooper & Scindler 2011) suggest three major 
forms of validity: content validity; construct validity and factorial validity 
(unidimensionality). However it should be noted that content and construct validity are 
interrelated both theoretically and operationally (Cooper & Scindler 2011). They are 
discussed below with reference to the multi-item measurement instrument employed in the 
current study.  
 
6.2.1.1 Content (Face) Validity  
 
This approach emphasises the extent to which the indicators measure the different aspects of 
the concept (de Vaus 1995). When using a measurement device such as a multi-item survey 
instrument to measure constructs as in the current study, it is necessary to identify whether 
there is adequate coverage of the investigative questions. There are many ways to judge 
adequate coverage (Saunders et al. 2009). They include getting the expertise judgement on 
measurement questions to determine whether the intended constructs will be measured by the 
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questions or carrying out pilot studies (Bryman & Bell 2007). As explained in Chapter Five, 
the content validity of the multi-item survey instrument of the current study is carried out by 
means of expert judgement of six professors and a senior academic from three different 
universities in the discipline of accounting and two ex-local government councillors. Also a 
pilot study was carried out among 30 Victorian LGAs during March- April 2011. However, it 
should be noted that the determination of content validity is highly subjective and 
judgemental (Cooper & Scindler 2011).  
 
6.2.1.2 Construct Validity (Measurement Validity)  
 
Construct validity is one of the most important concepts in social science, particularly when 
researchers use a variable that is not itself directly observable, such as perception, skill 
attitude or ability, that an instrument is intend to measure. Accordingly, Cronbach and Meehl 
(1955) assert ‘construction validation is involved whenever a test is to be interpreted as a 
measure of some attribute or quality which is not operationally defined’ (p. 282).  Interpreting 
the results obtained from an analysis will be problematic if such an analysis lacks construct 
validity (Westen & Rosenthal 2003). There are two concepts in construct validation, namely: 
convergent validity and discrimant validity. Convergent validity is the property of not making 
discriminations where theory says there should not be any or in other words it is the degree 
that a group of indicators measure the same construct. Discriminant validity indicates the 
power of the test to discriminate between persons or situations which theory says should be 
different. In other words it is the degree that two constructs are distinct from each other 
(Sapsford 2007). Construct validity is typically established by presenting correlations between 
a measure of a construct and a number of other measures that should, theoretically, be 
associated with it (convergent validity) or vary independently of it (discrimant validity) 
(Westen & Rosenthal 2003).  
 
When trying to evaluate construct validity, a researcher needs to consider both the theory and 
measuring instrument being used. This means the operationally defined constructs have to 
correspond to an empirically grounded theory (Cooper & Schindler 2011). Thus, the positivist 
researcher deduces hypotheses from a theory that are relevant to constructs (Collis & Hussey 
2009) as explained in Chapter Four of the current study. This provides the preliminary 
indications of convergent validity, a method used to evaluate construct validity. 
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6.2.1.3 Factorial Validity  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the constructs used in the study are not directly measured, and 
involved multiple measurement items to create a single construct. When multiple items are 
involved it is necessary to ascertain that all items are correlated with each other and are 
measuring the same underlying dimensions. This is known as unidimensionality (Sapsford 
2007) and the underlying dimensions are known as factors or latent variables (Field 2009).  If 
an item does not measure what it intends to measure, that item needs to be eliminated from 
the scale.  The first thing to do in order to  ensure whether the responses on a particular item 
reflect the responses on other items is to calculate a correlation co-efficient between the items 
(variables) (de Vaus 1995). Correlation coefficient of the variables in the study is discussed in 
Chapter Seven.  A supplementary test for unidimensionality can be done with factor analysis 
where a unidimensional measure should result in a factor solution with only one factor. Factor 
analysis is an appropriate method for scale development when there is a set of interval-level 
and non-dichotomous variables. Principal components analysis is a technique that can be used 
when a researcher wants to explore data while restricting the conclusions to the sample 
collected. Accordingly the current study uses the principal components analysis extraction 
with Varimax with Kaiser Normalization rotation method. The following sub sections present 
the results of the factorial validity tests of the multi-scale constructs, i.e., infrastructure 
backlog, managerial values, stakeholder attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency), 
stakeholder salience, public accountability, managerial accountability and political 
accountability. Factor loadings less than .400 are suppressed since for a sample size of 200 the 
loading should be greater than .364 (Stevens 2009) based on alpha level of .01 (two tailed). 
 
Infrastructure Backlog 
Infrastructure backlog is measured with a three item scale as explained in Chapter Five. Table 
6.1 presents results of the initial and final factor solution after extraction.  It produces a single 
factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1. 
 
Table 6.1: Infrastructure Backlog- Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
BACK- 
LOG 
BLOG1 Our council has experienced a serious deficit budget in 
recent years 
BLOG1 .734 
BLOG2 Our council faces difficulties in meeting the increasing 
demand for new/upgraded infrastructure 
BLOG2 .895 
BLOG3 Our council encounters difficulties in renewing exiting 
infrastructure 
BLOG3 .911 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Only one component was extracted. 
KMO sampling adequacy test =.640; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
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Managerial Values 
As explained earlier, the initial step to undertake when conducting factor analysis or principal 
components analysis is to examine the inter-correlation between variables (Field 2009). If the 
measurement items of a particular construct measure the same underlying dimension it is 
expected the items will be correlated. However, there may be two possible complications: 
correlations that are too low; and correlations that are too high (Field 2009). As a rule of 
thumb, if a variables has many correlations less than 0.3  then eliminating an item from the 
variable before the principal components analysis is carried out should be considered (de 
Vaus 1995; Field 2009).   Accordingly, it is decided to remove managerial value 6 (MVAL 6- 
I balance work with personal wellbeing) from the set of items since all correlations were 
below 0.3. Table 6.2 shows the initial and final factor solution once MVAL6 is removed with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 for the eight remaining items. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Managerial Values- Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
Manageri
al Values 
MVAL1 I openly recognise success and achievement of 
colleagues 
MVAL1 
.718 
MVAL2 I care about the effect that the organisation has on the 
environment 
MVAL2 
.588 
MVAL3 I believe that loyalty must not be taken for granted MVAL3 
.622 
MVAL4 I strive to exceed expectations MVAL4 
.735 
MVAL5 I take pride in my work MVAL5 
.726 
MVAL7 I encourage teamwork that enables a supportive 
working environment 
MVAL6 
.674 
MVAL8 I embrace innovative change amongst the 
organisation’s people and services 
MVAL7 
.710 
MVAL9 I value freedom of expression in the workplace MVAL8 
.652 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
KMO sampling adequacy test = .860; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
 
 
Stakeholder Attributes  
As explained in Chapter Five, the three stakeholder attributes- power, legitimacy and 
urgency- are measured with three different scales which consist of three measurement items in 
each attribute. Table 6.3 presents initial and final factor solution after extraction which 
produced three-factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1. 
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Table 6.3: Stakeholder Attributes- Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution (Rotated 
Component Matrixa ) 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 2 3 
POWER POW1 Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity 
and ability (whether used or not) to apply direct 
sanctions on their council (e.g. withhold money, 
labour, remove councillors) to obtain their will 
regarding infrastructure assets. 
POW1  .901  
POW2 Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity 
and ability (whether used or not) to apply direct 
force or legal action against their local council to 
obtain their will regarding infrastructure assets. 
POW2  .898  
POW3 Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity 
and ability (whether used or not) to influence the 
public image of their local council regarding 
infrastructure assets. 
POW3  .759  
LEGITI-
MACY 
LEG1 The management team of our local council treats the 
claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding 
infrastructure assets of each stakeholder group as 
proper or appropriate. 
LEG1   .827 
LEG2 The management team of our local council treats the 
claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding 
infrastructure assets of each stakeholder group as 
deserving serious consideration 
LEG2   .882 
LEG3 The management team of our local council treats the 
claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding 
infrastructure assets of each stakeholder group as 
trivial and inconsequential 
LEG3   -
.641* 
URGEN-
CY 
URG1 Each respective stakeholder group actively and 
persistently put their claims (i.e. demands and 
requests) regarding infrastructure assets with our 
staff or councillors. 
URG1 .937   
URG2 Each respective stakeholder group actively and 
persistently seeks the attention of our staff or 
councillors regarding claims of infrastructure assets 
URG2 .941   
URG3 Each respective stakeholder group actively and 
persistently communicates the importance and 
urgency of their claims regarding infrastructure 
assets to our staff or councillors. 
URG3 .936   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Vaimax with Kaiser Normalization 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations 
KMO sampling adequacy test = .760; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
* Negative sign indicates the requirement of a reverse coding (this was done before carrying out the reliability 
test) 
 
 
Stakeholder Salience 
Stakeholder salience is measured with a three item scale as explained in Chapter Five. Table 
6.4 presents results of initial and final factor solution after extraction which produced a single 
factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1. 
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Table 6.4: Stakeholder Salience- Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
SALIENCE SAL1 Each respective stakeholder group receives high priority 
from our management team regarding claims of 
infrastructure assets. 
SAL1 .908 
SAL2 Each respective stakeholder group takes up the time and 
attention of our management team regarding claims of 
infrastructure assets. 
SAL2 .793 
SAL3 Each respective stakeholder group has their satisfaction 
treated as highly important by our management team 
regarding acclaims of infrastructure assets. 
SAL3 .869 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Only one component was extracted. 
KMO sampling adequacy test = .670; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
 
Public Accountability  
This is measured with a six item scale as explained in Chapter Five. Table 6.5 presents results 
of the initial and final factor solution which produced a single factor solution with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.  
 
Table 6.5: Public Accountability - Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTA- 
BILITY 
PUB 
ACC1 
Our council (i.e. our organisation) makes a wide 
range of information on infrastructure assets 
transparent to the public. 
PUB 
ACC1 
.758 
PUB 
ACC2 
Our council provides qualitative information on 
physical condition on infrastructure assets to the 
public. 
PUB 
ACC2 
.729 
PUB 
ACC3 
Our council knows the likely cost (cost of repair,   
upgrading or replacement) of bringing 
infrastructure to a satisfactory condition. 
PUB 
ACC3 
.781 
PUB 
ACC4 
Our council gives an excellent service to the 
public in answering enquiries and complaints in 
relation to infrastructure assets. 
PUB 
ACC4 
.779 
PUB 
ACC5 
Our council carries out community consultation  
when preparing plans and policies in relation   
to infrastructure assets. 
PUB 
ACC5 
.739 
PUB 
ACC6 
Our council considers the requirements of future 
generations, when planning infrastructure. 
PUB 
ACC6 
.714 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
KMO sampling adequacy test = .856; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
 
 
Managerial Accountability 
This is measured with a six item scale as explained in Chapter Five. Table 6.6 presents results 
of initial and final factor solution which produced a single factor solution with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.  
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Table 6.6: Managerial Accountability - Initial and Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
MANA- 
GERIAL 
ACCOUNTA-
BILITY 
MGL 
ACC1 
Our council uses performance information  on 
infrastructure assets to improve service delivery  
and quality of service. 
MGL 
ACC1 
.736 
MGL 
ACC2 
Our council collects and carefully assesses 
performance measures of community satisfaction 
with regard to infrastructure. 
MGL 
ACC2 
.812 
MGL 
ACC3 
Our council assesses performance measures on 
service accessibility with regard to infrastructure. 
MGL 
ACC3 
.850 
MGL 
ACC4 
Our council uses performance indictors on 
infrastructure assets to reward or sanction 
individual staff. 
MGL 
ACC4 
.633 
MGL 
ACC5 
Our council uses performance indicators of 
infrastructure for inter-council comparability. 
MGL 
ACC5 
.704 
MGL 
ACC6 
Our council often provides the infrastructure 
performance information to stakeholders of local 
government. 
MGL 
ACC6 
.717 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
KMO sampling adequacy test = .801; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
 
 
Political Accountability 
This is measured with a six item scale as explained in Chapter Five.  
 
Table 6.7: Political Accountability - Initial Factor Analysis Solution (Rotated 
Component Matrixa ) 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Component  Action 
1 2 
POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTA
-BILITY 
POL 
ACC1 
Our council has become more accountable to the 
State government since the Regional and Local 
Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) was 
introduced. 
.872    
POL 
ACC2 
Our council has become more accountable to 
State and/or Federal government since the 
Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 was introduced. 
.882    
POL 
ACC3 
Our council has become more accountable to 
Federal and/or State government since the Nation 
Building –Economic Stimulus Plan was 
introduced. 
.826    
POL 
ACC4 
Our council has more frequent meetings of the  
committee(s) of council responsible for 
infrastructure assets and their management 
.522 .516 Removed 
due to cross-
loading 
POL 
ACC5 
Our council often has formal and informal 
communication about infrastructure assets with 
the relevant Minister or his/her Department. 
  .732 Removed 
due to 
content 
POL 
ACC6 
Our council gives very careful attention to any 
compliance requirements in reporting to agencies 
or departments of State and Federal governments 
concerning infrastructure assets. 
  .855 Removed 
due to 
content 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Vaimax with Kaiser Normalization 
a.Rotation converged in 3 iterations 
KMO sampling adequacy test =.774; Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
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Table 6.7 presents results of initial factor solution which produced a two-factor solution with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. One item was removed due to cross loading (POLACC4) and two 
more items (POLACC5 and POLACC6) were removed due to the content of the questions. 
The researcher believes those two items may not fit into a common theme and moreover, 
according to Costello and Osborne (2005), a factor with fewer than three items is generally 
weak and unstable. 
 
The principal components analysis was run again with the remaining three items fixing the 
extraction to a single factor solution. The result is provided in Table 6.8.  It indicates that 
Mayors and CEOs perceive political accountability as a bundle of accountabilities to different 
tiers of government once a particular program, plan or Act is introduced and implemented 
(POLACC1-3) instead of  routine activities carried out by the LGA (POLACC4-6).  
 
Table 6.8: Political Accountability - Final Factor Analysis Solution 
Construct Initial 
Code 
Item Revised 
Code 
Component 
1 
POLITICAL 
ACCOUN-
TABILITY 
 
POL 
ACC1 
Our council has become more accountable to the 
State government since the Regional and Local 
Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) was 
introduced. 
POL 
ACC1 
.881 
POL 
ACC2 
Our council has become more accountable to State 
and/or Federal government since the Infrastructure 
Australia Act 2008 was introduced. 
POL 
ACC2 
.907 
POL 
ACC3 
Our council has become more accountable to 
Federal and/or State government since the Nation 
Building –Economic Stimulus Plan was introduced. 
POL 
ACC3 
.848 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
KMO sampling adequacy test =.714;  Bartlett’s Test of sphericity =.000 significant 
 
6.3 Assessing Reliability of the Multi-item Measurement Instrument  
 
The previous sections assessed the content, construct and factorial validity of the scales used 
to measure the latent variables in the study. This section assesses the scales for reliability.  
‘Reliability refers to the extent to which the data collection techniques or analysis procedures 
will yield consistent findings’ (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 156). In other words, reliability is the 
non-existence of variations in the results if the research was repeated (Collis & Hussey 2009). 
Accordingly, it is the extent to which measures are free from random errors (Malhotra 2002) 
or unstable errors (Cooper & Schindler 2011). There are three common approaches to 
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estimating the reliability of the responses to an item in a multi-item measurement instrument, 
namely: test-retest reliability; alternative-form reliability and internal consistency reliability.   
In the test-retest reliability approach, the same respondents are administered at two separate 
instances with identical sets of scale measurements. This is also referred to as ‘stability’ of the 
instrument (Cooper & Schindler 2011). The extent of the similarity of the two measurements 
is obtained by computing a correlation co-efficient. The next approach, the alternative-form 
reliability or the ‘equivalence’ (Cooper & Schindler 2011), measures the same respondents at 
two different times using alternative scale forms. Here the measure of reliability is obtained 
by correlation between the responses to the two equivalent forms of the scale (Malhotra 
2002). The third approach, the internal consistency reliability approach uses only one 
administration of a variable to assess its the homogeneity (Cooper & Schindler 2011) or 
consistency (Malhotra 2002) among the items. Since the current study is a cross-sectional 
study (as explained in Chapter Five) and moreover, administering the measurement 
instrument multiple times is not feasible in this study, the most appropriate method to assess 
reliability would be the internal consistence reliability approach.  
 
6.3.1 Internal Consistency Reliability 
 
‘This approach is used to assess the reliability of a summated scale, or subscale, where scores 
for several items are summed to form a total score for a construct’ (Malhotra 2002, p. 293) 
which is similar to what is being undertaken in the current study (refer Chapter Five –
Instrumentation).   Each item in the instrument measures some aspect of the construct by the 
entire scale. Therefore, the items need to be consistent in what they indicate about the 
characteristics of the construct. The simplest measure of internal consistency in practice is to 
use split-half reliability (Malhotra 2002). This method randomly splits the data set into two 
and the resulting half scores are correlated (Field 2009). High internal consistency is indicated 
by high correlations and the coefficient alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is the most common measure 
of scale reliability (Field 2009), which is calculated by averaging the coefficients that result 
from all possible combinations of split halves.  Cronbach’s alpha varies from 0 to 1, and a 
value of .6 or less generally indicates unsatisfactory internal consistency reliability (Malhotra 
2002). The alpha measures unidimensionality or the extent to which the scale measures one 
underlying factor or construct.  This is due to the fact that when there is one factor underlying 
the data, alpha is a measure of the strength of that factor (Cortina cited in Field 2009). 
Therefore, to assess the internal consistency reliability of the constructs in the current study, 
the items remain after the assessment of factorial validity or dimensionality is taken into 
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consideration. The results show (refer Table 6.9) that Cronbach’s alpha is greater than .6 for 
all constructs, indicating high internal consistency reliability.   
 
Table 6.9: Internal Consistency Reliability 
Construct Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Power .843 
Legitimacy (LEG3 is reverse coded-refer section 6.2.13) .739 
Urgency .956 
Salience .821 
Infrastructure Backlog .787 
Managerial Values  ( MVAL 6 is removed refer section 6.2.13) .829 
Public Accountability .842 
Managerial Accountability .830 
Political Accountability (POLACC4-6 are removed refer section 6.2.1.3) .852 
 
 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The previous sections presented the results of the assessment of the validity and reliability of 
the multi-item variables. The specific items retained in each validated variable are referred to 
as its latent variables. This section presents the descriptive statistics on the profile of the 
respondents and their LGAs followed by the descriptive statistics on each of the latent 
variables. 
 
6.4.1 Profile of Respondents  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five- Research Methodology- the first section of the survey 
instrument seeks data on the professional background and other demographics of the 
respondent. The professional background and demographic details are used as control 
variables in the subsequent regression models as explained in Chapter Five. Accordingly, this 
section analyses the profiles of the respondents – Mayors and CEOs. The results are presented 
in Table 6.10 and summarised as follows: 
• The majority of the Mayor respondents (71%) and CEO respondents (92%) are males; 
• There are no Mayors and CEOs below 35 years of age. Majority of the Mayors and CEOs 
fall into the category of 55-64 years of age.  
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• 27% of the Mayors possess postgraduate qualifications while another 27% holds only 
secondary school attainment. One of the Mayor respondents stated in the questionnaire:  
‘I find this question most offence, because one is put in a box. Education a great gift to  
have, not all if little comes at times from academic continual journey of life with a dusk of 
common sense’. On the other hand 65% of the CEO respondents possess a postgraduate 
qualification while only 0 .7% holds only secondary school attainment. These figures 
indicate that CEOs possess more academic qualifications than Mayors.  
• With respect to the discipline of their highest academic qualification, 25% of the Mayor 
respondents had obtained their qualification from the discipline of Public or Political 
administration followed by Business (21%) and Social Science (8.6%). Nearly 6% of the 
Mayors’ highest academic qualification was from the discipline of Accounting. It is noted 
that 24% of the Mayor respondents did not respond to this question, whereas the missing 
figure for CEOs is just 2%. Among CEO respondents, nearly 52% of them possess a 
business qualification as their highest academic qualification. This is followed by Public or 
Political Administration (14.6%) and Accounting (10.6%). Town Country or Property 
Planning and Engineering together are held by nearly 14% of the CEOs.  
• Approximately 38% of the Mayor respondents stated that they have gained 20 years or 
more work experience in the public sector while this figure is 80% amongst the CEO 
respondents. Nearly 10% of the Mayors and 1.3% of the CEOs have less than 4 years of 
work experience in the public sector.  The information reflects the fact that CEOs possess 
more public sector experience than Mayors.  
• When it comes to private sector work experience, nearly 54.3% of the Mayors have gained 
20 years or more while this is only 6% amongst the CEOs. It is interesting to see that 
nearly 36% of the CEO respondents have never worked in the private sector while only 8% 
of the Mayors have stated that they have no experience in the private sector. This 
information with respect to work experience shows that the Mayors have more work 
experience in the private sector than CEOs.  
• Nearly 27 % of the Mayors say that they attend workshops, conferences and seminars 
relevant to their work once in three months, while 14% attend once a month and 18% 
attend only once a year. With respect to CEOs nearly 44% of them attend once in six 
months, 32% attend once in three months and 15% attend once a year.  
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Table 6.10: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
Profile/demographic details   Mayor n=70 CEO n=151 
                                Scale Frequency Percentage Mean Frequency Percentage Mean 
Gender    1.27   1.07 
     Male                                 (1) 50 71.4  140 92.7  
     Female                             (2) 19 27.1  11 7.3  
     Missing 01 1.4  - -  
Age   3.84   3.4 
     Below 35 years                (1) - -  - -  
     35-44 years                      (2) 3 4.3  17 11.3  
     45-54 years                      (3) 17 24.3  59 39.1  
     55-64 years                      (4) 37 52.9  72 47.7  
     65 or older                       (5) 12 17.1  3 2.0  
     Missing 1 1.4  -   
Academic Qualifications   3.30   4.50 
     Other                                (1) 6 8.6  2 1.3  
     Secondary                        (2) 19 27.1  1 .7  
     TAFE diploma                 (3) 11 15.7  14 9.3  
     Bachelors                         (4) 14 20  35 23.2  
     Postgraduate                    (5) 19 27.1  99 65.6  
     Missing 1 1.4  - -  
Discipline of the highest 
Academic Qualification 
  N/A   N/A 
   Accounting                           4 5.7  16 10.6  
   Business 15 21.4  78 51.7  
   Engineering - -  10 6.6  
   Town country property     
    planning 
2 2.9  12 7.9  
   Social Science 6 8.6  3 2.0  
   Public/ Political  
   administration 
18 25.7  22 14.6  
   Others 8 11.4  7 4.6  
   Missing 17 24.3  3 2.0  
Work experience in  public 
sector 
  3.46   4.66 
   Less than 4  years               (1) 7 10  2 1.3  
   5-9 years                             (2) 15 21.4  4 2.6  
   10-14 years                         (3) 10 14.3  9 6.0  
   15-19 years                         (4) 4 5.7  12 7.9  
   20 years or more                 (5) 27 38.6  121 80.1  
   Missing 7 10  3 2.0  
Work experience in  pvt. sector   4.06   1.27 
   No experience                     (0) 6 8.6  54 35.8  
   Less than 4 years                 (1) 3 4.3  35 23.2  
   5-9 years                              (2) 6 8.6  28 18.5  
   10-14 years                          (3) 5 7.1  6 4.0  
   15-19 years                          (4) 5 7.1  5 3.3  
   20 years or more                 (5) 38 54.3  9 6.0  
   Missing 7 10  14 9.3  
Attendance of  conferences, 
seminars and workshops  
  3.30   3.15 
  Once in two years or more   (1) 3 4.3  7 4.7  
   Once a year                         (2) 13 18.6  23 15.2  
   Once in 6 months                (3) 21 30  66 43.7  
   Once in 3 months                (4) 19 27.1  49 32.5  
   Once a month                      (5) 10 14.3  6 4  
   Missing 4 5.7  - -  
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6.4.2 Characteristics of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) of the 
Respondents  
 
In addition to the professional background and demographic data of the Mayors and CEOs, 
they were asked to provide some information relevant to the LGA.  There were four questions 
in Section one and two of them are considered as control variables in the regression models 
set out in  Chapter Five, namely the state the LGA belongs to and its Australian Classification 
of Local Government  (ACLG). Accordingly, this section analyses these two characteristics of 
the LGAs of the respondents.  The results are presented in Table  6.11.  
 
 
Table 6.11: Descriptive Statistics of the Respondents’ Local Government Authorities  
Characteristics of the LGA Mayor n=70 CEO n=151 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Jurisdiction of the Local Government  
Authority 
New South Wales 18 25.7 54 35.8 
Victoria 15 21.4 30 19.8 
Queensland 6 8.6 7 4.6 
South Australia 7 10 16 10.6 
Western Australia 10 14.3 20 13.2 
Tasmania 7 10 9 6 
Northern Territory - - 1 .7 
Missing 7 10 14 9.3 
Total  70 100 151 100 
Australian Classification of Local Government  
(ACLG) 
Urban Capital City    2 2.9 4 2.6 
Urban Development  5 7.1 24 15.9 
Urban Regional 20 28.6 33 21.9 
Urban Fringe 7 10 18 11.9 
Rural Significant Growth - - 4 2.6 
Rural Agricultural 28 40 51 33.8 
Rural Remote Large 1 1.4 3 2 
Missing 7 10 14 9.3 
Total 70 100 151 100 
 
 
The above table shows that the majority of the Mayor respondents (25%) are from the 
jurisdiction of New South Wales followed by Victoria (21%) and Western Australia (14%). 
There are no Mayor respondents from Northern Territory, however there was one CEO 
respondent. Similar to Mayor respondents, the majority of the CEO respondents are from 
New South Wales (35%) followed by Victoria (20%) and Western Australia (13%).  
 
When looking at the ACLG category, the majority of Mayor respondents (40%) and CEO 
respondents (33%) are from Rural Agricultural (see Chapter Two for explanations). This is 
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consistent with the number of Rural Agricultural LGAs represented in the sample (as 
explained in Chapter 5) which is also 40 % (167) out of the total sample (420). The second 
highest responses are from Urban Regional category for both Mayor (28%) and CEO (21%) 
respondents, which is again the second highest category (97) of the total sample selection 
(420). With respect to Mayors (0%), the least responses are from the Rural Significant 
Growth category, which represented just 3% of the total sample selected (420).  Rural Remote 
Large category was the least represented by CEOs (2%) which is again consistent with the 
number of Rural Remote Large LGAs (2%) in the total sample (420).  
 
6.4.3  Descriptive Statistics of Infrastructure Backlog 
 
As explained in Chapter Five, section two of the survey instrument was developed to capture 
the perceptions of the mayors and CEOs about the severity of infrastructure backlog 
experienced by their LGA. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with the given three statements on a six-point Likert Scale. These are variables which 
have successfully gone through the tests of reliability and validity as discussed above.  Table 
6.12 shows the descriptive statistics of items related to infrastructure backlog while Table 
6.13 provides the descriptions of the infrastructure backlog items.  
 
Table 6.12: Descriptive Statistics of Infrastructure Backlog 
Code  Mayor n=70 CEO n= 151 t stat & (sig) 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
BACKLOG1 67 1.00 6.00 2.63 1.75 150 1.00 6.00 2.92 1.69 -1.17  (.245) 
BACKLOG2 68 1.00 6.00 4.75 1.41 150 1.00 6.00 4.69 1.27 .330   (.742) 
BACKLOG3 67 1.00 6.00 4.51 1.47 151 1.00 6.00 4.37 1.41 .786   (.517) 
 
 
‘Our council faces difficulties in meeting the increasing demand for new/upgraded 
infrastructure’ (BACKLOG2) was the most prevalent infrastructure backlog statement by 
both Mayors and CEOs with a mean of 4.75 and 4.69 respectively out of a response scale of 
six. The results are consistent with the findings of PWC report (2006) as explained in Chapter 
Two, that states 10% to 30% of Australian LGAs have financial sustainability issues causing 
difficulties in upgrading existing assets and investing in new assets. Similarly, both the 
Mayors and CEOs least perceived that their LGAs experienced a serious deficit in recent 
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years (BACKLOG1) with a mean of 2.63 and 2.92 respectively. The mean differences 
between perceptions of Mayors and CEOs are not significant in respect of each item.    
 
Table 6.13: Description of Infrastructure Backlog Survey Items Used in Statistical 
Analyses 
Code 
 
Description 
BACKLOG1 Our council has experienced a serious deficit budget in recent years 
BACKLOG2 Our council faces difficulties in meeting the increasing demand for upgraded infrastructure 
BACKLOG3 Our council encounters difficulties in renewing exiting infrastructure 
 
 
6.4.4 Descriptive Statistics of Managerial Values 
 
The managerial values of Mayors and CEOs have been measured against the Schwartz (1992) 
value categories as explained in Chapter Five. Respondents were given a six point Likert scale 
to evaluate each of the statements related to their own managerial values. It was reported in 
section 6.2.1.3, that out of the nine items designed to measure the managerial values of 
Mayors and CEOs they were reduced to eight items through principal components factor 
analysis. Therefore, the following discussion on descriptive results is limited to the eight 
validated items. Both Mayors and CEOs mostly agree that they take pride in their work 
(VALUE5) with a mean of 5.55 and 5.62 respectively. Believing  that loyalty must not be 
taken for granted (VALUES3) was the second most highly rated statement by Mayors with a 
mean value of 5.42, while CEOs rated the item ‘encouragement of  teamwork enables a 
supportive working environment’ with a mean value of 5.43. The third highest rated perceive 
managerial value by the Mayors was that they ‘openly recognise success and achievement of 
colleagues’ (VALUE1, mean=5.40). There were three managerial values that CEOs perceive 
most at the third place at a mean value of 5.37 each: ‘I openly recognise success and 
achievement of colleagues’ (VALUE1); ‘I strive to exceed expectations’ (VALUE4); ‘I 
embrace innovative change amongst the organisation’s people and services’ (VALUE7). The 
lowest rated managerial value by the Mayors was that ‘they value freedom of expression in 
the workplace’ (VALUE8, mean=5.21) while for CEOs it was that ‘loyalty must not be taken 
for granted’ (VALUE3, mean=5.28). 
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Table 6.14: Descriptive Statistics Managerial Values 
Code  Mayor n=70 CEO n= 151 t stat & (sig) 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
VALUE1 70 1 6 5.40 .52 151 1 6 5.37 .57 .362  (.718) 
VALUE2 70 1 6 5.34 .72 151 1 6 5.31 .55 .281  (.779) 
VALUE3 70 1 6 5.42 .57 151 1 6 5.28 .733 1.44   (.150) 
VALUE4 70 1 6 5.30 .68 151 1 6 5.37 .57 -.801  (.424) 
VALUE5 70 1 6 5.55 .50 151 1 6 5.62 .51 -.888  (.375) 
VALUE6 70 1 6 5.31 .62 151 1 6 5.43 .53 -1.42  (.157) 
VALUE7 70 1 6 5.38 .62 151 1 6 5.37 .58 .095   (.924) 
VALUE8 70 1 6 5.21 .74 151 1 6 5.29 .56 -.856  (.393) 
 
 
Table 6.15: Description of Managerial Values- Survey Items Used in Statistical Analyses 
Code 
 
Description 
VALUE1 
I openly recognise success and achievement of colleagues 
VALUE2 
I care about the effect that the organisation has on the environment 
VALUE3 
I believe that loyalty must not be taken for granted 
VALUE4 
I strive to exceed expectations 
VALUE5 
I take pride in my work 
VALUE6 
I encourage teamwork that enables a supportive working environment 
VALUE7 
I embrace innovative change amongst the organisation’s people and services 
VALUE8 
I value freedom of expression in the workplace 
 
 
6.4.5 Descriptive Statistics of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience 
 
As explained in Chapter Five, section four of the survey questionnaire is developed to 
measure the perception of the Mayors and CEOs with respect to stakeholder attributes (power, 
legitimacy and urgency) possessed by seven different stakeholders regarding infrastructure 
decision making. The respondents are asked to select a number from a six point Likert scale to 
rate each item (three items per attribute) for each of seven stakeholder groups.   
 
The following sub-sections present the descriptive statistics of the three stakeholder attributes 
that passed the tests of validity and reliability.  These sections present the overall results of the 
descriptive statistics on each of the items used to measure stakeholder attributes and salience. 
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A comparison of the perceived cumulative attributes and salience of Mayors and CEOs with 
mean differences are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.  
 
6.4.5.1  Stakeholder Power 
 
Table 6.16 presents the descriptive statistics of the stakeholder attribute ‘power’ and Table 
6.17 presents the items used to measure power in the current study. That is, how do the 
Mayors and CEOs perceive power, possessed by seven different stakeholders with respect to 
infrastructure asset decision making. With respect to the first item that measures power, both 
Mayor and CEO perceive that the State government department responsible for local 
government has the highest capacity and ability to apply direct sanctions (POWER1; 
Mayor=3.77, CEO=3.67) and direct force or legal action (POWER2; Mayor=3.58, 
CEO=3.28) on their LGA to obtain their will regarding infrastructure assets as a stakeholder. 
The Mayors believe that users of infrastructure assets has the least power on capacity and 
ability to apply direct sanction to the local government, while CEO perceives it is the State 
auditor general’s office (POWER1; Mayor=2.48, CEO=2.47).  Both Mayors and CEOs 
perceive that local media is the stakeholder who has the least capacity and ability to apply 
direct force or legal action against their LGA (POWER2; Mayor=2.10, CEO=2.09). Similarly, 
both Mayors and CEOs perceive that local media has the most power to influence the public 
image of their LGA regarding infrastructure assets (POWER3; Mayor=4.42, CEO=2.61), 
followed by community special interest groups (Mayor=3.92, CEO=4.11).    
 
 
6.4.5.2  Stakeholder Legitimacy 
 
Table 6.18 and Table 6.19 present the descriptive statistics of the stakeholder attribute 
‘legitimacy’ and the items used to measure legitimacy respectively, in the current study. That 
is, how do the Mayors and CEOs perceive legitimacy, possessed by seven different 
stakeholders with respect to infrastructure asset decision making. Mayors perceive the 
ratepayers as the stakeholder group whose demands and requests are most proper and 
appropriate with respect to infrastructure assets (LEGITIMACY1, mean=4.88), while CEOs 
perceive it as the users of infrastructure assets (mean=4.88). Mayors and CEOs both perceive 
demands and requests of rate payers as mostly deserving serious consideration 
(LEGITICAY2; Mayor=4.94, CEO=5.02) followed by demands and requests of users of 
infrastructure assets. For both LEGITIMACY1 and LEGITIMACY2 the Mayors and CEOs 
perceive the local media as the least legitimate stakeholder group. Similarly, when 
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considering the item number three in measurement of legitimacy, both Mayors and CEOs 
perceive that the demands and claims of the local media are the most trivial and 
inconsequential (LEGITIMACY3; Mayor=4.88, CEO=4.94). Mayors perceive the claims of 
users of infrastructure as the most legitimate while CEOs perceive the claims of the State 
Auditor General as the most legitimate (LEGITIMACY3, Mayor=5.33, CEO=5.46). 
 
 6.4.5.3 Stakeholder Urgency 
 
Table 6.20 presents the descriptive statistics of the stakeholder attribute ‘urgency’ and Table 
6.21 presents the items used to measure urgency in the current study. Both Mayors and CEOs 
perceive community special interest groups as the stakeholders who actively and persistently 
put their claims regarding infrastructure assets (URGENCY1; Mayor=4.28, CEO= 4.33), 
while the least perceived is State Auditor General (Mayor=2.41, CEO=2.19). Mayors 
(mean=4.21) perceive ratepayers actively and persistently seek attention of the staff or 
councillors with regard to infrastructure assets (URGENCY2) while CEOs (mean=4.31) 
perceives it is the users of infrastructure.  Mayors and CEOs both perceive community special 
interest groups as the most active and persistent stakeholder group that communicates the 
importance and urgency of their claims regarding infrastructure assets (URGENCY3; 
Mayor=4.30, CEO=4.24) while they both least  perceive the State Auditor General.  
 
 
6.4.5.4 Stakeholder Salience 
 
Table 6.22 presents the descriptive statistics of ‘stakeholder salience’ and Table 6.23 presents 
the items used to measure salience in the current study. This Table shows how Mayors and 
CEOs perceive the salience, possessed by seven different stakeholders with respect to 
infrastructure asset decision making. Regarding the first item that measures salience both 
Mayors and CEOs perceive ratepayers as the stakeholder group who receives high priority 
from the management team of the LGA regarding infrastructure assets (SALIENCE1; 
Mayor=4.62, CEO=4.62) followed by users of infrastructure assets and community special 
interest groups. They both perceive that local media gets the least priority from the 
management team (Mayor=3.20, CEO=3.34).  Once more, both Mayors and CEOs perceive 
that ratepayers take up most time and attention of the management team regarding claims of 
infrastructure assets (SALIENCE2; Mayor=4.26, CEO=4.13) while the least perceived was 
State Auditor General (Mayor=2.94, CEO= 2.52). With regard to the third item, Mayors 
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(mean=4.81) perceive that satisfaction of the ratepayers has been treated as highly important 
by the management team regarding acclaims of infrastructure assets (SALIENCE3) while 
CEO (mean=4.62) perceives both ratepayers and users of infrastructure as highly important. 
Mayors (mean=3.13) perceive that satisfaction of the State government department for local 
government as the least important to the management team,  while CEOs  perceive it is the 
State auditor general (mean=3.44).  
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Table 6.16: Descriptive Statistics - Perception of Stakeholder Attributes- Power 
Perception Mayor n =70 
 
CEO n=151 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
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POWER1       Mean      2.71 
 
2.48 2.68 2.65 3.77 2.98 3.05 2.75 2.49 2.66 2.58 3.67 2.47 3.04 
                       SD 1.44 
 
1.32 1.31 1.29 1.62 1.62 1.52 1.25 .999 1.04 1.16 1.40 1.39 1.48 
POWER2      Mean       2.24 
 
2.17 2.285 2.10 3.58 2.85 2.77 2.36 2.39 2.50 2.09 3.28 2.39 2.60 
                      SD 1.16 
 
.962 1.065 1.05 1.64 1.61 1.56 1.03 .987 1.03 1.08 1.45 1.37 1.49 
POWER3      Mean       3.74 
 
3.64 3.92 4.42 3.21 2.68 2.61 3.98 3.96 4.11 4.49 2.99 2.37 2.45 
                      SD 1.21 
 
1.17 1.14 1.22 1.57 1.62 1.59 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.21 1.20 1.34 1.17 
 
 
 
Table 6.17:  Descriptions of Stakeholder Attribute –Power- Survey Items Used in Statistical Analyses 
Code Description 
POWER1 
 
Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity and ability (whether used or not) to apply direct sanctions on their council (e.g. 
withhold money, labour, remove councillors) to obtain their will regarding infrastructure assets. 
POWER2 
 
Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity and ability (whether used or not) to apply direct force or legal action against their 
local council to obtain their will regarding infrastructure assets. 
POWER3 
 
Each respective stakeholder group has the capacity and ability (whether used or not) to influence the public image of their local 
council regarding infrastructure assets. 
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Table 6.18: Descriptive Statistics - Perception of Stakeholder Attributes- Legitimacy 
Perception Mayor n =70 
 
CEO n=151 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
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LEGITIMACY1    Mean 
                               
4.88 4.76 4.40 3.64 4.28 4.14 4.00 4.85 4.88 4.53 3.59 4.44 3.91 3.98 
                              SD 
 
.893 .957 1.02 1.40 1.24 1.58 1.48 .961 .874 .994 1.17 1.21 1.67 1.43 
LEGITIMACY2    Mean  
 
4.94 4.81 4.38 3.72 4.60 4.40 4.25 5.02 4.97 4.69 3.70 4.62 4.08 4.18 
                              SD 
 
1.06 1.05 1.17 1.42 1.23 1.58 1.53 .944 .904 .971 1.19 1.15 1.69 1.49 
LEGITIMACY3    Mean 
                              
5.30 5.33 5.23 4.88 5.11 5.27 5.26 5.41 5.37 5.22 4.94 5.40 5.46 5.32 
                              SD 
 
.912 .834 .859 1.05 1.03 .937 1.00 .725 .773 .8200 .995 .866 .879 1.02 
 
 
 
Table 6.19: Descriptions of Stakeholder Attribute –Legitimacy- Survey Items Used in Statistical Analyses 
Code Description 
LEGITIMACY1 
 
The management team of our local council treats the claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding infrastructure assets of each 
stakeholder group as proper or appropriate. 
LEGITIMACY2 
 
The management team of our local council treats the claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding infrastructure assets of each 
stakeholder group as deserving serious consideration 
LEGITIMACY3 
 
The management team of our local council treats the claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding infrastructure assets of each 
stakeholder group as trivial and inconsequential 
 
 202 
 
Table 6.20: Descriptive Statistics - Perception of Stakeholder Attributes- Urgency 
Perception Mayor n =70 
 
CEO n=151 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
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URGENCY1       Mean     
 
4.12 4.12 4.28 3.14 2.90 2.41 2.48 4.24 4.32 4.33 3.07 3.00 2.19 2.42 
                            SD 
 
1.15 1.21 1.20 1.49 1.20 1.34 1.29 1.16 1.04 1.17 1.16 1.27 1.31 1.28 
URGENCY2      Mean      
 
4.21 4.12 4.15 3.34 2.87 2.31 2.44 4.27 4.31 4.30 3.28 2.95 2.17 2.42 
                           SD 
 
1.04 1.19 1.22 1.43 1.23 1.25 1.21 1.20 1.10 1.18 1.31 1.22 1.28 1.21 
URGENCY3      Mean      
 
4.21 4.20 4.30 3.34 3.02 2.40 2.50 4.13 4.16 4.24 3.14 2.95 2.24 2.41 
                           SD 
 
1.10 1.26 1.32 1.41 1.20 1.28 1.22 1.25 1.14 1.17 1.28 1.27 1.35 1.29 
 
 
 
Table 6.21: Descriptions of Stakeholder Attribute –Urgency- Survey Items Used in Statistical Analyses 
Code Description 
URGENCY1 
 
Each respective stakeholder group actively and persistently put their claims (i.e. demands and requests) regarding infrastructure assets 
with our staff or councillors. 
URGENCY2 
 
Each respective stakeholder group actively and persistently seeks the attention of our staff or councillors regarding claims of 
infrastructure assets. 
URGENCY3 
 
Each respective stakeholder group actively and persistently communicates the importance and urgency of their claims regarding 
infrastructure assets to our staff or councillors. 
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Table 6.22:  Descriptive Statistics - Perception of Stakeholder Salience 
Perception Mayor n =70 CEO n=151 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
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SALIENCE1      Mean  
     
4.62 4.56 4.27 3.20 4.01 3.48 3.55 4.62 4.61 4.28 3.34 4.11 3.42 3.52 
                           SD 
 
1.03 1.14 1.08 1.39 1.22 1.63 1.41 .931 .981 1.07 1.25 1.30 1.75 1.57 
SALIENCE2     Mean   
 
4.26 4.24 4.18 3.13 3.45 2.94 3.07 4.13 4.08 3.99 3.13 3.33 2.52 2.73 
                          SD 
 
1.12 1.19 1.22 1.41 1.41 1.54 1.31 1.10 1.12 1.10 1.16 1.24 1.38 1.30 
SALIENCE3    Mean            
 
4.81 4.73 4.37 3.41 3.13 3.77 3.76 4.62 4.62 4.38 3.45 4.18 3.44 3.58 
                         SD 
 
.927 1.00 1.04 1.43 1.33 1.65 1.46 1.00 .973 1.03 1.24 1.26 1.76 1.60 
 
 
 
Table 6.23: Descriptions of Stakeholder Salience- Survey Items Used in Statistical Analyses 
Code Description 
SALIENCE1 Each respective stakeholder group receives high priority from our management team regarding claims of infrastructure assets. 
SALIENCE2 Each respective stakeholder group takes up the time and attention of our management team regarding claims of infrastructure assets. 
SALIENCE3 Each respective stakeholder group has their satisfaction treated as highly important by our management team regarding acclaims of 
infrastructure assets. 
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For each of the stakeholder attributes for public and high-tier government respectively, t-tests 
of differences between means of Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceptions were conducted. The results 
(not reported here) revealed no significant differences. This result is not a test of Hypothesis 
1, which addresses the relationship between the stakeholder attributes and salience.  However 
it lends support to aspect of Hypothesis 1, that the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs are not 
significantly different.  
 
6.4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Dimensions of Accountability 
 
Section five of the survey questionnaire is developed to measure the rating by Mayors and 
CEOs of the extent of accountability emphasis on attention given by the LGA with respect to 
its infrastructure assets. Three dimensions of accountability: public, managerial and political 
are measured using multi-item scales and each of these accountability dimensions is measured 
with six items making a total of 18 items in the instrument. The items are concerned with the 
organisational emphasis given to the processes, practices and systems for discharging 
accountability as perceived by Mayors and CEOs.  The respondents are asked to agree/ 
disagree on a scale to each of these 18 statements. The following sub-sections present the 
descriptive statistics of the three dimensions of accountability emphasis that passed the tests 
of validity and reliability.   
 
6.4.6.1  Public Accountability 
 
Table 6.24 presents the descriptive statistics of public accountability while Table 6.25 
presents the items used to measure public accountability in the current study. It is interesting 
to note that both Mayors and CEOs both give the higher rating to the item ‘our council 
considers the requirements of future generations, when planning infrastructure’ (PUBACC6) 
with mean of 5.37 and 5.11 respectively out of 6. This was followed by the items that the 
LGA ‘makes a wide range of information on infrastructure assets transparent to the public’ 
(PUBACC1; Mayor=5.28, CEO=4.74) and the LGA ‘knows the likely cost (cost of repair, 
upgrading or replacement) of bringing infrastructure to a satisfactory condition’ (PUBACC3; 
Mayor=5.27, CEO=4.84). The lowest rated item by both Mayors and CEOs was the 
‘provision of qualitative information on physical condition on infrastructure assets to the 
public’ (PUBACC2; Mayor=4.58, CEO=4.14), which suggests that this accountability 
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practice is poor. However, Walker and Jones’ (2012) telephone and mail survey administered 
among engineers, accounting and financial professionals and other senior managers of 
Australian public sector agencies about the attitudes of current infrastructure reporting 
practices reveals that respondents preferred information about the physical condition of assets, 
combined with estimates of the current cost of bringing those assets to a satisfactory 
condition.  The fourth and fifth items are concerned of the LGAs’ service to the community in 
answering enquiries or complaints (PUBACC4) and community consultation when preparing 
plans and policies in relation to infrastructure assets (PUBACC5) respectively. Mayors’ mean 
perceptions with regard to the fourth and fifth items (PUBACC4=5.00, PUBACC5= 5.25) are 
slightly higher than the perceptions of the CEOs’ (PUBACC4=4.61, PUBACC5= 4.67).  It is 
noted that the mean differences of all six items between the Mayors and CEOs are significant.  
Mayors give a constantly higher rating on public accountability items compared to CEOs.  
 
Table 6.24: Descriptive Statistics - Public Accountability 
Code  Mayor n=70 CEO n= 151 t stat & (sig) 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
PUBACC1 70 1 6 5.28 .704 151 1 6 4.74 .932 4.28 (.000)*** 
PUBACC2 70 1 6 4.58 .999 151 1 6 4.14 .995 3.05(.003)** 
PUBACC3 70 1 6 5.27 .832 151 1 6 4.84 .984 3.12(.002)** 
PUBACC4 70 1 6 5.00 .761 151 1 6 4.61 .863 3.19(.002)** 
PUBACC5 70 1 6 5.25 .652 151 1 6 4.67 1.05 4.24(.000)*** 
PUBACC6 70 1 6 5.37 .684 151 1 6 5.11 .852 2.22(.027)* 
*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<.001 
 
 
Table 6.25: Description of Public Accountability- Survey Items Used in Statistical 
Analyses 
Code 
 
Description 
PUBACC1 Our council (i.e. our organisation) makes a wide range of information on infrastructure 
assets transparent to the public 
PUBACC2 Our council provides qualitative information on physical condition on infrastructure 
assets to the public 
PUBACC3 Our council knows the likely cost (cost of repair, upgrading or replacement) of bringing infrastructure to a satisfactory condition. 
PUBACC4 Our council gives an excellent service to the public in answering enquiries and 
complaints in relation to infrastructure assets. 
PUBACC5 Our council carries out community consultation when preparing plans and policies in 
relation to infrastructure assets. 
PUBACC6 Our council considers the requirements of future generations, when planning infrastructure. 
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6.4.6.2 Managerial Accountability  
 
The second dimension of accountability considered in the current study, managerial 
accountability is important especially with the pervasion of NPM throughout the local 
government level. Mangers are now expected to achieve certain goals and outputs while 
making the LGA more efficient and effective, akin to practices of private sector. Table 6.26 
presents the descriptive statistics of managerial accountability and Table 6.27 presents the 
individual items used to measure managerial accountability in the current study. Both Mayors 
and CEOs rate higher the item, that their ‘LGA uses performance information on 
infrastructure assets to improve service delivery and quality of service’ (MGLACC1; 
Mayor=4.91, CEO=4.49).  
 
Table 6.26: Descriptive Statistics Managerial Accountability 
Code  Mayor n=70 CEO n= 151 t stat & (sig) 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
MGLACC1 69 1 6 4.91 .761 151 1 6 4.49 1.00 3.11(.002)** 
MGLACC2 69 1 6 4.62 .892 151 1 6 4.33 1.06 1.92(.054) 
MGLACC3 69 1 6 4.72 .855 151 1 6 4.16 1.02 3.93(.000)*** 
MGLACC4 69 1 6 3.68 1.31 151 1 6 2.78 1.19 4.99(.000)*** 
MGLACC5 69 1 6 4.04 1.130 151 1 6 3.64 1.20 2.29(.023)* 
MGLACC6 69 1 6 4.37 .956 151 1 6 3.89 1.14 3.05(.003)** 
*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<.001 
 
 
Table 6.27: Description of Managerial Accountability- Survey Items Used in Statistical 
Analyses 
Code 
 
Description 
MGLACC1 Our council uses performance information  on infrastructure assets to improve service delivery  and quality of service 
MGLACC2 Our council collects and carefully assesses performance measures of community 
satisfaction with regard to infrastructure 
MGLACC3 Our council assesses performance measures on service accessibility with regard to infrastructure 
MGLACC4 Our council uses performance indictors on infrastructure assets to reward or sanction individual staff 
MGLACC5 Our council uses performance indicators of infrastructure for inter-council 
comparability 
MGLACC6 Our council often provides the infrastructure performance information to stakeholders 
of local government 
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These descriptive results are consistent with the mandatory requirements of LGAs. As indicated in 
Chapter Four, State and Northern Territory local government Acts require all LGAs to report 
on their performance either by way of annual reports, performance statements, financial 
statements and/or strategic planning reporting (DRALGAS 2012). And based on these reports 
a comparative analysis of the performances amongst the LGAs in the same jurisdiction is 
undertaken.  The second most highly rated item by the Mayor (mean= 4.72) is that the LGA ‘assesses 
performance measures on service accessibility with regard to infrastructure’ (MGLACC3) and this is 
the third highest rated item by the CEO (mean=4.16). The third item most perceived by the mayor 
(mean=4.62) is that the LGA ‘collects and carefully assesses performance measures of community 
satisfaction with regard to infrastructure’ (MGLACC2) while this item was rated as the second most 
perceived by the CEO (mean=4.33). Again the results are consistent with the requirements of 
some of the States (Victoria, Queensland and South Australia) that commission community 
satisfaction surveys annually or in two years’ time.  The least perceived item by both Mayors 
and CEOs is that their LGA use performance indicators on infrastructure assets to reward or 
sanction individual staff (MGLACC4; Mayor=3.68, CEO=2.78). It is to be noted here that 
except for item number two (MGLACC2) all other mean differences are significantly higher 
for Mayors compared to CEOs. 
 
 
6.4.6.3 Political Accountability  
 
The third dimension of accountability considered in the current study is political 
accountability. In section 6.2.1.3, it was reported that the originally six items were designed to 
measure the dimension of political accountability and were reduced to three items through 
principal component factor analysis. Therefore, the following discussion on descriptive results 
is limited to the three validated items.  Table 6.26 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
political accountability and Table 6.27 presents the individual items used to measure political 
accountability in the current study. These tables reveal how the Mayors and CEOs rate 
political accountability, discharged to different stakeholders with respect to infrastructure 
assets. Both Mayors and CEOs give the highest rating to the item that their ‘LGA has become 
more accountable to State and/or Federal government since the Infrastructure Australia Act 
2008 was introduced’ (POLACC2;Mayor=3.88, CEO=3.56). This is supported by the findings 
of the report prepared by Infrastructure Australia (2012) to the council of Australian 
Governments which says; 
  
 208 
 
‘… the work of the state-based advisory bodies, together with infrastructure planning at 
the local government level, improves Australia’s ability to identify a clear pipeline of 
integrated infrastructure projects and reforms. The work increases the level of attention 
on individual projects, as well as provide better transparency for the community’ (p.19).  
 
 
Item one (POLACC1), ‘the LGA has become more accountable to the State government since 
the Regional and Local Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) was introduced’ is the 
second highest rated item by the Mayors (mean=3.75) and lowest rated by the CEOs 
(mean=3.35). The Mayors’ least rated (mean=3.60) and CEOs second rated (mean=3.45) item 
out of the three items is that the LGA ‘has become more accountable to Federal and/or State 
government since the Nation Building –Economic Stimulus Plan was introduced’ 
(POLACC3). None of the mean differences of the items between the Mayor and CEO are 
found to be significant.  
 
Table 6.28: Descriptive Statistics Political Accountability 
Code  Mayor n=70 CEO n= 151 t stat & (sig) 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
POLACC1 69 1 6 3.75 1.26 151 1 6 3.35 1.27 2.14(.033) 
POLACC2 69 1 6 3.88 1.17 151 1 6 3.56 1.21 1.85(.065) 
POLACC3 69 1 6 3.60 1.22 151 1 6 3.45 1.15 .842(.401) 
*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<.001 
 
 
Table 6.29: Description of Political Accountability- Survey Items Used in Statistical 
Analyses 
Code 
 
Description 
POLACC1 Our council has become more accountable to the State government since the Regional 
and Local Community Infrastructure Program (RLCIP) was introduced 
POLACC2 Our council has become more accountable to State and/or Federal government since the Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 was introduced 
POLACC3 Our council has become more accountable to Federal and/or State government since the Nation Building –Economic Stimulus Plan was introduced 
 
 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter first provides the results of the assessment of the validity and reliability of the 
multi-item scales of the main variables to be modelled in the next chapter. A confirmatory 
factor analysis using principal components analysis (PCA) is carried out to assess the factorial 
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validity of the multi-items in the constructs. Then, a Cronbach’s Alpha test is performed to 
test the internal consistency of the multi-item construct. Secondly, the chapter presents the 
descriptive statistics on the profile of the respondents and characteristics of the respondents’ 
LGAs followed by the descriptive statistics on each of the main variables. The descriptive 
statistics highlight the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs regarding stakeholder attributes. The 
public stakeholder groups are perceived to possess stronger stakeholder attributes- power, 
legitimacy and urgency, and as being perceived as the most salient stakeholder groups 
compared to higher-tier government stakeholders. A further finding is that there are 
significant differences between the mean ratings of Mayors and CEOs regarding the 
dimensions of accountability for infrastructure assets emphasised by their LGAs in terms of 
the processes, practices and systems adopted to discharge accountability to stakeholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 210 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS  
_______________________________________________________________ 
7.1   Introduction 
 
Chapter Six presented the assessment of scales for construct validity and reliability. In 
addition, the chapter presented the descriptive statistics of the profile of respondents, their 
respective local government authority (LGA) and latent variables. The current chapter 
presents the results of tests of the six hypotheses developed in Chapter Four. Prior to testing 
the hypotheses, bivariate correlations analyses are carried out as preliminary tests of 
hypotheses. Then, the multiple regression results are presented under three theoretical 
perspectives. First the relationship among stakeholder attributes, managerial values and 
stakeholder salience is analysed. The second analysis provides empirical findings on the 
relationship among stakeholder salience, managerial values and accountability emphasis. 
Finally, the findings of the relationship between stakeholder salience and infrastructure 
backlog are presented. Further, secondary data on infrastructure backlog is used to reinforce 
the findings of the final analysis.  Each of these analyses is followed by a discussion based 
upon theoretical inquiries and prior empirical findings. 
 
7.2 Preliminary Tests of Hypotheses- Bivariate Correlations Analyses 
 
Employing the arithmetic mean values, the preliminary data analysis is performed by 
computing bivariate correlations between the latent variables. All the validated items in each 
of the latent variables (refer Chapter Six) are used. Moreover, the data regarding most of the 
latent variables are obtained from the same survey questionnaire, so multicolinearity can be a 
concern. Thus, in order to identify any strong correlations among the explanatory variables 
the correlation matrix was examined. Correlations no greater than 0.8 between any pair of 
explanatory variables have been found, indicating that multicolinearity may not be a problem.  
A stronger test of multicolinearity, undertaken as part of the regression analysis, has revealed 
that the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the latent variables is well within the 
acceptable level. The highest VIF is 1.547, which is below the threshold of 10 suggested by 
Myers (1990).  
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The second set of hypotheses in the study predicts a positive relationship between stakeholder 
attributes and salience while the third set of hypotheses assumes a relationship between 
managerial values and stakeholder salience with respect infrastructure asset decision-making.  
Accordingly, hypothesis H2 (a) predicts a positive significant relationship between public 
stakeholder attributes and perceived public stakeholder salience.  
 
The correlation results are presented in Table 7.1. The results indicate positive correlations 
between the salience of public stakeholders (SALPUB) and each of the respective attributes of 
public stakeholders - power POWPUB (r = .278), legitimacy LEGIPUB (r = .582), and 
urgency URGPUB (r =.588) at significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01. Hypothesis 3(a) predicts a 
significant relationship between managerial values held by Mayors and the salience of public 
stakeholders. The bivariate correlation result in Table 7.1 indicates that the relationship 
between managerial values of mayors (MVMAY) and public stakeholder salience (SALPUB) 
is statistically significant with a coefficient of .211 at .05 level. The results in Table 7.1 
provide support for both hypotheses H2 (a) and H3 (a).  
 
Table 7.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix – Hypotheses H2 (a) and H3 (a)  
 
POWPUB LEGIPUB URGPUB 
 
SALPUB MVMAY 
POWPUB 1.000     
LEGIPUB .286** 1.000 .   
URGPUB .395** .508** 1.000   
SALPUB .278* .582** .588** 1.000  
MVMAY .119 .137 .032 .211* 1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed);  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
 
 
The results in Table 7.2 provide the bivariate correlations for preliminary tests of hypotheses 
H2 (b) and H3 (b). Hypothesis H2 (b) assumes a positive significant relationship between 
higher-tier government stakeholder attributes and perceived higher-tier government 
stakeholder salience. The results indicate positive significant correlation between the salience 
of higher-tier government stakeholders (SALHIGH) and their three stakeholder attributes of - 
power POWHIGH (r = .313), legitimacy LEGIHIGH (r = .638) and urgency URGHIGH (r 
= .539) at a significance level of 0.01. The results provide preliminary support for hypothesis 
H2 (b). Table 7.2 also presents bivariate correlation result for hypothesis 3(b), which predicts 
a significant relationship between managerial values held by CEOs and the salience of higher-
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tier government stakeholders. However, the correlation results indicate a non-significance 
relationship between the two variables, not providing support for hypothesis H3 (a).  
 
 
Table 7.2 Pearson Correlation Matrix – Hypotheses H2 (b) and H3 (b)  
 
POWHIGH LEGIHIGH 
 
URGHIGH 
 
SALHIGH 
 
MVCEO 
 
POWHIGH 1.000     
LEGIHIGH .305** 1.000    
URGHIGH .350** .378** 1.000   
SALHIGH .313** .638** .539** 1.000  
MVCEO -.081 .081 .005 .077 1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed);  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
 
   The fourth set of hypotheses concerns the relationships between stakeholder salience and 
accountability. Hypothesis H4 (a) specifies that the perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs 
with regard to public stakeholders and high-tier government stakeholders is significantly  
related to the extent of aggregate accountability for infrastructure  assets. The correlation 
results shown in Table 7.3 provide preliminary support for hypothesis H4 (a). Pearson 
correlation coefficient at the 0.01 significance level for perceived public stakeholder salience 
(SALPUBCUM) is r = .289 and r = .162 for perceived higher-tier government stakeholder 
salience (SALHIGHCUM). Hypothesis H4 (b), predicts a significant relationship between 
perceived public and higher-tier government stakeholder and the three respective 
accountability dimensions of public, managerial and political. The correlation results partially 
support the hypothesis. Both public accountability (PUBACC) and managerial accountability 
(MGLACC) are correlated with salience of public stakeholders (SALPUBCUM) with Pearson 
correlation coefficients of r = .254 and r = .211 respectively at the 0.01 significant levels. 
Political accountability (POLACC) correlates with both public (SALPUBCUM) and higher-
tier government (SALHIGHCUM) stakeholder salience with Pearson correlation coefficients 
of r = .181 and r = .200 respectively at the 0.01 significant levels. 
 
The fifth set of hypotheses predicts a significant relationship between managerial values of 
Mayors’ and CEOs’ and accountability. The correlation results in Table 7.3 provide 
preliminary support for hypothesis H 5(a), which predicts a significant association between 
managerial values (MVCUM) of Mayors’ and CEOs’ and aggregate accountability 
(AGGACC=.184).  Similarly, hypothesis H5 (b), predicts a significant association between 
 213 
 
managerial values of Mayors’ and CEOs’ with the three perceived accountability dimensions. 
The results show that except for political accountability (POLACC), the other two dimensions 
of accountability are correlated with managerial values of Mayors’ and CEOs’ at a significant 
level of 0.01 providing partial support for hypothesis H5(b).  
 
Table 7.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix – Hypotheses H4 (a), H4 (b), H5 (a), H5 (b) and 
H6 
 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.SALPUBCUM 1.000         
2.SALHIGCUM 
.458** 1.000        
3.AGGACC 
.289** .162* 1.000       
4.PUBACC 
.254** .118 .722** 1.000      
5.MGLACC 
.211** .009 .783** .691** 1.000     
6.POLACC 
.181** .200** .680** .090 .163* 1.000    
7.MVCUM 
.260** .080 .184** .306** .219** -.042 1.000   
8.IFBLOG1 
-.025 -.050 -.079 -.159* -.140* -.126 -.126 1.000  
9.IFBLOG2 
-.057 -.029 .046 .000 .034 -.134 -.134 -.018 1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
Finally, the sixth hypothesis H6 concerns the relationship between perceived salience of 
stakeholders and infrastructure backlog of the relevant local government authority (LGA) as 
perceived by Mayors and CEOs. The correlation results in Table 7.3 do not statistically 
support the hypothesis.  However, there is a negative association between stakeholder salience 
(SALPUBCUM and SALHIGHCUM) and infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1and IFBLOG2), 
which is the predicted direction in the current study.  
 
As can be seen in Table 7.4, most of the hypotheses are supported by findings of the bivariate 
correlation analyses. 
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Table 7.4: Summary of Preliminary Tests of Hypothesis-Bivariate Correlations Analyses 
Hypothesis Association Hypothesis 
supported or not? 
H2(a) Attributes of public stakeholders and salience perceived 
by Mayors 
Supported 
H2(b) Attributes of higher-tier government stakeholders and 
salience perceived by CEOs 
Supported 
H3(a) Managerial values of Mayors and public stakeholder 
salience 
Supported 
H3(b) Managerial values of CEOs and higher-tier government 
stakeholder salience 
Not supported 
H4(a) Public and higher-tier government stakeholder salience 
and aggregate accountability 
Supported 
H4(b) Public and higher-tier government stakeholder salience 
and dimensions of accountability 
Partially supported 
H5(a) Managerial values of Mayors and CEOs and aggregate 
accountability 
Supported 
H5(b) Managerial values of Mayors and CEOs and dimensions 
of accountability 
Partially supported 
H6 Public and higher-tier government stakeholder salience 
and infrastructure backlog 
Not Supported 
 
 
7.3 Comparison of Mayors’ and CEOs’ Perceptions of Stakeholders 
 
This section compares the differences of mean perceptions between the Mayor and CEO with 
regard to stakeholder attributes and salience in order to provide tests of H1. 
 
7.3.1 Comparison of Perceived Stakeholder Attributes - Tests of Hypothesis H1 
 
One-way ANOVA is carried out to compare differences between mean perceptions by 
Mayors and CEOs of the power, legitimacy and urgency attributes of the seven stakeholder 
groups. The means of the attributes are measured using the multi-item scales of each attribute 
for each stakeholder group (refer Chapter Six). Separate tests are performed for Mayors and 
CEOs, which are shown in Table 7.5 and 7.6 respectively. The results reveal similarities and 
differences between the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about the attributes of the seven 
stakeholder groups. First, in respect of power, they both perceive the most powerful 
stakeholder to be the State government department responsible for LGA (Mayors’ mean = 
3.523 in Table 7.5 and CEOs’ mean = 3.317 in Table 7.6). The Mayors perceive the users of 
infrastructure as the least powerful (mean=2.766) while the CEOs perceive the least powerful 
stakeholder as the State auditor general’s office (mean=2.412). This finding may be due to the 
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fact that LGAs in some jurisdictions are no longer audited by the auditor general, but rather 
by an independent audit firm.  
 
Second, in respect to legitimacy, the most legitimate stakeholder group perceived by Mayors 
is the ratepayer (mean=3.850), while the CEOs perceive it as the users of infrastructure 
(mean=3.826).  Mayors (mean=3.164) who are the political leaders perceive that local media 
is the least legitimate stakeholder group and CEO (mean=3.117) perceives the same. This 
result is in agreement with the finding of de Bussy and Kelly (2010) who employ Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) theory to explore the meaning of the stakeholder concept of attributes and 
salience in politics in Western Australia. O’Higgins and Morgan (2006) found that although 
the media is rated as the most powerful stakeholder in the political arena in Ireland, it is not 
necessarily rated as legitimate. The power of media is believed to be continuous and is 
exercised not only during election time (O’Higgins & Morgan 2006). 
 
Table 7.5: Differences of Perception in Stakeholder Attributes: Mayors (n =70) 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions 
Stakeholder Groups 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Rate 
payers 
Users of 
infra. 
Assets 
Special 
Interest 
Groups 
Local 
Media 
 State     
 Govt. 
 Dept. 
 for LGA 
State 
Auditor 
General’s  
Office 
Infra 
structure 
Australia 
Power Mean 2.900 
 
2.766 2.966 3.061 3.523 2.842 2.814 
 SD (1.014) 
 
(.936) (.937) (.951) (1.372) (1.374) (1.277) 
Legitimacy Mean 3.850 
 
3.750 3.521 3.164 3.595 3.435 3.345 
 SD (.598) 
 
(.613) (.685) (.883) (.734) (.989) (.992) 
Urgency Mean 4.185 
 
4.152 4.247 3.276 2.933 2.376 2.476 
 SD (1.017) 
 
(1.159) (1.176) (1.27) (1.085) (1.232) (1.167) 
F  38.56*** 41.062*** 31.700*** .727 7.699*** 13.495*** 10.110*** 
 
Standardized coefficients *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
Third, in terms of urgency, the stakeholder group with the highest perceived mean attribute of 
urgency, both for Mayors (mean= 4.247) and CEOs (mean=3.164), is community special 
interest groups.  Urgency is the call for immediate attention and is based on the time 
sensitivity and criticality of the claim (Mitchell et al. 1997).  Community special interest 
groups tend to become undeniably active whenever a crisis situation arises over an 
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infrastructure issue. They will tend to demand immediate resolution of the portrayed crisis. 
For example this may be due to contaminated soil in a proposed residential area, the removal 
of a public parking area or the planned construction of expensive new LGA offices.  
 
 
Table 7.6: Differences of Perception in Stakeholder Attributes: CEO (n=151) 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions 
Stakeholder Groups 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government  
Stakeholders 
Rate 
payers 
Users of 
infra. 
Assets 
Special 
Interest 
Groups 
Local 
Media 
State 
Govt. 
Dept. 
for LGA 
State 
Auditor 
General’s  
Office 
Infra 
structure 
Australia 
Power Mean 
 
SD 
3.035 
 
(.928) 
 
2.949 
 
(.783) 
3.092 
 
(.834) 
3.057 
 
(.895) 
3.317 
 
(1.112) 
2.412 
 
(1.215) 
2.699 
 
(1.199) 
Legitimacy Mean 
 
SD 
3.814 
 
3.826 3.662 3.117 3.557 3.180 3.283 
(.595) 
 
(.533) (.574) (.685) (.725) (1.051) (.917) 
Urgency Mean 4.216 
 
4.269 4.291 3.164 2.971 2.198 2.421 
 SD (1.133) 
 
(1.015) (1.115) (1.16) (1.166) (1.274) (1.200) 
F Stat. 65.28*** 105.82*** 71.67*** .495 12.553*** 28.526*** 23.069*** 
 
Standardized coefficients *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
In summary, the impression from comparing results for the Mayor in Table 7.5 to the CEO in 
Table 7.6 is that Mayors and CEOs are more similar than different in their perceptions of the 
attributes of various stakeholder groups. Thus, power is rated more highly for the same three 
stakeholder groups (state government department, local media and community interest 
groups) by both the Mayor and CEO groups. Legitimacy is rated with relatively similar means 
and low standard deviations across all the seven stakeholder groups by both the Mayor and 
CEO. Finally, urgency is rated highest for the same three stakeholder groups (ratepayers, 
users, and community interest groups) by both the Mayor and CEO. Therefore, the descriptive 
results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 confirm that the null hypothesis, H1, is supported. Mayors and 
CEOs, on average, are not significantly different in their perceptions of the relative power, 
legitimacy and urgency of various stakeholder groups in relation to infrastructure asset 
decisions. As per the findings of Martin and Simons (2002), Mayors and CEOs in Australian 
local government context, report an effective working relationship with each other and are on 
the same leadership style dimension. The results suggest that the relatively strong alignment 
of perceptions of stakeholders’ attributes by Mayors and CEOs is a reflection of the common 
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need to achieve good governance of LGAs through an effective working relationship.  
Complementarities in perceptions about stakeholders can act to provide greater harmony in 
decision-making and implementation between the political and executive arms of local 
government. 
 
7.3.2  Comparison of Perceived Stakeholder Salience 
 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 show the differences between Mayors’ and CEOs’ mean perceptions of 
stakeholder salience. The means of stakeholder salience are measured using the multi-item 
scales of each of the stakeholder group (refer Chapter Six). The Tables also provide rankings 
of stakeholders according to these measures. From the comparison of the two Tables it is 
evident that both Mayor (mean=4.565) and CEO (mean= 4.460) perceive the ratepayers as the 
most salient stakeholder.  
 
The users of infrastructure assets and community special interest groups are ranked as second 
and third respectively according to the perceived stakeholder salience. This result is in 
contrast to O’Higgins and Morgan’s (2006) finding that special interest/lobby groups do not 
have any power, legitimacy and urgency over political parties in Ireland which leads to lower 
salience. However, this conflicting result between different nations (Australia and Ireland) 
and different organisations (LGAs and political parties), with respect to the same stakeholder 
group can be explained by features of stakeholder attributes suggested by Mitchell et al. 
(1997) which cause dynamism in the stakeholder salience theory. These features are the 
varying and socially constructed nature of stakeholder attributes and unawareness of existence 
of the stakeholder attributes. 
 
The least salient stakeholder group perceived by the Mayors (mean=3.250) is local media, 
which is ranked number seven. This low salience could have been confounded by the 
existence of other factors, such as the quality of journalism or the extent of local government 
sponsorship of the local media.  In the findings of O’Higgins and Morgan (2006), media was 
ranked as a moderately salient stakeholder group by five political parties in Ireland, though 
media is the most powerful in the political arena. The reason suggested was, though actors in 
the media are important, they are independent and the political parties would not treat them as 
salient due to their impartiality. Similarly Gago and Antolin (2004) found that, despite the 
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possession of power and urgency, media was rated as being a low salient stakeholder group 
amongst environmental managers in Spanish manufacturing firms. 
   
The State auditor general’s office is perceived by the CEO (mean=3.128) as the least salient. 
It is also noted in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 that Mayors and CEOs, on average, both perceive ‘public 
stakeholder groups’ except for the local media as the higher salient stakeholder category 
compared to the higher-tier government stakeholder category.  
 
Table 7.7: Differences of Perception in Stakeholder Salience and Cumulative Attribute 
Score Mayor (n= 69) 
 
 
Perceptions 
Stakeholder Groups 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Rate 
payers 
Users of 
infra. 
assets 
 
Comm 
unity 
SIG 
Local 
Media 
State 
Dept. 
for LGA 
State 
Auditor 
General 
 
Infra 
structure 
Australia 
Salience Mean 4.565 4.516 4.280 3.250 3.867 3.402 3.465 
 SD (.871) (.981) (.928) (1.302) (1.133) (1.407) (1.195) 
 Rank 1 2 3 7 4 6 5 
 
 
Table 7.8: Differences of Perception in Stakeholder Salience and Cumulative Attribute 
Score CEO (n= 148) 
 
 
Perceptions 
Stakeholder Groups 
Public Stakeholders Higher-tier Government 
Stakeholders 
Rate 
payers 
Users of 
infra. 
assets 
 
Comm 
unity 
SIG 
Local 
Media 
State 
Gov. 
Dept. 
for LGA 
State 
Auditor 
General’s  
 
Infra 
structure 
Australia 
Salience Mean 4.460 4.442 4.220 3.308 3.877 3.128 3.283 
 SD (.813) (.857) (.884) (1.024) (1.056) (1.468) (1.311) 
 Rank 1 2 3 5 4 7 6 
 
 
7.4 Formal Tests of Hypotheses - Multiple Regression Results 
 
This section presents the findings of multiple regression analyses between latent variables 
associated with the hypothesised relationships H2 to H6 as developed in Chapter Four.  The 
three linear multiple regression models to test these relationships have been developed in 
Chapter Five.  
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7.4.1 Determinants of Perceived Salience of Public Stakeholders: Model 1(a),    
2(a) and Higher-tier Government Stakeholders Model 1(b), 2(b); Tests of 
Hypotheses 2(a), 2(b), 3(a) and 3(b)   
 
Repeated below, from Chapter Four, is Model 1(a) which tests hypotheses H2 (a) and H3 (a), 
and Model 1(b) which tests hypotheses H2 (b) and 3(b). The models below differ only in 
terms of their stakeholder category. Hence, the dependent variable is the salience of the 
‘public stakeholder’ category (consisting of four different stakeholder groups- ratepayers, 
users of infrastructure backlog, community special interest groups and local media) for model 
1(a), and the higher-tier government category (consisted with three different stakeholder 
groups-State government department responsible for LGA, State auditor general’s office and 
Federal government’s Infrastructure Australia) for model 1(b). Within these two sets, the 
relationships are tested separately for Mayor respondents (n=70) and CEO respondents 
(n=151).  
 
SALPUB = β0+ β1POWPUB + β2LEGIPUB + β3URGPUB+   β4 MVMAY + β5 ACLG + β6 
JURIS
 + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                              (1a) 
 
 
SALHIGH =  β0 + β1POWHIGH + β2LEGIHIGH + β3URGHIGH + β4 MVCEO + β5 ACLG 
+β6JURIS+β7GENDER+β8AGE+β9ACQUALI+ε                                                              (1b) 
 
7.4.1.1  Regression Results of Models 1(a) and 1(b) 
 
Table 7.9 presents the regression results of Mayor respondents while Table 7.10 presents the   
CEO respondents. In general each model has significant explanatory power. For each of the 
public and higher-tier government stakeholder categories, the adjusted R2 explains between 
46% to 48% of variance in the stakeholder salience perceived by Mayor and CEO 
respectively.  The F  tests of the models are also significant, with p-value < .001 for both 
Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceptions. 
 
When examining the stakeholder attributes in Table 7.9, both legitimacy (LEGIPUB) and 
urgency (URGPUB) are significantly associated with salience in both regression models. 
According to the results, Mayors’ perceptions of legitimacy (LEGIPUB) and urgency 
(URGPUB) of public stakeholders have a positive significant effect on perceived salience of 
public stakeholders at confidence intervals of 95% (t=2.732) and 99% (t=3.9540) 
respectively. The regression coefficients (i.e. Beta) of these two independent variables are 
 220 
 
quite large and in a positive direction, suggesting a unit change in the independent variables 
will have significant impact on public stakeholder salience (PUBSAL). Since two of the three 
attributes have a significant effect on perceived salience, this result provides support for 
hypothesis H2(a). That is, in terms of infrastructure decision-making by Mayors, their 
perceptions of the extent of legitimacy and urgency (but not power) of public stakeholders are 
positively related to their perception of the extent of salience of the stakeholder category 
 
Table 7.9: Model 1(a) Effect of Perceived Stakeholder Attributes and Managerial Values 
on Salience of Public Stakeholder Group –Mayor Respondents (n = 70) 
DV=Public 
Stakeholder 
Salience SALPUB 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)    -.076 .940   
POWPUB -.107 1.408 .024 .208 .836 .688 1.454 
LEGPUB .026 .127 .312 2.732 .009 .681 1.468 
URGPUB .410 .110 .470 3.954 .000 .629 1.589 
MVMAY .394 .104 .187 1.741 .048 .772 1.295 
ACLG -.025 .227 -.045 -.430 .669 .799 1.251 
JURIS .045 .057 .089 .886 .380 .890 1.123 
GENDER .104 .051 .053 .478 .635 .716 1.396 
AGE -.209 .218 -.180 -1.869 .067 .955 1.047 
QUALIF -.087 .112 -.133 -1.284 .205 .823 1.215 
Model Summary: R=.734; R2 =.538; Adj. R2 = .458; F Stat = 6.734; Sig. =.000 
 
Table 7.10: Model 1(b) Effect of Perceived Stakeholder Attributes and Managerial 
Values on Salience of Higher-tier Government Stakeholder Group – CEO Respondents      
(n = 151) 
DV=Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Salience SALHIGH 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.070 1.176  -.059 .953   
POWHIGHER .028 .077 .025 .356 .722 .792 1.263 
LEGHIGHER .712 .101 .507 7.023 .000 .750 1.334 
URGHIGHER .335 .074 .320 4.537 .000 .785 1.273 
MVCEO .109 .188 .038 .578 .564 .898 1.114 
ACLG .009 .043 .013 .196 .845 .869 1.151 
JURIS .035 .041 .054 .841 .402 .940 1.063 
GENDER -.022 .293 -.005 -.075 .940 .892 1.122 
AGE -.093 .097 -.061 -.966 .336 .985 1.016 
QUALIF -.042 .094 -.030 -.450 .653 .874 1.144 
Model Summary: R=.715; R2 =.512; Adj. R2 = .476; F Stat = 14.544; Sig. =.000 
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By comparison, CEOs’ perceptions (Table 7.10) of legitimacy (LEGIHIGHER, t=7.023) and 
urgency (URGHIGHER, t=4.537) are significantly and positively related to the salience of 
higher-tier government stakeholders at a 99% confidence interval. Similar to the results of 
model 1(a), the regression coefficients (i.e. Beta) of legitimacy (LEGIHIGHER) and urgency 
(URGHIGHER) are large and positive, suggesting a unit change in these independent 
variables will have a significant impact on higher-tier government stakeholder salience 
(HIGHSAL). Since two of the three attributes have a significant effect on perceived salience, 
this result provides support for hypothesis H2 (b). That is, in terms of infrastructure decision-
making by CEOs, their perceptions of the extent of legitimacy and urgency (but not power) of 
higher-tier government stakeholders are positively related to the extent of salience they give 
to this stakeholder category. 
 
It should be noted that in both models, Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceptions with regard to 
‘power’ do not have a significant impact on respective stakeholders’ salience. However, the 
correlation results (section 7.2 above) show that all three stakeholder attributes including 
power of both categories of stakeholder groups are significantly correlated with their 
respective stakeholder salience.  
 
Additionally, Tables 7.9 and 7.10 reveal no other significant relationships between any of the 
independent variables and salience in both the Models except for managerial values 
(MVMAY). Hypothesis H3 (a) and hypothesis H3 (b) predict that Mayors’ and CEOs’ values 
are expected to directly affect their perceptions of public stakeholder salience and higher-tier 
government salience respectively.  The results show that managerial values of Mayors 
(MVMAY) have a positive significant effect on public stakeholder salience at a 95% 
confidence level (t=1.741).  
 
Thus, hypothesis H3 (a) is supported. However, there is no significant relationship between 
managerial values and salience of high-tier government as perceived by CEOs. Therefore 
hypothesis H3 (b) is not supported. That is, managerial values of CEOs (MVCEO) have no 
significant impact on how they perceive the salience of higher-tier government stakeholders. 
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7.4.1.2 Discussion of Models 1(a) and 1(b) 
 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997), when stakeholders possess only two attributes out of the 
three stakeholder attributes, they are referred to as moderately salient stakeholders or 
expectant stakeholders – they expect something. This stakeholder typology, as shown in Table 
3.5 (refer Chapter Three), indicates that stakeholders perceived to have a combination of 
legitimacy and urgency are labelled as ‘expectant-dependant’ stakeholders. ‘Dependant’ 
stakeholders are those who lack power but have urgent legitimate claims like a ‘dependant 
person’ (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 877). They are deemed to depend on other stakeholders or 
managers to accomplish their will. Further, under this stakeholder typology, ‘dependant’ 
stakeholders can be moved to the most salient stakeholder class when their claims are adopted 
by ‘dominant’ stakeholders (i.e., those who have power and legitimacy). Accordingly, Mayors 
perceive the public stakeholder as dependent stakeholders while CEOs also perceive the 
higher-tier government stakeholders as dependent stakeholders.  This suggests they both view 
stakeholders in infrastructure decision-making as largely ‘expectant dependant’ (i.e., lacking 
power but having urgent legitimate claims). These findings provide a new contribution of 
evidence to the stakeholder salience literature in the public sector, particularly in the local 
government context.  
 
The results in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 are consistent with a majority of prior studies from 
different contexts on the relationship between stakeholder attributes and salience, namely: 
Agle et al. (1999); Harvey and Schaefer (2001); Eesley and Lenox (2006); Parent and 
Deephouse (2007); Boesso and Kumar (2009a); Assard and Goddard (2010); and Masoud and 
Wilson (2011). They all suggest stakeholder attributes do affect the degree to which top 
management give priority to competing stakeholder needs and demands. However, there are 
other mix views from prior studies. For example, Gifford (2010) suggests that all three 
stakeholder attributes need not be present to achieve high levels of salience. Gifford’s study 
found, among the UK and US investee companies that engage with practitioner communities, 
there is a strong preference for legitimacy-based engagement in the first instance. Power is 
applied by investees only after legitimacy based options have been exhausted. 
 
 
Looking at the stakeholder attributes that influence stakeholder salience, the current study 
finds that power is not a determinant factor of salience. Similarly, in another study in a public 
sector health organisation in the New Zealand context, Wynn-Williams (2012) found the 
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recipient group in public health systems or the general public is viewed as a dependent 
stakeholder with no power but with legitimacy and urgency.  
 
However, many other studies have found that power is a determinant factor on stakeholder 
salience. First, Parent and Deephouse (2007) found that power has the most important effect 
on salience, followed by urgency and legitimacy in two large scale sporting organisation 
committees in Canada.  Second, Boesso and Kumar (2009b) claim that power and legitimacy 
that managers associate with a stakeholder group cumulatively are the most important 
determinants of how managers go about prioritising competing claims in the US and Italian 
contexts. Third, Assard and Goddard (2010) when investigating the influence of stakeholders 
on accountability relationships and the development of accounting practices and processes 
within two Tanzanian NGOs found that donors were significantly more salient and most 
powerful due to their possession of financial resources. Similarly, Bussy and Kelly (2010) in 
search of the meaning of the stakeholder concept in politics assert that in practice, power 
seems to play a far greater role than legitimacy in determining stakeholder salience among 
political decision-makers. They argue as follows;  
 
‘……in terms of stakeholder identification, legitimacy is the most important of the 
three variables (Mitchell et al. 1997) in a political context. However, a very different 
picture emerges…… concerned with salience rather than identification. It appears 
there are many groups with legitimate interests who are effectively excluded from the 
consultative process because they are largely unorganised and hence lack the power to 
command the attention of the political elite. In practice, politicians and their advisers 
pay most attention to those with the power and urgency to assert their influence. 
Unsurprisingly, urgency is a particular factor in the lead-up to elections when those 
with power redouble their efforts to sway the policy debate. Indeed it is not 
uncommon for powerful interests to gain acceptance as stakeholders even when the 
decision-makers are fully aware that the group in question is unrepresentative of all 
those affected by the issue and that the bestowal of stakeholder status is at best 
dubious’ (pp. 300-301). 
 
 
When considering the above argument and the results of the current study, it is suggested that 
perhaps stakeholder power may be a factor that influences the manner in which Mayors and 
CEOs prioritise demands and claims for infrastructure assets in the local government context, 
although they may possibly not accept it explicitly.  
 
When considering managerial values of Mayors and CEOs (MVMAY/MVCEO), prior 
literature provides mix support for the relationship between managerial values and 
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stakeholder salience. Mitchell et al. (1997) suggested that variability in managers’ perceptions 
or characteristics of individual managers will moderate the attribute–salience relationship. 
However, Agle et al. (1999) did not find support for this suggestion when using CEO values 
as the moderator in the US context.  They found an interaction between CEOs’ values and 
salience only on employees and customers while the overall results is one of non- significance 
with no moderating effect. In contrast, Gifford (2010) found that values of company managers 
are one of the most important contributors to shareholder salience in the UK investee 
companies. They also noted that managers’ values are considerably associated with managers’ 
personal reputations. 
 
7.4.1.3 Regression Results for Models 2(a) and 2(b) 
 
The previous models do not directly test for significant differences between the perceptions of 
the Mayors and CEOs. In order to execute this statistical test, the sample is not split, but 
instead, a dummy variable is introduced into the regression model to distinguish Mayors’ 
from CEOs’ responses (Mayor=1 and CEO=2). The following model 2(a) tests the hypotheses 
H2 (a) and H3 (a) while model 2(b) test hypotheses H2 (b) and H3 (b). The dependent 
variable for model 1(a) is salience of public stakeholder group while salience of high-tier 
government group is the dependent variable for model 2(b). 
   
 
SALPUBCUM=β0+ β1POWPUBCUM+ β2LEGIPUBCUM+ β3URGPUBCUM + β4 
(POWPUBCUM* MAYORADJ) +   β5 (LEGIPUBCUM* MAYORADJ) + β6 (URGPUBCUM* 
MAYORADJ) + β7 MVCUM + β8 ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε                                                                                                                        (2a) 
 
 
SALHIGHCUM= β0 + β1POWHIGHCUM+ β2LEGIHIGHCUM + β3URGHIGHCUM + 
β4(POWHIGHCUM* CEOADJ)+ β5(LEGIHIGHCUM* CEOADJ)+   β6(URGHIGHCUM* 
CEOADJ) + β7 MVCUM + β8 ACLG+ Β9 JURIS + β10 GENDER + β11 AGE ++ β12 
ACQUALI+ ε                                                                                                                        (2b)                   
 
 
 
The results in Table 7.11 and 7.12 for the interactions with the Mayor/CEO dummy 
adjustments provide evidence of the extent to which significant differences between the 
perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs affect the priority given to different stakeholders in 
infrastructure decisions. By modelling these dummy variables as interactions with the main 
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variables, an increase in multicolinearity becomes a consequence. This occurrence of 
multicolinearity, as indicated in the VIF scores above 10 in Tables 7.11 and 7.12, is deemed 
to be acceptable when one dummy is used as an interaction term in a model (Hair et al. 2011).   
 
Table 7.11: Model 2(a) Effect of Perceived Stakeholder Attributes and Managerial 
Values on Salience of Public Stakeholder Groups of Mayor and CEO Respondents         
(n = 221) 
DV=Public 
Stakeholder 
Salience of 
Mayors and 
CEOs 
SALPUBCUM 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.268 .706  -.379 .705   
POWPUBCUM .149 .075 .146 1.979 .043 .558 1.791 
LEGIPUBCUM .320 .065 .349 4.922 .000 .605 1.653 
URGPUBCUM .220 .061 .263 3.598 .000 .570 1.754 
POWPUBCUM 
*MAYORADJ 
.110 .134 .204 .819 .414 .049 20.238 
LEGIPUBCUM 
*MAYORADJ 
.032 .125 .086 .252 .801 .026 38.163 
URGPUBCUM 
*MAYORADJ 
-.149 .112 -.371 -1.329 .185 .039 25.480 
MVCUM .337 .126 .172 2.679 .008 .740 1.351 
Control Variables        
ACLG .007 .027 .015 .262 .794 .902 1.109 
JURIS .052 .026 .115 2.000 .047 .934 1.071 
ACQUAL -.009 .046 -.013 -.190 .849 .666 1.502 
GENDER -.022 .147 -.010 -.150 .881 .735 1.360 
AGE -.069 .059 -.068 -1.166 .245 .912 1.097 
Model Summary: R=.661; R2 = .437; Adj. R2 =.400; F Stat =11.957; Sig. =.000; R square change .021 
 
  
By entering the dummy variables into the model, the overall explanatory power improves 
slightly. That is, R square change is 2.1% and 2.0%. For the combined sample, the result now 
shows that all three stakeholder attributes – power, legitimacy and urgency – are significantly 
and positively related to the salience of both public stakeholders and higher-tier government 
stakeholders. When looking at the results of model 2(a) in Table 7.11 power 
(POWPUBCUM) is significant at 95% confidence interval while legitimacy 
(LEGIPUBCUM) and urgency are significant at (URGPUBCUM) 99% level. 
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Table 7.12: Model 2(b) Effect of Perceived Stakeholder Attributes and Managerial 
Values on Salience of Higher-tier Government Stakeholder Groups of Mayor and CEO 
Respondents (n = 221) 
DV=Higher-tier 
Government 
Stakeholder 
Salience of 
Mayors and 
CEOs 
SALHIGHCUM 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) .819 .974  .841 .401   
POWHIGHCUM .204 .098 .198 2.081 .039 .291 3.436 
LEGIHIGHCUM .365 .117 .260 3.118 .022 .380 2.633 
URGHIGHCUM .525 .104 .497 5.056 .000 .273 3.658 
POWHIGHCUM
*CEOADJ 
.193 .122 .267 1.577 .116 .092 10.827 
LEGIHIGHCUM
*CEOADJ 
-.338 .126 -.507 -2.678 .008 .074 13.552 
URGHIGHCUM 
*CEOADJ 
.191 .127 .250 1.506 .134 .096 10.452 
MVCUM .027 .154 .010 .173 .863 .871 1.147 
Control 
Variables 
       
ACLG -.029 .036 -.044 -.800 .425 .885 1.129 
JURIS .034 .034 .052 .972 .332 .922 1.084 
GENDER .163 .196 .050 .835 .405 .729 1.371 
AGE -.176 .079 -.120 -2.213 .028 .899 1.112 
ACQUAL -.046 .062 -.047 -.742 .459 .652 1.534 
  Model Summary: R=.717; R2 = .513; Adj. R2 =.482; F Stat =16.180; Sig. =.000; R square Change .020 
 
It is recognised that VIF scores in Table7.12 of 10.8, 13.5 and 10.4 for the three dummy- 
adjusted variables would indicate a slight possibility of presence of multicollinearity in model 
2(b). However these VIF numbers did not indicate as a serious statistical issue for the results 
of model 2(b). 
The co-efficient parameters of the three independents variables indicate that legitimacy 
(LEGIPUBCUM) has the most significant impact (Beta=.349) on perceived salience of public 
stakeholders (SALPUBCUM) while the least significant impact (Beta=.146) is from 
stakeholder power (POWPUBCUM). The F test of the model is also significant, with p-
value< .001. Since all three stakeholder attributes are contributing factors of salience of public 
stakeholders (SALPUBCUM) the results of Model 2(a) provide further support for hypothesis 
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2(a). It is also noted that one of the control variables, jurisdiction (JURIS) of the relevant 
LGA has a significant association with the public stakeholder salience although the 
coefficient is not large. Also, managerial values (MVCUM) perceived by Mayor and CEOs 
are positively related with the public stakeholder salience at a 95% confidence level. 
When turning to the results of Model 2(b) shown in Table 7.12 it is noted that all three 
stakeholder attributes (POWHIGHCUM, LEGIHIGHCUM and URGHIGHCUM) are 
positively and significantly associated with salience of higher-tier government stakeholders 
(SALHIGHCUM).  The F test of the model is significant, with p-value< .001. Unlike in 
Model 2(a), in this model the co-efficient parameters of the three independents variables 
indicate that the stakeholder urgency (URGHIGHCUM) has the most significant impact 
(Beta=.497) on perceived salience of high-tier government stakeholders (SALHIGHCUM) 
while the least significant impact (Beta=.198) is stakeholder power (POWHIGHCUM) which 
is similar to Model 2(a). However the coefficient of stakeholder power (POWHIGHCUM) in 
Model 2(b) (Beta=.198) is slightly higher than in Model 2(a) (Beta=.146). That is, the power 
of higher-tier government stakeholders may have a higher influence on the way the Mayors 
and CEOs prioritise the demands and claims of higher-tier government stakeholders compared 
with the power possessed by public stakeholders. The results provide further support for 
hypothesis H2 (a) and H2 (b). That is, in terms of infrastructure decision-making by Mayors 
and CEOs, their perceptions of the extent of stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency of 
public stakeholders are positively related to their perception of the extent of salience of that 
stakeholder category. 
 
However, there is no significant relationship with managerial values (MVCUM) and salience 
of higher-tier government stakeholders (SALHIGHCUM). 
 
7.4.1.4 Discussion of Model 2(a) and 2(b) 
 
According to the results of Model 1(a) and 1(b)  shown in Table 7.9 and 7.10,  Mayors 
perceived public stakeholders as ‘expectant dependant’ stakeholders and CEOs perceived 
higher-tier government stakeholders as ‘expectant dependant’ stakeholders as well. That is, 
when stakeholders are perceived to possess the attributes of legitimacy and urgency, they are 
categorised as ‘expectant dependants’. These findings of model 1(a) and 1(b) show the 
stakeholder power of both groups of stakeholders is not a perceived attribute that influences 
salience.  However, when considering the combined perceptions of Mayors’ and CEOs’ in 
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model 2(a) and 2(b), stakeholder power has also become significant in addition to the other 
two attributes- stakeholder legitimacy and urgency. According to Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 
878), stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes - power, 
legitimacy, and urgency - are perceived by managers to be present. Thus, when all three 
attributes are possessed by stakeholders, they are categorised as ‘definitive’ stakeholders.  
‘Any expectant stakeholder can become a definitive stakeholder by acquiring the missing 
attribute’ (Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 878). Further they say ‘power is not reciprocal in this 
relationship, its exercise is governed either through the advocacy or guardianship of other 
stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal management values’ (p. 877). Mitchell et al. 
(1997) state as an example the giant oil spill from the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound. 
There were several stakeholder groups such as local residents, marine mammals and birds and 
even the natural environment who had legitimate and urgent claims, but had little or no power 
to enforce their will in the relationship. ‘These stakeholders, in order to satisfy their claims, 
had to rely on the support of the other powerful stakeholders or on the generosity and 
voluntarism of the firm’s management. ‘Dominant’ stakeholders (stakeholders with power 
and legitimacy) – the Alaska state government and the court system- provided guardianships 
to these dependant stakeholders in order to satisfy their claims’ (p. 877).  
 
In the current study, ratepayers, users of infrastructure assets and community special interest 
groups are all perceived to have high legitimacy and urgency but low power. By gaining 
support from the relevant state government department (perceived to have high power in 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6) these ‘expectant dependent’ public stakeholder groups can effectively 
become ‘definitive’ stakeholders. It should be noted that the combined sample is analysed in 
Table 7.12. Here power becomes a contributing factor on the salience of the public 
stakeholder group categories, making them definitive stakeholders in the eyes of Mayors and 
CEOs with regard to infrastructure assets decision-making.   
 
When considering managerial values of Mayors and CEOs (MVCUM), the results further 
confirm prior literature (Mitchell et al. 1997; Agle et al. 1999; Gifford 2010) that provides 
mix support for the relationship between managerial values and stakeholder salience as 
discussed in section 7.4.1.2 above.   
 
In summary, models 2(a) and 2(b) which consider perceptions of both Mayors and CEOs 
(combined sample, n=221) have generated more significant results compared to models 1(a) 
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and 1(b) which separately consider the perceptions of Mayors’ and CEOs’ (split sample: 
Mayor =70; CEO n= 151). Further, the split sample approach reduces the sample size and 
creates a problem of relying on intuition, not significance testing, when comparing the results 
from the split samples. Hence, from this point onwards the study will analyse the perceptions 
of the combined sample.  
 
 
 
7.4.2  Relationship among Stakeholder Salience, Managerial Values and     
            Accountability Emphasis 
 
This section first analyses the influence of Mayors’ and CEOs’ perceived stakeholder salience 
along with managerial values on aggregate accountability and then analyses the impact of 
perceived stakeholder salience and managerial values on dimensions of accountability-public, 
managerial and political accountability.  
 
7.4.2.1   The Effect of Stakeholder Salience and Managerial Values on Perceived  
             Aggregate Accountability of both Mayors and CEOs: Model 3; Tests of Hypothesis  
             4(a) and 5(a) 
 
 
Model (3) below is developed to test the hypotheses H4 (a) and H5 (a). The dependent 
variable is the organisation’s extent of rendering of aggregate accountability for infrastructure 
assets as self-rated by Mayors’ and CEOs’. 
 
AGGACC =   β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG 
+ Β6 JURIS + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                      (3) 
 
 
 
7.4.2.1.1 Regression Results of Model 3 
 
Multiple regression analysis is performed to examine the relationship between the perceived 
salience of public and higher-tier government stakeholder groups and the discharge of 
aggregate accountability for infrastructure as rated by Mayors and CEOs.  Results of model 3 
are presented in Table 7.13.  
 
In general, the model has a significant explanatory power with the adjusted R2 explaining 19% 
variation. The F test of the model is also significant, with p-value< .001. It is revealed that 
public stakeholder salience perceived by Mayors and CEOs (SALPUBCUM) has a positive 
 230 
 
significant effect on aggregate accountability (AGGACC) at a confidence interval of 95% and 
t statistics of 3.084.  With a large regression coefficient value of .234 it suggests that a unit 
variation in the perceived salience of public stakeholders will have a significant impact on 
aggregate accountability. However, there is no significant relationship between perceived 
salience of higher-tier government stakeholders (SALHIGHCUM) and aggregate 
accountability (AGGACC). Thus, the results provide partial support for hypothesis 4(a). That 
is, in terms of infrastructure decision-making by Mayors and CEOs, the extent to which they 
give priority for  the needs and claims of public stakeholders has a positive impact on 
aggregate accountability rendered by the organisation (as self-rated by the Mayor and CEO). 
But this positive impact on accountability is not evident in respect of the priority given to 
higher-tier government stakeholders.  
 
Table 7.13: Model 3 Determinants of the LGA’s Accountability for Infrastructure rated 
by Mayors and CEOs      (n = 221) 
DV=Aggregate 
accountability for 
infrastructure 
AGGACC 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 3.267 .677  4.827 .000   
SALPUBCUM .992 .062 .234 3.084 .002 .714 1.400 
SALHIGHCUM .027 .043 .047 .638 .524 .751 1.331 
MVCUM .212 .113 .147 1.900 .043 .829 1.207 
POS -.487 .111 -.352 -4.407 .000 .645 1.551 
Control 
Variables 
       
ACLG -.022 .026 -.058 -.854 .394 .903 1.108 
JURIS -.043 .024 -.117 -1.770 .078 .940 1.064 
GENDER -.242 .134 -.129 -1.812 .072 .806 1.241 
AGE .055 .056 .066 .981 .328 .918 1.090 
QUALIF .001 .004 .002 .027 .978 .677 1.476 
Model Summary: R=.477; R2 =.228; Adj. R2 = .191; F Stat = 6.165; Sig. =.000 
 
Table 7.13 also reveals that managerial values (MVCUM) of Mayors and CEOs have a 
positive significant effect on aggregate accountability (AGGACC) at 95% confidence level. 
As expected by hypothesis H5 (a), there is a positive relationship between the managerial 
values of the Mayors and CEOs and the LGA’s accountability for infrastructure asset.  
 
In addition to the above findings, it is noted that the ‘position’ (POS) held by Mayor and CEO 
has a negative significant relationship with aggregate accountability (AGGACC). This inverse 
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relationship indicates that Mayors have a high believe than CEOs regarding the extent of 
accountability rendered for the LGA’s infrastructure policies, plans and performance.  
 
7.4.2.1.2 Discussion of Model 3 
 
The above results suggest that the extent of accountability for infrastructure is influenced by 
the way Mayors and CEOs prioritise the demands and needs of the public stakeholders 
(ratepayers, users of infrastructure assets, community special interest groups and local media). 
These stakeholders are mostly the end-users of infrastructure assets while some will also be 
fund providers. The high-tier government stakeholders (the State government department 
responsible for local government authority, State auditor general, and Infrastructure Australia) 
who can affect local governments through their policy-making, oversighting, monitoring and 
funding powers are not perceived as a sufficiently salient stakeholder group to have a 
significant influence on the accountability practices of the LGAs.  To this end, the current 
study reveals that the Mayors and CEOs prioritise the demands and claims of the end-users or 
service recipients of infrastructure assets but not the regulatory and funding bodies. It can be 
said that there is an unequal perceived salience between the stakeholders at public or 
community level and government regulators or fund providers with respect to infrastructure 
assets. These significant results provide some insight into local government attention to the 
notion of accountability. Two prior studies, Collier (2008) and Assard and Goddard (2010), 
which employed a salience model to explore accountability have provided mix results. 
 
First, Collier (2008) in his field study examined complicated accountability relationships 
between the board and three stakeholder groups (the regulator in social housing, lenders and 
tenants) within a social housing organisation in the quasi-public sector in the UK. He found 
there is an unequal salience between the stakeholders with economic concern who are keen on 
efficiency, and stakeholders with broader social concern. However, their field study 
demonstrated that the board of the housing organisation discharged accountability, not only to 
lenders who has an economic concern but also to service recipients who has a social concern. 
 
Secondly, Assard and Goddard (2010) investigated the influence of stakeholders on 
accountability relationships in two Tanzanian NGOs. They found that out of six stakeholder 
groups, overseas donors were the stakeholders with the highest salience that significantly 
influenced accountability relationships and accounting processes and practices. This is due to 
the fact that 98% of all incomes of the two NGOs concerned in the study are contributed by 
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the overseas donors.  Moreover, they found the beneficiary communities and general public 
were least salient in terms of accountability relationships. This finding is in contrast with the 
current study that perceives public stakeholders who are more salient will impact 
accountability.   
 
In addition, some other previous studies (Taylor & Rosair 2000; Kloot & Martin 2001; 
Kluvers & Tippet 2010) deal with multiple stakeholders and multiple accountabilities of 
public sector. These studies reflect that when managers need to prioritise the demands and 
claims of multiple stakeholders they do not equally prioritise the demands and claims of these 
stakeholders. However, these studies do not employ the stakeholder salience model suggested 
by Mitchell et al. (1997).  
 The findings of the current study contribute supporting evidence to the following claim made 
by Mitchell et al. (1997): 
 
‘ the theory of stakeholder salience does not argue that managers should pay attention to 
this and that class of stakeholders rather they argue that  to  achieve  certain  ends,  or 
because  of  perceptual factors,  managers  do  pay  certain  kinds  of  attention  to  certain  
kinds  of stakeholders’ (p. 855).  
 
 
While the findings in this section indicate that managers (Mayors and CEOs) pay more 
attention to the ‘public’ class of stakeholder, this may change over time when different 
infrastructure issues arise. Mitchell et al. (1997) emphasise that their theory of stakeholder 
salience is dynamic and needs to consider several additional features (p. 868). 
  
‘First, each  attribute (power, legitimacy and urgency)  is  a  variable,  not  a  steady  state,  
and  can  change  for any particular  entity  or  stakeholder-manager  relationship’.   
 
‘Second, the  existence  (or degree  present)  of  each  attribute  is  a matter  of multiple  
perceptions  and  is  a  constructed  reality  rather  than  an  objective’ .   
 
‘Third, an individual  or entity  may  not be  ‘conscious’  of possessing  the  attribute  or, 
if  conscious  of  possession,  may  not  choose  to  enact  any  implied  behaviours’. 
 
 
These features of stakeholder attributes,  are  important  to  the  theory's  dynamism;  that  is,  
they  provide  a  preliminary framework  for understanding  how  stakeholders  can  gain  or 
lose  salience. Accordingly they believe that stakeholder-manager relations are not static but, 
rather, are in constant flux. 
 
 233 
 
When turning to the relationship between managerial values and accountability, hypothesis 
H5 (a) is supported by findings of the current study. This result is supported by Kluvers and 
Tippet (2010) who found that the attitudes towards accountability and managing the 
accountability relationship of councillors and managers of LGAs in Victoria are shaped by 
values of the individuals.  
Further, results of model 3 provide an interesting insight to the relationship between the 
position held by Mayor and CEO and aggregate accountability, even though it was not an 
objective of the current study. The effect of ‘position’ on aggregate accountability reflects an 
anomaly. Although the Mayors and CEOs have similar perceptions about stakeholder 
attributes and salience of different stakeholder groups with respect to infrastructure asset 
decision-making, the way they rate accountability towards stakeholders is different.  Some 
parallel can be drawn to Parent and Deephouse’s (2007) finding that managers’ positions in 
the organisational hierarchy (top, middle and lower level) and their divisional role have direct 
and moderating effects on stakeholder salience.  
 
 
7.4.2.2 The Effect of Stakeholder Salience and Managerial Values on Accountability   
            Dimensions: Model 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c); Tests of Hypotheses 4(b) and 5(b)  
 
Results in this section relate to the following models:  
 
PUBACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG + 
Β6 JURIS + β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                      (4a)   
 
 
MGLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG 
+Β6 JURIS +β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                     (4b) 
 
 
POLACC= β0 + β1SALPUBCUM+ β2SALHIGHCUM + β3MVCUM + β4 POS + β5 ACLG 
+Β6 JURIS +β7 GENDER + β8 AGE + β9 ACQUALI+ ε                                                     (4c) 
 
Model 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) test the hypotheses 4(b) and 5(b) which were developed in Chapter 
Four. The regression models are run separately for the three accountability dimensions. 
Hence, the dependent variables are public accountability, managerial accountability and 
political accountability for the three models respectively. The relationships are tested on the 
combined sample of Mayors and CEOs (n=221). 
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7.4.2.2.1   Regression Results of Models 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) 
 
Results are shown in Tables 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16. For each of the dimensions of accountability, 
the adjusted R2 explains 24%, 20% and 6% of variance in the LGA’s emphasis on public 
(PUBACC), managerial (MGLACC) and political (POLACC) accountability respectively. 
The F tests of the three models are significant, with p-value< .001 and p-value< .05.  
 
 
Table 7.14:Model 4(a) Determinants of the LGA’s Public Accountability Emphasis 
(n=221)  
DV=Public 
Accountability 
PUBACC 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 2.775 .713  3.889 .000   
SALPUBCUM .175 .066 .197 2.670 .008 .714 1.400 
SALHIGHCUM .006 .045 .009 .125 .901 .751 1.331 
 MVCUM .444 .119 .255 3.727 .000 .829 1.207 
 POS -.416 .117 -.277 -3.571 000 .645 1551 
 ACLG -.044 .027 -.106 -1.618 .107 .903 1.108 
JURIS -.061 .026 -.152 -2.369 .019 .940 1.064 
GENDER -.105 .141 -.052 -.747 .456 .806 1.241 
QUALIF .100 .059 .109 1.681 .094 .918 1.090 
AGE -.045 .046 -.074 -.982 .327 .677 1.476 
Model Summary: R=.522; R2 = .273; Adj. R2 =.238; F Stat =7.830; Sig. =.000 
 
When looking at results of model 4(a), shown in Table 7.14 salience of public stakeholders 
(SALPUBCUM) has a significant impact on the dimension of public accountability 
(PUBACC) at a confidence interval of 95% and t statistics of 2.670. However, there is no 
significant impact found between the salience of higher-tier government stakeholders 
(SALHIGHCUM) and public accountability (PUBACC).  In addition, two control variables 
namely the position of the respondent (POS) and the jurisdiction (JURIS) of the LGA have 
negative significant relationships with public accountability (PUBACC) at a 99% and 95% 
confidence interval respectively.   
 
Table 7.15 presents the regression results of Model 4(b).  The adjusted R2 is lower than in 
Model 4(a) and explains a variation of nearly 20%. Even in Model 4(b) the accountability 
dimension - managerial accountability (MGLACC) - is influenced only by salience of public 
stakeholders (SALPUBCUM) but not by higher-tier government stakeholders 
(SALHIGHCUM). 
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Table 7.15: Model 4(b) Determinants of LGA’s Managerial Accountability Emphasis 
(n=221) 
DV=Managerial 
Accountability 
MGLACC 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 3.219 .882  3.650 .000   
SALPUBCUM .267 .081 .249 3.276 .001 .709 1.411 
SALHIGHCUM -.088 .055 -.118 -1.595 .112 .747 1.339 
MVCUM .258 .147 .124 1.758 .080 .827 1.210 
 POS -.613 .145 -.339 -4.217 .000 .635 1.574 
 ACLG -.065 .033 -.131 -1.946 .053 .903 1.107 
JURIS -.067 .032 -.139 -2.099 .037 .940 1.064 
GENDER .022 .174 .009 .124 .901 .800 1.250 
QUALIF .031 .073 .028 .418 .676 .913 1.095 
AGE .018 .057 .024 .314 .754 .676 1.479 
Model Summary: R=.482; R2 =.232; Adj. R2 = .196; F Stat =6.292; Sig. =.000 
 
There is a positive significant relationship at a confidence interval of 95% and t statistics of 
3.276. The co-efficient of the parameter is significantly large (Beta=.249) suggesting a unit 
change in salience of public stakeholders (SALPUBCUM) will have a significant impact on 
managerial accountability (MGLACC). Similar to Model 4(a) the same control variables, 
position (POS) and jurisdiction (JURIS) have negative and significant relationships with 
managerial accountability (MGLACC) at a 99% and 95% confidence interval respectively.   
 
Table 7.16: Model 4(c) Determinants of Perceived Political Accountability of Mayors 
and CEOs (n=221)  
DV=Political 
Accountability 
POLACC 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 3.805 1.232  3.088 .002   
SALPUBCUM .134 .113 .097 1.184 .238 .714 1.400 
SALHIGHCUM .164 .077 .169 2.118 .035 .751 1.331 
MVCUM -.066 .206 -.024 -.320 .749 .829 1.207 
 POS -.431 .201 -.184 -2.141 .034 .645 1.551 
 ACLG .043 .047 .067 .918 .360 .903 1.108 
JURIS -.002 .045 -.003 -.040 .968 .940 1.064 
GENDER -.642 .243 -.203 -2.639 .009 .806 1.241 
QUALIF .036 .103 .025 .347 .729 .918 1.090 
AGE .031 .079 .033 .388 .699 .677 1.476 
Model Summary: R=.319; R2 =.102; Adj. R2 = .059; F Stat =2.367; Sig. =.015 
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When compared with Models 4(a) and 4(b) the overall explanatory power of Model 4(c) is 
reasonably low with an adjusted R2 of .059 as shown in Table 7.16. Unlike the results of the 
other two models, (in which the influence is from salience of public stakeholder on 
dimensions of accountability) the regression results of model 4(c) show a positive, significant 
influence of salience of higher-tier government stakeholders (SALHIGHCUM) on political 
accountability (POLACC).  The relationship is at a confidence interval of 95% and t statistics 
of 2.118. Similar to the other two models the control variable ‘position’ (POS) has a negative 
significant relationship with political accountability (POLACC) at 95% confidence interval. 
In addition, another control variable gender has a negative significant impact on political 
accountability (POLACC).  
 
From the regression results of the three models, it is noted that managerial values (MVCUM) 
has a positive significant impact only in model 4(a), public accountability (PUBACC). The 
relationship is at a confidence interval of 99% and t statistics of 3.727. The coefficient of the 
parameter is significantly large (Beta=.255) suggesting a unit change in managerial values 
(MVCUM) will have a significant impact on public accountability (PUBACC). With these 
results it can be said that hypothesis 5 (b), that is the managerial values of the Mayors and 
CEOs are significantly related to the emphasis given to different accountability dimensions of 
infrastructure assets, is partially supported.  
 
In summary, the regression results reveal that public accountability (PUBACC) and 
managerial accountability (MGLACC) are impacted by the public stakeholder salience 
(SALPUBCUM) while political accountability (POLACC) is influenced by salience of 
higher-tier government stakeholders. Thus, when turning to hypothesis 4(b) which stated that 
the perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs with regard to public stakeholders and high-tier 
government stakeholders is significantly related to the emphasis given to different 
accountability dimensions for infrastructure assets is partially supported.  
 
 
7.4.2.2.2 Discussion of Models 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) 
 
The findings for Models 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) provide a new contribution to research on the 
linked fields of stakeholder salience and accountability. These results are not directly 
comparable with prior studies, since according to the researcher’s knowledge there is no prior 
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research that has investigated the relationship between stakeholder salience model (Mitchell et 
al. 1997) and dimensions of accountability. 
 
The findings of the current study suggest that the way the Mayors and CEOs prioritise the 
needs and claims of public stakeholders  (ratepayers, users of infrastructure assets, community 
special interest groups and local media) with regard to infrastructure assets, has an influence 
on their rating of the amount of emphasis or attention given by their organisation to public 
(PUBACC) and managerial accountability (MGLACC) dimensions but not on political 
accountability. As explained in Chapter Three, public accountability holds those in power 
accountable for the community and general public at large for their acts and omissions, 
decision and policies and expenditure which requires openness of account giving (Cameron 
2004). This will involve responding to, and directly informing, the public and community in 
relation to its claims, concerns, complaints and enquiries regarding infrastructure assets. 
Accordingly, the salience of public stakeholders has an influence on public accountability.   
 
When turning to managerial accountability, Sinclair (1995) states that this concept is the 
answerability of the managers when producing outputs or use of resources in achieving the 
final objectives of a particular organisation. Thus, managerial accountability involves 
achieving economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the functions and operations of the 
organisation when delivering goods and services to the recipients.  Public stakeholder salience 
would be expected, therefore, to have an influence on managerial accountability with respect 
to infrastructure decision-making. The results in Table 7.13 have strongly confirms this. 
 
On the other hand, the results also reveal that the way the Mayors and CEOs prioritise the 
needs and claims of higher-tier government stakeholders (State government department 
responsible for LGA, State auditor general’s office and federal government’s Infrastructure 
Australia) does have a significant impact on the emphasis given to political accountability 
(POLACC), but not public and managerial accountabilities. As explained in Chapter Three, 
the Westminster system of government provides a direct line or a chain of political 
accountabilities, where the government representatives (managers/CEOs) are directly 
accountable to an executive or a minister for implementing the set of policies and the minister 
is accountable to the Parliament for the outcomes and ultimately the Parliament is accountable 
to the electorate (Thynne & Goldring 1987; Stewart 1984; Funnell & Cooper 1998). This 
hierarchical accountability leads the LGA managers to be answerable to different tiers of 
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government oversight bodies, including the State government department responsible for the 
LGA and State auditor-general. Moreover, since LGAs normally receive financial support 
from Federal and State/Territory levels of governments in terms of capital funding for general 
and specific infrastructure projects, they are accountable to different tiers of government. That 
is, key management personnel of LGAs have political accountability to State and Federal 
ministers, who in turn are accountable to their constituents.  As stated in Chapter Two, during 
the year 2011-12 the grants received by local governments totalled $1495.2 million under the 
general purpose component and $663.4 million under local roads component. Around 10% of 
LGAs are heavily dependent on these grants provided by other tiers of government.   Overall, 
the model results suggest that salience of public stakeholders does influence public and 
managerial accountability while salience of higher-tier government stakeholders influences 
political accountability. 
 
The results also reflect that there is a positive significant relationship between managerial 
values (MVCUM) and emphasis on public accountability (PUBACC) but not with managerial 
(MGLACC) and political (POLACC) accountability. This can be due to the fact that 
discharging of managerial accountability (MGLACC) and political accountability (POLACC) 
may involve compliance with legal requirements specially when achieving outcomes in order 
to acquit grants and receive further grants from other tiers of government. Thus, compliance 
with legal requirements may override the values a manager believes in. However this finding 
is in contrast with Kluvers and Tippet (2010) who found that irrespective of legal 
requirements the operations of accountability is perceived to be dependent upon an 
individual’s values.   
 
The final explanatory variable, position (POS) shows a significant negative relationship 
between public (PUBACC) and managerial accountability (MGLACC) which infers that the 
Mayor has a perspective of higher emphasis or attention being given by their organisation to 
public (PUBACC) and managerial accountability (MGLACC) compared to CEOs.   
 
This inverse significant relationship between ‘position’ (POS) and accountability dimensions 
in Table 7.17 creates an interest in further examining the ratings of LGA’s accountability 
emphasis of the two positions - the Mayor and the CEO. An independent samples t-test is 
carried out and results are shown in Table 7.17. It is found that there are significant 
differences among the perceived public and managerial accountability dimensions of the two 
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positions.  Thus, the differences indicate that Mayors’ emphasis on public and managerial 
accountability is higher than the emphasis of the CEOs (Mayor Code =1, CEO Code=2). The 
inference is that the Mayor is more attuned to pushing the LGA to emphasise the dimensions 
of accountability for infrastructure assets because the Mayor is the elected representative who 
more strongly identifies the importance of comprehensively rendering accountability in all its 
dimensions.      
 
Table 7.17: Mean differences in dimensions of perceived accountability between the 
Mayor and CEO 
Accountability Dimensions Mayor 
Mean  (SD) 
CEO 
Mean (SD) 
t- stat Sig. 
Public Accountability  5.12(.493) 4.69 (.724) 5.248 .000 
Managerial Accountability 4.39(.688) 3.88(.815) 4.766 .000 
Political Accountability 3.74(1.050) 3.45 (1.076) 1.884 .062 
 
 
7.5 Relationship between Stakeholder Salience and Infrastructure     
          Backlog 
 
This analysis in this section explores the influence of the Mayor’s and CEO’s perceived 
stakeholder salience on their LGA’s infrastructure backlog. Infrastructure backlog is a widely 
used performance measure amongst LGAs throughout Australia. When stakeholders are 
accorded higher salience concerning their infrastructure claims and demands, it is 
hypothesised that there will be better infrastructure performance as reflected in lower 
infrastructure backlog. In this section, infrastructure backlog is measured in two ways. First 
its level is rated by Mayors and CEOs based on their belief about the degree of difficulty by 
the LGA with infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1). This measure is used in the multiple 
regression analysis and presentation of results. Second, it is measured as an infrastructure 
renewal/replacement ratio which is disclosed in the annual report by many LGAs. This 
infrastructure backlog ratio has been collected as secondary data (IFBLOG2). This measure is 
used for supplementary analysis in this section. 
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7.5.1 The Effect of Stakeholder Salience on Perceived Infrastructure Backlog of  
            Mayors and CEOs: Model 5; Test of Hypothesis 6  
 
Model (5) given below is designed to test hypothesis H6. Its dependent variable is the 
infrastructure backlog as rated by both Mayors’ and CEOs’ (n=221). Multiple regression 
analysis is performed to examine the relationship between the perceptions of the Mayors’ and 
CEOs’ with regard to salience associated with infrastructure claims of public stakeholder and 
higher-tier government stakeholders, and their rating of the LGA’s degree of difficulty 
experienced with infrastructure backlog. Results of the regression are presented in Table 7.18. 
 
 
IFBLOG1=β0+β1SALPUBCUM+β2SALHIGHCUM+β3POS+β4ACLG+β4JURIS+ε           (5)    
                                                
Table 7.18: Model (5) Determinants of Perceived Infrastructure Backlog of Mayors and 
CEOs (n=221) 
DV= 
Infrastructure 
Backlog 
IFBLOG1 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 3.923 .690  5.689 .000   
SALPUBCUM -.008 .130 -.005 -.058 .954 .793 1.261 
SALHIGHCUM -.057 .091 -.049 -.629 .530 .795 1.257 
ACLG .158 .053 .210 2.980 .003 .985 1.016 
JURIS 
-.102 .052 -.139 -1.972 .050 .980 1.020 
POS 
-.004 .194 -.001 -.019 .985 .986 1.014 
Model Summary: R=.253; R2 =.06; Adj. R2 = .040; F Stat =2.617; Sig. =.026 
 
7.5.1.1 Regression Result of Model 5 
 
It is noted that the overall explanatory power of the model (Model 5) is very poor, with a .040 
adjusted R2. However, the F statistic of the model is significant at p< .05. According to the 
empirical results, neither perceived public stakeholder salience (SALPUBCUM) nor the 
higher-tier government salience (SALHIGHCUM) of Mayors’ and CEOs’ has any significant 
influence on their rating of the LGA’s difficulty with infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1). That 
is the way the Mayors and CEOs prioritise the needs and claims of public and higher-tier 
government stakeholders with respect to infrastructure assets, does not have an impact on the 
LGA’s infrastructure backlog performance as rated by Mayors and CEOs. 
 
The only contributing factor on the rated infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1) is the Australian 
classification of local government (ACLG), which is a control variable. It has a significant 
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impact on infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1) at confidence interval of 95% (t=2.980, p<0.05). 
This result indicates that when the municipality of the LGA has a lower population, less 
population density and a lower proportion of urban population (based on the Australian 
Council of Local Governments’ (ACLG) classification system) then infrastructure backlog as 
rated by Mayors and CEOs will be higher. The empirical findings of Model 5 lead to a 
rejection of hypothesis H6, which states that the perceived salience of Mayors and CEOs with 
regard to public and higher-tier government stakeholders is significantly related to the extent 
of infrastructure backlog experienced by the relevant LGAs.    
 
7.5.1.2 Discussion of Model 5 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the empirical studies undertaken with regard to infrastructure 
backlog have investigated the relationship only between financial sustainability and 
infrastructure backlog. This study provides new evidence on the relationship between 
stakeholder salience and infrastructure backlog. A non-significant relationship is found. While 
an inverse relationship is found, which is the predicted direction in this study, the significant 
level is very weak. So no support is provided for H6.  
 
However, the influence of stakeholder salience on infrastructure backlog appears to have been 
confounded by the LGA’s classification. The control variable, ACLG, in Table 7.18 is found 
to be highly significant (sig. = .003). This result suggests that the higher the ACLG 
classification, the more is the infrastructure backlog experienced by a particular LGA. This 
classification enables comparisons of structurally similar LGAs (Murray & Dollery 2005). 
The allocated ACLG scores are: urban capital city=1, urban development =2; urban rural =3; 
urban fringe=4; rural significant growth=5; rural agricultural =6; rural remote large=7 (refer 
Chapter Two and Five). For instance the results interpret that the infrastructure backlog 
experienced by a LGA classified as urban development (2) is lower than the backlog 
experienced by a rural agricultural (6) LGA.  These results support the findings of the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Report (2006) which revealed the financial sustainability of LGAs to 
a certain extent.  They made three main conclusions from their work on a sample of 100 
LGAs categorised according to the ACLG classification (p. 114)  
 
 Most ‘large’ metropolitan councils are ‘generally viable’, with some ‘stretched’ owing to 
‘service expansion’, and ‘internal reform’ is necessary. 
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‘Urban Fringe’ councils have ‘mixed’ sustainability, ‘internal reform’ is needed, and 
‘only some’ councils need ‘additional’ funding. 
 
 ‘Rural Remote’ and ‘Rural Agricultural’ exhibited ‘pronounced’ sustainability problems, 
required ‘internal reforms’, and most should receive ‘extra funding’ for the ‘renewal of 
existing community infrastructure’. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, it is admitted that there is an inverse correlation between the 
financial sustainability of a LGA and the infrastructure renewal backlog. That is, when LGAs 
report operating deficits or, more specifically, operating cash flow deficits, there is a strong 
tendency to defer renewal expenditures on existing infrastructure assets. Accordingly, the 
findings of the PWC report indicate that LGAs which are categorised as urban capital (ACLG 
=1) or urban development (ACLG=2) may have no or very low infrastructure backlog since 
their financial sustainability is generally viable. At the next grouping level, LGAs classified as 
urban fringe (ACLG=4) may experience infrastructure backlog to a certain extent since they 
have mixed financial sustainability conditions. Finally, rural agricultural (ACLG= 6) and rural 
remote (ACLG=7) suffer from financial sustainability problems there is high tendency that 
they will experience infrastructure backlog difficulties.  
 
7.5.2  Further Analysis of Infrastructure Backlog Using Secondary Data  
 
With the intention of corroborating the regression results of model (5), which used Mayors’ 
and CEOs’ ratings of their LGA’s infrastructure backlog difficulties, secondary data are used 
to explore the influence of stakeholder salience on infrastructure backlog.  As explained in 
Chapter Four, a common way to determine the extent of an LGA’s infrastructure backlog 
difficulties is to evaluate the asset renewal/replacement ratio. Accordingly, as explained in 
Chapter Five, on-line annual reports from year 2011/12 are used to obtain data to calculate the 
renewal/replacement ratio, which is used to measure the infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG2) 
experienced by LGAs. The data collection was carried out only on those LGAs that responded 
to the survey questionnaire of the current study. However, annual reports of three jurisdictions 
namely, Western Australia, Tasmania and Northern Territory did not provide sufficient 
information to calculate the renewal/replacement ratio. As explained in Chapter Five, the 
LGAs in these jurisdictions provide information on capital expenditure ratio, not 
renewal/replacement ratio. Since the current study considers only the infrastructure ‘renewal’ 
backlog and not backlog created by non-investment in ‘new’ infrastructure assets or 
‘maintenance’ of existing infrastructure assets (as explained in Chapter Two) these three 
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jurisdictions were removed from data analyses. Thus, only New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia are considered for the analyses. The following sections 
present the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and multiple regression results of the 
infrastructure backlog based on infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio.   
 
7.5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Infrastructure Renewal Backlog Based on  
           Renewal/replacement Ratio  
 
Descriptive statistics for the infrastructure backlog based on the survey responses were 
presented in Chapter Six. This section provides the descriptive statistics on infrastructure 
renewal backlog based on the infrastructure asset renewal/replacement ratio. Table 7.19 
presents descriptive and quartile statistics for the renewal/replacement ratio. (Refer Appendix 
Six for frequencies).  
 
  Table 7.19: Descriptive and Quartile Statistics of Infrastructure Backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained in Chapter Five, an infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio that results in 1:1 
indicates that spending on existing assets is equal to the depreciation rate. That is, there exists 
no infrastructure backlog during that particular period. Accordingly, based on the above 
statistics the LGAs are categorised into following four infrastructure renewal/ replacement 
backlog groups (Table 7.20). 
 
 
Table 7.20: Backlog Groups Based on Infrastructure Renewal/ Replacement Ratio  
Quartile Statistics Backlog 
Group 
Comment 
Below .46                4 The worst affected group from infrastructure 
renewal backlog 
Between .47-.725    3 Backlog is experienced at a higher extent 
Between .726- 1      2 Backlog is experienced at a lower level 
Greater than 1         1 Currently do not experience an infrastructure 
renewal backlog 
                         Valid 146 
                         Missing 75 
Mean .8614 
Median .7250 
Range 4.63 
                            25 .4600 
Percentiles          50 .7250 
                            75 .9725 
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7.5.2.2 Comparison of Infrastructure Backlog Groups within ACLG Categories 
  
Crosstabulation of the backlog groups and ACLG categories is presented in Table 7.21. The 
results are similar to the findings of model 5 as explained above (section 7.5.1.2) relating to 
ACLG.  
 
Table 7.21: Infrastructure Backlog Groups and Australian Classification of Local 
Government (ACLG) 
ACLG  Backlog Group Total 
1 2 3 4 
1. Urban Capital    
    City 
Count 1 1 0 0 2 
% within ACLG 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
2. Urban  
    Development 
Count  9 5 7 2 23 
% within ACLG 39.1% 21.7% 30.4% 8.7% 100% 
3. Urban Rural  Count  9 15 6 14 44 
% within ACLG 20.5% 34.1% 13.6% 31.8% 100% 
4. Urban Fringe Count  2 2 7 6 17 
% within ACLG 11.8% 11.8% 41.2% 35.3% 100% 
5. Rural Significant  
    Growth 
Count  1 0 1 0 2 
% within ACLG 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100% 
6. Rural  
    Agricultural   
Count  12 16 14 15 57 
% within ACLG 21.1% 28.1% 24.6% 26.3% 100% 
7. Rural Remote  
    Large 
Count  0 0 0 1 1 
% within ACLG 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 100% 
Total  Count  34 39 35 38 146 
% within ACLG 23.3% 26.7% 24.0% 26.0% 100% 
Pearson Chi- Square = 21.640; sig=.248 
 
 
The results indicate very low or no infrastructure among the urban capital cities. When 
looking at the urban developed category, nearly 40% of the LGAs fall into the backlog group 
that does not currently experience an infrastructure renewal/replacement, while another 22% 
fall into the category of low level backlog. This finding with respect to urban developed 
category supports the findings of the ‘national financial sustainability study of local 
government’ report (PWC 2006) which states the majority of larger urban developed LGAs 
are generally financially viable. When a LGA is financially viable it has the capacity to ‘clear 
the backlog and lift renewals expenditure to the optimal level’ (PWC 2006, p. 12). However, 
30% of the urban developed LGAs experience renewal backlog to a higher extent, falling into 
group 3.  
 
Turning to the urban rural category, 34% of the LGAs experience a low level of backlog 
falling into group 2, while another 32% fall into the worst affected group. Nearly 75% of the 
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LGAs in the urban fringe category either experience backlog to a higher extent or are worst 
affected. The PWC report (2006) states that urban fringe LGAs have mixed financial 
sustainability. Most of the Australian LGAs are classified as ‘rural agricultural’. Looking at 
the result of the rural agricultural category it shows that 28% of the LGAs experience a lower 
level backlog, while 26% are in the worst case scenario. Local government authorities that are 
classified as rural remote large fall into the fourth backlog group indicating they are affected 
worst by infrastructure renewal backlog. Again, these findings with regard to rural 
agricultural and rural remote large are consistent with the findings of PWC report (2006) 
which claims:  
 
‘…..rural remote and rural agricultural councils generally have more pronounced viability 
problems. These councils typically have relatively larger scope for internal reforms, 
however they often battle against lack of scale, and extra funding for renewal of existing 
community infrastructure is required for most’ (p. 13).  
 
 
Further, Dolley et al. (2007a) assert:  
 
‘…small rural LGAs with large spatial jurisdictions suffer the most not only in terms of 
infrastructure renewal and replacement backlogs, but also from asset management and 
reporting deficiencies’ (p. 8). 
 
 
The total results in Table 7.21 indicate that out of the 146 LGAs considered in the analysis, 
26% or 38 LGAs are worst affected by infrastructure renewal/replacement backlog  while 
another 24% (35 LGAs)  experience the backlog at a higher level. Thirty four LGAs (23%) do 
not currently experience infrastructure backlog and another 39 LGAs (27%) experience 
backlog only at a lower level. Overall, the results give evidence that infrastructure 
renewal/replacement backlog is notably dispersed across all categories of ACLG.  
 
7.5.2.3 Comparison of Infrastructure Backlog Groups within Jurisdictions 
 
Table 7.22 presents a cross-tabulation of the four backlog groups and four jurisdictions. The 
results indicate that New South Wales consists of the most number of LGAs that are affected 
by infrastructure renewal/ replacement backlog.   Nearly 41% of the LGAs are worst affected 
while another 19% experience the backlog to a higher degree. This remaining 40% of the 
LGAs in NSW either do not experience backlog at all in the current year (13%) or are at a 
lower level (28%). In Victoria, most of the LGAs (36%) fall into the second backlog group 
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which experiences backlog at a lower level, while another 30% do not experience backlog 
during the current year. Only 2% are worst affected and the remaining 32% experience 
infrastructure backlog at a higher level.   
 
Results reveal Queensland is the least affected by infrastructure backlog with 10% of the 
LGAs affected worst, with 0% of LGAs that experience backlog at a higher level. Out of the 
remaining 90% of the LGAs, 60% of them do not experience infrastructure backlog during the 
current year. Infrastructure assets controlled by LGAs in Queensland were severely damaged 
due to a major flood event that occurred during the summer months of year 2010/11. Due to 
major funding from Federal and State government, most of the flood restoration work was 
completed during the year 2011/12. This created a low backlog situation among the LGAs in 
Queensland during year 2011/12. For instance, the Lord Mayor’s report of Brisbane City 
Council’s annual report says: 
 
‘Brisbane’s resilience in the face of the January 2011 flood saw major rebuilding work on 
parks, waterways, drainage systems, and sea and river walls completed this year. By June 
2012, Council had spent more than $164 million on flood recovery works. For Council – 
just as for many residents – the financial impact remains significant. Despite major 
funding from the Federal and State governments, there will be a considerable shortfall. 
Council has responded fully to the recommendations from the State Government’s Flood 
Commission of Inquiry. There will be extensive work performed on the city’s drainage 
systems and waterways, and funding for delivery of backflow prevention valves. The 
impact of the January 2011 flood was immense and will not be forgotten’   (Brisbane City 
Council 2012, p. 21) 
 
When turning to South Australia, it is evidence that nearly 32% of the LGAs fall into the 
worst affected group category while another 36% of the LGAs experience a higher level of 
backlog.  Largely, it can be assumed according to the study, that in year 2011/12, NSW has 
the highest number of LGAs affected by infrastructure renewal/replacement backlog while the 
least affected in that year is in Queensland.  
 
The Chi Square tests in Table 7.21 and 7.22 reveal that jurisdiction (JURIS) makes a 
significant difference to the amount of backlog of an LGA, but the ACLG classification does 
not.  
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Table 7.22: Infrastructure Backlog Group and Jurisdiction (JURIS) 
Jurisdiction  Backlog Group Total 
1 2 3 4 
New South 
Wales (NSW) 
Count 9 19 13 28 69 
% within Jurisdiction 13.0% 27.5% 18.8% 40.6% 100% 
Victoria (VIC) Count  13 16 14 1 44 
% within Jurisdiction 29.5% 36.4% 31.8% 2.3% 100% 
Queensland 
(QLD) 
Count  6 3 0 1 10 
% within Jurisdiction 60.0% 30.0% 0.0% 10.0% 100% 
South Australia 
(SA) 
Count  6 1 8 7 22 
% within Jurisdiction 27.3% 4.5% 36.4% 31.8% 100% 
Total  Count  34 39 35 38 146 
% within Jurisdiction 23.3% 26.7% 24.0% 26.0% 100% 
Pearson Chi- Square= 40.386; sig=.000 
 
7.5.2.4   Bivariate Correlation Analysis of Infrastructure Backlog  
 
This preliminary data analysis is performed before the multiple regression model is run.  
Since the model is regressed only for the four jurisdictions (NSW, VIC, QLD and SA) that 
have provided data to calculate the infrastructure renewal ratio, the correlation analysis is also 
undertaken only for these four jurisdictions. The results are shown in Table 7.23 below.  
 
 
         Table 7.23: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 
IFBLOG1 IFBLOG2 
IFBLOG1 1.000  
IFBLOG2 -.018 1.000 
  
It is expected that ratings of the LGA’s difficulties with infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG1) as 
perceived by Mayors and CEOs would be significantly positively correlated with the 
infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio (IFBLOG2) calculated using the data given in the 
respective annual reports of the LGA that responded to the survey questionnaire. However, 
none of the three rating statements correlate with the infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio 
(IFBLOG2.  Even the mean value of the three infrastructure backlog statements (IFBLOG1) 
does not correlate with the infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio. Interestingly, Mayors and 
CEO appear to make no connection with the LGA’s reported infrastructure 
renewal/replacement ratio (IFBLOG2) when they are asked to intuitively give a rating on the 
degree of difficulty experienced by their LGA with infrastructure backlog.  
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7.5.2.5   Regression Result of Model 5 using infrastructure renewal /replacement ratio 
 
The same regression model used in section 7.5.1 to test hypothesis H6 is used again to 
determine the effect of stakeholder salience now on infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio 
(IFBLOG2). The regression results are shown in Table 7.24. The overall explanatory power 
of the model (Model 5) is poor, with a .014 adjusted R- squared. The F statistic and p- value 
also indicates that the model is statistically not significant. Once again the two independent 
variables, the perceived public stakeholder salience (SALPUBCUM) or the higher-tier 
government salience (SALHIGHCUM) have no significant relationships with infrastructure 
backlog (IFBLOG2). The results also reveal that all control variables- classification of LGA 
(ACLG), jurisdiction (JURIS) and position (POS) - have no significant relationships with 
infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG2). South Australian Financial Sustainability Review Board 
(2005, p. 2) highlights:  
 
‘…..differences in council size (and whether a council was formed by amalgamation or 
not) and location (urban/rural) seem to play a relatively minor role in explaining the 
incidence of operating deficits and substantial infrastructure renewal/replacement 
backlogs’.  
 
Given all variables have no significant impact on IFBLOG2 it can be assumed that there can 
be other variables outside of the model that influence the infrastructure backlog (IFBLOG2). 
Clearly, there is no support for the hypothesised relationship between stakeholder salience and 
infrastructure backlog.  
 
 
Table 7.24: Model (5) Determinants of Infrastructure Backlog (NSW, VIC, QLD and 
SA) 
DV= 
Infrastructure 
Backlog 
IFBLOG2 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 1.088 .442  2.462 .015   
SALPUBCUM -.067 .079 -.077 -.839 .403 .816 1.226 
SALHIGHCUM -.016 .056 -.026 -.285 .776 .813 1.230 
ACLG .027 .034 .067 .793 .429 .980 1.021 
JURIS 
.096 .053 .153 1.811 .072 .971 1.030 
POS 
-.166 .124 -.112 -1.338 .183 .977 1.023 
Model Summary: R=.220; R2 =.048; Adj. R2 = .014; F Stat =1.399; Sig. =.228 
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7.6  Chapter Summary 
 
The results of data analyses based on both survey questionnaire and secondary data are 
presented in this chapter. The first section of the chapter presents the results of bivariate 
correlation analyses. Several significant relationships are identified between independent and 
dependent variables, and preliminary support for the potential of sufficiently low 
multicolinearity levels between independent variables is provided.  
 
Next, the results of multiple regression analyses are reported to address the research questions 
and hypotheses developed in previous chapters. The results are presented according to three 
theoretical perspectives. First the relationships among stakeholder attributes, managerial 
values and stakeholder salience are analysed. The results first reveal that there are more 
similarities than differences between the perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs with regard to 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency of different stakeholder groups.  Both rank 
‘public stakeholders’ (except media) more highly than ‘higher-tier government stakeholders. 
The regression results reveal that legitimacy and urgency, but not power, affect the perceived 
salience of most stakeholder groups by both Mayors and CEOs. This suggests they both view 
stakeholders in infrastructure decision-making as largely ‘expectant dependant’ (i.e., lacking 
power but having urgent legitimate claims) under Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder 
typology. 
 
The second set of analysis provides empirical findings on the relationship among stakeholder 
salience, managerial values and accountability emphasis. It reveals that there is a positive 
effect of both public stakeholder salience and managerial values on the emphasis given to 
accountability in aggregate. That is, while public stakeholder salience influences aggregate 
accountability emphasis, there is no significant influence from the salience of higher-tier 
government shareholders. It is revealed that the position held whether it is Mayor or CEO, has 
an inverse relationship with aggregate accountability, indicating that Mayors give a higher 
rating to the LGA’s degree of emphasis given to accountability than the CEOs. When turning 
to the three dimensions of accountability, the regression results reveal that public 
accountability and managerial accountability are impacted only by public stakeholder 
salience, while political accountability is influenced only by salience of higher-tier 
government stakeholders. It is also noted that managerial values of Mayors and CEOs have a 
positive impact only on public accountability emphasis, but not on the emphasis given to 
managerial and political accountabilities.  
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Finally the findings of the relationship between stakeholder salience and infrastructure 
backlog are presented. Secondary data on infrastructure backlog (infrastructure 
renewal/replacement ratio) is used to reinforce the findings of the analysis. Descriptive 
statistics of the secondary data are presented according to the Australian classification of local 
government (ACLG) and jurisdictions. It is found that both public and higher-tier government 
stakeholder salience have no significant explanatory power on infrastructure renewal backlog 
based on rated (survey based) and reported (secondary based) measurements.  
 
All regression results are interpreted with reference to theoretical frameworks and constructs 
employed in the current study- that is, relationships between the constructs of stakeholder 
attributes, stakeholder salience, dimensions of accountability, and infrastructure backlog. The 
results are also compared to prior empirical findings. The next chapter provides the summary, 
conclusion and implications of the thesis. Limitations of the study and recommendations for 
future research are also provided. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
_______________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter synthesizes the objectives, hypotheses, main results and discussion of 
results of the study. Implications of the study are then considered in terms of managerial, 
policy and theoretical implications. Next imitations of the study’s methods and scope are 
considered. Finally, suggestions are given for future research directions.  
 
8.2 Synthesis of the Study and Its Findings 
 
Responsibility for the development, maintenance, renewal or replacement of community and 
heritage infrastructure assets falls heavily on local governments in Australia. Infrastructure 
asset management by LGAs involves on-going decisions concerning policies, plans, budgets 
and controls that largely revolve around resource allocation and project prioritization issues. 
A feature of infrastructure asset management by LGAs is the presence of multiple external 
stakeholders who express needs, have expectations and make claims about infrastructure 
projects, plans and policies. These stakeholders range from groups at the level of public users 
including local residents and businesses, to institutions at the higher-tier government level 
including funding and oversight ministries and agencies. These multiple stakeholders create a 
complex context for decision-making and the rendering of accountability by the management 
of LGAs. Despite the important phenomenon of the influence of stakeholder expectations on 
top management of LGAs when prioritising, implementing and being accountable for 
infrastructure projects, the prior research on this phenomenon is limited.  
 
This study has sought to advance the modelling and testing of the application of stakeholder 
theory in the public sector through a survey of LGA Mayors and CEOs. Mitchell et al.’s 
(1997) version of stakeholder theory, referred to as stakeholder identification and salience, is 
adopted. In its modelling, this study has integrated the concepts of stakeholder attributes, 
stakeholder salience, managerial values, organisational accountability and organisational 
performance. More specifically, its modelling has addressed hypotheses and provided 
evidence about phenomena in the following five associated areas:   
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(1) the perceptions of Mayors and CEOs about stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy 
and urgency regarding their claims and needs concerning infrastructure assets;  
(2) the relationship between these attributes and perceived salience of different stakeholder 
groups (where salience is deemed to reflect the priority given to different stakeholder 
groups in infrastructure decision-making);  
(3) the relationship between the salience of different stakeholder groups and the type of 
accountability emphasis given for infrastructure management by the LGA;  
(4) the relationship between the salience of different stakeholder groups and the actual and 
perceived infrastructure performance of the LGA in terms of its renewal backlog;  
(5) in testing the above relationships, the inherent managerial values held by the Mayor and 
CEO are also modelled, together with control variables on LGAs’ demographics.   
 
Items (3) and (4) above are especially original because there is no known prior study on the 
application of stakeholder theory to the explanation of accountability emphasis and 
infrastructure renewal backlog in the local government context. 
 
In terms of the stakeholders, a review of literature has led to the categorization of LGA 
stakeholders with an interest in infrastructure into two levels based on the closeness of their 
proximity and beneficiary to the infrastructure. The first level is the public stakeholder 
category comprising four groups, namely: ratepayers; users of infrastructure assets; 
community special interest groups; and local media. The second level is the higher-tier 
government stakeholder category comprising three groups namely: State government 
department responsible for local government; State auditor general’s office; and Federal 
government’s Infrastructure Australia. In terms of management, two players are chosen, the 
Mayor who heads the political arm of LGAs and the CEO who heads the administrative arm. 
These are the two most authoritative figures in the governance and management of an LGA. 
 
Two stages of data collection have been employed. The main stage has involved primary data 
collection using a survey questionnaire; the supplementary stage has involved secondary data 
collection using on-line annual reports of LGAs for the 2011/12 financial year. The mail 
survey was carried out in year 2011 among 420 LGAs across all jurisdictions in Australia. 
This survey was sent to two targeted respondents in each of these 420 LGAs, the Mayor and 
the CEO. In the second stage of data collection, secondary data (infrastructure renewal/ 
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replacement backlog ratio) was collected only from the LGAs that responded to the survey 
questionnaire.   
 
Thus, the data is used to test sets of hypotheses as summarized in Table 8.1. Table 8.1 
summarises these hypotheses and their related research questions, and shows whether the 
hypotheses are supported or not by the findings of the data analysis. Five out of ten 
hypotheses are supported by the empirical findings of the study while three hypotheses are 
partially supported and two hypotheses are not supported.  
 
Table 8.1: Summary of Research Questions, Hypotheses and Findings 
Research Question Hypothesis Findings 
RQ1: Are there differences 
and similarities between 
Mayors and CEOs in their 
perceptions of stakeholder 
attributes and salience when 
considering the infrastructure 
asset claims, demands or 
needs of various stakeholders 
groups? 
 
 H1: There are no significant differences 
between the ratings given by Mayors and 
CEOs to the perceived power, perceived 
legitimacy and perceived urgency of various          
stakeholder groups in relation to infrastructure 
asset decision-making. 
 
Supported 
RQ2: To what extent do the 
perceptions of Mayors and 
CEOs about stakeholder 
attributes influence the 
salience of stakeholders 
regarding the prioritisation of 
demands and needs of 
competing stakeholder 
groups in infrastructure 
decision-making? 
 
H2a:  In terms of infrastructure asset decision-
making by Mayors, their perceptions of the 
extent of (a) power (b) legitimacy and (c) 
urgency of ‘public stakeholders’ are positively 
related to their perception of the extent of 
salience of that stakeholder category. 
 
Partially 
Supported 
 H2b: In terms of infrastructure asset decision-
making by CEOs, their perceptions of the 
extent of (a) power (b) legitimacy and (c) 
urgency of ‘higher-tier government 
stakeholders’ are positively related to their 
perception of the extent of salience  of that 
stakeholder category. 
 
Partially 
Supported 
RQ3: To what extent do 
managerial values held by 
Mayors and CEOs affect the 
perceptions of stakeholder 
salience and accountability? 
 
H3a. Managerial values held by Mayors will 
be significantly related to their perceptions of 
the salience of ‘public stakeholders’ with 
regard to infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
Supported 
H3b: Managerial values held by CEOs will be 
significantly related to their perceptions of the 
salience of ‘higher-tier government 
stakeholders’ with regard to infrastructure asset 
decision-making. 
Not 
Supported 
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Research Question Hypothesis Findings 
RQ4: To what extent do the 
perceptions of Mayors and 
CEOs about stakeholder 
salience influence the overall 
accountability and 
dimensions of accountability 
(public, managerial and 
political) emphasised by the 
LGA in relation to 
infrastructure assets? 
 
H4a: The perceived salience of Mayors and 
CEOs with regard to ‘public stakeholders’ and 
‘high-tier government’ stakeholders is 
significantly related   to the extent of aggregate 
accountability for infrastructure asset decision-
making. 
Partially 
Supported 
H4b: The perceived salience of Mayors and 
CEOs with regard to ‘public stakeholders’ and 
‘high-tier government’ stakeholders is 
significantly related to the emphasis given to 
different accountability dimensions of (a) 
public accountability (b) managerial 
accountability and (c) political accountability 
for infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
Partially 
Supported 
H5a: The managerial values of the Mayors and 
CEOs are significantly related to the extent of 
aggregate accountability for infrastructure asset 
decision-making. 
 
Supported 
H5b: The managerial values of the Mayors and 
CEOs are significantly related to the emphasis 
given to different accountability dimensions of 
(a) public accountability (b) managerial 
accountability and (c) political accountability 
for infrastructure asset decision-making. 
 
Partially 
Supported 
RQ5: To what extent do the 
perceptions of Mayors and 
CEOs about stakeholder 
salience influence the 
perceived and actual 
infrastructure renewal 
backlog experienced by 
LGAs? 
H6: The perceived salience of Mayors and 
CEOs with regard to ‘public stakeholders’ and 
‘higher-tier government stakeholders’ is 
significantly related to the extent of 
infrastructure backlog experienced by the 
relevant local government authorities.    
 
Not 
Supported 
 
As seen in Table 8.1 above, partial support is indicated for Hyotheses H2 (a), H2 (b), H4 (a), 
H4 (b) and H5 (b). Each of these hypotheses is testing either multiple levels of stakeholders or 
multiple dimensions of accountability.  For H2(a) and H2(b) two of the three stakeholder 
attributes were found to be significant; for H4(a) one of the two levels of stakeholders was 
found to be significant; for H4(b) one stakeholder level and two accountability dimensions 
were significant ; for H5(b) two accountability dimensions were significant. Because some 
but not all the components in these composite hypotheses are significant, the overall tests 
indicate partial support. 
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The conclusions on the hypotheses tests as indicated in Table 8.1 have been discussed in the 
previous chapter. A review of these results and discussion is provided here. First, results 
reveal that in terms of research question one (RQ1), there are more similarities than 
differences between the perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs with regard to attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency of different stakeholder groups.  Thus, both the Mayor and 
CEO on average, hold similar perceptions about the stakeholder groups to which they accord 
higher power and higher urgency. Further, the Mayor and CEO accord legitimacy fairly 
evenly across all seven stakeholder groups. Moreover, in terms of RQ1, Mayors’ and CEOs’ 
give similar rankings across the seven stakeholder groups in terms of their mean perceptions 
of stakeholder salience and cumulative attributes. Both rank ‘public stakeholders’ (except 
media) more highly than ‘higher-tier government stakeholders’.  
 
Secondly, the evidence from this study in terms of research question two (RQ2) is the 
regression results of determinants of perceived salience, and hence, likely prioritisation given 
to various stakeholders by the Mayor and CEO in infrastructure decisions. Interestingly, the 
regression results, as summarised in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 for  RQ2, reveal that legitimacy and 
urgency, but not power, affect the perceived salience of most stakeholder groups by both 
Mayors and CEOs, when their responses are analysed separately. This suggests they both 
view stakeholders in infrastructure decision-making as largely ‘expectant dependant’ (i.e., 
lacking power but having urgent legitimate claims) under Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder 
typology. However, the results of the analysis change in the combined sample of the Mayor 
and CEO (with the introduction of dummy). Perceived power of both categories of 
stakeholders now significantly influences salience, making them ‘definitive’ stakeholders in 
infrastructure decision-making. Moreover, the combined results indicate that the salience of 
the public stakeholders is mostly impacted by the legitimacy of public stakeholders while 
salience of higher-tier government stakeholders are mostly impacted by the urgency of the 
higher-tier government stakeholders.  
 
Third, the managerial values of the Mayor and CEO, as summarised in Tables 7.9 and 7.10 in 
terms of  research question three (RQ3),  have different effects on perceived salience – the 
Mayors’ values affect the extent of salience given to ‘public stakeholders’, but the CEOs’ 
values have no effect on the salience given to ‘higher-tier government’ stakeholders. Even the 
results of the analysis in the combined sample of the Mayors and CEOs (with the introduction 
of a dummy) provide no relationship between managerial values and salience of higher-tier 
government stakeholders. 
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The fourth area of findings from this study in terms of research question four (RQ4) is the 
regression results of the extent of influence of perceived stakeholder salience on aggregate 
accountability and the dimensions of accountability- public, managerial and political. The 
results show the overall accountability for infrastructure by the LGA, from the perception of 
Mayors’ and CEOs’, is influenced by the salience accorded to the demands and needs of 
public stakeholders but not by the salience accorded higher-tier government stakeholders. 
This suggests that salient groups of stakeholders at the ‘public’ level, who are closer in 
physical proximity and as beneficiaries to an LGAs infrastructure assets, are accorded greater 
accountability.   
 
When looking at the three dimensions of accountability, it is evident that public and 
managerial accountabilities are impacted only by the public stakeholder salience while 
political accountability is impacted only by salience of higher-tier government stakeholders. 
Hence, an LGA’s accountability emphasis concerning infrastructure that emphasises 
transparency and responsiveness to the public (i.e., public accountability) and emphasises 
disclosures about service quality and performance measures (i.e., managerial accountability), 
is positively affected by the salience accorded ‘public’  stakeholder groups, not ‘higher-tier 
government’ stakeholder groups. The latter are accorded greater accountability emphasis only 
when a major change is introduced through relevant State government legislation or a Federal 
government funding authority (i.e., political accountability).   
 
It is also noted that managerial values of Mayors and CEOs has a positive impact only on 
public accountability but not on managerial and political accountabilities. Moreover, the 
results show an inverse significant relationship between ‘position’ and accountability 
dimensions, indicating that the Mayor rates the LGA’s emphasis on accountability 
significantly higher than the CEO.  This is despite the fact that there are more similarities than 
differences between the perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs with regard to stakeholder 
attributes as explained in RQ1. 
 
Finally, in answering research question five (RQ5) the regression results suggest that the only 
contributing factor on perceived infrastructure renewal backlog is the jurisdiction (JURIS). 
This control variable has a positive significant impact indicating the amount of infrastructure 
backlog renewal experienced by LGAs varies according to the jurisdiction. The same 
relationship when tested with secondary data, (that is instead of perceived infrastructure 
backlog of Mayors’ and CEOs’ the infrastructure renewal/replacement ratio is employed) 
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found that none of the variables contributed towards infrastructure backlog suggesting there 
can be variables outside the model that influence the infrastructure renewal backlog. 
Stakeholder theory has been unable to explain the aggregate infrastructure performance of 
LGAs as measured by their ‘renewal ratio’.  
 
8.3 Implications of the Study  
 
The results of the study have important implications for the management of infrastructure in 
the public sector, especially in local government. These implications can have practical and 
policy consequences for LGAs. They also raise conceptual and methodological issues for 
researchers in the areas of stakeholder analysis and accountability in the public sector.   
 
8.3.1 Managerial Implications 
 
The results first have implications for the governance of LGAs in terms of the ability of the 
head of the political arm (the Mayor) and the administrative arm (the CEO) to jointly lead 
their organisation to achieve effective and cost-efficient outcomes that meet the needs of 
multiple stakeholders.  Results of this study reveal that there are more similarities than 
differences between the perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs with regard to attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency of different stakeholder groups. Moreover, the results suggest 
both Mayors and CEOs view stakeholders in infrastructure decision-making as largely 
‘expectant dependant’ (i.e., lacking power but having urgent legitimate claims) under Mitchell 
et al.’s (1997) stakeholder typology. The implications of the similar perceptions are that 
infrastructure decision-making in LGAs, particularly in the prioritization of infrastructure 
projects, will be relatively efficient and decisive. This is because Mayors and CEOs tend to 
have converging views about the strength of attributes of particular groups and categories of 
stakeholders in terms of their needs and claims concerning infrastructure issues. This finding 
suggests that greater harmony will occur between the political and bureaucratic sides of LGA 
management in the way multiple stakeholders’ claims and needs are to be met when 
determining, and being accountable for, infrastructure plans, policies and budgets and 
performance.  
Second, the results have practical implications for the systematic determination of those 
stakeholder groups whose claims, demands and needs will be given priority. The study 
attempts to systematically classify seven stakeholder groups who may influence the 
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infrastructure decisions taken by LGAs into two broader categories, namely:  public 
stakeholders and higher-tier government stakeholders. A manager’s assessment of a 
stakeholder category’s/group’s attributes and salience is critical to the manager’s view of 
stakeholder importance which, in turn, is found to influence the accountability emphasis 
rendered by the LGA. Stronger salience given by the Mayor and CEO to stakeholders at the 
‘public’ level would signal to others in the management of LGAs that greater emphasis is to 
be given to both the public and managerial dimensions of accountability. This has particular 
relevance to accountants preparing information to report to stakeholders, because they can 
expect to be better supported in the provision of reports/documents that contain information 
about infrastructure budgets, service quality and performance measures. However, stronger 
salience by Mayors and CEOs of ‘higher-tier government’ stakeholders does not translate into 
support within the LGA for this type of accountability reporting. Instead, when Mayors and 
CEOs give greater salience to stakeholders at the higher-tier government level, then the 
results in this study imply that management within the LGA, including the accountant, will 
need to be vigilant about the LGA’s compliance with any changes in State legislative and 
Federal oversight body infrastructure reporting and policy requirements.  
 
Third, there is evidence of systematic differences in the managerial values held by Mayors 
and CEOs in terms of the way these values affect perceived stakeholder salience. The 
Mayor’s values affect the extent of salience given to ‘public stakeholders’, but neither 
Mayor’s nor the CEO’s values have no effect on the salience given to ‘higher-tier 
government’ salience. The implication is that stakeholders in the ‘public’ category are more 
likely to get their infrastructure demands prioritized if they target the Mayor. But the targeting 
of Mayors or CEOs based on the managerial values they hold is not likely to be an effective 
strategy for higher-tier government stakeholders when needing to get their infrastructure 
demands satisfied by LGAs. 
 
8.3.2 Policy Implications 
 
First, enhanced LGA infrastructure accountability to higher-tier government stakeholders is in 
need of stronger policy incentives. When looking at the three dimensions of accountability, it 
is evident that public and managerial accountabilities are impacted only by the public 
stakeholder salience. This result has implications for higher-tier government departments and 
agencies that provide funding and set policies in relation to the development and maintenance 
of infrastructure assets by LGAs.  According to Funnel et al. (2012), delivery of public sector 
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services is wholly dependent upon the ability of public servants to interpret the intentions of 
government policies and to implement them by managing the funds which are made available 
through constitutional processes.  Mayors and CEOs need to be incentivised to give greater 
salience to these government departments and agencies if they are to encourage their LGA to 
provide enhanced accountability for infrastructure assets to high-tier government. This could 
require higher-tier government stakeholders to more fully exercise their ‘power’ attribute by 
mandating more prescriptive infrastructure performance disclosures. The State government in 
New South Wales has led the way in mandating that LGAs provide a section in their annual 
report that gives project-by-project information on infrastructure budgets and expenditures, 
and detailed physical conditions of infrastructure assets. Other States/Territory could consider 
following the New South Wales government in strengthening LGAs’ accountability reporting 
requirements.  
 
Second, there are policy implications for higher-tier government funding and oversight bodies 
arising from the result that the stakeholder salience model does not explain LGAs’ 
infrastructure renewal backlog. This result should be a concern to both State government 
departments responsible for local government and the federal government’s Infrastructure 
Australia funding and advisory body. The concern is that, even though ‘public’ stakeholder 
claims and needs are found to influence the prioritization of infrastructure decisions made at 
the local government level, this prioritization process has not been effective in addressing the 
size of the infrastructure renewal backlog problem faced by LGAs. This study infers that the 
backlog problem is not resolved through a process of stakeholder groups influencing 
infrastructure decision-making at the local community level. Dependency on the influence of 
existing ‘public’ stakeholders is a crucial issue for the infrastructure renewal backlog problem 
because, as predicted in PWC report (2006), the burden of renewing infrastructure may be 
transferred to future generations of ratepayers. Hence, there is a case for more direct 
intervention by high-tier government stakeholders in setting and enforcing renewal backlog 
targets or thresholds for LGAs.  
 
8.3.3 Theoretical Implications 
 
First, in the application of the theory of stakeholder identification and salience (Mitchell et al. 
1997), the results reveal that legitimacy and urgency are the most important factors 
determining the level of stakeholder salience in the local government context with respect to 
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infrastructure asset decision-making. This result is not in accordance with prior studies such 
as Bussy and Kelly (2010) who assert that it is not surprising for powerful stakeholder 
interests to gain acceptance even when the decision-makers are fully aware that the demand or 
claim can be not legitimate and urgent, particularly in the public sector arena.  Perhaps 
stakeholder power is a factor that influences the manner in which the Mayor - the elected 
leader - and the CEO - the appointed leader - prioritise demands and claims on infrastructure 
assets, although they may possibly do not explicitly accept the fact.  
 
Second, the results have implications for the dimensionalization of the concept of 
accountability. The results of the current study indicate that managerial accountability is 
correlated separately with public accountability and political accountability. This correlation 
suggests that although the accountabilities may be multiple with different dimensions, these 
accountabilities may not always be mutually exclusive. In particular, with the introduction of 
private sector management practices into the public sector under the NPM, it is dubious to 
look at the notion of managerial accountability as a separate dimension when managers render 
different dimensions of accountability. Since managerial accountability is concerned with the 
reporting of inputs, outputs and outcomes as measures of management’s effectiveness, it is 
envisaged as being pivotal to all other dimensions of accountability.  
 
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
The results of this study are subject to the usual limitation of mail survey research. The 
instrument has adopted multi-item constructs from other studies. While construct validity and 
reliability tests have been successfully applied, there remains the problem that the responses 
to some items can be sensitive to the wording used. In the case of the variable ‘political 
accountability’ this measure was reduced to only two valid items, which are unlikely to have 
captured the full range of the meaning of this concept. Further, the data collected for the 
measures of stakeholder attributes, stakeholder salience and accountability are based on 
perceptions of the Mayors and CEOs.  Such survey data can have systematic errors arising 
from the respondents’ tendency to ‘partition’ to avoid using the full range of the rating scales, 
to acquiescence in providing the expected ‘right’ answer, and to suffer fatigue when 
completing the questionnaire. Further, there is no guarantee that the person to whom the 
research instrument was sent is the person who actually completed the survey. 
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The heavy reliance on questionnaire data in this study means that the results can be subjected 
by a form of common method variance. This is defined as overlapping variability due to the 
way data is collected. It is also referred to as single source bias which arises when overlapping 
variability is due to data collected from a single source. Such overlapping variability can 
occur when the respondent has difficulty distinguishing multiple attributes of the same object. 
Although a questionnaire is an efficient method for cognitive processing, it can produce less 
accurate variability in the data when it comes to respondents’ forming perceptions. While 
some of the primary data in this study, namely, the extent of infrastructure backlog, has been 
triangulated with secondary data from another source, there is other primary data in this study 
which could be affected by single source bias. 
 
Finally, the study is limited in scope to its model specifications. There will be other concepts 
or elements of concepts that could potentially have been included in the model specifications. 
For example, stakeholders could have included prospective tenderers to, or actual contractors 
on  LGAs’ infrastructure asset development projects. Accountability dimensions could have 
included an extra dimension such as fiduciary accountability. 
 
8.5 Suggestions for Future Research  
 
The current study uses predominantly a survey research methodology to obtain primary data 
on perceptions of Mayors and CEOs with regard to stakeholder attributes, salience, 
infrastructure backlog and accountability.  Further research could be undertaken to obtain 
greater depth of insight into stakeholder identification and prioritisation by qualitative 
interviews and observation methods.  While other LGA infrastructure studies have taken a 
qualitative approach, this approach has not been attempted for a study of stakeholder 
influence on accountability for infrastructure in the public sector. Through inductive analysis, 
a more in-depth understanding could be gained of the extent to which Mayors’ and CEOs’ 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes and salience remains static or change across different 
infrastructure projects.  
 
The survey instrument could be adapted to different tiers of government which have 
responsibilities for different infrastructure assets across Australia. This would enable an inter-
government comparison of the perceptions of stakeholder attributes, salience, accountability 
and infrastructure backlog.  
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Future research also could be ventured within local government in the international arena 
across varied geographical, cultural and demographical contexts. This would enable a 
comparison within the cross-national context. For instance, are the public and higher-tier 
government stakeholders perceived differently in developed countries and developing 
countries? How would the Mayors and CEOs perceive dimensions of accountability? To what 
extent do these countries experience an infrastructure renewal backlog and is it influenced by 
the stakeholder salience model? Answers to these questions require empirical evidence. Such 
evidence can potentially have wide practical implications for the management of public 
infrastructure, and can build a body of knowledge that can result in the wider generalizability 
of aspects of the relationship between stakeholder theory and accountability for, and 
performance of, public infrastructure. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One: Survey Instrument 
 
Questionnaire  
 
Accountability for Infrastructure Assets in Local Government 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
We thank you for assisting us with this survey. All information is strictly confidential and no 
names of persons or organisations will be disclosed.  
 
The questionnaire is organised in five sections. Most of the questions require your perception 
or belief measured on a six-point scale.  
 
Once completed please return the questionnaire using the reply-paid self-addressed envelope 
provided. We thank you for your time.  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section One – Professional Background and Demographic data 
 
 
Please tick the correct box 
 
 
1.1 Your current position:          Mayor            CEO  
 
 
1.2 Your highest academic qualification:        Post graduate      Bachelor         TAFE Diploma  
  
  Secondary         Other      Please specify ------------------------------------------ 
 
 
1.3 Please specify your highest academic qualification’s discipline (field of study) -------------- 
 
 
1.4 Your professional body membership, if any ------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
1.5 Extent of work experience:   
 
       1.5.1 Public sector   
 1-4 years  5- 9 years 10-14 years       15-19 years  20 years or more 
  
       1.5.2 Private sector   
 1-4 years 5- 9 years         10-14 years         15-19 years     20 years or more 
                No experience 
  
       1.5.3 Number of years of work experience in current local government position ------------ 
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1.6 Do you attend any conferences/ seminars and workshops relevant to your work or self    
      development?    
                           Yes             No 
 
  
1.6.1 If yes, please specify how often?   
 
                  Once a month                  Once in 3 months                Once in 6 months   
 
 Once a year Once in two years or more 
 
 
1.7 Your gender:    Male   Female 
 
 
1.8 Your age group:   
 
 1 below 35        35 to 44    45 to 54        55 to 64        65 or older 
 
 
 
1.9 The name of your local council is: (optional) 
 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
1.10 Demographic details of your local council: 
 
1.9.1 What is the current population of your local council?  
 
            -------------------------------(approximately) 
    
1.9.2 What is the area of your local council in square kilometres?  
 
           --------------------------------------------(approximately) 
 
 
1.11Please cross your local council category according to the Australian Classification of 
Local Governments (ACLG), provided in the following table. 
             
          ACLG Category 
 
 
 
 
UCC UDS UDM UDL UDV URS URM URL URV  
 
UFS UFM 
UFL UFV RSG RAS RAM RAL 
 
RAV RTX RTS RTM RTL 
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Section Two – Infrastructure Backlog 
 
This part of the questionnaire is concerned with your perception of infrastructure backlog 
in your local council. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by 
circling a response. 
                                                                                                    (Please circle only one response) 
 
St
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Sl
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gr
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St
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1.Our council has experienced a serious deficit budget in   
    recent years 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.Our council faces difficulties in meeting the increasing  
   demand for new/ upgraded infrastructure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3.Our council encounters difficulties in renewing existing  
   infrastructure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
Section Three – Mayor/ CEO Values 
 
The following questions relate to your personal values. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by 
circling a response 
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                    (Please circle only one response) 
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1. I openly recognise success and achievement of  
    colleagues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. I care about the effect that the organisation has on    
    the  environment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. I believe that loyalty must not be taken for granted 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. I strive to exceed expectations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. I take pride in my work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. I promote balance of work with personal wellbeing  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. I encourage teamwork that enables a supportive  
    working environment  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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8. I embrace innovative change amongst the  
   organisation’s people and services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. I value freedom of expression in the workplace 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Section Four – Perceptions about Stakeholders 
 
The following questions relate to key stakeholders of infrastructure assets of local councils. 
 
Instructions for section four  
Select a number from the given scale for each of the stakeholders named in the columns in 
section 4.1- 4.4.  Please make sure that you write a number under all the stakeholder columns. 
Scale points are equally spaced and ties are allowed. Your response on the scale should be 
based on the perceptions you have formed throughout your current tenure. 
 
Scale 
Never Very Little Somewhat Quite a bit A lot Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Example only:  
Questions Key  Stakeholders of Infrastructure Assets 
 
  
Each respective stakeholder group has  
the capacity and ability  (whether used  or not) 
to:  
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a.  apply direct sanctions on their local council  
(e.g. withhold money, labour, remove  
councillors or managers) to obtain their will  
regarding infrastructure assets 
5 4 3 5 5 2 6 
 
 
4.1 Power of Stakeholders 
Please choose a number from the following scale according to your perception for each 
stakeholder group. 
Scale 
Never Very Little Somewhat Quite a bit A lot Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Questions 
    
        Key Stakeholders of Infrastructure Assets 
 
Each respective stakeholder group has 
the capacity and ability (whether used  
or not) to: 
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1.   apply direct sanctions on their local 
council (e.g. withhold money, labour, 
remove councillors) to obtain their will 
regarding  infrastructure assets 
       
2.   apply direct force or legal action 
against their local council to obtain 
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their will regarding  infrastructure 
assets 
3.   influence the public image of their 
local council  regarding  infrastructure 
assets 
       
 
4.2 Legitimacy of Stakeholders 
Please choose a number from the following scale according to your perception for each stakeholder 
group.  
Scale 
Never Very Little Somewhat Quite a bit A lot Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Questions  Key Stakeholders of Infrastructure Assets                             
 
 
 
The claims (i.e. demands and 
requests) regarding  infrastructure 
assets of each respective stakeholder 
group are:  
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1.   proper or appropriate  
 
       
2. Deserving serious   
      consideration 
       
3.   trivial and inconsequential 
 
       
 
  
4.3 Urgency of Stakeholders 
 
Scale 
Never Very Little Somewhat Quite a bit A lot Always 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Please choose a number from the following scale according to your perception for each stakeholder 
group 
Questions               Key Stakeholders of Infrastructure Assets                    
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1.   put their claims (i.e. demands 
      and requests) regarding     
      infrastructure assets with staff   
      or  councillors  
       
2.   seek the attention of staff 
      or councillors regarding   
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      claims of infrastructure assets 
 
3.   communicate the importance 
      and urgency of their claims  
      regarding infrastructure  
      assets to staff or councillors  
       
4.4 Salience of Stakeholders 
Please choose a number from the following scale according to your perception for each stakeholder 
group.         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Questions Key Stakeholders of Infrastructure Assets 
(Salience is the extent to which 
priority is given to competing 
stakeholder claims) 
  
Each respective stakeholder group: 
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1.  receives high priority from      
     our management team regarding      
     claims of infrastructure assets 
       
2.  takes up the time and  
     attention of our management team  
     regarding claims of infrastructure    
     assets 
       
3.  has its satisfaction treated 
     as highly important by our 
     management team regarding   
     claims of infrastructure assets 
       
 
 
 
Section Five – Accountability Emphasis  
 
This part concerns your perception of different aspects of accountability for infrastructure assets. 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by     
circling a response. 
 
 
Public Accountability 
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1.  Our council (i.e. our organisation) makes a      
wide  range of  information on infrastructure 
assets  transparent to the public 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.   Our council provides qualitative information on  
      physical condition of infrastructure assets to the   
      public  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3.   Our council knows the likely cost (cost of    
      repair,  upgrading or replacement) of bringing   
      infrastructure to a satisfactory condition  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4.   Our council gives an excellent service to the  
      public in answering enquiries and complaints in    
      relation  to  infrastructure assets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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5.   Our council carries out community consultation  
      when preparing plans and policies in relation to  
      infrastructure  assets  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 6.   Our council considers the requirements of  
       future generations, when planning  
       infrastructure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Managerial Accountability 
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1. Our council uses performance information on   
     infrastructure assets to improve service  
     delivery and quality of service 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.  Our council collects and carefully assesses   
     performance measures of community  
     satisfaction with regard to infrastructure  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3.  Our council assesses performance measures on     
     service accessibility with regard to    
     infrastructure  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 4.  Our council uses performance indictors on      
infrastructure assets to reward or sanction 
individual staff 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. Our council uses performance indicators of     
      infrastructure for inter-council comparability 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
6.   Our council often provides the infrastructure  
      performance information to stakeholders of    
      local  government 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Political Accountability 
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1.   Our council has become more accountable to    
      the State  government since the Regional and  
      Local Community Infrastructure Program  
      (RLCIP) was introduced 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.   Our council has become more accountable to  
      State and/or Federal government since the  
      Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 was   
      introduced 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3.   Our council has become more accountable to  
      Federal and/or State government since the     
      Nation Building –  Economic Stimulus Plan     
      was introduced  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4.   Our council has more frequent meetings of the    
      committee(s) of council responsible for   
      infrastructure assets and their management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5.   Our council often has formal and informal     
      communication about infrastructure assets with   
      the relevant Minister or his/her Department 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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6.    Our council gives very careful attention to any   
      compliance requirements in reporting to  
       agencies or  departments of State and Federal  
       governments   concerning infrastructure assets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation.  
 
 Please return the questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope. 
 
Request for report on findings 
 
If you would like a summary of the findings sent to you, please write your email address here 
 
 
 
               ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
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Appendix Two: Local Government Authorities Sampled 
Local Government Authorities Sampled 
 Name of the LGA Jurisdiction ACLG Responded By 
1 Albury City Council  NSW URM   
2 Armidale Dumaresq Council  NSW URS   
3 Ashfield Municipal Council  NSW UDM   
4 Auburn Council  NSW UDM  CEO 
5 Ballina Shire Council  NSW URM   
6 Balranald Shire Council  NSW RAM   
7 Bankstown City Council  NSW UDV   
8 Bathurst City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
9 Bega Valley Shire Council  NSW URS   
10 Bellingen Shire Council  NSW RAV   
11 Berrigan Shire Council  NSW RAL   
12 Blacktown City Council  NSW UDV   
13 Bland Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
14 Blayney Shire Council  NSW RAL   
15 Blue Mountains City Council  NSW UFL   
16 Bogan Shire Council  NSW RAM   
17 Bombala Council  NSW RAM   
18 Boorowa Council  NSW RAM   
19 Botany Bay City Council  NSW UDM   
20 Bourke Shire Council  NSW RAM Mayor   
21 Brewarrina Shire Council  NSW RAM  CEO 
22 Broken Hill City Council  NSW URS  CEO 
23 Burwood Council  NSW UDS  CEO 
24 Byron Shire Council  NSW URS   
25 Cabonne Shire Council  NSW RAV   
26 Camden Council  NSW UFS   
27 Campbelltown City Council  NSW UFV  CEO 
28 Canada Bay Council  NSW UDM   
29 Canterbury City Council  NSW UDV   
30 Carrathool Shire Council  NSW RAM   
31 Cessnock City Council  NSW URM   
32 Clarence Valley Council NSW URS   
33 Cobar Shire Council  NSW RTL  CEO 
34 Coffs Harbour City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
35 Coolamon Shire Council  NSW RAM   
36 Cooma-Monaro Shire Council  NSW RAL   
37 Coonamble Shire Council NSW RAL   
38 Cootamundra Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
39 Corowa Shire Council  NSW RAL   
40 Cowra Shire Council  NSW RAV   
41 Deniliquin Council  NSW URS Mayor  CEO 
42 Dubbo City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
43 Dungog Shire Council  NSW RAL Mayor  CEO 
44 Eurobodalla Shire Council  NSW URM  CEO 
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 Name of the LGA Jurisdiction ACLG Responded By 
45 Fairfield City Council  NSW UDV  CEO 
46 Forbes Shire Council  NSW RAV  CEO 
47 Gilgandra Shire Council  NSW RAM   
48 Glen Innes Severn Council  NSW RAV   
49 Gloucester Shire Council  NSW RAM Mayor  CEO 
50 Gosford City Council  NSW UFV   
51 Goulburn Mulwaree Council NSW URS  CEO 
52 Great Lakes Council  NSW URS   
53 Greater Hume Shire Council NSW RAM   
54 Greater Queanbeyan City Council NSW URS Mayor   
55 Greater Taree City Council  NSW URM Mayor  CEO 
56 Griffith City Council  NSW URS Mayor  CEO 
57 Gundagai Shire Council  NSW RAM  CEO 
58 Gunnedah Shire Council  NSW RAV   
59 Guyra Shire Council  NSW RAM   
60 Gwydir Shire Council NSW RAL  CEO 
61 Harden Shire Council  NSW RAM  CEO 
62 Hawkesbury City Council  NSW UFM   
63 Hay Shire Council  NSW RAM   
64 Holroyd City Council  NSW UDL   
65 Hornsby Shire Council  NSW UFV  CEO 
66 Hunter's Hill Council  NSW UDS   
67 Hurstville City Council  NSW UDM  CEO 
68 Inverell Shire Council  NSW RAV   
69 Junee Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
70 Kempsey Shire Council  NSW URS   
71 Kiama Municipal Council  NSW URS Mayor   
72 Kogarah City Council  NSW UDM   
73 Ku-ring-gai Council  NSW UDL  CEO 
74 Kyogle Council  NSW RAV   
75 Lachlan Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
76 Lake Macquarie City Council  NSW URV  CEO 
77 Lane Cove Municipal Council  NSW UDM   
78 Leeton Shire Council  NSW RAV   
79 Leichhardt Municipal Council  NSW UDM   
80 Lismore City Council  NSW URM Mayor   
81 Lithgow City Council  NSW URS   
82 Liverpool City Council  NSW UFL   
83 Liverpool Plains Shire Council NSW RAL Mayor   
84 Lockhart Shire Council  NSW RAM  CEO 
85 Maitland City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
86 Manly Council  NSW UDM   
87 Marrickville Council  NSW UDL   
88 Mid-Western Regional Council NSW RAV   
89 Moree Plains Shire Council  NSW RAV  CEO 
90 Mosman Municipal Council  NSW UDS   
91 Murray Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
 292 
 
 Name of the LGA Jurisdiction ACLG Responded By 
92 Murrumbidgee Shire Council  NSW RAM   
93 Muswellbrook Shire Council  NSW RAV   
94 Nambucca Shire Council  NSW RAV Mayor  CEO 
95 Narrabri Shire Council  NSW RAV Mayor   
96 Narrandera Shire Council  NSW RAL   
97 Narromine Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
98 Newcastle City Council  NSW URV  CEO 
99 North Sydney Council  NSW UDM  CEO 
100 Oberon Council  NSW RAM   
101 Orange City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
102 Palerang Council NSW RAV   
103 Parkes Shire Council  NSW RAL   
104 Parramatta City Council  NSW UDV   
105 Penrith City Council  NSW UFV  CEO 
106 Pittwater Council  NSW UDM   
107 Port Macquarie Hastings Council  NSW URL   
108 Port Stephens Council  NSW URM   
109 Randwick City Council  NSW UDL   
110 Richmond Valley Council  NSW URS   
111 Rockdale City Council  NSW UDL   
112 Ryde City Council  NSW UDL  CEO 
113 Shellharbour City Council  NSW URM  CEO 
114 Shoalhaven City Council  NSW URL Mayor  CEO 
115 Singleton Council  NSW RAV   
116 Snowy River Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
117 Strathfield Municipal Council  NSW UDS   
118 Sutherland Shire Council  NSW UDV Mayor   
119 Sydney City Council  NSW UCC  CEO 
120 Temora Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
121 Tenterfield Shire Council  NSW RAL   
122 Tumbarumba Shire Council  NSW RAM   
123 Tumut Shire Council  NSW RAV  CEO 
124 Tweed Shire Council  NSW URM   
125 Upper Hunter Shire Council NSW RAV  CEO 
126 Upper Lachlan Council NSW RAL   
127 Uralla Shire Council  NSW RAL Mayor  CEO 
128 Wagga Wagga City Council  NSW URM Mayor   
129 Wakool Shire Council  NSW RAL  CEO 
130 Walcha Council  NSW RAM   
131 Walgett Shire Council  NSW RAL   
132 Warren Shire Council  NSW RAM   
133 Warringah Council  NSW UDV  CEO 
134 Warrumbungle Shire Council NSW RAL   
135 Waverley Council  NSW UDM   
136 Weddin Shire Council  NSW RAM  CEO 
137 Wellington Council  NSW RAL   
138 Wentworth Shire Council  NSW RAL Mayor   
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 Name of the LGA Jurisdiction ACLG Responded By 
139 Willoughby City Council  NSW UDM  CEO 
140 Wingecarribee Shire Council  NSW URM   
141 Wollondilly Shire Council  NSW UFM   
142 Wollongong City Council  NSW URV  CEO 
143 Woollahra Municipal Council  NSW UDM   
144 Wyong Shire Council  NSW UFL   
145 Yass Shire Council  NSW RAL   
146 Young Shire Council NSW RAV   
147 The Hills Shire Council NSW UFV Mayor  CEO 
148 Alpine Shire Council VIC RAV   
149 Ararat Rural City Council VIC URS Mayor   
150 Banyule City Council VIC UDL   
151 Bass Coast Shire Council VIC UFS Mayor  CEO 
152 Baw Baw Shire Council VIC URM  CEO 
153 Bayside City Council VIC UDL   
154 Benalla Rural City Council VIC RAV   
155 Borough of Queenscliffe VIC URS   
156 Brimbank City Council VIC UDV   
157 Buloke Shire Council VIC RAL Mayor   
158 Campaspe Shire Council VIC URM   
159 Cardinia Shire Council VIC UFM   
160 Central Goldfield Shire Council VIC RAV   
161 City of Ballarat VIC URL Mayor  CEO 
162 City of Boroondara VIC UDV   
163 City of Casey VIC UFV   
164 City of Greater Bendigo VIC URL   
165 City of Greater Dandenong VIC UDV  CEO 
166 City of Greater Geelong VIC URV  CEO 
167 City of Port Phillip VIC UDL   
168 City of Whittlesea  VIC UFL   
169 City of Wodonga VIC URM   
170 Colac Otway Shire Council VIC URS   
171 Corangamite Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor  CEO 
172 Darebin  City Council VIC UDV  CEO 
173 East Gippsland Shire Council VIC URM  CEO 
174 Frankston City Council VIC UDL   
175 Gannawarra Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor   
176 Glen Eira City Council VIC UDV  CEO 
177 Glenelg Shire Council VIC URS   
178 Golden Plains Shire Council  VIC RAV   
179 Greater Shepperton City Council VIC URM  CEO 
180 Hepburn Shire Council VIC RAV   
181 Hindmarsh Shire Council VIC RAL   
182 Hobsons Bay City Council VIC UDL   
183 Horsham Rural City Council VIC URS  CEO 
184 Hume City Council  VIC UFV Mayor  CEO 
185 Indigo Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor   
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 Name of the LGA Jurisdiction ACLG Responded By 
186 Kingston City Council VIC UDV  CEO 
187 Knox City Council  VIC UDV  CEO 
188 Latrobe City Council VIC URL   
189 Loddon Shire Council VIC RAL  CEO 
190 Macedon Ranges Shire Council VIC URM   
191 Manningham City Council VIC UDL   
192 Mansfield Shire Council VIC RAL Mayor  CEO 
193 Maribyrnong City Council VIC UDM   
194 Maroondah City Council VIC UDL   
195 Melbourne City Council VIC UCC   
196 Melton Shire Council VIC UFM  CEO 
197 Mildura Rural City Council VIC URM   
198 Mitchell Shire Council VIC URS  CEO 
199 Moira Shire Council VIC URS   
200 Monash City Council VIC UDV   
201 Moonee Valley City Council VIC UDL  CEO 
202 Moorabool Shire Council VIC URS   
203 Moreland City Council VIC UDV  CEO 
204 Morington Peninsula City Coincil VIC UFL Mayor  CEO 
205 Mount Alexander Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor   
206 Moyne Shire Council VIC RAV  CEO 
207 Murrindindi Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor  CEO 
208 Nillumbik Shire Council VIC UFM  CEO 
209 Northern Grampians Shire Council VIC RAV Mayor   
210 Pyrenees Shire Council VIC RAL   
211 Rural City of Wangaratta VIC URS   
212 South GippslandShire Council VIC URS Mayor   
213 Southern Grampian Shire Council VIC RAV   
214 Stonnington City Council VIC UDL  CEO 
215 Strathbogie Shire Council VIC UDL Mayor   
216 Surf Coast Shire Council VIC RSG  CEO 
217 Swan Hill Rural City Council VIC URS  CEO 
218 Towong Shire Council VIC RAL   
219 Warranbool City Council VIC URS   
220 Wellington Shire Council VIC URM   
221 West Wimmera Shire Council VIC RAL   
222 Whitehorse City Council VIC UDV  CEO 
223 Wyndham City Council VIC UFL  CEO 
224 Yarra City Council VIC UDM   
225 Yarra Ranges Shire Council VIC UFV   
226 Yarriambiack Shire Council VIC RAL  CEO 
227 Balonne Shire Council QLD RAM   
228 Banana Shire Council QLD RAV  CEO 
229 Brisbane City Council QLD UCC  CEO 
230 Bundaberg Regional Council QLD URM Mayor  CEO 
231 Burdekin Shire Council QLD RAV   
232 Cairns Regional Council QLD URL   
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233 Cassowary Coast Regional Council QLD RAM Mayor  CEO 
234 Charters Towers Regional Council QLD URS   
235 Cloncurry Shire Council QLD RAM Mayor   
236 Cook Shire Council QLD RTL   
237 Flinders Shire Council QLD RAM   
238 Gladstone Regional Council QLD URS  CEO 
239 Gold Coast City Council QLD URV Mayor   
240 Goondiwindi Regional Council QLD URS   
241 Hinchinbrook Shire Council QLD RAV   
242 Hope Vale Aboriginal Shire Council QLD UFS   
243 Ipswich City Council QLD UFV   
244 Lockhart River Aboriginal Shire 
Council 
QLD RAM   
245 Logan City Council QLD UDV   
246 Longreach Regional Council QLD RAM   
247 Mackay Regional Council QLD URL Mayor  CEO 
248 Mapoon Aboriginal Shire Council QLD UFS   
249 Moreton Bay Regional Council QLD UFL   
250 Mount Isa City Council QLD URS   
251 Murweh Shire Council QLD RTL   
252 Palm Island Aboriginal Shire Council QLD URS   
253 Redland City Council QLD UFL Mayor   
254 Rockhampton Regional Council QLD URM   
255 Toowoomba Regional Council QLD UDL   
256 Torres Shire Council QLD RTL   
257 Torres Strait Island Regional Council QLD RTL   
258 Townsville City Council QLD URL   
259 Whitsunday Regional Council QLD RAV  CEO 
260  Harvey, Shire of WA RSG   
261  Serpentine-Jarrahdale, Shire of WA RSG   
262 Albany, City of WA URS Mayor  CEO 
263 Armadale, City of WA UFM Mayor   
264 Ashburton, Shire of WA RTL  CEO 
265 Augusta-Margaret River, Shire of WA RSG   
266 Bassendean, Town of WA UDS  CEO 
267 Bayswater, City of WA UDM   
268 Belmont, City of WA UDS Mayor   
269 Bridgetown-Greenbushes, Shire of WA RAM   
270 Broome, Shire of WA RTL Mayor   
271 Bunbury, City of WA URS   
272 Busselton, Shire of WA RSG  CEO 
273 Cambridge, Town of WA UDS   
274 Canning, City of WA UDL   
275 Capel, Shire of WA RSG  CEO 
276 Carnarvon, Shire of WA RAL   
277 Chittering, Shire of WA RAM   
278 Claremont, Town of WA UDS   
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279 Cockburn, City of WA UFM   
280 Collie, Shire of WA RAL   
281 Coolgardie, Shire of WA URS   
282 Cottesloe, Town of WA UDS   
283 Dandaragan, Shire of WA RAM   
284 Dardanup, Shire of WA RSG   
285 Denmark, Shire of WA RAM   
286 Derby-West Kimberley, Shire of WA RTL   
287 Donnybrook-Balingup, Shire of WA RAM   
288 East Fremantle, Town of WA UDS   
289 East Pilbara, Shire of WA RTL   
290 Esperance, Shire of WA RAV  CEO 
291 Fremantle, City of WA UDS Mayor   
292 Geraldton-Greenough, City of WA URS Mayor   
293 Gingin, Shire of WA RAM   
294 Gosnells, City of WA UFL   
295 Irwin, Shire of WA RAM  CEO 
296 Joondalup, City of WA UFV   
297 Kalamunda, Shire of WA UFM   
298 Kalgoorlie-Boulder, City of WA URM   
299 Katanning, Shire of WA RAM Mayor   
300 Kojonup, Shire of WA RAM   
301 Kwinana, Town of WA UFS   
302 Mandurah, City of WA URM  CEO 
303 Manjimup, Shire of WA RAV   
304 Melville, City of WA UDL  CEO 
305 Merredin, Shire of WA RAM  CEO 
306 Moora, Shire of WA RAM  CEO 
307 Mosman Park, Town of WA UDS   
308 Mundaring, Shire of WA UFM   
309 Murray, Shire of WA RSG   
310 Narrogin, Town of WA URS   
311 Nedlands, City of WA UDS   
312 Northam, Shire of WA RAM   
313 Northampton, Shire of WA RAM   
314 Peppermint Grove, Shire of WA UDS   
315 Perth, City of WA UCC Mayor  CEO 
316 Plantagenet, Shire of WA RAM Mayor  CEO 
317 Port Hedland, Town of WA URS   
318 Rockingham, City of WA UFM  CEO 
319 Roebourne, Shire of WA URS   
320 South Perth, City of WA UDM   
321 Stirling, City of WA UDV   
322 Subiaco, City of WA UDS   
323 Swan, City of WA UFL  CEO 
324 Toodyay, Shire of WA RAM   
325 Victoria Park, Town of WA UDS   
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326 Vincent, Town of WA UDS  CEO 
327 Wanneroo, City of WA UFM  CEO 
328 Waroona, Shire of WA RAM Mayor   
329 Wyndham-East Kimberley, Shire of WA RTL  CEO 
330 Yilgarn, Shire of WA RAM  CEO 
331 York, Shire of WA RAM  CEO 
332 Adelaide City Council SA UCC Mayor   
333 Adelaide Hills Council SA UFM  CEO 
334 Alexandrina Council SA UFS  CEO 
335 Barossa Council SA RSG   
336 Berri Barmera Council SA RAV  CEO 
337 Campbelltown City Council SA UDM   
338 City of Burnside SA UDM   
339 City of Charles Sturt SA UDL   
340 City of Holdfast Bay SA UDM   
341 City of Marion SA UDL   
342 City of Mitcham SA UDM  CEO 
343 City of Mount Gambier SA URS   
344 City of Norwood Payneham and St 
Peters 
SA UDM   
345 City of Onkaparinga SA URS   
346 City of Playford SA UFM   
347 City of Port Adelaide Enfield SA UDL   
348 City of Port Lincoln SA URS   
349 City of Prospect SA UDS Mayor   
350 City of Salisbury SA UDL Mayor   
351 City of Tea Tree Gully SA UDL  CEO 
352 City of Unley SA UDM  CEO 
353 City of Victor Harbor SA RAL Mayor  CEO 
354 City of West Torrens SA UDM  CEO 
355 Clare and Gilbert Valleys Council SA RAL  CEO 
356 Coorong District Council SA RAL   
357 Corporation of the City of Whyalla SA URS   
358 Corporation of the Town of Walkerville SA UDS   
359 District Council of Barunga West SA RAM  CEO 
360 District Council of Ceduna SA RAM   
361 District Council of Coober Pedy SA URS   
362 District Council of Copper Coast SA RAV  CEO 
363 District Council of Grant SA RAL   
364 District Council of Lower Eyre 
Peninsula 
SA RAM   
365 District Council of Loxton Waikerie SA RAV  CEO 
366 District Council of Mallala SA RAL   
367 District Council of Mount Barker SA URS   
368 District Council of Mount Remarkable SA RAM   
369 District Council of Peterborough SA RAM   
370 District Council of Tumby Bay SA RAM  CEO 
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371 District Council of Yankalilla SA RAM Mayor  CEO 
372 District Council of Yorke Peninsula SA RAV   
373 Kangaroo Island Council SA RAM   
374 Kingston District Council SA RAM   
375 Light Regional Council SA RAL   
376 Mid Murray Council SA RAL Mayor   
377 Municipal Council of Roxby Downs SA URS  CEO 
378 Naracoorte Lucindale Council SA RSG   
379 Northern Areas Council SA RAL   
380 Port Augusta City Council SA URS  CEO 
381 Port Pirie Regional Council SA RAV   
382 Regional Council of Goyder SA RAM   
383 Renmark Paringa Council SA RSG   
384 Rural City of Murray Bridge SA RAV Mayor   
385 Southern Mallee District Council SA RAM   
386 Tatiara District Council SA RAL   
387 Town of Gawler SA UFS   
388 Wakefield Regional Council SA RAL   
389 Wattle Range Council SA RAV   
390 Break O' Day Council TAS RAL   
391 Brighton Council TAS URS  CEO 
392 Burnie City Council TAS URS   
393 Central Coast Council TAS URS   
394 Central Highlands Council TAS RAM   
395 Circular Head Council TAS RAL  CEO 
396 Clarence City Council TAS URM   
397 Derwent Valley Council TAS RAV   
398 Devonport City Council TAS URS  CEO 
399 Dorest Council TAS RAL  CEO 
400 George Town Council TAS RAL Mayor   
401 Glamorgan Spring Bay Council TAS RAM Mayor   
402 Glenorchy City Council TAS URM Mayor   
403 Hobart City Council TAS UCC Mayor  CEO 
404 Huon Valley Council TAS RAV Mayor   
405 Kentish Council TAS RAL   
406 Kingborough Council TAS URS Mayor   
407 Latrobe Council TAS RAL Mayor   
408 Launceston City Council TAS URM   
409 Meander Valley Council TAS RAV  CEO 
410 Northern Midlands Council TAS RAV  CEO 
411 Sorell Council TAS RSG   
412 Sourthern Midlands Council TAS RAL   
413 Tasman Council TAS RAM  CEO 
414 Waratah-Wynyard Council TAS RAV   
415 West Coast Council TAS RAL   
416 West Tamar Council TAS UFS  CEO 
417 Alice Spring Town Council NT URS   
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418 Darwin City Council  NT UCC   
419 Litchfield Shire Council NT RAV   
420 Palmerston City Council NT UFS  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA Mayor   
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
 DNA DNA DNA  CEO 
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Appendix Three: Survey Covering Letter- Mayor/ Chief Executive Officer 
          School of Accounting 
  
GPO Box 2476 
Melbourne VIC 3001 
Australia 
 
 
 XX August 2011 
 
A Survey on Accountability for Infrastructure Assets in Local Government 
 
Dear Mayor/ Chief Executive Officer, 
Your participation is sought in a project conducted by RMIT University, which investigates 
accountability for infrastructure assets by local governments throughout Australia. The 
project requires the views and perceptions of both Mayors/Shire Presidents and CEOs.  
 
With increased availability of funding to local governments for infrastructure development 
through the Australian government’s 2008 economic stimulus package administered by 
Infrastructure Australia, and now the likely new flood recovery infrastructure repair/rebuilding 
funding, comes greater demands from federal and state government and local communities 
on the accountability of local governments for their infrastructure plans, activities, spending 
and performance.  
 
The findings from this research project will be published in government, professional and 
academic circles and are expected to have an influence on regulators and community 
stakeholders. We will be pleased to send you an advanced summary report on the analysis 
of data from the questions in the questionnaire once ready.  
  
To participate, please complete the enclosed questionnaire. Confidentiality will be assured. 
While we ask you to name your municipality in the questionnaire for purposes of linking your 
responses with further information from your council’s annual report, we will ensure 
anonymity of you and your council since the actual names will not be kept in our data. The 
questionnaire will be destroyed after data is recorded for statistical analysis.  
 
The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Please return it using 
the self-stamped envelope provided by no later than xx August 2011. 
 
This questionnaire has been approved by RMIT University’s Business College Human Ethics 
Committee. A separate statement called ‘invitation to participate’ is attached. To discuss any 
ethical concerns you may have, please free to contact either Pavithra Siriwardhane or 
Kristina Tsoulis- Reay via the details listed below. 
 
We would like to thank you in advance for giving valuable time to this research study. Your 
response is highly valued. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Pavithra Siriwardhane             Dr. Dennis Taylor 
Lecturer in Accounting & Governance          Professor in Accounting & Governance 
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Appendix Four: Invitation to Participate in a Research Project – Mayor  
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PROJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Project Title:  Accountability emphasis on infrastructure assets of Australian local governments: A 
Stakeholder Theory approach 
Investigators: 
Mrs. Pavithra Siriwardhane - PhD Candidate, 03 99251620, pavithra.siriwardhane@rmit.edu.au 
 
Professor Dennis Taylor - Senior Supervisor, School of Accounting, RMIT University,   
03 9925 5765, dennis.taylor@rmit.edu.au  
 
Dear Mayor,  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. This 
information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or ‘plain English’. Please read this 
sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to 
participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.   
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
I am Pavithra Siriwardhane. Accountability emphasis on infrastructure assets of Australian local 
governments: A Stakeholder Theory approach is part of my PhD project. I am being supervised by 
Professor Dennis Taylor. The research project has been approved by the Business Portfolio Human 
Research Ethics Sub Committee. This study is partly funded by Accounting and Finance Association 
of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ). 
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
You are approached to participate in this research since you are the elected mayor of the local council. 
The mayor has a general leadership role as “first citizen” of the local council. This reflects that you are 
the most suitable person to have complete understanding of accountability emphasis of infrastructure 
assets of local governments. 
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
 
This study is carried out in all the states in Australia. The research examines the accountability 
emphasis of infrastructure assets perceived by mayors and senior managers (CEOs) of local councils 
and different stakeholder factors that influence the different accountability dimensions.  
The research questions are: 
1. To what extent is the local government’s type of accountability emphasis concerning 
infrastructure assets, affected by mayors’ and senior managers’ perception of public salience 
and higher-tier government salience? 
2.  Does the infrastructure backlog affect the local government’s type of accountability emphasis 
concerning infrastructure assets? 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
If you agree to participate in the research project, you will be required to complete a questionnaire. 
Please note that completion of the questionnaire implies that you have consented to participate in the 
research. The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
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What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation? 
 
There is not any perceived risk or disadvantages associated with your participation in this project. 
Your involvement in this project is purely voluntary. The information from the questionnaires will 
only be reported in the form of statistical summaries. You, as a participant will remain anonymous in 
publications resulting from the research.  
If you are unduly concerned about your responses to any of the questionnaire items or if you find 
participation in the project distressing, you should contact Professor Dennis Taylor as soon as 
convenient. Professor Dennis Taylor will discuss your concerns with you confidentially and suggest 
appropriate follow-up if necessary.  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
 
Your participation in the project is important for the investigators to understand the perceived 
accountability emphasis of infrastructure assets of senior managers and mayors of local government. 
The information can provide new insights to assist policy makers, mayors, councilors and the 
management in making decisions on infrastructure assets in local governments.  
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
The information obtained through the survey will be used to examine whether there is a relationship 
between stakeholder factor and accountability emphasis of infrastructure assets. All completed and 
returned survey questionnaires (hard copies) and electronic data will be securely stored in the 
researcher’s office at RMIT University, School of Accounting, Melbourne. Data will be kept securely 
at RMIT for period of five years, after the completion of the project before being destroyed. Only the 
two researchers have access to the information for the purpose of data entry and analysis. Any 
information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from harm, (2) a 
court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researcher with written permission. 
Because of the nature of data collection, we are not obtaining written informed consent from you. 
Instead, we assume that you have given consent by your completion and return of the materials. 
    
What are my rights as a participant? 
 
You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time, without prejudice. You have the right to 
have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably identified, and 
provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the participant. You have the right to have any 
questions answered at any time. 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any queries regarding this project, please contact Mrs. Pavithra Siriwardhane or Professor 
Dennis Taylor using the above contact details. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Pavithra Siriwardhane 
PhD Candidate 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Secretary, Portfolio Human Research Ethics Sub Committee, 
Business Portfolio, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  The telephone number is (03) 9925 5594 or email address rdu@rmit.edu.au. 
Details of the complaints procedure are available from  http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints HREC NO: 1000231 
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Appendix Five: Invitation to Participate in a Research Project – CEO 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PROJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Project Title:  Accountability emphasis on infrastructure assets of Australian local governments: A 
Stakeholder Theory approach 
 
Investigators: 
 
Mrs. Pavithra Siriwardhane - PhD Candidate, 03 99251620, pavithra.siriwardhane@rmit.edu.au 
 
Professor Dennis Taylor - Senior Supervisor, School of Accounting, RMIT University,   
03 9925 5765, dennis.taylor@rmit.edu.au  
 
Dear Chief Executive Officer,  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. This 
information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or ‘plain English’. Please read this 
sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to 
participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of the investigators.   
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
I am Pavithra Siriwardhane. Accountability emphasis on infrastructure assets of Australian local 
governments: A Stakeholder Theory approach is part of my PhD project. I am being supervised by 
Professor Dennis Taylor. The research project has been approved by the Business Portfolio Human 
Research Ethics Sub Committee. This study is partly funded by Accounting and Finance Association 
of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ). 
 
Why have you been approached? 
 
You are approached to participate in this research due to your senior management position as the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the local council. The CEO is responsible for managing and achieving the 
goals and strategies endorsed by the council. These reflect that you are the most suitable person to 
have complete understanding of accountability emphasis of infrastructure assets of local governments. 
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
 
This study is carried out in all the states in Australia. The research examines the accountability 
emphasis of infrastructure assets perceived by mayors and senior managers (CEOs) of local councils 
and different stakeholder factors that influence the different accountability dimensions.  
The research questions are: 
1. To what extent is the local government’s type of accountability emphasis concerning 
infrastructure assets, affected by mayors’ and senior managers’ perception of public salience 
and higher-tier government salience? 
2.  Does the infrastructure backlog affect the local government’s type of accountability emphasis 
concerning infrastructure assets? 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
 
If you agree to participate in the research project, you will be required to complete a questionnaire. 
Please note that completion of the questionnaire implies that you have consented to participate in the 
research. The questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
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What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation? 
 
There is not any perceived risk or disadvantages associated with your participation in this project. 
Your involvement in this project is purely voluntary. The information from the questionnaires will 
only be reported in the form of statistical summaries. You, as a participant will remain anonymous in 
publications resulting from the research.  
If you are unduly concerned about your responses to any of the questionnaire items or if you find 
participation in the project distressing, you should contact Professor Dennis Taylor as soon as 
convenient. Professor Dennis Taylor will discuss your concerns with you confidentially and suggest 
appropriate follow-up if necessary.  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
 
Your participation in the project is important for the investigators to understand the perceived 
accountability emphasis of infrastructure assets of senior managers and mayors of local government. 
The information can provide new insights to assist policy makers, mayors, councilors and the 
management in making decisions on infrastructure assets in local governments.  
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
 
The information obtained through the survey will be used to examine whether there is a relationship 
between stakeholder factor and accountability emphasis of infrastructure assets. All completed and 
returned survey questionnaires (hard copies) and electronic data will be securely stored in the 
researcher’s office at RMIT University, School of Accounting, Melbourne. Data will be kept securely 
at RMIT for period of five years, after the completion of the project before being destroyed. Only the 
two researchers have access to the information for the purpose of data entry and analysis. Any 
information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from harm, (2) a 
court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researcher with written permission. 
Because of the nature of data collection, we are not obtaining written informed consent from you. 
Instead, we assume that you have given consent by your completion and return of the materials. 
    
What are my rights as a participant? 
 
You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time, without prejudice. You have the right to 
have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be reliably identified, and 
provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the participant. You have the right to have any 
questions answered at any time. 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
 
If you have any queries regarding this project, please contact Mrs. Pavithra Siriwardhane or Professor 
Dennis Taylor using the above contact details. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Pavithra Siriwardhane 
PhD Candidate 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Secretary, Portfolio Human Research Ethics Sub Committee, 
Business Portfolio, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  The telephone number is (03) 9925 5594 or email address rdu@rmit.edu.au. 
Details of the complaints procedure are available from  http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints HREC NO: 1000231 
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Appendix Six: Frequencies of Renewal/replacement Ratio 
Statistics 
 
 INFRA BACKLOG  
 (Renewal replacement ratio) 
N 
Valid 146 
Missing 75 
Mean .8614 
Median .7250 
Range 4.63 
Percentiles 
25 .4600 
50 .7250 
75 .9725 
 
          INFRA BACKLOG (Renewal/replacement ratio) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
.17 1 .5 .7 .7 
.19 1 .5 .7 1.4 
.20 1 .5 .7 2.1 
.21 1 .5 .7 2.7 
.24 2 .9 1.4 4.1 
.26 2 .9 1.4 5.5 
.30 1 .5 .7 6.2 
.31 1 .5 .7 6.8 
.32 4 1.8 2.7 9.6 
.34 4 1.8 2.7 12.3 
.35 2 .9 1.4 13.7 
.36 1 .5 .7 14.4 
.39 2 .9 1.4 15.8 
.40 5 2.3 3.4 19.2 
.41 1 .5 .7 19.9 
.42 2 .9 1.4 21.2 
.43 1 .5 .7 21.9 
.44 1 .5 .7 22.6 
.45 1 .5 .7 23.3 
.46 4 1.8 2.7 26.0 
.50 1 .5 .7 26.7 
.52 2 .9 1.4 28.1 
.53 4 1.8 2.7 30.8 
.54 1 .5 .7 31.5 
.55 1 .5 .7 32.2 
.56 2 .9 1.4 33.6 
.57 1 .5 .7 34.2 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
.60 3 1.4 2.1 36.3 
.62 1 .5 .7 37.0 
.63 2 .9 1.4 38.4 
.64 1 .5 .7 39.0 
.65 2 .9 1.4 40.4 
.66 2 .9 1.4 41.8 
.67 3 1.4 2.1 43.8 
.68 4 1.8 2.7 46.6 
.69 1 .5 .7 47.3 
.71 2 .9 1.4 48.6 
.72 2 .9 1.4 50.0 
.73 1 .5 .7 50.7 
.74 1 .5 .7 51.4 
.76 1 .5 .7 52.1 
.77 1 .5 .7 52.7 
.80 5 2.3 3.4 56.2 
.82 2 .9 1.4 57.5 
.83 1 .5 .7 58.2 
.84 4 1.8 2.7 61.0 
.86 3 1.4 2.1 63.0 
.88 2 .9 1.4 64.4 
.89 4 1.8 2.7 67.1 
.90 2 .9 1.4 68.5 
.91 3 1.4 2.1 70.5 
.92 4 1.8 2.7 73.3 
.95 2 .9 1.4 74.7 
.97 1 .5 .7 75.3 
.98 1 .5 .7 76.0 
.99 1 .5 .7 76.7 
1.00 1 .5 .7 77.4 
1.02 1 .5 .7 78.1 
1.03 2 .9 1.4 79.5 
1.04 3 1.4 2.1 81.5 
1.07 1 .5 .7 82.2 
1.08 1 .5 .7 82.9 
1.10 1 .5 .7 83.6 
1.11 2 .9 1.4 84.9 
1.13 1 .5 .7 85.6 
1.14 1 .5 .7 86.3 
1.16 1 .5 .7 87.0 
1.21 1 .5 .7 87.7 
1.26 1 .5 .7 88.4 
1.30 2 .9 1.4 89.7 
1.31 1 .5 .7 90.4 
1.32 1 .5 .7 91.1 
1.53 1 .5 .7 91.8 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
1.55 2 .9 1.4 93.2 
1.62 1 .5 .7 93.8 
1.85 1 .5 .7 94.5 
1.89 1 .5 .7 95.2 
1.98 1 .5 .7 95.9 
2.61 1 .5 .7 96.6 
3.09 2 .9 1.4 97.9 
3.78 1 .5 .7 98.6 
3.92 1 .5 .7 99.3 
4.80 1 .5 .7 100.0 
Total 146 66.1 100.0  
Missing  
System 
75 33.9   
Total 221 100   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
